2017-11-01 14:09:13 +00:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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/* audit.h -- Auditing support
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*
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* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
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* All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*
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* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
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*
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*/
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#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_AUDIT_H_
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#define _UAPI_LINUX_AUDIT_H_
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/elf-em.h>
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/* The netlink messages for the audit system is divided into blocks:
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* 1000 - 1099 are for commanding the audit system
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* 1100 - 1199 user space trusted application messages
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* 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon
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* 1300 - 1399 audit event messages
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landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials
Add a new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record type dedicated to an access
request denied by a Landlock domain. AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS indicates
that something unexpected happened.
For now, only denied access are logged, which means that any
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record is always followed by a SYSCALL record with
"success=no". However, log parsers should check this syscall property
because this is the only sign that a request was denied. Indeed, we
could have "success=yes" if Landlock would support a "permissive" mode.
We could also add a new field to AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN for this mode
(see following commit).
By default, the only logged access requests are those coming from the
same executed program that enforced the Landlock restriction on itself.
In other words, no audit record are created for a task after it called
execve(2). This is required to avoid log spam because programs may only
be aware of their own restrictions, but not the inherited ones.
Following commits will allow to conditionally generate
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS records according to dedicated
landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS message contains:
- the "domain" ID restricting the action on an object,
- the "blockers" that are missing to allow the requested access,
- a set of fields identifying the related object (e.g. task identified
with "opid" and "ocomm").
The blockers are implicit restrictions (e.g. ptrace), or explicit access
rights (e.g. filesystem), or explicit scopes (e.g. signal). This field
contains a list of at least one element, each separated with a comma.
The initial blocker is "ptrace", which describe all implicit Landlock
restrictions related to ptrace (e.g. deny tracing of tasks outside a
sandbox).
Add audit support to ptrace_access_check and ptrace_traceme hooks. For
the ptrace_access_check case, we log the current/parent domain and the
child task. For the ptrace_traceme case, we log the parent domain and
the current/child task. Indeed, the requester and the target are the
current task, but the action would be performed by the parent task.
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
A following commit adds user documentation.
Add KUnit tests to check reading of domain ID relative to layer level.
The quick return for non-landlocked tasks is moved from task_ptrace() to
each LSM hooks.
It is not useful to inline the audit_enabled check because other
computation are performed by landlock_log_denial().
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-10-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2025-03-20 19:06:58 +00:00
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* 1400 - 1499 access control messages
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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* 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
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* 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
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* 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
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* 1800 - 1899 kernel integrity events
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* 1900 - 1999 future kernel use
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* 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy)
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* 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel)
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* 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records
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* 2200 - 2299 user space actions taken in response to anomalies
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* 2300 - 2399 user space generated LSPP events
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* 2400 - 2499 user space crypto events
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* 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events)
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*
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* Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are
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2021-06-09 02:27:01 +00:00
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* exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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* communication.
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*/
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#define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */
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#define AUDIT_SET 1001 /* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */
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#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall rules -- deprecated */
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#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall rule -- deprecated */
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#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall rule -- deprecated */
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#define AUDIT_USER 1005 /* Message from userspace -- deprecated */
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#define AUDIT_LOGIN 1006 /* Define the login id and information */
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#define AUDIT_WATCH_INS 1007 /* Insert file/dir watch entry */
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#define AUDIT_WATCH_REM 1008 /* Remove file/dir watch entry */
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#define AUDIT_WATCH_LIST 1009 /* List all file/dir watches */
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#define AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO 1010 /* Get info about sender of signal to auditd */
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#define AUDIT_ADD_RULE 1011 /* Add syscall filtering rule */
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#define AUDIT_DEL_RULE 1012 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */
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#define AUDIT_LIST_RULES 1013 /* List syscall filtering rules */
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#define AUDIT_TRIM 1014 /* Trim junk from watched tree */
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#define AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV 1015 /* Append to watched tree */
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#define AUDIT_TTY_GET 1016 /* Get TTY auditing status */
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#define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */
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2013-05-22 16:54:49 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */
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#define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
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#define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */
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#define AUDIT_USER_TTY 1124 /* Non-ICANON TTY input meaning */
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#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG 1199
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#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 2100 /* More user space messages */
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#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2 2999
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2021-06-09 02:27:01 +00:00
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_DAEMON_START 1200 /* Daemon startup record */
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#define AUDIT_DAEMON_END 1201 /* Daemon normal stop record */
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#define AUDIT_DAEMON_ABORT 1202 /* Daemon error stop record */
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#define AUDIT_DAEMON_CONFIG 1203 /* Daemon config change */
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#define AUDIT_SYSCALL 1300 /* Syscall event */
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/* #define AUDIT_FS_WATCH 1301 * Deprecated */
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#define AUDIT_PATH 1302 /* Filename path information */
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#define AUDIT_IPC 1303 /* IPC record */
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#define AUDIT_SOCKETCALL 1304 /* sys_socketcall arguments */
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#define AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE 1305 /* Audit system configuration change */
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#define AUDIT_SOCKADDR 1306 /* sockaddr copied as syscall arg */
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#define AUDIT_CWD 1307 /* Current working directory */
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#define AUDIT_EXECVE 1309 /* execve arguments */
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#define AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM 1311 /* IPC new permissions record type */
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#define AUDIT_MQ_OPEN 1312 /* POSIX MQ open record type */
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#define AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV 1313 /* POSIX MQ send/receive record type */
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#define AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY 1314 /* POSIX MQ notify record type */
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#define AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR 1315 /* POSIX MQ get/set attribute record type */
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#define AUDIT_KERNEL_OTHER 1316 /* For use by 3rd party modules */
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#define AUDIT_FD_PAIR 1317 /* audit record for pipe/socketpair */
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#define AUDIT_OBJ_PID 1318 /* ptrace target */
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#define AUDIT_TTY 1319 /* Input on an administrative TTY */
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#define AUDIT_EOE 1320 /* End of multi-record event */
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#define AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS 1321 /* Information about fcaps increasing perms */
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#define AUDIT_CAPSET 1322 /* Record showing argument to sys_capset */
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#define AUDIT_MMAP 1323 /* Record showing descriptor and flags in mmap */
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#define AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT 1324 /* Packets traversing netfilter chains */
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#define AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG 1325 /* Netfilter chain modifications */
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2013-01-11 22:32:05 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_SECCOMP 1326 /* Secure Computing event */
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audit: Audit proc/<pid>/cmdline aka proctitle
During an audit event, cache and print the value of the process's
proctitle value (proc/<pid>/cmdline). This is useful in situations
where processes are started via fork'd virtual machines where the
comm field is incorrect. Often times, setting the comm field still
is insufficient as the comm width is not very wide and most
virtual machine "package names" do not fit. Also, during execution,
many threads have their comm field set as well. By tying it back to
the global cmdline value for the process, audit records will be more
complete in systems with these properties. An example of where this
is useful and applicable is in the realm of Android. With Android,
their is no fork/exec for VM instances. The bare, preloaded Dalvik
VM listens for a fork and specialize request. When this request comes
in, the VM forks, and the loads the specific application (specializing).
This was done to take advantage of COW and to not require a load of
basic packages by the VM on very app spawn. When this spawn occurs,
the package name is set via setproctitle() and shows up in procfs.
Many of these package names are longer then 16 bytes, the historical
width of task->comm. Having the cmdline in the audit records will
couple the application back to the record directly. Also, on my
Debian development box, some audit records were more useful then
what was printed under comm.
The cached proctitle is tied to the life-cycle of the audit_context
structure and is built on demand.
Proctitle is controllable by userspace, and thus should not be trusted.
It is meant as an aid to assist in debugging. The proctitle event is
emitted during syscall audits, and can be filtered with auditctl.
Example:
type=AVC msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1971 comm="mkdir" name="/" dev="selinuxfs" ino=1 scontext=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 tcontext=system_u:object_r:security_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): arch=c000003e syscall=137 success=yes exit=0 a0=7f019dfc8bd7 a1=7fffa6aed2c0 a2=fffffffffff4bd25 a3=7fffa6aed050 items=0 ppid=1967 pid=1971 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" subj=system_u:system_r:consolekit_t:s0-s0:c0.c255 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1327] msg=audit(1391217013.924:386): proctitle=6D6B646972002D70002F7661722F72756E2F636F6E736F6C65
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> (wrt record formating)
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2014-02-11 18:12:01 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */
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2014-04-02 20:21:24 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
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2016-01-25 23:04:15 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
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2017-02-04 18:10:38 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */
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2017-10-03 00:21:39 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */
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2019-04-10 09:14:19 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET 1332 /* Timekeeping offset injected */
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2019-04-10 09:14:20 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL 1333 /* NTP value adjustment */
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2019-12-06 21:49:34 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_BPF 1334 /* BPF subsystem */
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2020-04-22 21:37:04 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_EVENT_LISTENER 1335 /* Task joined multicast read socket */
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2021-02-17 00:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_URINGOP 1336 /* io_uring operation */
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2021-05-19 20:00:22 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_OPENAT2 1337 /* Record showing openat2 how args */
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2021-09-04 09:59:28 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_DM_CTRL 1338 /* Device Mapper target control */
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#define AUDIT_DM_EVENT 1339 /* Device Mapper events */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
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#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
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#define AUDIT_AVC_PATH 1402 /* dentry, vfsmount pair from avc */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD 1403 /* Policy file load */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS 1404 /* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE 1405 /* Changes to booleans */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_ALLOW 1406 /* NetLabel: allow unlabeled traffic */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD 1407 /* NetLabel: add CIPSOv4 DOI entry */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL 1408 /* NetLabel: del CIPSOv4 DOI entry */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_MAP_ADD 1409 /* NetLabel: add LSM domain mapping */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_MAP_DEL 1410 /* NetLabel: del LSM domain mapping */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSA 1411 /* Not used */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA 1412 /* Not used */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSPD 1413 /* Not used */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD 1414 /* Not used */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT 1415 /* Audit an IPSec event */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCADD 1416 /* NetLabel: add a static label */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
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2016-06-27 19:02:46 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418 /* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */
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#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419 /* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */
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audit,ipe: add IPE auditing support
Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE
itself.
This patch introduces 3 new audit events.
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420) indicates the result of an IPE policy evaluation
of a resource.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421) indicates the current active IPE policy
has been changed to another loaded policy.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) indicates a new IPE policy has been loaded
into the kernel.
This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to
identify why an allow decision was made for a resource. However, it is
recommended to use this option with caution, as it is quite noisy.
Here are some examples of the new audit record types:
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420):
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=297 comm="sh" path="/root/vol/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=3897 rule="op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=299 comm="sh" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=300 path="/tmp/tmpdp2h1lub/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=131 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
The above three records were generated when the active IPE policy only
allows binaries from the initramfs to run. The three identical `hello`
binary were placed at different locations, only the first hello from
the rootfs(initramfs) was allowed.
Field ipe_op followed by the IPE operation name associated with the log.
Field ipe_hook followed by the name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE
event.
Field enforcing followed by the enforcement state of IPE. (it will be
introduced in the next commit)
Field pid followed by the pid of the process that triggered the IPE
event.
Field comm followed by the command line program name of the process that
triggered the IPE event.
Field path followed by the file's path name.
Field dev followed by the device name as found in /dev where the file is
from.
Note that for device mappers it will use the name `dm-X` instead of
the name in /dev/mapper.
For a file in a temp file system, which is not from a device, it will use
`tmpfs` for the field.
The implementation of this part is following another existing use case
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE in security/lsm_audit.c
Field ino followed by the file's inode number.
Field rule followed by the IPE rule made the access decision. The whole
rule must be audited because the decision is based on the combination of
all property conditions in the rule.
Along with the syscall audit event, user can know why a blocked
happened. For example:
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=2138 comm="bash" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit[1956]: SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=59
success=no exit=-13 a0=556790138df0 a1=556790135390 a2=5567901338b0
a3=ab2a41a67f4f1f4e items=1 ppid=147 pid=1956 auid=4294967295 uid=0
gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0
ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
The above two records showed bash used execve to run "hello" and got
blocked by IPE. Note that the IPE records are always prior to a SYSCALL
record.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421):
audit: AUDIT1421
old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0
old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649
new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0
new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed the current IPE active policy switch from
`Allow_All` to `boot_verified` along with the version and the hash
digest of the two policies. Note IPE can only have one policy active
at a time, all access decision evaluation is based on the current active
policy.
The normal procedure to deploy a policy is loading the policy to deploy
into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422):
audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0
policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F2676
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed a new policy has been loaded into the kernel
with the policy name, policy version and policy hash.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-08-03 06:08:23 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS 1420 /* IPE denial or grant */
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#define AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE 1421 /* IPE config change */
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#define AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD 1422 /* IPE policy load */
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landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials
Add a new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record type dedicated to an access
request denied by a Landlock domain. AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS indicates
that something unexpected happened.
For now, only denied access are logged, which means that any
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record is always followed by a SYSCALL record with
"success=no". However, log parsers should check this syscall property
because this is the only sign that a request was denied. Indeed, we
could have "success=yes" if Landlock would support a "permissive" mode.
We could also add a new field to AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN for this mode
(see following commit).
By default, the only logged access requests are those coming from the
same executed program that enforced the Landlock restriction on itself.
In other words, no audit record are created for a task after it called
execve(2). This is required to avoid log spam because programs may only
be aware of their own restrictions, but not the inherited ones.
Following commits will allow to conditionally generate
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS records according to dedicated
landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS message contains:
- the "domain" ID restricting the action on an object,
- the "blockers" that are missing to allow the requested access,
- a set of fields identifying the related object (e.g. task identified
with "opid" and "ocomm").
The blockers are implicit restrictions (e.g. ptrace), or explicit access
rights (e.g. filesystem), or explicit scopes (e.g. signal). This field
contains a list of at least one element, each separated with a comma.
The initial blocker is "ptrace", which describe all implicit Landlock
restrictions related to ptrace (e.g. deny tracing of tasks outside a
sandbox).
Add audit support to ptrace_access_check and ptrace_traceme hooks. For
the ptrace_access_check case, we log the current/parent domain and the
child task. For the ptrace_traceme case, we log the parent domain and
the current/child task. Indeed, the requester and the target are the
current task, but the action would be performed by the parent task.
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
A following commit adds user documentation.
Add KUnit tests to check reading of domain ID relative to layer level.
The quick return for non-landlocked tasks is moved from task_ptrace() to
each LSM hooks.
It is not useful to inline the audit_enabled check because other
computation are performed by landlock_log_denial().
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-10-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2025-03-20 19:06:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS 1423 /* Landlock denial */
|
landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status
Asynchronously log domain information when it first denies an access.
This minimize the amount of generated logs, which makes it possible to
always log denials for the current execution since they should not
happen. These records are identified with the new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN
type.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN message contains:
- the "domain" ID which is described;
- the "status" which can either be "allocated" or "deallocated";
- the "mode" which is for now only "enforcing";
- for the "allocated" status, a minimal set of properties to easily
identify the task that loaded the domain's policy with
landlock_restrict_self(2): "pid", "uid", executable path ("exe"), and
command line ("comm");
- for the "deallocated" state, the number of "denials" accounted to this
domain, which is at least 1.
This requires each domain to save these task properties at creation
time in the new struct landlock_details. A reference to the PID is kept
for the lifetime of the domain to avoid race conditions when
investigating the related task. The executable path is resolved and
stored to not keep a reference to the filesystem and block related
actions. All these metadata are stored for the lifetime of the related
domain and should then be minimal. The required memory is not accounted
to the task calling landlock_restrict_self(2) contrary to most other
Landlock allocations (see related comment).
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN record follows the first AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS
record for the same domain, which is always followed by AUDIT_SYSCALL
and AUDIT_PROCTITLE. This is in line with the audit logic to first
record the cause of an event, and then add context with other types of
record.
Audit event sample for a first denial:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=300 uid=0 exe="/root/sandboxer" comm="sandboxer"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
Audit event sample for a following denial:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
Log domain deletion with the "deallocated" state when a domain was
previously logged. This makes it possible for log parsers to free
potential resources when a domain ID will never show again.
The number of denied access requests is useful to easily check how many
access requests a domain blocked and potentially if some of them are
missing in logs because of audit rate limiting, audit rules, or Landlock
log configuration flags (see following commit).
Audit event sample for a deletion of a domain that denied something:
type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.393:46): domain=195ba459b status=deallocated denials=2
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-11-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update comment and GFP flag for landlock_log_drop_domain()]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2025-03-20 19:06:59 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN 1424 /* Landlock domain status */
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND 1701 /* Process ended abnormally */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ANOM_LINK 1702 /* Suspicious use of file links */
|
2019-10-02 23:41:58 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ANOM_CREAT 1703 /* Suspicious file creation */
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA 1800 /* Data integrity verification */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA 1801 /* Metadata integrity verification */
|
|
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|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
|
2018-05-15 17:38:26 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR 1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */
|
2018-06-04 20:54:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */
|
2024-12-12 17:42:23 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_USERSPACE 1808 /* Userspace enforced data integrity */
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
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|
#define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
|
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|
|
/* Rule flags */
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_USER 0x00 /* Apply rule to user-generated messages */
|
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_TASK 0x01 /* Apply rule at task creation (not syscall) */
|
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#define AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY 0x02 /* Apply rule at syscall entry */
|
|
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH 0x03 /* Apply rule to file system watches */
|
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT 0x04 /* Apply rule at syscall exit */
|
2018-06-05 15:45:07 +00:00
|
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE 0x05 /* Apply rule before record creation */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE /* obsolete misleading naming */
|
2017-08-23 11:03:39 +00:00
|
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_FS 0x06 /* Apply rule at __audit_inode_child */
|
2021-04-19 01:54:47 +00:00
|
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT 0x07 /* Apply rule at io_uring op exit */
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
|
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|
2021-04-19 01:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 8
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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|
#define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND 0x10 /* Prepend to front of list */
|
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|
|
/* Rule actions */
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_NEVER 0 /* Do not build context if rule matches */
|
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|
#define AUDIT_POSSIBLE 1 /* Build context if rule matches */
|
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|
#define AUDIT_ALWAYS 2 /* Generate audit record if rule matches */
|
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|
|
|
/* Rule structure sizes -- if these change, different AUDIT_ADD and
|
|
|
|
* AUDIT_LIST commands must be implemented. */
|
|
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|
#define AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS 64
|
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|
#define AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN 256
|
|
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|
#define AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE 64
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_WORD(nr) ((__u32)((nr)/32))
|
2022-10-31 02:10:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_BIT(nr) (1U << ((nr) - AUDIT_WORD(nr)*32))
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
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|
#define AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES 16
|
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|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE 0
|
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|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_DIR_WRITE_32 1
|
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|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR 2
|
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|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32 3
|
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|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_READ 4
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32 5
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE 6
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32 7
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL 8
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32 9
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
/* This bitmask is used to validate user input. It represents all bits that
|
|
|
|
* are currently used in an audit field constant understood by the kernel.
|
|
|
|
* If you are adding a new #define AUDIT_<whatever>, please ensure that
|
|
|
|
* AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS is updated if need be. */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS 0x07FFFC00
|
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|
|
|
/* AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE rule list */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID 1
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID 2
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID 3
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID 4
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID 5
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID 6
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID 7
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID 8
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID 9
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID 10
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID 11
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID 12
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID 13
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID 14
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID 15
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID 16
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID 17
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID 18
|
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|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID 19
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID 20
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID 21
|
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|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID 22
|
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|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID 23
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID 24
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID 25
|
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|
|
|
#define AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
/* Rule fields */
|
|
|
|
/* These are useful when checking the
|
|
|
|
* task structure at task creation time
|
|
|
|
* (AUDIT_PER_TASK). */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_PID 0
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_UID 1
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_EUID 2
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUID 3
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FSUID 4
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_GID 5
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_EGID 6
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SGID 7
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FSGID 8
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_PERS 10
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ARCH 11
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER 13 /* security label user */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_PPID 18
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER 19
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE 20
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
|
2013-04-09 09:22:10 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24
|
2016-11-20 21:47:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SESSIONID 25 /* Session ID */
|
2017-08-23 11:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FSTYPE 26 /* FileSystem Type */
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
|
|
|
|
* at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_DEVMAJOR 100
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_DEVMINOR 101
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_INODE 102
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_EXIT 103
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SUCCESS 104 /* exit >= 0; value ignored */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_WATCH 105
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_PERM 106
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_DIR 107
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FILETYPE 108
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_UID 109
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OBJ_GID 110
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
|
2015-08-05 20:29:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_EXE 112
|
2019-05-10 00:01:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_SADDR_FAM 113
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ARG0 200
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1)
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2)
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FILTERKEY 210
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These are the supported operators.
|
|
|
|
* 4 2 1 8
|
|
|
|
* = > < ?
|
|
|
|
* ----------
|
|
|
|
* 0 0 0 0 00 nonsense
|
|
|
|
* 0 0 0 1 08 & bit mask
|
|
|
|
* 0 0 1 0 10 <
|
|
|
|
* 0 1 0 0 20 >
|
|
|
|
* 0 1 1 0 30 !=
|
|
|
|
* 1 0 0 0 40 =
|
|
|
|
* 1 0 0 1 48 &= bit test
|
|
|
|
* 1 0 1 0 50 <=
|
|
|
|
* 1 1 0 0 60 >=
|
|
|
|
* 1 1 1 1 78 all operators
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_BIT_MASK 0x08000000
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN 0x10000000
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN 0x20000000
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL 0x30000000
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_EQUAL 0x40000000
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_BIT_TEST (AUDIT_BIT_MASK|AUDIT_EQUAL)
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_LESS_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_GREATER_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_OPERATORS (AUDIT_EQUAL|AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL|AUDIT_BIT_MASK)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum {
|
|
|
|
Audit_equal,
|
|
|
|
Audit_not_equal,
|
|
|
|
Audit_bitmask,
|
|
|
|
Audit_bittest,
|
|
|
|
Audit_lt,
|
|
|
|
Audit_gt,
|
|
|
|
Audit_le,
|
|
|
|
Audit_ge,
|
|
|
|
Audit_bad
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Status symbols */
|
2020-07-04 15:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Mask values */
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED 0x0001
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE 0x0002
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_PID 0x0004
|
2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT 0x0008
|
2020-07-04 15:15:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT 0x0010
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME 0x0020
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_LOST 0x0040
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME_ACTUAL 0x0080
|
2014-01-13 21:48:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-17 20:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT 0x00000001
|
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME 0x00000002
|
2015-08-05 20:29:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH 0x00000004
|
2016-08-18 16:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND 0x00000008
|
2016-11-20 21:47:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER 0x00000010
|
2017-01-13 08:26:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET 0x00000020
|
2017-08-23 11:03:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS 0x00000040
|
2017-01-13 08:26:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-11-17 20:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL (AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT | \
|
2015-08-05 20:29:37 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME | \
|
2016-08-18 16:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXECUTABLE_PATH | \
|
2016-12-14 22:06:40 +00:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_EXCLUDE_EXTEND | \
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2017-01-13 08:26:29 +00:00
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AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER | \
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2017-08-23 11:03:39 +00:00
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AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET | \
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AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS)
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2014-11-17 20:51:01 +00:00
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/* deprecated: AUDIT_VERSION_* */
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#define AUDIT_VERSION_LATEST AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL
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#define AUDIT_VERSION_BACKLOG_LIMIT AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_LIMIT
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#define AUDIT_VERSION_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME
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2014-01-13 21:48:45 +00:00
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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/* Failure-to-log actions */
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#define AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT 0
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#define AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK 1
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#define AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC 2
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2014-04-22 14:40:36 +00:00
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/*
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* These bits disambiguate different calling conventions that share an
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* ELF machine type, bitness, and endianness
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*/
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#define __AUDIT_ARCH_CONVENTION_MASK 0x30000000
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#define __AUDIT_ARCH_CONVENTION_MIPS64_N32 0x20000000
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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/* distinguish syscall tables */
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#define __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT 0x80000000
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#define __AUDIT_ARCH_LE 0x40000000
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2014-04-22 14:40:36 +00:00
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2014-07-04 07:28:30 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 (EM_AARCH64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ALPHA (EM_ALPHA|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2019-03-17 23:28:47 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARCOMPACT (EM_ARCOMPACT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARCOMPACTBE (EM_ARCOMPACT)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARCV2 (EM_ARCV2|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARCV2BE (EM_ARCV2)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARM (EM_ARM|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_ARMEB (EM_ARM)
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2019-03-17 23:28:53 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_C6X (EM_TI_C6000|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_C6XBE (EM_TI_C6000)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_CRIS (EM_CRIS|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2018-12-13 17:22:07 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_CSKY (EM_CSKY|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_FRV (EM_FRV)
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2019-03-17 23:29:01 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_H8300 (EM_H8_300)
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2019-03-17 23:29:32 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_HEXAGON (EM_HEXAGON)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_I386 (EM_386|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_IA64 (EM_IA_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_M32R (EM_M32R)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_M68K (EM_68K)
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2014-03-11 17:50:46 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MICROBLAZE (EM_MICROBLAZE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS (EM_MIPS)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
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2014-04-22 14:40:36 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|\
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__AUDIT_ARCH_CONVENTION_MIPS64_N32)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2014-05-21 02:49:19 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 (EM_MIPS|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE|\
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2014-04-22 14:40:36 +00:00
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__AUDIT_ARCH_CONVENTION_MIPS64_N32)
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2019-03-17 23:29:57 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_NDS32 (EM_NDS32|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_NDS32BE (EM_NDS32)
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2019-03-17 23:30:02 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_NIOS2 (EM_ALTERA_NIOS2|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_OPENRISC (EM_OPENRISC)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC (EM_PARISC)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_PARISC64 (EM_PARISC|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC (EM_PPC)
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2014-12-09 20:37:07 +00:00
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/* do not define AUDIT_ARCH_PPCLE since it is not supported by audit */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 (EM_PPC64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
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2014-12-09 20:37:07 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE (EM_PPC64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2018-10-29 10:48:53 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV32 (EM_RISCV|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64 (EM_RISCV|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_S390 (EM_S390)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_S390X (EM_S390|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_SH (EM_SH)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL (EM_SH|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_SH64 (EM_SH|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_SHEL64 (EM_SH|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC (EM_SPARC)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC64 (EM_SPARCV9|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT)
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2015-07-22 18:30:14 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_TILEGX (EM_TILEGX|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_TILEGX32 (EM_TILEGX|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_TILEPRO (EM_TILEPRO|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2019-03-17 23:30:11 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_UNICORE (EM_UNICORE|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (EM_X86_64|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2018-11-20 00:17:01 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_XTENSA (EM_XTENSA)
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2022-05-31 10:04:10 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH32 (EM_LOONGARCH|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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#define AUDIT_ARCH_LOONGARCH64 (EM_LOONGARCH|__AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT|__AUDIT_ARCH_LE)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_PERM_EXEC 1
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#define AUDIT_PERM_WRITE 2
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#define AUDIT_PERM_READ 4
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#define AUDIT_PERM_ATTR 8
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2013-09-16 22:20:42 +00:00
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/* MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH is set in audit:lib/libaudit.h as:
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* 8970 // PATH_MAX*2+CONTEXT_SIZE*2+11+256+1
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* max header+body+tailer: 44 + 29 + 32 + 262 + 7 + pad
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*/
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#define AUDIT_MESSAGE_TEXT_MAX 8560
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2014-04-23 01:31:57 +00:00
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/* Multicast Netlink socket groups (default up to 32) */
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enum audit_nlgrps {
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AUDIT_NLGRP_NONE, /* Group 0 not used */
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AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG, /* "best effort" read only socket */
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__AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX
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};
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#define AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX (__AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX - 1)
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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struct audit_status {
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__u32 mask; /* Bit mask for valid entries */
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__u32 enabled; /* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
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__u32 failure; /* Failure-to-log action */
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__u32 pid; /* pid of auditd process */
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__u32 rate_limit; /* messages rate limit (per second) */
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__u32 backlog_limit; /* waiting messages limit */
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__u32 lost; /* messages lost */
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__u32 backlog; /* messages waiting in queue */
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2014-11-17 20:51:01 +00:00
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union {
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__u32 version; /* deprecated: audit api version num */
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__u32 feature_bitmap; /* bitmap of kernel audit features */
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};
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2013-09-18 15:55:12 +00:00
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__u32 backlog_wait_time;/* message queue wait timeout */
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2020-07-04 15:15:28 +00:00
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__u32 backlog_wait_time_actual;/* time spent waiting while
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* message limit exceeded
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*/
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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};
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2013-05-22 16:54:49 +00:00
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struct audit_features {
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#define AUDIT_FEATURE_VERSION 1
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__u32 vers;
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__u32 mask; /* which bits we are dealing with */
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__u32 features; /* which feature to enable/disable */
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__u32 lock; /* which features to lock */
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};
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2013-05-24 13:18:04 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID 0
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2013-05-23 18:26:00 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE 1
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#define AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
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2013-05-22 16:54:49 +00:00
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#define audit_feature_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE)
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#define AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for __u32 */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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struct audit_tty_status {
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2013-05-03 18:03:50 +00:00
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__u32 enabled; /* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
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__u32 log_passwd; /* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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};
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2013-05-20 19:08:18 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1
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2018-05-13 01:58:19 +00:00
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#define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1)
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2013-05-20 19:08:18 +00:00
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
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* fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
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* AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests.
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*/
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struct audit_rule_data {
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__u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
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__u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
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__u32 field_count;
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__u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; /* syscall(s) affected */
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__u32 fields[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
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__u32 values[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
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__u32 fieldflags[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
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__u32 buflen; /* total length of string fields */
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2021-12-17 01:01:52 +00:00
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char buf[]; /* string fields buffer */
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2012-10-13 09:46:48 +00:00
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};
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#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_AUDIT_H_ */
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