net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes:
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| can.h | ||
| conntrack.h | ||
| core.h | ||
| dccp.h | ||
| generic.h | ||
| hash.h | ||
| ieee802154_6lowpan.h | ||
| ipv4.h | ||
| ipv6.h | ||
| mib.h | ||
| mpls.h | ||
| netfilter.h | ||
| nftables.h | ||
| packet.h | ||
| sctp.h | ||
| unix.h | ||
| x_tables.h | ||
| xdp.h | ||
| xfrm.h | ||