mirror of https://github.com/qt/qtbase.git
1861 lines
70 KiB
C++
1861 lines
70 KiB
C++
// Copyright (C) 2021 The Qt Company Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Qt-Commercial OR LGPL-3.0-only OR GPL-2.0-only OR GPL-3.0-only
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#include "qsslsocket_openssl_symbols_p.h"
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#include "qx509_openssl_p.h"
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#include "qtls_openssl_p.h"
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#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
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#include "qwindowscarootfetcher_p.h"
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#endif
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#include <QtNetwork/private/qsslpresharedkeyauthenticator_p.h>
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#include <QtNetwork/private/qsslcertificate_p.h>
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#include <QtNetwork/private/qocspresponse_p.h>
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#include <QtNetwork/private/qsslsocket_p.h>
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#include <QtNetwork/qsslpresharedkeyauthenticator.h>
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#include <QtCore/qscopedvaluerollback.h>
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#include <QtCore/qscopeguard.h>
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#include <algorithm>
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#include <cstring>
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QT_BEGIN_NAMESPACE
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using namespace Qt::StringLiterals;
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namespace {
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QSsl::AlertLevel tlsAlertLevel(int value)
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{
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using QSsl::AlertLevel;
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if (const char *typeString = q_SSL_alert_type_string(value)) {
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// Documented to return 'W' for warning, 'F' for fatal,
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// 'U' for unknown.
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switch (typeString[0]) {
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case 'W':
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return AlertLevel::Warning;
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case 'F':
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return AlertLevel::Fatal;
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default:;
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}
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}
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return AlertLevel::Unknown;
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}
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QString tlsAlertDescription(int value)
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{
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QString description = QLatin1StringView(q_SSL_alert_desc_string_long(value));
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if (!description.size())
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description = "no description provided"_L1;
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return description;
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}
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QSsl::AlertType tlsAlertType(int value)
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{
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// In case for some reason openssl gives us a value,
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// which is not in our enum actually, we leave it to
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// an application to handle (supposedly they have
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// if or switch-statements).
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return QSsl::AlertType(value & 0xff);
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}
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#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
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QSslCertificate findCertificateToFetch(const QList<QSslError> &tlsErrors, bool checkAIA)
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{
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QSslCertificate certToFetch;
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for (const auto &tlsError : tlsErrors) {
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switch (tlsError.error()) {
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case QSslError::UnableToGetLocalIssuerCertificate: // site presented intermediate cert, but root is unknown
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case QSslError::SelfSignedCertificateInChain: // site presented a complete chain, but root is unknown
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certToFetch = tlsError.certificate();
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break;
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case QSslError::SelfSignedCertificate:
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case QSslError::CertificateBlacklisted:
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//With these errors, we know it will be untrusted so save time by not asking windows
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return QSslCertificate{};
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default:
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#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
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qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << tlsError.errorString();
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#endif
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//TODO - this part is strange.
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break;
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}
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}
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if (checkAIA) {
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const auto extensions = certToFetch.extensions();
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for (const auto &ext : extensions) {
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if (ext.oid() == u"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1") // See RFC 4325
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return certToFetch;
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}
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//The only reason we check this extensions is because an application set trusted
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//CA certificates explicitly, thus technically disabling CA fetch. So, if it's
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//the case and an intermediate certificate is missing, and no extensions is
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//present on the leaf certificate - we fail the handshake immediately.
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return QSslCertificate{};
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}
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return certToFetch;
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}
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#endif // Q_OS_WIN
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} // unnamed namespace
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namespace QTlsPrivate {
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extern "C" {
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int q_X509Callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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{
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if (!ok) {
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// Store the error and at which depth the error was detected.
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using ErrorListPtr = QList<QSslErrorEntry> *;
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ErrorListPtr errors = nullptr;
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// Error list is attached to either 'SSL' or 'X509_STORE'.
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if (X509_STORE *store = q_X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(ctx)) // We try store first:
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errors = ErrorListPtr(q_X509_STORE_get_ex_data(store, 0));
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if (!errors) {
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// Not found on store? Try SSL and its external data then. According to the OpenSSL's
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// documentation:
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//
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// "Whenever a X509_STORE_CTX object is created for the verification of the
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// peer's certificate during a handshake, a pointer to the SSL object is
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// stored into the X509_STORE_CTX object to identify the connection affected.
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// To retrieve this pointer the X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data() function can be
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// used with the correct index."
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const auto offset = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData
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+ TlsCryptographOpenSSL::errorOffsetInExData;
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if (SSL *ssl = static_cast<SSL *>(q_X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(
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ctx, q_SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()))) {
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// We may be in a renegotiation, check if we are inside a call to SSL_read:
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const auto tlsOffset = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData
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+ TlsCryptographOpenSSL::socketOffsetInExData;
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auto tls = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tlsOffset));
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Q_ASSERT(tls);
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if (tls->isInSslRead()) {
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// We are in a renegotiation, make a note of this for later.
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// We'll check that the certificate is the same as the one we got during
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// the initial handshake
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tls->setRenegotiated(true);
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return 1;
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}
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errors = ErrorListPtr(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, offset));
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}
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}
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if (!errors) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Neither X509_STORE, nor SSL contains error list, handshake failure");
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return 0;
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}
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errors->append(X509CertificateOpenSSL::errorEntryFromStoreContext(ctx));
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}
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// Always return OK to allow verification to continue. We handle the
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// errors gracefully after collecting all errors, after verification has
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// completed.
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return 1;
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}
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int q_X509CallbackDirect(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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{
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// Passed to SSL_CTX_set_verify()
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// https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.html
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// Returns 0 to abort verification, 1 to continue.
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// This is a new, experimental verification callback, reporting
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// errors immediately and returning 0 or 1 depending on an application
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// either ignoring or not ignoring verification errors as they come.
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if (!ctx) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Invalid store context (nullptr)");
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ok) {
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// "Whenever a X509_STORE_CTX object is created for the verification of the
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// peer's certificate during a handshake, a pointer to the SSL object is
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// stored into the X509_STORE_CTX object to identify the connection affected.
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// To retrieve this pointer the X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data() function can be
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// used with the correct index."
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SSL *ssl = static_cast<SSL *>(q_X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, q_SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()));
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if (!ssl) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "No external data (SSL) found in X509 store object");
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return 0;
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}
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const auto offset = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData
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+ TlsCryptographOpenSSL::socketOffsetInExData;
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auto crypto = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, offset));
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if (!crypto) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "No external data (TlsCryptographOpenSSL) found in SSL object");
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return 0;
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}
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return crypto->emitErrorFromCallback(ctx);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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static unsigned q_ssl_psk_client_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned max_identity_len,
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unsigned char *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)
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{
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auto *tls = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData));
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return tls->pskClientTlsCallback(hint, identity, max_identity_len, psk, max_psk_len);
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}
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static unsigned int q_ssl_psk_server_callback(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk,
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unsigned int max_psk_len)
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{
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auto *tls = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData));
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Q_ASSERT(tls);
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return tls->pskServerTlsCallback(identity, psk, max_psk_len);
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}
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#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
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static unsigned q_ssl_psk_restore_client(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned max_identity_len,
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unsigned char *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)
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{
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Q_UNUSED(hint);
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Q_UNUSED(identity);
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Q_UNUSED(max_identity_len);
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Q_UNUSED(psk);
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Q_UNUSED(max_psk_len);
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#ifdef QT_DEBUG
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auto tls = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData));
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Q_ASSERT(tls);
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Q_ASSERT(tls->d);
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Q_ASSERT(tls->d->tlsMode() == QSslSocket::SslClientMode);
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#endif
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unsigned retVal = 0;
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// Let developers opt-in to having the normal PSK callback get called for TLS 1.3
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// PSK (which works differently in a few ways, and is called at the start of every connection).
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// When they do opt-in we just call the old callback from here.
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if (qEnvironmentVariableIsSet("QT_USE_TLS_1_3_PSK"))
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retVal = q_ssl_psk_client_callback(ssl, hint, identity, max_identity_len, psk, max_psk_len);
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q_SSL_set_psk_client_callback(ssl, &q_ssl_psk_client_callback);
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return retVal;
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}
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static int q_ssl_psk_use_session_callback(SSL *ssl, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char **id,
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size_t *idlen, SSL_SESSION **sess)
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{
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Q_UNUSED(md);
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Q_UNUSED(id);
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Q_UNUSED(idlen);
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Q_UNUSED(sess);
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#ifdef QT_DEBUG
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auto *tls = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData));
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Q_ASSERT(tls);
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Q_ASSERT(tls->d);
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Q_ASSERT(tls->d->tlsMode() == QSslSocket::SslClientMode);
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#endif
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// Temporarily rebind the psk because it will be called next. The function will restore it.
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q_SSL_set_psk_client_callback(ssl, &q_ssl_psk_restore_client);
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return 1; // need to return 1 or else "the connection setup fails."
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}
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int q_ssl_sess_set_new_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
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{
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if (!ssl) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Invalid SSL (nullptr)");
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return 0;
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}
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if (!session) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Invalid SSL_SESSION (nullptr)");
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return 0;
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}
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auto *tls = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData));
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Q_ASSERT(tls);
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return tls->handleNewSessionTicket(ssl);
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}
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#endif // TLS1_3_VERSION
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#endif // !OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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#if QT_CONFIG(ocsp)
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int qt_OCSP_status_server_callback(SSL *ssl, void *ocspRequest)
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{
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Q_UNUSED(ocspRequest);
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if (!ssl)
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
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auto crypto = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData));
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if (!crypto)
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
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Q_ASSERT(crypto->d);
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Q_ASSERT(crypto->d->tlsMode() == QSslSocket::SslServerMode);
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const QByteArray &response = crypto->ocspResponseDer;
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Q_ASSERT(response.size());
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unsigned char *derCopy = static_cast<unsigned char *>(q_OPENSSL_malloc(size_t(response.size())));
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if (!derCopy)
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
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std::copy(response.data(), response.data() + response.size(), derCopy);
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// We don't check the return value: internally OpenSSL simply assigns the
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// pointer (it assumes it now owns this memory btw!) and the length.
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q_SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, derCopy, response.size());
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
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}
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#endif // ocsp
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void qt_AlertInfoCallback(const SSL *connection, int from, int value)
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{
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// Passed to SSL_set_info_callback()
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// https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/SSL_set_info_callback.html
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if (!connection) {
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#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Invalid 'connection' parameter (nullptr)");
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#endif // QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
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return;
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}
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const auto offset = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData
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+ TlsCryptographOpenSSL::socketOffsetInExData;
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auto crypto = static_cast<TlsCryptographOpenSSL *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(connection, offset));
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if (!crypto) {
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// SSL_set_ex_data can fail:
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#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "No external data (socket backend) found for parameter 'connection'");
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#endif // QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
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return;
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}
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if (!(from & SSL_CB_ALERT)) {
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// We only want to know about alerts (at least for now).
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return;
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}
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if (from & SSL_CB_WRITE)
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crypto->alertMessageSent(value);
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else
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crypto->alertMessageReceived(value);
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}
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} // extern "C"
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#if QT_CONFIG(ocsp)
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namespace {
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QSslError::SslError qt_OCSP_response_status_to_SslError(long code)
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{
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switch (code) {
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case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST:
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return QSslError::OcspMalformedRequest;
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case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR:
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return QSslError::OcspInternalError;
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case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER:
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return QSslError::OcspTryLater;
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case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED:
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return QSslError::OcspSigRequred;
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case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED:
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return QSslError::OcspUnauthorized;
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case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL:
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default:
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return {};
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}
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Q_UNREACHABLE();
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}
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QOcspRevocationReason qt_OCSP_revocation_reason(int reason)
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{
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switch (reason) {
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::None;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::Unspecified;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::KeyCompromise;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::CACompromise;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::AffiliationChanged;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::Superseded;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::CessationOfOperation;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::CertificateHold;
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case OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::RemoveFromCRL;
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default:
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return QOcspRevocationReason::None;
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}
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Q_UNREACHABLE();
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}
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bool qt_OCSP_certificate_match(OCSP_SINGLERESP *singleResponse, X509 *peerCert, X509 *issuer)
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{
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// OCSP_basic_verify does verify that the responder is legit, the response is
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// correctly signed, CertID is correct. But it does not know which certificate
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// we were presented with by our peer, so it does not check if it's a response
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// for our peer's certificate.
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Q_ASSERT(singleResponse && peerCert && issuer);
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const OCSP_CERTID *certId = q_OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(singleResponse); // Does not increment refcount.
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if (!certId) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "A SingleResponse without CertID");
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return false;
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}
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ASN1_OBJECT *md = nullptr;
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ASN1_INTEGER *reportedSerialNumber = nullptr;
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const int result = q_OCSP_id_get0_info(nullptr, &md, nullptr, &reportedSerialNumber, const_cast<OCSP_CERTID *>(certId));
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if (result != 1 || !md || !reportedSerialNumber) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Failed to extract a hash and serial number from CertID structure");
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return false;
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}
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if (!q_X509_get_serialNumber(peerCert)) {
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// Is this possible at all? But we have to check this,
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// ASN1_INTEGER_cmp (called from OCSP_id_cmp) dereferences
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// without any checks at all.
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "No serial number in peer's ceritificate");
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return false;
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}
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const int nid = q_OBJ_obj2nid(md);
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if (nid == NID_undef) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Unknown hash algorithm in CertID");
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return false;
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}
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const EVP_MD *digest = q_EVP_get_digestbynid(nid); // Does not increment refcount.
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if (!digest) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend) << "No digest for nid" << nid;
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return false;
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}
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OCSP_CERTID *recreatedId = q_OCSP_cert_to_id(digest, peerCert, issuer);
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if (!recreatedId) {
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qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Failed to re-create CertID");
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return false;
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}
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const QSharedPointer<OCSP_CERTID> guard(recreatedId, q_OCSP_CERTID_free);
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|
|
|
if (q_OCSP_id_cmp(const_cast<OCSP_CERTID *>(certId), recreatedId)) {
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend, "Certificate ID mismatch");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
// Bingo!
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // unnamed namespace
|
|
#endif // ocsp
|
|
|
|
TlsCryptographOpenSSL::~TlsCryptographOpenSSL()
|
|
{
|
|
destroySslContext();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::init(QSslSocket *qObj, QSslSocketPrivate *dObj)
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(qObj);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(dObj);
|
|
q = qObj;
|
|
d = dObj;
|
|
|
|
ocspResponses.clear();
|
|
ocspResponseDer.clear();
|
|
|
|
systemOrSslErrorDetected = false;
|
|
handshakeInterrupted = false;
|
|
|
|
fetchAuthorityInformation = false;
|
|
caToFetch.reset();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::checkSettingSslContext(std::shared_ptr<QSslContext> tlsContext)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sslContextPointer)
|
|
sslContextPointer = std::move(tlsContext);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::shared_ptr<QSslContext> TlsCryptographOpenSSL::sslContext() const
|
|
{
|
|
return sslContextPointer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QList<QSslError> TlsCryptographOpenSSL::tlsErrors() const
|
|
{
|
|
return sslErrors;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::startClientEncryption()
|
|
{
|
|
if (!initSslContext()) {
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Unable to init SSL Context: %1").arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start connecting. This will place outgoing data in the BIO, so we
|
|
// follow up with calling transmit().
|
|
startHandshake();
|
|
transmit();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::startServerEncryption()
|
|
{
|
|
if (!initSslContext()) {
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Unable to init SSL Context: %1").arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start connecting. This will place outgoing data in the BIO, so we
|
|
// follow up with calling transmit().
|
|
startHandshake();
|
|
transmit();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool TlsCryptographOpenSSL::startHandshake()
|
|
{
|
|
// Check if the connection has been established. Get all errors from the
|
|
// verification stage.
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
using ScopedBool = QScopedValueRollback<bool>;
|
|
|
|
if (inSetAndEmitError)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
const auto mode = d->tlsMode();
|
|
|
|
pendingFatalAlert = false;
|
|
errorsReportedFromCallback = false;
|
|
QList<QSslErrorEntry> lastErrors;
|
|
q_SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData + errorOffsetInExData, &lastErrors);
|
|
|
|
// SSL_set_ex_data can fail, but see the callback's code - we handle this there.
|
|
q_SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData + socketOffsetInExData, this);
|
|
q_SSL_set_info_callback(ssl, qt_AlertInfoCallback);
|
|
|
|
int result = (mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode) ? q_SSL_connect(ssl) : q_SSL_accept(ssl);
|
|
q_SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData + errorOffsetInExData, nullptr);
|
|
// Note, unlike errors as external data on SSL object, we do not unset
|
|
// a callback/ex-data if alert notifications are enabled: an alert can
|
|
// arrive after the handshake, for example, this happens when the server
|
|
// does not find a ClientCert or does not like it.
|
|
|
|
if (!lastErrors.isEmpty() || errorsReportedFromCallback)
|
|
storePeerCertificates();
|
|
|
|
// storePeerCertificate() if called above - would update the
|
|
// configuration with peer's certificates.
|
|
auto configuration = q->sslConfiguration();
|
|
if (!errorsReportedFromCallback) {
|
|
const auto &peerCertificateChain = configuration.peerCertificateChain();
|
|
for (const auto ¤tError : std::as_const(lastErrors)) {
|
|
emit q->peerVerifyError(QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::openSSLErrorToQSslError(currentError.code,
|
|
peerCertificateChain.value(currentError.depth)));
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
errorList << lastErrors;
|
|
|
|
// Connection aborted during handshake phase.
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// Check if we're encrypted or not.
|
|
if (result <= 0) {
|
|
switch (q_SSL_get_error(ssl, result)) {
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
// The handshake is not yet complete.
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
QString errorString = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::msgErrorsDuringHandshake();
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::startHandshake: error!" << errorString;
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslHandshakeFailedError, errorString);
|
|
if (pendingFatalAlert) {
|
|
trySendFatalAlert();
|
|
pendingFatalAlert = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
q->abort();
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// store peer certificate chain
|
|
storePeerCertificates();
|
|
|
|
// Start translating errors.
|
|
QList<QSslError> errors;
|
|
|
|
// Note, the storePeerCerificates() probably updated the configuration at this point.
|
|
configuration = q->sslConfiguration();
|
|
// Check the whole chain for blacklisting (including root, as we check for subjectInfo and issuer)
|
|
const auto &peerCertificateChain = configuration.peerCertificateChain();
|
|
for (const QSslCertificate &cert : peerCertificateChain) {
|
|
if (QSslCertificatePrivate::isBlacklisted(cert)) {
|
|
QSslError error(QSslError::CertificateBlacklisted, cert);
|
|
errors << error;
|
|
emit q->peerVerifyError(error);
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const bool doVerifyPeer = configuration.peerVerifyMode() == QSslSocket::VerifyPeer
|
|
|| (configuration.peerVerifyMode() == QSslSocket::AutoVerifyPeer
|
|
&& mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode);
|
|
|
|
#if QT_CONFIG(ocsp)
|
|
// For now it's always QSslSocket::SslClientMode - initSslContext() will bail out early,
|
|
// if it's enabled in QSslSocket::SslServerMode. This can change.
|
|
if (!configuration.peerCertificate().isNull() && configuration.ocspStaplingEnabled() && doVerifyPeer) {
|
|
if (!checkOcspStatus()) {
|
|
if (ocspErrors.isEmpty()) {
|
|
{
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslHandshakeFailedError, ocspErrorDescription);
|
|
}
|
|
q->abort();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const QSslError &error : ocspErrors) {
|
|
errors << error;
|
|
emit q->peerVerifyError(error);
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // ocsp
|
|
|
|
// Check the peer certificate itself. First try the subject's common name
|
|
// (CN) as a wildcard, then try all alternate subject name DNS entries the
|
|
// same way.
|
|
if (!configuration.peerCertificate().isNull()) {
|
|
// but only if we're a client connecting to a server
|
|
// if we're the server, don't check CN
|
|
const auto verificationPeerName = d->verificationName();
|
|
if (mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode) {
|
|
QString peerName = (verificationPeerName.isEmpty () ? q->peerName() : verificationPeerName);
|
|
|
|
if (!isMatchingHostname(configuration.peerCertificate(), peerName)) {
|
|
// No matches in common names or alternate names.
|
|
QSslError error(QSslError::HostNameMismatch, configuration.peerCertificate());
|
|
errors << error;
|
|
emit q->peerVerifyError(error);
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// No peer certificate presented. Report as error if the socket
|
|
// expected one.
|
|
if (doVerifyPeer) {
|
|
QSslError error(QSslError::NoPeerCertificate);
|
|
errors << error;
|
|
emit q->peerVerifyError(error);
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Translate errors from the error list into QSslErrors.
|
|
errors.reserve(errors.size() + errorList.size());
|
|
for (const auto &error : std::as_const(errorList))
|
|
errors << X509CertificateOpenSSL::openSSLErrorToQSslError(error.code, peerCertificateChain.value(error.depth));
|
|
|
|
if (!errors.isEmpty()) {
|
|
sslErrors = errors;
|
|
#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
|
|
const bool fetchEnabled = QSslSocketPrivate::rootCertOnDemandLoadingSupported()
|
|
&& d->isRootsOnDemandAllowed();
|
|
// !fetchEnabled is a special case scenario, when we potentially have a missing
|
|
// intermediate certificate and a recoverable chain, but on demand cert loading
|
|
// was disabled by setCaCertificates call. For this scenario we check if "Authority
|
|
// Information Access" is present - wincrypt can deal with such certificates.
|
|
QSslCertificate certToFetch;
|
|
if (doVerifyPeer && !d->verifyErrorsHaveBeenIgnored())
|
|
certToFetch = findCertificateToFetch(sslErrors, !fetchEnabled);
|
|
|
|
//Skip this if not using system CAs, or if the SSL errors are configured in advance to be ignorable
|
|
if (!certToFetch.isNull()) {
|
|
fetchAuthorityInformation = !fetchEnabled;
|
|
//Windows desktop versions starting from vista ship with minimal set of roots and download on demand
|
|
//from the windows update server CA roots that are trusted by MS. It also can fetch a missing intermediate
|
|
//in case "Authority Information Access" extension is present.
|
|
//
|
|
//However, this is only transparent if using WinINET - we have to trigger it
|
|
//ourselves.
|
|
fetchCaRootForCert(certToFetch);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // Q_OS_WIN
|
|
if (!checkSslErrors())
|
|
return false;
|
|
// A slot, attached to sslErrors signal can call
|
|
// abort/close/disconnetFromHost/etc; no need to
|
|
// continue handshake then.
|
|
if (q->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState)
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sslErrors.clear();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
continueHandshake();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::enableHandshakeContinuation()
|
|
{
|
|
handshakeInterrupted = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::cancelCAFetch()
|
|
{
|
|
fetchAuthorityInformation = false;
|
|
caToFetch.reset();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::continueHandshake()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(plainSocket);
|
|
|
|
const auto mode = d->tlsMode();
|
|
|
|
// if we have a max read buffer size, reset the plain socket's to match
|
|
if (const auto maxSize = d->maxReadBufferSize())
|
|
plainSocket->setReadBufferSize(maxSize);
|
|
|
|
if (q_SSL_session_reused(ssl))
|
|
QTlsBackend::setPeerSessionShared(d, true);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef QT_DECRYPT_SSL_TRAFFIC
|
|
if (q_SSL_get_session(ssl)) {
|
|
size_t master_key_len = q_SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(q_SSL_get_session(ssl), nullptr, 0);
|
|
size_t client_random_len = q_SSL_get_client_random(ssl, nullptr, 0);
|
|
QByteArray masterKey(int(master_key_len), Qt::Uninitialized); // Will not overflow
|
|
QByteArray clientRandom(int(client_random_len), Qt::Uninitialized); // Will not overflow
|
|
|
|
q_SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(q_SSL_get_session(ssl),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(masterKey.data()),
|
|
masterKey.size());
|
|
q_SSL_get_client_random(ssl, reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(clientRandom.data()),
|
|
clientRandom.size());
|
|
|
|
QByteArray debugLineClientRandom("CLIENT_RANDOM ");
|
|
debugLineClientRandom.append(clientRandom.toHex().toUpper());
|
|
debugLineClientRandom.append(" ");
|
|
debugLineClientRandom.append(masterKey.toHex().toUpper());
|
|
debugLineClientRandom.append("\n");
|
|
|
|
QString sslKeyFile = QDir::tempPath() + "/qt-ssl-keys"_L1;
|
|
QFile file(sslKeyFile);
|
|
if (!file.open(QIODevice::Append))
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend) << "could not open file" << sslKeyFile << "for appending";
|
|
if (!file.write(debugLineClientRandom))
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend) << "could not write to file" << sslKeyFile;
|
|
file.close();
|
|
} else {
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "could not decrypt SSL traffic");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // QT_DECRYPT_SSL_TRAFFIC
|
|
|
|
const auto &configuration = q->sslConfiguration();
|
|
// Cache this SSL session inside the QSslContext
|
|
if (!(configuration.testSslOption(QSsl::SslOptionDisableSessionSharing))) {
|
|
if (!sslContextPointer->cacheSession(ssl)) {
|
|
sslContextPointer.reset(); // we could not cache the session
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Cache the session for permanent usage as well
|
|
if (!(configuration.testSslOption(QSsl::SslOptionDisableSessionPersistence))) {
|
|
if (!sslContextPointer->sessionASN1().isEmpty())
|
|
QTlsBackend::setSessionAsn1(d, sslContextPointer->sessionASN1());
|
|
QTlsBackend::setSessionLifetimeHint(d, sslContextPointer->sessionTicketLifeTimeHint());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
|
|
QTlsBackend::setAlpnStatus(d, sslContextPointer->npnContext().status);
|
|
if (sslContextPointer->npnContext().status == QSslConfiguration::NextProtocolNegotiationUnsupported) {
|
|
// we could not agree -> be conservative and use HTTP/1.1
|
|
// T.P.: I have to admit, this is a really strange notion of 'conservative',
|
|
// given the protocol-neutral nature of ALPN/NPN.
|
|
QTlsBackend::setNegotiatedProtocol(d, QByteArrayLiteral("http/1.1"));
|
|
} else {
|
|
const unsigned char *proto = nullptr;
|
|
unsigned int proto_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
q_SSL_get0_alpn_selected(ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
|
|
if (proto_len && mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode) {
|
|
// Client does not have a callback that sets it ...
|
|
QTlsBackend::setAlpnStatus(d, QSslConfiguration::NextProtocolNegotiationNegotiated);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!proto_len) { // Test if NPN was more lucky ...
|
|
q_SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(ssl, &proto, &proto_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (proto_len)
|
|
QTlsBackend::setNegotiatedProtocol(d, QByteArray(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(proto), proto_len));
|
|
else
|
|
QTlsBackend::setNegotiatedProtocol(d,{});
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
|
|
if (mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *key;
|
|
if (q_SSL_get_server_tmp_key(ssl, &key))
|
|
QTlsBackend::setEphemeralKey(d, QSslKey(key, QSsl::PublicKey));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d->setEncrypted(true);
|
|
emit q->encrypted();
|
|
if (d->isAutoStartingHandshake() && d->isPendingClose()) {
|
|
d->setPendingClose(false);
|
|
q->disconnectFromHost();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
using ScopedBool = QScopedValueRollback<bool>;
|
|
|
|
if (inSetAndEmitError)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
// If we don't have any SSL context, don't bother transmitting.
|
|
if (!ssl)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
auto &writeBuffer = d->tlsWriteBuffer();
|
|
auto &buffer = d->tlsBuffer();
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(plainSocket);
|
|
bool &emittedBytesWritten = d->tlsEmittedBytesWritten();
|
|
|
|
bool transmitting;
|
|
do {
|
|
transmitting = false;
|
|
|
|
// If the connection is secure, we can transfer data from the write
|
|
// buffer (in plain text) to the write BIO through SSL_write.
|
|
if (q->isEncrypted() && !writeBuffer.isEmpty()) {
|
|
qint64 totalBytesWritten = 0;
|
|
int nextDataBlockSize;
|
|
while ((nextDataBlockSize = writeBuffer.nextDataBlockSize()) > 0) {
|
|
int writtenBytes = q_SSL_write(ssl, writeBuffer.readPointer(), nextDataBlockSize);
|
|
if (writtenBytes <= 0) {
|
|
int error = q_SSL_get_error(ssl, writtenBytes);
|
|
//write can result in a want_write_error - not an error - continue transmitting
|
|
if (error == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
|
|
transmitting = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (error == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
|
|
//write can result in a want_read error, possibly due to renegotiation - not an error - stop transmitting
|
|
transmitting = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// ### Better error handling.
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Unable to write data: %1").arg(
|
|
QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: encrypted" << writtenBytes << "bytes";
|
|
#endif
|
|
writeBuffer.free(writtenBytes);
|
|
totalBytesWritten += writtenBytes;
|
|
|
|
if (writtenBytes < nextDataBlockSize) {
|
|
// break out of the writing loop and try again after we had read
|
|
transmitting = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (totalBytesWritten > 0) {
|
|
// Don't emit bytesWritten() recursively.
|
|
if (!emittedBytesWritten) {
|
|
emittedBytesWritten = true;
|
|
emit q->bytesWritten(totalBytesWritten);
|
|
emittedBytesWritten = false;
|
|
}
|
|
emit q->channelBytesWritten(0, totalBytesWritten);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if we've got any data to be written to the socket.
|
|
QVarLengthArray<char, 4096> data;
|
|
int pendingBytes;
|
|
while (plainSocket->isValid() && (pendingBytes = q_BIO_pending(writeBio)) > 0
|
|
&& plainSocket->openMode() != QIODevice::NotOpen) {
|
|
// Read encrypted data from the write BIO into a buffer.
|
|
data.resize(pendingBytes);
|
|
int encryptedBytesRead = q_BIO_read(writeBio, data.data(), pendingBytes);
|
|
|
|
// Write encrypted data from the buffer to the socket.
|
|
qint64 actualWritten = plainSocket->write(data.constData(), encryptedBytesRead);
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: wrote" << encryptedBytesRead
|
|
<< "encrypted bytes to the socket" << actualWritten << "actual.";
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (actualWritten < 0) {
|
|
//plain socket write fails if it was in the pending close state.
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, plainSocket->error(), plainSocket->errorString());
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
transmitting = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if we've got any data to be read from the socket.
|
|
if (!q->isEncrypted() || !d->maxReadBufferSize() || buffer.size() < d->maxReadBufferSize())
|
|
while ((pendingBytes = plainSocket->bytesAvailable()) > 0) {
|
|
// Read encrypted data from the socket into a buffer.
|
|
data.resize(pendingBytes);
|
|
// just peek() here because q_BIO_write could write less data than expected
|
|
int encryptedBytesRead = plainSocket->peek(data.data(), pendingBytes);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: read" << encryptedBytesRead << "encrypted bytes from the socket";
|
|
#endif
|
|
// Write encrypted data from the buffer into the read BIO.
|
|
int writtenToBio = q_BIO_write(readBio, data.constData(), encryptedBytesRead);
|
|
|
|
// Throw away the results.
|
|
if (writtenToBio > 0) {
|
|
plainSocket->skip(writtenToBio);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// ### Better error handling.
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Unable to decrypt data: %1")
|
|
.arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
transmitting = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the connection isn't secured yet, this is the time to retry the
|
|
// connect / accept.
|
|
if (!q->isEncrypted()) {
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: testing encryption";
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (startHandshake()) {
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: encryption established";
|
|
#endif
|
|
d->setEncrypted(true);
|
|
transmitting = true;
|
|
} else if (plainSocket->state() != QAbstractSocket::ConnectedState) {
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: connection lost";
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
} else if (d->isPaused()) {
|
|
// just wait until the user continues
|
|
return;
|
|
} else {
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: encryption not done yet";
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the request is small and the remote host closes the transmission
|
|
// after sending, there's a chance that startHandshake() will already
|
|
// have triggered a shutdown.
|
|
if (!ssl)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
// We always read everything from the SSL decryption buffers, even if
|
|
// we have a readBufferMaxSize. There's no point in leaving data there
|
|
// just so that readBuffer.size() == readBufferMaxSize.
|
|
int readBytes = 0;
|
|
const int bytesToRead = 4096;
|
|
do {
|
|
if (q->readChannelCount() == 0) {
|
|
// The read buffer is deallocated, don't try resize or write to it.
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
// Don't use SSL_pending(). It's very unreliable.
|
|
inSslRead = true;
|
|
readBytes = q_SSL_read(ssl, buffer.reserve(bytesToRead), bytesToRead);
|
|
inSslRead = false;
|
|
if (renegotiated) {
|
|
renegotiated = false;
|
|
X509 *x509 = q_SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
|
|
const auto peerCertificate =
|
|
QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::certificateFromX509(x509);
|
|
// Fail the renegotiate if the certificate has changed, else: continue.
|
|
if (peerCertificate != q->peerCertificate()) {
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(
|
|
d, QAbstractSocket::RemoteHostClosedError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr(
|
|
"TLS certificate unexpectedly changed during renegotiation!"));
|
|
q->abort();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (readBytes > 0) {
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: decrypted" << readBytes << "bytes";
|
|
#endif
|
|
buffer.chop(bytesToRead - readBytes);
|
|
|
|
if (bool *readyReadEmittedPointer = d->readyReadPointer())
|
|
*readyReadEmittedPointer = true;
|
|
emit q->readyRead();
|
|
emit q->channelReadyRead(0);
|
|
transmitting = true;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
buffer.chop(bytesToRead);
|
|
|
|
// Error.
|
|
switch (q_SSL_get_error(ssl, readBytes)) {
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
// Out of data.
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
|
|
// The remote host closed the connection.
|
|
#ifdef QSSLSOCKET_DEBUG
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend) << "TlsCryptographOpenSSL::transmit: remote disconnect";
|
|
#endif
|
|
shutdown = true; // the other side shut down, make sure we do not send shutdown ourselves
|
|
{
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::RemoteHostClosedError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("The TLS/SSL connection has been closed"));
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: // some IO error
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SSL: // error in the SSL library
|
|
// we do not know exactly what the error is, nor whether we can recover from it,
|
|
// so just return to prevent an endless loop in the outer "while" statement
|
|
systemOrSslErrorDetected = true;
|
|
{
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Error while reading: %1")
|
|
.arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
default:
|
|
// SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT, SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT: can only happen with a
|
|
// BIO_s_connect() or BIO_s_accept(), which we do not call.
|
|
// SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: can only happen with a
|
|
// SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(), which we do not call.
|
|
// So this default case should never be triggered.
|
|
{
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Error while reading: %1")
|
|
.arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (ssl && readBytes > 0);
|
|
} while (ssl && transmitting);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::disconnectFromHost()
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
if (!shutdown && !q_SSL_in_init(ssl) && !systemOrSslErrorDetected) {
|
|
if (q_SSL_shutdown(ssl) != 1) {
|
|
// Some error may be queued, clear it.
|
|
QTlsBackendOpenSSL::clearErrorQueue();
|
|
}
|
|
shutdown = true;
|
|
transmit();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(plainSocket);
|
|
plainSocket->disconnectFromHost();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::disconnected()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(plainSocket);
|
|
d->setEncrypted(false);
|
|
|
|
if (plainSocket->bytesAvailable() <= 0) {
|
|
destroySslContext();
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Move all bytes into the plain buffer.
|
|
const qint64 tmpReadBufferMaxSize = d->maxReadBufferSize();
|
|
// Reset temporarily, so the plain socket buffer is completely drained:
|
|
d->setMaxReadBufferSize(0);
|
|
transmit();
|
|
d->setMaxReadBufferSize(tmpReadBufferMaxSize);
|
|
}
|
|
//if there is still buffered data in the plain socket, don't destroy the ssl context yet.
|
|
//it will be destroyed when the socket is deleted.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QSslCipher TlsCryptographOpenSSL::sessionCipher() const
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl)
|
|
return {};
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *sessionCipher = q_SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
|
|
return sessionCipher ? QTlsBackendOpenSSL::qt_OpenSSL_cipher_to_QSslCipher(sessionCipher) : QSslCipher{};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QSsl::SslProtocol TlsCryptographOpenSSL::sessionProtocol() const
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl)
|
|
return QSsl::UnknownProtocol;
|
|
|
|
const int ver = q_SSL_version(ssl);
|
|
switch (ver) {
|
|
QT_WARNING_PUSH
|
|
QT_WARNING_DISABLE_DEPRECATED
|
|
case 0x301:
|
|
return QSsl::TlsV1_0;
|
|
case 0x302:
|
|
return QSsl::TlsV1_1;
|
|
QT_WARNING_POP
|
|
case 0x303:
|
|
return QSsl::TlsV1_2;
|
|
case 0x304:
|
|
return QSsl::TlsV1_3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return QSsl::UnknownProtocol;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QList<QOcspResponse> TlsCryptographOpenSSL::ocsps() const
|
|
{
|
|
return ocspResponses;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool TlsCryptographOpenSSL::checkSslErrors()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
if (sslErrors.isEmpty())
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
emit q->sslErrors(sslErrors);
|
|
|
|
const auto vfyMode = q->peerVerifyMode();
|
|
const auto mode = d->tlsMode();
|
|
|
|
bool doVerifyPeer = vfyMode == QSslSocket::VerifyPeer || (vfyMode == QSslSocket::AutoVerifyPeer
|
|
&& mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode);
|
|
bool doEmitSslError = !d->verifyErrorsHaveBeenIgnored();
|
|
// check whether we need to emit an SSL handshake error
|
|
if (doVerifyPeer && doEmitSslError) {
|
|
if (q->pauseMode() & QAbstractSocket::PauseOnSslErrors) {
|
|
QSslSocketPrivate::pauseSocketNotifiers(q);
|
|
d->setPaused(true);
|
|
} else {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslHandshakeFailedError, sslErrors.constFirst().errorString());
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(plainSocket);
|
|
plainSocket->disconnectFromHost();
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int TlsCryptographOpenSSL::handleNewSessionTicket(SSL *connection)
|
|
{
|
|
// If we return 1, this means we own the session, but we don't.
|
|
// 0 would tell OpenSSL to deref (but they still have it in the
|
|
// internal cache).
|
|
Q_ASSERT(connection);
|
|
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
if (q->sslConfiguration().testSslOption(QSsl::SslOptionDisableSessionPersistence)) {
|
|
// We silently ignore, do nothing, remove from cache.
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *currentSession = q_SSL_get_session(connection);
|
|
if (!currentSession) {
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend,
|
|
"New session ticket callback, the session is invalid (nullptr)");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (q_SSL_version(connection) < 0x304) {
|
|
// We only rely on this mechanics with TLS >= 1.3
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
if (!q_SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(currentSession)) {
|
|
qCDebug(lcTlsBackend, "New session ticket, but the session is non-resumable");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
|
|
const int sessionSize = q_i2d_SSL_SESSION(currentSession, nullptr);
|
|
if (sessionSize <= 0) {
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "could not store persistent version of SSL session");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We have somewhat perverse naming, it's not a ticket, it's a session.
|
|
QByteArray sessionTicket(sessionSize, 0);
|
|
auto data = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(sessionTicket.data());
|
|
if (!q_i2d_SSL_SESSION(currentSession, &data)) {
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "could not store persistent version of SSL session");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTlsBackend::setSessionAsn1(d, sessionTicket);
|
|
QTlsBackend::setSessionLifetimeHint(d, q_SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(currentSession));
|
|
|
|
emit q->newSessionTicketReceived();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::alertMessageSent(int value)
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
const auto level = tlsAlertLevel(value);
|
|
if (level == QSsl::AlertLevel::Fatal && !q->isEncrypted()) {
|
|
// Note, this logic is handshake-time only:
|
|
pendingFatalAlert = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
emit q->alertSent(level, tlsAlertType(value), tlsAlertDescription(value));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::alertMessageReceived(int value)
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
|
|
emit q->alertReceived(tlsAlertLevel(value), tlsAlertType(value), tlsAlertDescription(value));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int TlsCryptographOpenSSL::emitErrorFromCallback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
// Returns 0 to abort verification, 1 to continue despite error (as
|
|
// OpenSSL expects from the verification callback).
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(ctx);
|
|
|
|
using ScopedBool = QScopedValueRollback<bool>;
|
|
// While we are not setting, we are emitting and in general -
|
|
// we want to prevent accidental recursive startHandshake()
|
|
// calls:
|
|
const ScopedBool bg(inSetAndEmitError, true);
|
|
|
|
X509 *x509 = q_X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
|
|
if (!x509) {
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "Could not obtain the certificate (that failed to verify)");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const QSslCertificate certificate = QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::certificateFromX509(x509);
|
|
const auto errorAndDepth = QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::errorEntryFromStoreContext(ctx);
|
|
const QSslError tlsError = QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::openSSLErrorToQSslError(errorAndDepth.code, certificate);
|
|
|
|
errorsReportedFromCallback = true;
|
|
handshakeInterrupted = true;
|
|
emit q->handshakeInterruptedOnError(tlsError);
|
|
|
|
// Conveniently so, we also can access 'lastErrors' external data set
|
|
// in startHandshake, we store it for the case an application later
|
|
// wants to check errors (ignored or not):
|
|
const auto offset = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData
|
|
+ TlsCryptographOpenSSL::errorOffsetInExData;
|
|
if (auto errorList = static_cast<QList<QSslErrorEntry> *>(q_SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, offset)))
|
|
errorList->append(errorAndDepth);
|
|
|
|
// An application is expected to ignore this error (by calling ignoreSslErrors)
|
|
// in its directly connected slot:
|
|
return !handshakeInterrupted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::trySendFatalAlert()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(pendingFatalAlert);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
|
|
pendingFatalAlert = false;
|
|
QVarLengthArray<char, 4096> data;
|
|
int pendingBytes = 0;
|
|
while (plainSocket->isValid() && (pendingBytes = q_BIO_pending(writeBio)) > 0
|
|
&& plainSocket->openMode() != QIODevice::NotOpen) {
|
|
// Read encrypted data from the write BIO into a buffer.
|
|
data.resize(pendingBytes);
|
|
const int bioReadBytes = q_BIO_read(writeBio, data.data(), pendingBytes);
|
|
|
|
// Write encrypted data from the buffer to the socket.
|
|
qint64 actualWritten = plainSocket->write(data.constData(), bioReadBytes);
|
|
if (actualWritten < 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
plainSocket->flush();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool TlsCryptographOpenSSL::initSslContext()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
// If no external context was set (e.g. by QHttpNetworkConnection) we will
|
|
// create a new one.
|
|
const auto mode = d->tlsMode();
|
|
const auto configuration = q->sslConfiguration();
|
|
if (!sslContextPointer)
|
|
sslContextPointer = QSslContext::sharedFromConfiguration(mode, configuration, d->isRootsOnDemandAllowed());
|
|
|
|
if (sslContextPointer->error() != QSslError::NoError) {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInvalidUserDataError, sslContextPointer->errorString());
|
|
sslContextPointer.reset();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create and initialize SSL session
|
|
if (!(ssl = sslContextPointer->createSsl())) {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Error creating SSL session, %1").arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (configuration.protocol() != QSsl::UnknownProtocol && mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode) {
|
|
const auto verificationPeerName = d->verificationName();
|
|
// Set server hostname on TLS extension. RFC4366 section 3.1 requires it in ACE format.
|
|
QString tlsHostName = verificationPeerName.isEmpty() ? q->peerName() : verificationPeerName;
|
|
if (tlsHostName.isEmpty())
|
|
tlsHostName = d->tlsHostName();
|
|
QByteArray ace = QUrl::toAce(tlsHostName);
|
|
// only send the SNI header if the URL is valid and not an IP
|
|
if (!ace.isEmpty()
|
|
&& !QHostAddress().setAddress(tlsHostName)
|
|
&& !(configuration.testSslOption(QSsl::SslOptionDisableServerNameIndication))) {
|
|
// We don't send the trailing dot from the host header if present see
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3
|
|
if (ace.endsWith('.'))
|
|
ace.chop(1);
|
|
if (!q_SSL_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name, ace.data()))
|
|
qCWarning(lcTlsBackend, "could not set SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME, Server Name Indication disabled");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Clear the session.
|
|
errorList.clear();
|
|
|
|
// Initialize memory BIOs for encryption and decryption.
|
|
readBio = q_BIO_new(q_BIO_s_mem());
|
|
writeBio = q_BIO_new(q_BIO_s_mem());
|
|
if (!readBio || !writeBio) {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Error creating SSL session: %1").arg(QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl()));
|
|
if (readBio)
|
|
q_BIO_free(readBio);
|
|
if (writeBio)
|
|
q_BIO_free(writeBio);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Assign the bios.
|
|
q_SSL_set_bio(ssl, readBio, writeBio);
|
|
|
|
if (mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode)
|
|
q_SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
|
|
else
|
|
q_SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
|
|
|
|
q_SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, QTlsBackendOpenSSL::s_indexForSSLExtraData, this);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
// Set the client callback for PSK
|
|
if (mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode)
|
|
q_SSL_set_psk_client_callback(ssl, &q_ssl_psk_client_callback);
|
|
else if (mode == QSslSocket::SslServerMode)
|
|
q_SSL_set_psk_server_callback(ssl, &q_ssl_psk_server_callback);
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101006L
|
|
// Set the client callback for TLSv1.3 PSK
|
|
if (mode == QSslSocket::SslClientMode
|
|
&& QSslSocket::sslLibraryBuildVersionNumber() >= 0x10101006L) {
|
|
q_SSL_set_psk_use_session_callback(ssl, &q_ssl_psk_use_session_callback);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // openssl version >= 0x10101006L
|
|
|
|
#endif // OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
|
|
#if QT_CONFIG(ocsp)
|
|
if (configuration.ocspStaplingEnabled()) {
|
|
if (mode == QSslSocket::SslServerMode) {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInvalidUserDataError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Server-side QSslSocket does not support OCSP stapling"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (q_SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) != 1) {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInternalError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Failed to enable OCSP stapling"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ocspResponseDer.clear();
|
|
const auto backendConfig = configuration.backendConfiguration();
|
|
auto responsePos = backendConfig.find("Qt-OCSP-response");
|
|
if (responsePos != backendConfig.end()) {
|
|
// This is our private, undocumented 'API' we use for the auto-testing of
|
|
// OCSP-stapling. It must be a der-encoded OCSP response, presumably set
|
|
// by tst_QOcsp.
|
|
const QVariant data(responsePos.value());
|
|
if (data.canConvert<QByteArray>())
|
|
ocspResponseDer = data.toByteArray();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ocspResponseDer.size()) {
|
|
if (mode != QSslSocket::SslServerMode) {
|
|
setErrorAndEmit(d, QAbstractSocket::SslInvalidUserDataError,
|
|
QSslSocket::tr("Client-side sockets do not send OCSP responses"));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif // ocsp
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::destroySslContext()
|
|
{
|
|
if (ssl) {
|
|
if (!q_SSL_in_init(ssl) && !systemOrSslErrorDetected) {
|
|
// We do not send a shutdown alert here. Just mark the session as
|
|
// resumable for qhttpnetworkconnection's "optimization", otherwise
|
|
// OpenSSL won't start a session resumption.
|
|
if (q_SSL_shutdown(ssl) != 1) {
|
|
// Some error may be queued, clear it.
|
|
const auto errors = QTlsBackendOpenSSL::getErrorsFromOpenSsl();
|
|
Q_UNUSED(errors);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
q_SSL_free(ssl);
|
|
ssl = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
sslContextPointer.reset();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::storePeerCertificates()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
// Store the peer certificate and chain. For clients, the peer certificate
|
|
// chain includes the peer certificate; for servers, it doesn't. Both the
|
|
// peer certificate and the chain may be empty if the peer didn't present
|
|
// any certificate.
|
|
X509 *x509 = q_SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
|
|
|
|
const auto peerCertificate = QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::certificateFromX509(x509);
|
|
QTlsBackend::storePeerCertificate(d, peerCertificate);
|
|
q_X509_free(x509);
|
|
auto peerCertificateChain = q->peerCertificateChain();
|
|
if (peerCertificateChain.isEmpty()) {
|
|
peerCertificateChain = QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::stackOfX509ToQSslCertificates(q_SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl));
|
|
if (!peerCertificate.isNull() && d->tlsMode() == QSslSocket::SslServerMode)
|
|
peerCertificateChain.prepend(peerCertificate);
|
|
QTlsBackend::storePeerCertificateChain(d, peerCertificateChain);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if QT_CONFIG(ocsp)
|
|
|
|
bool TlsCryptographOpenSSL::checkOcspStatus()
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(ssl);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
|
|
const auto &configuration = q->sslConfiguration();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d->tlsMode() == QSslSocket::SslClientMode); // See initSslContext() for SslServerMode
|
|
Q_ASSERT(configuration.peerVerifyMode() != QSslSocket::VerifyNone);
|
|
|
|
const auto clearErrorQueue = qScopeGuard([] {
|
|
QTlsBackendOpenSSL::logAndClearErrorQueue();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
ocspResponses.clear();
|
|
ocspErrorDescription.clear();
|
|
ocspErrors.clear();
|
|
|
|
const unsigned char *responseData = nullptr;
|
|
const long responseLength = q_SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, &responseData);
|
|
if (responseLength <= 0 || !responseData) {
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back(QSslError(QSslError::OcspNoResponseFound));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OCSP_RESPONSE *response = q_d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(nullptr, &responseData, responseLength);
|
|
if (!response) {
|
|
// Treat this as a fatal SslHandshakeError.
|
|
ocspErrorDescription = QSslSocket::tr("Failed to decode OCSP response");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
const QSharedPointer<OCSP_RESPONSE> responseGuard(response, q_OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
|
|
|
|
const int ocspStatus = q_OCSP_response_status(response);
|
|
if (ocspStatus != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
|
|
// It's not a definitive response, it's an error message (not signed by the responder).
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back(QSslError(qt_OCSP_response_status_to_SslError(ocspStatus)));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OCSP_BASICRESP *basicResponse = q_OCSP_response_get1_basic(response);
|
|
if (!basicResponse) {
|
|
// SslHandshakeError.
|
|
ocspErrorDescription = QSslSocket::tr("Failed to extract basic OCSP response");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
const QSharedPointer<OCSP_BASICRESP> basicResponseGuard(basicResponse, q_OCSP_BASICRESP_free);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx = q_SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); // Does not increment refcount.
|
|
Q_ASSERT(ctx);
|
|
X509_STORE *store = q_SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); // Does not increment refcount.
|
|
if (!store) {
|
|
// SslHandshakeError.
|
|
ocspErrorDescription = QSslSocket::tr("No certificate verification store, cannot verify OCSP response");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *peerChain = q_SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl); // Does not increment refcount.
|
|
X509 *peerX509 = q_SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(peerChain || peerX509);
|
|
const QSharedPointer<X509> peerX509Guard(peerX509, q_X509_free);
|
|
// OCSP_basic_verify with 0 as verificationFlags:
|
|
//
|
|
// 0) Tries to find the OCSP responder's certificate in either peerChain
|
|
// or basicResponse->certs. If not found, verification fails.
|
|
// 1) It checks the signature using the responder's public key.
|
|
// 2) Then it tries to validate the responder's cert (building a chain
|
|
// etc.)
|
|
// 3) It checks CertID in response.
|
|
// 4) Ensures the responder is authorized to sign the status respond.
|
|
//
|
|
// Note, OpenSSL prior to 1.0.2b would only use bs->certs to
|
|
// verify the responder's chain (see their commit 4ba9a4265bd).
|
|
// Working this around - is too much fuss for ancient versions we
|
|
// are dropping quite soon anyway.
|
|
const unsigned long verificationFlags = 0;
|
|
const int success = q_OCSP_basic_verify(basicResponse, peerChain, store, verificationFlags);
|
|
if (success <= 0)
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back(QSslError(QSslError::OcspResponseCannotBeTrusted));
|
|
|
|
if (q_OCSP_resp_count(basicResponse) != 1) {
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back(QSslError(QSslError::OcspMalformedResponse));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OCSP_SINGLERESP *singleResponse = q_OCSP_resp_get0(basicResponse, 0);
|
|
if (!singleResponse) {
|
|
ocspErrors.clear();
|
|
// A fatal problem -> SslHandshakeError.
|
|
ocspErrorDescription = QSslSocket::tr("Failed to decode a SingleResponse from OCSP status response");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Let's make sure the response is for the correct certificate - we
|
|
// can re-create this CertID using our peer's certificate and its
|
|
// issuer's public key.
|
|
ocspResponses.push_back(QOcspResponse());
|
|
QOcspResponsePrivate *dResponse = ocspResponses.back().d.data();
|
|
dResponse->subjectCert = configuration.peerCertificate();
|
|
bool matchFound = false;
|
|
if (dResponse->subjectCert.isSelfSigned()) {
|
|
dResponse->signerCert = configuration.peerCertificate();
|
|
matchFound = qt_OCSP_certificate_match(singleResponse, peerX509, peerX509);
|
|
} else {
|
|
const STACK_OF(X509) *certs = q_SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl);
|
|
if (!certs) // Oh, what a cataclysm! Last try:
|
|
certs = q_OCSP_resp_get0_certs(basicResponse);
|
|
if (certs) {
|
|
// It could be the first certificate in 'certs' is our peer's
|
|
// certificate. Since it was not captured by the 'self-signed' branch
|
|
// above, the CertID will not match and we'll just iterate on to the
|
|
// next certificate. So we start from 0, not 1.
|
|
for (int i = 0, e = q_sk_X509_num(certs); i < e; ++i) {
|
|
X509 *issuer = q_sk_X509_value(certs, i);
|
|
matchFound = qt_OCSP_certificate_match(singleResponse, peerX509, issuer);
|
|
if (matchFound) {
|
|
if (q_X509_check_issued(issuer, peerX509) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
dResponse->signerCert = QTlsPrivate::X509CertificateOpenSSL::certificateFromX509(issuer);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
matchFound = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!matchFound) {
|
|
dResponse->signerCert.clear();
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back({QSslError::OcspResponseCertIdUnknown, configuration.peerCertificate()});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if the response is valid time-wise:
|
|
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *revTime = nullptr;
|
|
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisUpdate = nullptr;
|
|
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextUpdate = nullptr;
|
|
int reason;
|
|
const int certStatus = q_OCSP_single_get0_status(singleResponse, &reason, &revTime, &thisUpdate, &nextUpdate);
|
|
if (!thisUpdate) {
|
|
// This is unexpected, treat as SslHandshakeError, OCSP_check_validity assumes this pointer
|
|
// to be != nullptr.
|
|
ocspErrors.clear();
|
|
ocspResponses.clear();
|
|
ocspErrorDescription = QSslSocket::tr("Failed to extract 'this update time' from the SingleResponse");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OCSP_check_validity(this, next, nsec, maxsec) does this check:
|
|
// this <= now <= next. They allow some freedom to account
|
|
// for delays/time inaccuracy.
|
|
// this > now + nsec ? -> NOT_YET_VALID
|
|
// if maxsec >= 0:
|
|
// now - maxsec > this ? -> TOO_OLD
|
|
// now - nsec > next ? -> EXPIRED
|
|
// next < this ? -> NEXT_BEFORE_THIS
|
|
// OK.
|
|
if (!q_OCSP_check_validity(thisUpdate, nextUpdate, 60, -1))
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back({QSslError::OcspResponseExpired, configuration.peerCertificate()});
|
|
|
|
// And finally, the status:
|
|
switch (certStatus) {
|
|
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
|
|
// This certificate was not found among the revoked ones.
|
|
dResponse->certificateStatus = QOcspCertificateStatus::Good;
|
|
break;
|
|
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
|
|
dResponse->certificateStatus = QOcspCertificateStatus::Revoked;
|
|
dResponse->revocationReason = qt_OCSP_revocation_reason(reason);
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back({QSslError::CertificateRevoked, configuration.peerCertificate()});
|
|
break;
|
|
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
|
|
dResponse->certificateStatus = QOcspCertificateStatus::Unknown;
|
|
ocspErrors.push_back({QSslError::OcspStatusUnknown, configuration.peerCertificate()});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return !ocspErrors.size();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif // QT_CONFIG(ocsp)
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned TlsCryptographOpenSSL::pskClientTlsCallback(const char *hint, char *identity,
|
|
unsigned max_identity_len,
|
|
unsigned char *psk, unsigned max_psk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
|
|
QSslPreSharedKeyAuthenticator authenticator;
|
|
// Fill in some read-only fields (for the user)
|
|
const int hintLength = hint ? int(std::strlen(hint)) : 0;
|
|
QTlsBackend::setupClientPskAuth(&authenticator, hint, hintLength, max_identity_len, max_psk_len);
|
|
// Let the client provide the remaining bits...
|
|
emit q->preSharedKeyAuthenticationRequired(&authenticator);
|
|
|
|
// No PSK set? Return now to make the handshake fail
|
|
if (authenticator.preSharedKey().isEmpty())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
// Copy data back into OpenSSL
|
|
const int identityLength = qMin(authenticator.identity().size(), authenticator.maximumIdentityLength());
|
|
std::memcpy(identity, authenticator.identity().constData(), identityLength);
|
|
identity[identityLength] = 0;
|
|
|
|
const int pskLength = qMin(authenticator.preSharedKey().size(), authenticator.maximumPreSharedKeyLength());
|
|
std::memcpy(psk, authenticator.preSharedKey().constData(), pskLength);
|
|
return pskLength;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned TlsCryptographOpenSSL::pskServerTlsCallback(const char *identity, unsigned char *psk,
|
|
unsigned max_psk_len)
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
|
|
QSslPreSharedKeyAuthenticator authenticator;
|
|
|
|
// Fill in some read-only fields (for the user)
|
|
QTlsBackend::setupServerPskAuth(&authenticator, identity, q->sslConfiguration().preSharedKeyIdentityHint(),
|
|
max_psk_len);
|
|
emit q->preSharedKeyAuthenticationRequired(&authenticator);
|
|
|
|
// No PSK set? Return now to make the handshake fail
|
|
if (authenticator.preSharedKey().isEmpty())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
// Copy data back into OpenSSL
|
|
const int pskLength = qMin(authenticator.preSharedKey().size(), authenticator.maximumPreSharedKeyLength());
|
|
std::memcpy(psk, authenticator.preSharedKey().constData(), pskLength);
|
|
return pskLength;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool TlsCryptographOpenSSL::isInSslRead() const
|
|
{
|
|
return inSslRead;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::setRenegotiated(bool renegotiated)
|
|
{
|
|
this->renegotiated = renegotiated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef Q_OS_WIN
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::fetchCaRootForCert(const QSslCertificate &cert)
|
|
{
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
|
|
//The root certificate is downloaded from windows update, which blocks for 15 seconds in the worst case
|
|
//so the request is done in a worker thread.
|
|
QList<QSslCertificate> customRoots;
|
|
if (fetchAuthorityInformation)
|
|
customRoots = q->sslConfiguration().caCertificates();
|
|
|
|
//Remember we are fetching and what we are fetching:
|
|
caToFetch = cert;
|
|
|
|
QWindowsCaRootFetcher *fetcher = new QWindowsCaRootFetcher(cert, d->tlsMode(), customRoots,
|
|
q->peerVerifyName());
|
|
connect(fetcher, &QWindowsCaRootFetcher::finished, this, &TlsCryptographOpenSSL::caRootLoaded,
|
|
Qt::QueuedConnection);
|
|
QMetaObject::invokeMethod(fetcher, "start", Qt::QueuedConnection);
|
|
QSslSocketPrivate::pauseSocketNotifiers(q);
|
|
d->setPaused(true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void TlsCryptographOpenSSL::caRootLoaded(QSslCertificate cert, QSslCertificate trustedRoot)
|
|
{
|
|
if (caToFetch != cert) {
|
|
//Ooops, something from the previous connection attempt, ignore!
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Q_ASSERT(d);
|
|
Q_ASSERT(q);
|
|
|
|
//Done, fetched already:
|
|
caToFetch.reset();
|
|
|
|
if (fetchAuthorityInformation) {
|
|
if (!q->sslConfiguration().caCertificates().contains(trustedRoot))
|
|
trustedRoot = QSslCertificate{};
|
|
fetchAuthorityInformation = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!trustedRoot.isNull() && !trustedRoot.isBlacklisted()) {
|
|
if (QSslSocketPrivate::rootCertOnDemandLoadingSupported()) {
|
|
//Add the new root cert to default cert list for use by future sockets
|
|
auto defaultConfig = QSslConfiguration::defaultConfiguration();
|
|
defaultConfig.addCaCertificate(trustedRoot);
|
|
QSslConfiguration::setDefaultConfiguration(defaultConfig);
|
|
}
|
|
//Add the new root cert to this socket for future connections
|
|
QTlsBackend::addTustedRoot(d, trustedRoot);
|
|
//Remove the broken chain ssl errors (as chain is verified by windows)
|
|
for (int i=sslErrors.count() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
|
|
if (sslErrors.at(i).certificate() == cert) {
|
|
switch (sslErrors.at(i).error()) {
|
|
case QSslError::UnableToGetLocalIssuerCertificate:
|
|
case QSslError::CertificateUntrusted:
|
|
case QSslError::UnableToVerifyFirstCertificate:
|
|
case QSslError::SelfSignedCertificateInChain:
|
|
// error can be ignored if OS says the chain is trusted
|
|
sslErrors.removeAt(i);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
// error cannot be ignored
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto *plainSocket = d->plainTcpSocket();
|
|
Q_ASSERT(plainSocket);
|
|
// Continue with remaining errors
|
|
if (plainSocket)
|
|
plainSocket->resume();
|
|
d->setPaused(false);
|
|
if (checkSslErrors() && ssl) {
|
|
bool willClose = (d->isAutoStartingHandshake() && d->isPendingClose());
|
|
continueHandshake();
|
|
if (!willClose)
|
|
transmit();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif // Q_OS_WIN
|
|
|
|
} // namespace QTlsPrivate
|
|
|
|
QT_END_NAMESPACE
|