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Author SHA1 Message Date
Florian Weimer e51a6bf18e malloc: Increase tcache fill count from 16 to 32
This avoids a regression in the omnetpp and xalancbmk benchmarks
of SPEC.  Apparently, these benchmarks are very sensitive to the
fill rate in malloc.

Suggested-by: Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>
Tested-by: Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>
2026-06-30 09:07:19 +02:00
Florian Weimer b50e24aea3 malloc: Only fill half of the tcache during batch allocation
This leaves room for subsequent frees.
2026-06-30 09:07:19 +02:00
Florian Weimer c0a1c6e06d malloc: Perform batched frees if tcache is full
Batched frees amortize the locking overhead once the tcache is full.
Previously, once the tcache slot was full, each free acquired the
arena lock.  With this change, neighboring tcache allocations in the
same arena re-use an arena lock that already exists.

Pass the tcache pointer to __libc_free_batch so that it is not
necessary to reload the tcache pointer after the _int_free_chunk
calls.
2026-06-30 09:07:19 +02:00
503 changed files with 28510 additions and 40429 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
For the GNU C Library Security Advisories, see the git master branch:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=tree;f=advisories;hb=HEAD
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+8 -8
View File
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ build the GNU C Library:
GCC 12.1 or higher is required. In general it is recommended to
use the newest version of the compiler that is known to work for
building the GNU C Library, as newer compilers usually produce
better code. As of release time, GCC 16.1.1 is the newest compiler
better code. As of release time, GCC 15.2.1 is the newest compiler
verified to work to build the GNU C Library.
For multi-arch support it is recommended to use a GCC which has
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ build the GNU C Library:
You must use GNU 'binutils' (as and ld) to build the GNU C Library.
No other assembler or linker has the necessary functionality at the
moment. As of release time, GNU 'binutils' 2.46.1 is the newest
moment. As of release time, GNU 'binutils' 2.45.1 is the newest
verified to work to build the GNU C Library.
* GNU 'texinfo' 4.7 or later
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ build the GNU C Library:
need this version of the 'texinfo' package. Earlier versions do
not understand all the tags used in the document, and the
installation mechanism for the info files is not present or works
differently. As of release time, 'texinfo' 7.3 is the newest
differently. As of release time, 'texinfo' 7.2 is the newest
verified to work to build the GNU C Library.
* GNU 'awk' 3.1.2, or higher
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ build the GNU C Library:
'awk' is used in several places to generate files. Some 'gawk'
extensions are used, including the 'asorti' function, which was
introduced in version 3.1.2 of 'gawk'. As of release time, 'gawk'
version 5.4.1 is the newest verified to work to build the GNU C
version 5.3.2 is the newest verified to work to build the GNU C
Library.
Testing the GNU C Library requires 'gawk' to be compiled with
@@ -536,19 +536,19 @@ build the GNU C Library:
Perl is not required, but if present it is used in some tests and
the 'mtrace' program, to build the GNU C Library manual. As of
release time 'perl' version 5.44.0 is the newest verified to work
release time 'perl' version 5.42.0 is the newest verified to work
to build the GNU C Library.
* GNU 'sed' 3.02 or newer
'Sed' is used in several places to generate files. Most scripts
work with any version of 'sed'. As of release time, 'sed' version
4.10 is the newest verified to work to build the GNU C Library.
4.9 is the newest verified to work to build the GNU C Library.
* Python 3.4 or later
Python is required to build the GNU C Library. As of release time,
Python 3.14.6 is the newest verified to work for building and
Python 3.14.0 is the newest verified to work for building and
testing the GNU C Library.
* PExpect 4.0
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ components of the GNU C Library installation to be in '/lib' and some in
Library with '--prefix=/usr'. If you set some other prefix or allow it
to default to '/usr/local', then all the components are installed there.
As of release time, Linux version 7.1 is the newest stable version
As of release time, Linux version 6.12 is the newest stable version
verified to work to build the GNU C Library.
Reporting Bugs
-17
View File
@@ -782,14 +782,6 @@ run-built-tests = yes
endif
endif
# Whether the timing-sensitive test runs are serialized: each is run with
# .NOTPARALLEL and, at the top level, ordered after the rest of the test run.
# This is the default; 'make check-parallel' clears it to run every test
# concurrently.
ifndef serialize-tests
serialize-tests = yes
endif
# Whether to build the static math tests
ifndef build-math-static-tests
build-math-static-tests = no
@@ -823,15 +815,8 @@ $(subst $(empty) ,:,$(strip $(patsubst -Wl$(comma)-rpath-link=%, %,\
run-via-rtld-prefix = \
$(if $(strip $(filter $(notdir $(built-program-file)), \
$(tests-static) $(xtests-static))),, $(rtld-prefix))
# $(container-via-rtld-prefix) is like $(run-via-rtld-prefix), but for the
# support/test-container helper, which is always dynamically linked even
# when the test it launches is static. It must therefore always run
# through the newly built loader, unlike $(run-via-rtld-prefix) which is
# empty for tests listed in tests-static or xtests-static.
container-via-rtld-prefix = $(rtld-prefix)
else
run-via-rtld-prefix =
container-via-rtld-prefix =
endif
# $(run-program-env) is the default environment variable settings to
# use when running a program built with the newly built library.
@@ -898,7 +883,6 @@ endif
ifeq (yes,$(build-hardcoded-path-in-tests))
test-via-rtld-prefix =
test-container-via-rtld-prefix =
test-program-prefix-before-env = $(test-wrapper-env)
test-program-prefix-after-env =
test-program-prefix = $(test-program-prefix-before-env) $(run-program-env) \
@@ -910,7 +894,6 @@ test-program-cmd = $(test-program-cmd-before-env) $(run-program-env) \
host-test-program-cmd = $(built-program-file)
else
test-via-rtld-prefix = $(run-via-rtld-prefix)
test-container-via-rtld-prefix = $(container-via-rtld-prefix)
test-program-prefix-before-env = $(run-program-prefix-before-env)
test-program-prefix-after-env = $(run-program-prefix-after-env)
test-program-prefix = $(run-program-prefix)
+14 -198
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ configure: configure.ac aclocal.m4; $(autoconf-it)
endif # $(AUTOCONF) = no
# We don't want to run anything here in parallel.
.NOTPARALLEL:
# These are the targets that are made by making them in each subdirectory.
+subdir_targets := subdir_lib objects objs others subdir_mostlyclean \
subdir_clean subdir_distclean subdir_realclean \
@@ -126,13 +129,6 @@ lib-noranlib: subdir_lib
ifeq (yes,$(build-shared))
# Build the shared object from the PIC object library.
lib: $(common-objpfx)libc.so $(common-objpfx)linkobj/libc.so
ifdef libc.so-version
# Every program linked in the others pass lists the versioned name
# (through link-libc-between-gnulib) as a prerequisite, and the rule
# creating the symbolic link is visible in every sub-make. Build it
# here once so the concurrent sub-makes do not race to create it.
lib: $(common-objpfx)libc.so$(libc.so-version)
endif
endif # $(build-shared)
# Used to build testrun.sh.
@@ -494,159 +490,6 @@ subdir=$(@D)$(if $($(@D)-srcdir),\
endef
.PHONY: $(+subdir_targets) $(all-subdirs-targets)
# Encode the topological ordering computed by scripts/gen-sorted.awk as
# explicit dependencies between the per-subdirectory targets, so that
# independent subdirectories build concurrently. In summary:
#
# * Every subdirectory depends on the first sorted one (csu, or mach on
# Hurd): its sub-make also materializes the shared generated files in
# $(common-objpfx) (abi-versions.h, sysd-syscalls, before-compile
# headers, ...) that concurrent sub-makes would otherwise race to
# create.
#
# * The edges requested by the Depend files (emitted by gen-sorted.awk
# as subdir-deps-*) are preserved.
#
# * elf stays last for the object-building classes, as in the sorted
# list: its rtld link consumes $(common-objpfx)libc_pic.a, which
# aggregates every other subdirectory's objects, and its rtld-Rules
# recursion compiles into the other subdirectories' object
# directories. The others/tests/xtests classes have no such
# dependency (the pass barriers below provide everything they need),
# so elf is unordered there.
#
# * Only target classes without cross-directory file conflicts use this
# sparse ordering; everything else (install, clean, abi, stubs) keeps
# the previous total order via a serial chain.
+elf_last_subdir_targets := \
subdir_lib objects \
objs \
subdir_objs \
# +elf_last_subdir_targets
+parallel_subdir_targets := \
$(+elf_last_subdir_targets) \
others \
tests \
xtests \
# +parallel_subdir_targets
+serial_subdir_targets := $(filter-out $(+parallel_subdir_targets),\
$(+subdir_targets))
# The tests and xtests classes run, rather than build, the per-directory
# test programs; once the 'others' pass barrier below has built the tree
# they are mutually independent and carry no cross-directory ordering.
# Keeping them out of the generated-file and Depend edges below is what
# lets 'make subdir/tests' run only that subdirectory's tests.
+barrier_only_subdir_targets := tests xtests
+ordered_parallel_subdir_targets := \
$(filter-out $(+barrier_only_subdir_targets),$(+parallel_subdir_targets))
# The subdirectories that generate shared files in $(common-objpfx)
# consumed by the rest of the build without explicit dependencies: csu
# provides the gen-as-const headers, and on Hurd the mach and hurd
# directories generate the MiG RPC headers (every other subdirectory
# otherwise runs a nested make in hurd/ to create them, racing under
# parallel recursion; see sysdeps/mach/hurd/Makefile). Run them serially,
# in their sorted order (mach, hurd, csu).
+subdir-pregen := $(filter mach hurd csu,$(subdirs))
+subdir-rest := $(filter-out $(+subdir-pregen),$(subdirs))
$(foreach t,$(+ordered_parallel_subdir_targets),$(eval \
$(addsuffix /$(t),$(+subdir-rest)): $(addsuffix /$(t),$(+subdir-pregen))))
+subdir-pregen-prev :=
$(foreach d,$(+subdir-pregen),$(foreach t,$(+ordered_parallel_subdir_targets),$(eval \
$(d)/$(t): $(addsuffix /$(t),$(+subdir-pregen-prev))))\
$(eval +subdir-pregen-prev := $(d)))
# For the classes where elf is forced last, edges pointing to elf are
# dropped: the sorted list always overrides such Depend requests today
# (e.g. support/Depend), and the elf-last edges below would otherwise
# create a cycle. The remaining classes honor them.
$(foreach t,$(+elf_last_subdir_targets),$(foreach d,$(+subdir-rest),$(eval \
$(d)/$(t): $(addsuffix /$(t),\
$(filter-out elf,$(filter $(subdirs),$(subdir-deps-$(d))))))))
$(foreach t,$(filter-out $(+elf_last_subdir_targets),\
$(+ordered_parallel_subdir_targets)),\
$(foreach d,$(+subdir-rest),$(eval \
$(d)/$(t): $(addsuffix /$(t),$(filter $(subdirs),$(subdir-deps-$(d)))))))
ifneq (,$(filter elf,$(subdirs)))
$(foreach t,$(+elf_last_subdir_targets),$(eval \
elf/$(t): $(addsuffix /$(t),$(filter-out elf,$(subdirs)))))
endif
# The archive rules in Makerules list every stamp file as a
# prerequisite of libc_pic.a, which the elf sub-make evaluates for the
# librtld.map link, but a sub-make can only create its own directory's
# stamps. Create the top-level ones before the fan-out.
$(foreach t,$(+elf_last_subdir_targets),$(eval \
$(addsuffix /$(t),$(subdirs)): \
$(foreach o,$(object-suffixes-for-libc),$(common-objpfx)stamp$(o))))
# Pass barriers: a subdirectory 'others' build links programs against
# the libraries, so the 'lib' pass (including the top-level libc.so
# link) must have completed.
# 'tests' and 'xtests' additionally require the 'others' pass. The
# testroot used by the container tests performs a full installation in
# its recipe, which must not run concurrently with the build passes.
$(addsuffix /others,$(subdirs)): lib
$(addsuffix /tests,$(subdirs)) $(addsuffix /xtests,$(subdirs)): others
$(objpfx)testroot.pristine/install.stamp: | others
# Timing-sensitive test runs: the threading tests (nptl/htl) and the realtime
# tests (rt) are perturbed by the machine load, so run them after the rest of
# the test run has finished and one group at a time. Those subdirectories
# also serialize their own tests (.NOTPARALLEL in their Makefiles).
#
# This only orders a full-suite run ('make check'/'tests'); a targeted
# 'make subdir/tests' is left alone. And it only orders the test run
# (run-built-tests=yes); the "build the tests" pass (run-built-tests=no)
# is left fully parallel, so every test program still builds concurrently.
# serialize-tests=no ('make check-parallel') drops the ordering entirely.
ifeq ($(run-built-tests),yes)
ifeq (yes,$(serialize-tests))
ifneq (,$(filter tests xtests check xcheck,$(MAKECMDGOALS)))
+late-test-subdirs := $(filter nptl htl,$(subdirs)) $(filter rt,$(subdirs))
+test-run-prev := \
$(addsuffix /tests,$(filter-out $(+late-test-subdirs),$(subdirs)))
$(foreach d,$(+late-test-subdirs),\
$(eval $(d)/tests: $(+test-run-prev))\
$(eval +test-run-prev += $(d)/tests))
endif
endif
endif
ifeq (yes,$(build-shared))
# The top-level libc.so and linkobj/libc_pic.a rules list these
# subdirectory-built files as prerequisites, but no rule at this level
# builds them. The explicit empty recipe (';') is required, a
# prerequisite-only rule would send make on an implicitrule search and
# have this level compile them itself with the wrong context.
ifneq (,$(filter elf,$(subdirs)))
$(elf-objpfx)ld.so $(elf-objpfx)sofini.os $(elf-objpfx)interp.os: \
| elf/subdir_lib ;
endif
ifneq (,$(filter sunrpc,$(subdirs)))
# Makerules explicit adds librpc_compat_pic.a as a dependency of
# libc_pic.a.
$(common-objpfx)sunrpc/librpc_compat_pic.a: | sunrpc/subdir_lib ;
endif
# Hurd sysdedp Makeilfe links libc.so against the lib*user-link.so
# objects, built by the %-link.so: %_pic.a pattern rule from archives
# that only the mach and hurd sub-makes create.
ifneq (,$(filter mach,$(subdirs)))
$(common-objpfx)mach/libmachuser_pic.a: | mach/subdir_lib ;
endif
ifneq (,$(filter hurd,$(subdirs)))
$(common-objpfx)hurd/libhurduser_pic.a: | hurd/subdir_lib ;
endif
endif
# The remaining target classes keep the old total order.
+subdir-chain-prev :=
$(foreach d,$(subdirs),$(foreach t,$(+serial_subdir_targets),$(eval \
$(d)/$(t): $(addsuffix /$(t),$(+subdir-chain-prev))))\
$(eval +subdir-chain-prev := $(d)))
# Targets to clean things up to various degrees.
@@ -697,41 +540,26 @@ $(objpfx)check-local-headers.out: scripts/check-local-headers.sh
$(evaluate-test)
ifneq "$(headers)" ""
# Special test of all the installed headers in this directory. See
# Rules for the per-header split rationale.
# Special test of all the installed headers in this directory.
tests-special += $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c.out
libof-check-installed-headers-c := testsuite
+cih-c-iouts := $(patsubst %,$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c/%.iout,\
$(headers))
$(+cih-c-iouts): $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c/%.iout: \
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c.out: \
scripts/check-installed-headers.sh $(headers)
$(make-target-directory)
($(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CC) $(test-config-cflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$*; echo $$? > $@-ret) > $@T; \
mv -f $@T $@
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c.out: $(+cih-c-iouts)
cat $^ > $@; \
! grep -qv '^0$$' $(+cih-c-iouts:%=%-ret); \
$(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CC) $(test-config-cflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$(headers) > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
ifneq "$(CXX)" ""
tests-special += $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx.out
libof-check-installed-headers-cxx := testsuite
+cih-cxx-iouts := $(patsubst %,$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx/%.iout,\
$(headers))
$(+cih-cxx-iouts): $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx/%.iout: \
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx.out: \
scripts/check-installed-headers.sh $(headers)
$(make-target-directory)
($(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c++ $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CXX) $(test-config-cxxflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CXXFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$*; echo $$? > $@-ret) > $@T; \
mv -f $@T $@
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx.out: $(+cih-cxx-iouts)
cat $^ > $@; \
! grep -qv '^0$$' $(+cih-cxx-iouts:%=%-ret); \
$(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c++ $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CXX) $(test-config-cxxflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CXXFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$(headers) > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
endif # $(CXX)
@@ -820,13 +648,8 @@ else
LINKS_DSO_PROGRAM = links-dso-program
endif
# The testroot is only used by the container tests, which are not run
# when run-built-tests is no; skip the installation entirely in that
# case.
ifeq ($(run-built-tests),yes)
$(tests-container) $(addsuffix /tests,$(subdirs)) : \
$(objpfx)testroot.pristine/install.stamp
endif
$(objpfx)testroot.pristine/install.stamp :
test -d $(objpfx)testroot.pristine || \
mkdir $(objpfx)testroot.pristine
@@ -877,11 +700,7 @@ endif
touch $(objpfx)testroot.pristine/install.stamp
tests-special-notdir = $(patsubst $(objpfx)%, %, $(tests-special))
# The build-only first pass of the two-pass 'make check' (see Makerules)
# passes tests-summary=no: the merge and summary are left to the second
# pass, which folds in this pass's $(tests-special) results.
tests: $(tests-special)
ifneq ($(tests-summary),no)
$(..)scripts/merge-test-results.sh -s $(objpfx) "" \
$(sort $(tests-special-notdir:.out=)) \
> $(objpfx)subdir-tests.sum
@@ -889,14 +708,11 @@ ifneq ($(tests-summary),no)
$(sort $(subdirs) .) \
> $(objpfx)tests.sum
$(call summarize-tests,tests.sum)
endif
xtests:
ifneq ($(tests-summary),no)
$(..)scripts/merge-test-results.sh -t $(objpfx) subdir-xtests.sum \
$(sort $(subdirs)) \
> $(objpfx)xtests.sum
$(call summarize-tests,xtests.sum, for extra tests)
endif
# The realclean target is just like distclean for the parent, but we want
# the subdirs to know the difference in case they care.
+9 -77
View File
@@ -259,17 +259,7 @@ endif # gen-py-const-headers
ifdef gen-as-const-headers
# Generating headers for assembly constants.
# We need this defined early to get into before-compile before
# it's used in sysd-rules, below. The gen-as-const-headers is evaluated
# per subdirectory, so the before-compile dependency below only orders
# the generated header before the compiles of the subdirectory whose
# Makefile adds the .sym directive.
# The parallel subdirectory recursion does not order sibling subdirectories,
# so a .sym must be added in the subdirectory that compiles its consumers,
# or in csu (which runs before the parallel) when it has consumers in
# several subdirectories.
# It must not add the same .sym in several subdirectories though: their
# concurrent sub-makes would race generating the header through the fixed
# temporary files below.
# it's used in sysd-rules, below.
# Define GEN_AS_CONST_HEADERS to avoid circular dependency [BZ #22792].
# NB: <tcb-offsets.h> is generated from tcb-offsets.sym to define
# offsets and sizes of types in <tls.h> and maybe <pthread.h> which
@@ -312,12 +302,7 @@ lib-names-h-abi = gnu/lib-names-$(default-abi).h
lib-names-stmp-abi = gnu/lib-names-$(default-abi).stmp
before-compile += $(common-objpfx)$(lib-names-h-abi)
common-generated += gnu/lib-names.h
# The $(inst_includedir)/%.h install rules are defined only where $(headers)
# is non-empty, and with parallel subdir recursion a subdir without headers
# (e.g. csu) may run before the top level has installed the header.
ifndef subdir
install-others-nosubdir: $(inst_includedir)/$(lib-names-h-abi)
endif
$(common-objpfx)gnu/lib-names.h:
$(make-target-directory)
{ \
@@ -758,20 +743,10 @@ all-dt-files := $(foreach o,$(object-suffixes-for-libc),$(+depfiles:.d=$o.dt))
$(wildcard $(all-dt-files:.dt=.d))
# This is a funny rule in that it removes its input file.
#
# More than one make can convert the .dt files of a single object
# directory: the elf rtld-Rules recursion runs a sub-make over every
# $(rtld-subdirs) directory, concurrently with that directory's own
# sub-make under the parallel subdir recursion. Add the PID of the
# shell to the temporary name and claim the input with a rename: only
# the run that wins converts and installs the target.
%.d: %.dt
@dt=$(@:.d=.T)$$$$; \
if mv -f $< $$dt 2>/dev/null; then \
sed $(sed-remove-objpfx) $$dt > $$dt.new && \
mv -f $$dt.new $@ && \
rm -f $$dt; \
fi
@sed $(sed-remove-objpfx) $< > $(@:.d=.T) && \
mv -f $(@:.d=.T) $@ && \
rm -f $<
# Avoid the .h.d files for any .sym files whose .h files don't exist yet.
# They will be generated when they're needed, and trying too early won't work.
@@ -1209,55 +1184,12 @@ ALL_BUILD_CFLAGS = $(BUILD_CFLAGS) $(BUILD_CPPFLAGS) -D_GNU_SOURCE \
-DIS_IN_build -include $(common-objpfx)config.h
# Support the GNU standard name for this target.
# Special target xcheck runs tests which cannot be run unconditionally;
# maintainers should use this target.
.PHONY: check xcheck
# Building and running a subdirectory's tests are fused in its sub-make,
# and run-built-tests is fixed for a make instance, so the only way to
# build every test program with the recursion fully parallel while the
# run still honors the per-subdirectory .NOTPARALLEL (nptl/htl/rt) and the
# run-time ordering is to use two passes. At the top level, 'make check'
# therefore builds the test programs (run-built-tests=no, recursion fully
# parallel) and then runs them (run-built-tests=yes). 'make tests' and a
# subdirectory's own 'check' stay single-pass.
# The first pass still runs the static checks ($(tests-special): abi,
# conformtest, installed headers, ...), so tests-summary=no makes it skip
# the results merge and summary: an unexpected FAIL there would otherwise
# abort 'check' before the second pass runs any built test, and even a
# clean run would print a misleading partial summary. The .test-result
# files persist, so the second pass folds those results into the one
# complete summary at the end.
check-twopass :=
ifndef subdir
ifeq (yes,$(run-built-tests))
check-twopass := yes
endif
endif
ifeq (yes,$(check-twopass))
check:
$(MAKE) run-built-tests=no tests-summary=no tests
$(MAKE) run-built-tests=yes tests
xcheck:
$(MAKE) run-built-tests=no tests-summary=no xtests
$(MAKE) run-built-tests=yes xtests
else
.PHONY: check
check: tests
# Special target to run tests which cannot be run unconditionally.
# Maintainers should use this target.
.PHONY: xcheck
xcheck: xtests
endif
# 'make check-parallel' runs the whole suite with maximum concurrency:
# serialize-tests=no drops the per-subdirectory .NOTPARALLEL and the run-time
# ordering, so every test builds and runs in parallel. A single pass suffices
# (there is no .NOTPARALLEL to work around, so the test programs already build
# concurrently).
# This is faster on an idle machine, at the cost of possible flakiness in the
# timing-sensitive tests under the heavier load.
.PHONY: check-parallel xcheck-parallel
check-parallel:
$(MAKE) serialize-tests=no tests
xcheck-parallel:
$(MAKE) serialize-tests=no xtests
# Also handle test inputs in sysdeps.
vpath %.input $(sysdirs)
@@ -1443,7 +1375,7 @@ endef
# Also remove the dependencies and generated source files.
common-clean: common-mostlyclean
-rm -f $(addprefix $(objpfx),$(generated))
-rm -f $(objpfx)*.d $(objpfx)*.dt $(objpfx)*.T[0-9]*
-rm -f $(objpfx)*.d $(objpfx)*.dt
-rm -fr $(addprefix $(objpfx),$(generated-dirs))
-rm -f $(addprefix $(common-objpfx),$(common-generated))
-rm -f $(gen-as-const-headers:%.sym=$(common-objpfx)%.h)
+17 -163
View File
@@ -5,92 +5,48 @@ See the end for copying conditions.
Please send GNU C library bug reports via <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/>
using `glibc' in the "product" field.
Version 2.44.1
The following bugs are resolved with this release:
[34338] libc: Cancellable syscall wrappers are missing from backtraces
because they tail-call __syscall_cancel
[34438] build: non reproducible build failure: sigaltstack-offsets.h:
No such file or directory
[34439] build: parallel make install fails on multi-ABI targets: no
rule to make $(inst_includedir)/gnu/lib-names-$(abi).h in csu
[34441] math: math: sinh() returns wrong results for some inputs with
|x| > 36.736801
[34465] math: math: x86_64 tanh ifunc selection wrong
[34507] nptl: Pretty-printer tests FAIL instead of UNSUPPORTED when
cross-testing without python3 on target
[34509] libc: [m68k] Regression: Perl locks up after upgrading glibc
to 2.43
Version 2.44
Major new features:
* System-wide tunables can be applied using /etc/tunables.conf and
running ldconfig. Specific tunable settings and the
/etc/tunables.conf file format and path are not part of the stable
library interfaces and may change between releases.
* A new tunable, glibc.elf.thp, is added to map read-only segments with
Transparent Huge Pages (THP) if THP is not disabled in the kernel. When
Transparent Huge Pages (THP) if THP isn't disable in kernel. When
glibc.elf.thp is set to 1, malloc uses the actual kernel THP mode
instead of defaulting to madvise mode and madvise_thp will stop issuing
MADV_HUGEPAGE if kernel THP mode is always.
* The THP page size in malloc is capped to MAX_THP_PAGESIZE. If the THP
page size is above MAX_THP_PAGESIZE, THP in malloc is disabled.
* THP page size in malloc is capped to MAX_THP_PAGESIZE. If THP page
size is above MAX_THP_PAGESIZE, THP in malloc is disabled.
* Additional optimized and correctly rounded mathematical functions have
been imported from the CORE-MATH project, in particular cosh, sinh, and
tanh.
* Many additional improvements to existing functions have been synchronized
from the CORE-MATH project.
* The SVID handling for cosh and sinh were moved to compat symbols, allowing
improvements in performance.
* For C++26, the assert macro is now variadic, allowing more complex
arguments containing commas (which however still must evaluate to a single
value).
* The SVID error handling for cosh and sinh was moved to compatibility
symbols, allowing improvements in performance.
* New locale added: hrx_BR (Hunsrik language spoken in Brazil).
* Static PIE is now supported for arm-*-linux-gnueabi. It requires toolchain
support to correctly set the expected linker options.
* On AArch64 targets that support the Guarded Control Stack extension all GCS
* On AArch64 targets that support Guarded Control Stack extension all GCS
operations (including status, write on shadow stack, and push to shadow
stack) are locked after enabling GCS with ENFORCED or OVERRIDE GCS policy.
When a GCS operation is locked, a program cannot change this operation
status via the prctl syscall. This prevents disabling or corrupting the
GCS shadow stack during runtime.
* On AArch64 targets, log, exp, sin, cas, sinh, cosh, asinh, acosh, atanh
single and double precision special cases have been vectorized for SVE and
AdvSIMD, and vector variants of powr have been added.
* On RISC-V targets, vector extension optimized variants of memcmp, memccpy,
memchr, memcpy, memmove, stpncpy, strcmp, strchr, strcpy, strncmp, strncpy,
strlen, and strrchr have been added.
* On PowerPC, memchr optimized for Power10 has been re-added.
* Support for LoongArch32 has been added.
* Pre-built ld.so.cache files can be installed with ldconfig.
* A new locale has been added: hrx_BR (Hunsrik language spoken in Brazil).
status via prctl syscall. This prevents disabling or corrupting GCS
shadow stack during runtime.
Deprecated and removed features, and other changes affecting compatibility:
* Although malloc and related functions currently return pointers
aligned to alignof (max_align_t), the documentation now says future
versions of glibc may relax alignment requirements for small allocations.
For example, a future malloc(1) might return a pointer with odd
For example, a future malloc (1) might return a pointer with odd
alignment, because no object of size 1 can have a fundamental
alignment greater than 1.
* The s390-linux-gnu (31bit) configuration is no longer supported.
* The s390-linux-gnu (31bit) configuration is no longer supported.
* The --enable-memory-tagging configure option has been removed.
The corresponding AArch64-specific functionality that was previously
@@ -101,6 +57,10 @@ Deprecated and removed features, and other changes affecting compatibility:
remaining behavior was to suppress the link-time warnings on the NSS
interface functions in libc.a, which are now emitted unconditionally.
Changes to build and runtime requirements:
[Add changes to build and runtime requirements here]
Security related changes:
The following CVEs were fixed in this release, details of which can be
@@ -120,114 +80,8 @@ found in the advisories directory of the release tarball:
The following bugs were resolved with this release:
[2363] libc: EOPNOTSUPP and ENOTSUP in errno.h must be different,
according to SUSv3
[3794] manual: iconv: //TRANSLIT and //IGNORE feature not documented
[15792] dynamic-link: [arm] ARM dynamic linker should save/restore
coprocessor registers
[20331] libc: fts ignores errors from readdir()
[20680] dynamic-link: ifunc resolver cannot access the thread pointer
with static linking
[22944] libc: fts cannot traverse paths which have a length longer
than USHRT_MAX
[25257] libc: sotruss: fix error message for '--f' argument
[25770] locale: newlocale memory leak in LOCPATH parsing and on error
paths
[27582] libc: x86_64: IFUNC in static user programs may crash when
built with -fstack-protector-all
[28218] dynamic-link: ld.so: ifunc resolver calls a lazy PLT. When
does it work?
[28817] libc: static-pie ifunc resolver tls failure
[28940] nss: __nss_database_get doesn't check for allocation failure
[30136] manual: Please document behaviour of iconv(3) when input is
untranslatable
[30304] nptl: nptl/tst-pthread-gdb-attach test fails with new libc
shared library version
[30769] malloc: malloc_trim is not working correctly for arenas other
than arena 0
[30976] dynamic-link: rtld: resolve ifunc relocations after
JUMP_SLOT/GLOB_DAT/etc
[30992] libc: alpha: setrlimit() with negative values besides
RLIM_INFINITY returns EPERM
[31901] libc: elf/tst-glibc-hwcaps-prepend-cache fails on i686
[33226] math: math-vector-fortran.h vs not ffast-math
[33626] libc: execvpe should skip inaccessible $PATH components
[33650] build: abilist.awk doesn't handle unversioned defined symbols
[33785] stdio: New streams are linked into global list before they are
fully initialized
[33848] build: Build fails at openat2.h, redefinition of 'struct
open_how'
[33882] libc: Recursion in nftw() causes stack overflow(CWE-674)
[33904] build: error: '__vasprintf_chk' undeclared here
[33921] build: Building with Linux-7.0-rc1 errors on OPEN_TREE_CLONE
[33935] stdio: _IO_wfile_doallocate not linked correctly when linking
glibc statically
[33980] locale: iconv: ibm139x trigger assertion error when converting
to internal while lack enough room (CVE-2026-4046)
[33985] build: ld: cannot find -lgcc_s: No such file or directory
[33999] stdio: libio: potential dangling _IO_save_base or memory leak
in wgenops.c
[34006] stdio: libio: inconsistent fmemopen_write behavior on last \0
[34008] stdio: stdio-common: scanf %mc pattern will cause heap
overflow when width > 1024
[34014] nss: gethostbyaddr and gethostbyaddr_r may incorrectly handle
DNS response
[34015] nss: gethostbyaddr and gethostbyaddr_r return invalid DNS
hostnames
[34019] stdio: libio: undefined behavior when setbuf on open_memstream
[34033] network: resolv/ns_print.c: ns_sprintrrf TSIG path bypasses
buflen and can overflow caller buffer
[34064] dynamic-link: The unnecessary PT_NOTE check in when loading a
binary
[34069] network: Buffer overread in ns_sprintrrf with corrupted RDATA
field (CVE-2026-6238)
[34070] hurd: Calling open ("/dev/tty/", O_RDONLY) causes the program
to segfault
[34073] regex: regexec can mistakenly match with backrefs and the $
anchor
[34079] dynamic-link: THP segment load aligns all PT_LOAD segments to
THP page size
[34080] dynamic-link: Support THP segment load with THP enabled with
madvise
[34083] dynamic-link: __get_thp_mode and __get_thp_size are called
twice
[34090] libc: wordexp WRDE_APPEND rollback restores stale we_wordv,
leading to invalid free in wordfree
[34098] libc: Missing SUPPORT_STATIC_PIE in arm32
[34129] string: x86: Non-temporal memset unreachable on AMD Zen 3/4/5
[34144] libc: ld.so clobbers VFP registers during runtime linking
[34154] network: Segfault in sock_eq after res_init() returns -1, due
to stale _u._ext.nscount in __res_iclose
[34156] dynamic-link: dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT, ...) from a constructor
SIGSEGVs when tail-called
[34164] dynamic-link: elf: IFUNC resolvers do not see static TLS
initialization
[34170] dynamic-link: elf: IFUNC resolver reading global-
dynamic/TLSDESC __thread variable crashes inside __tls_get_addr
[34183] math: fma produces wrong results
[34192] nptl: pthread_setname_np opens /proc/<tid>/comm with O_RDWR
instead of O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC
[34196] libc: elf: static dlopen: pointer guard of the loaded
ld.so/libc.so is left uninitialized
[34197] dynamic-link: elf: Stack canary and pointer guard are
recoverable from AT_RANDOM (getauxval)
[34205] libc: aarch64: SIGSEGV in tunable_strcmp in static-pie
binaries run with a string tunable
[34208] stdio: scanf not pushback after matching failure
[34210] libc: elf/tst-glibc-hwcaps-prepend-cache fails on
armv7a-unknown-linux-gnueabihf
[34236] locale: Non-representable transliteration still causes iconv
to exit with 1 if //TRANSLIT is specified
[34289] network: ns_sprintrrf uses p_class, p_type internally
[34311] build: THP tests failed to link
[34347] libc: Incorrect trailing bitfield word of struct tcp_info
[34348] dynamic-link: FAIL: elf/tst-thp-1 if THP is disabled in kernel
[34351] build: Random test failures
[34355] build: [2.44 Regression] "make check -j7 subdirs=stdio-common"
no longer works
[34396] libc: sparc64-unknown-linux-gnu , Gentoo: >200 test failures,
SIGILL in many binaries
[34398] string: Truncated strncpy on s390x z900 ifunc variant
[The release manager will add the list generated by
scripts/list-fixed-bugs.py just before the release.]
Version 2.43
+14 -31
View File
@@ -80,24 +80,15 @@ common-generated += dummy.o dummy.c
ifneq "$(headers)" ""
# Test that all of the headers installed by this directory can be compiled
# in isolation. Each header gets its own intermediate target so that the
# it can run concurrently under -j; the .out target concatenates the per-header
# results in the original $(headers) order.
# in isolation.
tests-special += $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c.out
libof-check-installed-headers-c := testsuite
+cih-c-iouts := $(patsubst %,$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c/%.iout,\
$(headers))
$(+cih-c-iouts): $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c/%.iout: \
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c.out: \
$(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh $(headers)
$(make-target-directory)
($(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CC) $(test-config-cflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$*; echo $$? > $@-ret) > $@T; \
mv -f $@T $@
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-c.out: $(+cih-c-iouts)
cat $^ > $@; \
! grep -qv '^0$$' $(+cih-c-iouts:%=%-ret); \
$(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CC) $(test-config-cflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$(headers) > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
ifneq "$(CXX)" ""
@@ -105,19 +96,12 @@ ifneq "$(CXX)" ""
# in isolation as C++.
tests-special += $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx.out
libof-check-installed-headers-cxx := testsuite
+cih-cxx-iouts := $(patsubst %,$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx/%.iout,\
$(headers))
$(+cih-cxx-iouts): $(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx/%.iout: \
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx.out: \
$(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh $(headers)
$(make-target-directory)
($(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c++ $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CXX) $(test-config-cxxflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CXXFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$*; echo $$? > $@-ret) > $@T; \
mv -f $@T $@
$(objpfx)check-installed-headers-cxx.out: $(+cih-cxx-iouts)
cat $^ > $@; \
! grep -qv '^0$$' $(+cih-cxx-iouts:%=%-ret); \
$(SHELL) $(..)scripts/check-installed-headers.sh c++ $(supported-fortify) \
"$(CXX) $(test-config-cxxflags-finput-charset-ascii) \
$(filter-out -std=%,$(CXXFLAGS)) -D_ISOMAC $(+includes)" \
$(headers) > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
endif # $(CXX)
@@ -429,7 +413,7 @@ $(objpfx)%.out: /dev/null $(objpfx)% # Make it 2nd arg for canned sequence.
# and pid namespaces) in which to run, should be added to
# tests-container.
$(tests-container:%=$(objpfx)%.out): $(objpfx)%.out : $(if $(wildcard $(objpfx)%.files),$(objpfx)%.files,/dev/null) $(objpfx)%
$(test-wrapper-env) $(run-program-env) $(test-container-via-rtld-prefix) \
$(test-wrapper-env) $(run-program-env) $(test-via-rtld-prefix) \
$(common-objpfx)support/test-container env $(run-program-env) $($*-ENV) $(test-tunables) \
$(host-test-program-cmd) $($*-ARGS) > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
@@ -467,9 +451,8 @@ py-env := PYTHONPATH=$(py-const-dir):$(..)scripts:$${PYTHONPATH}
# The pretty printer files and test_common_printers.py must be present for all.
$(tests-printers-out): $(objpfx)%.out: $(objpfx)% %.py %.c $(pretty-printers) \
$(..)scripts/test_printers_common.py
$(test-wrapper-env) $(py-env) sh -c \
'command -v $(firstword $(PYTHON)) > /dev/null 2>&1 || exit 77; \
exec $(PYTHON) $*.py $*.c $(objpfx)$* $(pretty-printers)' > $@; \
$(test-wrapper-env) $(py-env) \
$(PYTHON) $*.py $*.c $(objpfx)$* $(pretty-printers) > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
endif
+1 -1
View File
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ core-math:
sysdeps/ieee754/dbl-64/s_erf.c
# src/binary64/erfc/erfc.c, revision 55e9869e
sysdeps/ieee754/dbl-64/s_erfc.c
# src/binary64/tanh/tanh.c, revision cf237fa0
# src/binary64/tanh/tanh.c, revision 8ea8ea35
sysdeps/ieee754/dbl-64/s_tanh.c
# src/binary32/acos/acosf.c, revision 56dd347
sysdeps/ieee754/flt-32/e_acosf.c
+14
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@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
printf: incorrect output for integers with thousands separator and width field
When the printf family of functions is called with a format specifier
that uses an <apostrophe> (enable grouping) and a minimum width
specifier, the resulting output could be larger than reasonably expected
by a caller that computed a tight bound on the buffer size. The
resulting larger than expected output could result in a buffer overflow
in the printf family of functions.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-25139
Public-Date: 2023-02-02
Vulnerable-Commit: e88b9f0e5cc50cab57a299dc7efe1a4eb385161d (2.37)
Fix-Commit: c980549cc6a1c03c23cc2fe3e7b0fe626a0364b0 (2.38)
Fix-Commit: 07b9521fc6369d000216b96562ff7c0ed32a16c4 (2.37-4)
+15
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
getaddrinfo: Stack read overflow in no-aaaa mode
If the system is configured in no-aaaa mode via /etc/resolv.conf,
getaddrinfo is called for the AF_UNSPEC address family, and a DNS
response is received over TCP that is larger than 2048 bytes,
getaddrinfo may potentially disclose stack contents via the returned
address data, or crash.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4527
Public-Date: 2023-09-12
Vulnerable-Commit: f282cdbe7f436c75864e5640a409a10485e9abb2 (2.36)
Fix-Commit: bd77dd7e73e3530203be1c52c8a29d08270cb25d (2.39)
Fix-Commit: 4ea972b7edd7e36610e8cde18bf7a8149d7bac4f (2.36-113)
Fix-Commit: b7529346025a130fee483d42178b5c118da971bb (2.37-38)
Fix-Commit: b25508dd774b617f99419bdc3cf2ace4560cd2d6 (2.38-19)
+15
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
getaddrinfo: Potential use-after-free
When an NSS plugin only implements the _gethostbyname2_r and
_getcanonname_r callbacks, getaddrinfo could use memory that was freed
during buffer resizing, potentially causing a crash or read or write to
arbitrary memory.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4806
Public-Date: 2023-09-12
Fix-Commit: 973fe93a5675c42798b2161c6f29c01b0e243994 (2.39)
Fix-Commit: e09ee267c03e3150c2c9ba28625ab130705a485e (2.34-420)
Fix-Commit: e3ccb230a961b4797510e6a1f5f21fd9021853e7 (2.35-270)
Fix-Commit: a9728f798ec7f05454c95637ee6581afaa9b487d (2.36-115)
Fix-Commit: 6529a7466c935f36e9006b854d6f4e1d4876f942 (2.37-39)
Fix-Commit: 00ae4f10b504bc4564e9f22f00907093f1ab9338 (2.38-20)
+16
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
tunables: local privilege escalation through buffer overflow
If a tunable of the form NAME=NAME=VAL is passed in the environment of a
setuid program and NAME is valid, it may result in a buffer overflow,
which could be exploited to achieve escalated privileges. This flaw was
introduced in glibc 2.34.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-4911
Public-Date: 2023-10-03
Vulnerable-Commit: 2ed18c5b534d9e92fc006202a5af0df6b72e7aca (2.34)
Fix-Commit: 1056e5b4c3f2d90ed2b4a55f96add28da2f4c8fa (2.39)
Fix-Commit: dcc367f148bc92e7f3778a125f7a416b093964d9 (2.34-423)
Fix-Commit: c84018a05aec80f5ee6f682db0da1130b0196aef (2.35-274)
Fix-Commit: 22955ad85186ee05834e47e665056148ca07699c (2.36-118)
Fix-Commit: b4e23c75aea756b4bddc4abcf27a1c6dca8b6bd3 (2.37-45)
Fix-Commit: 750a45a783906a19591fb8ff6b7841470f1f5701 (2.38-27)
+18
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
getaddrinfo: DoS due to memory leak
The fix for CVE-2023-4806 introduced a memory leak when an application
calls getaddrinfo for AF_INET6 with AI_CANONNAME, AI_ALL and AI_V4MAPPED
flags set.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-5156
Public-Date: 2023-09-25
Vulnerable-Commit: e09ee267c03e3150c2c9ba28625ab130705a485e (2.34-420)
Vulnerable-Commit: e3ccb230a961b4797510e6a1f5f21fd9021853e7 (2.35-270)
Vulnerable-Commit: a9728f798ec7f05454c95637ee6581afaa9b487d (2.36-115)
Vulnerable-Commit: 6529a7466c935f36e9006b854d6f4e1d4876f942 (2.37-39)
Vulnerable-Commit: 00ae4f10b504bc4564e9f22f00907093f1ab9338 (2.38-20)
Fix-Commit: 8006457ab7e1cd556b919f477348a96fe88f2e49 (2.34-421)
Fix-Commit: 17092c0311f954e6f3c010f73ce3a78c24ac279a (2.35-272)
Fix-Commit: 856bac55f98dc840e7c27cfa82262b933385de90 (2.36-116)
Fix-Commit: 4473d1b87d04b25cdd0e0354814eeaa421328268 (2.37-42)
Fix-Commit: 5ee59ca371b99984232d7584fe2b1a758b4421d3 (2.38-24)
+15
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
syslog: Heap buffer overflow in __vsyslog_internal
__vsyslog_internal did not handle a case where printing a SYSLOG_HEADER
containing a long program name failed to update the required buffer
size, leading to the allocation and overflow of a too-small buffer on
the heap.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6246
Public-Date: 2024-01-30
Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37)
Fix-Commit: 6bd0e4efcc78f3c0115e5ea9739a1642807450da (2.39)
Fix-Commit: 23514c72b780f3da097ecf33a793b7ba9c2070d2 (2.38-42)
Fix-Commit: 97a4292aa4a2642e251472b878d0ec4c46a0e59a (2.37-57)
Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16)
Fix-Commit: d1a83b6767f68b3cb5b4b4ea2617254acd040c82 (2.36-126)
+15
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
syslog: Heap buffer overflow in __vsyslog_internal
__vsyslog_internal used the return value of snprintf/vsnprintf to
calculate buffer sizes for memory allocation. If these functions (for
any reason) failed and returned -1, the resulting buffer would be too
small to hold output.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6779
Public-Date: 2024-01-30
Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37)
Fix-Commit: 7e5a0c286da33159d47d0122007aac016f3e02cd (2.39)
Fix-Commit: d0338312aace5bbfef85e03055e1212dd0e49578 (2.38-43)
Fix-Commit: 67062eccd9a65d7fda9976a56aeaaf6c25a80214 (2.37-58)
Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16)
Fix-Commit: 2bc9d7c002bdac38b5c2a3f11b78e309d7765b83 (2.36-127)
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
syslog: Integer overflow in __vsyslog_internal
__vsyslog_internal calculated a buffer size by adding two integers, but
did not first check if the addition would overflow.
CVE-Id: CVE-2023-6780
Public-Date: 2024-01-30
Vulnerable-Commit: 52a5be0df411ef3ff45c10c7c308cb92993d15b1 (2.37)
Fix-Commit: ddf542da94caf97ff43cc2875c88749880b7259b (2.39)
Fix-Commit: d37c2b20a4787463d192b32041c3406c2bd91de0 (2.38-44)
Fix-Commit: 2b58cba076e912961ceaa5fa58588e4b10f791c0 (2.37-59)
Vulnerable-Commit: b0e7888d1fa2dbd2d9e1645ec8c796abf78880b9 (2.36-16)
Fix-Commit: b9b7d6a27aa0632f334352fa400771115b3c69b7 (2.36-128)
+28
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
ISO-2022-CN-EXT: fix out-of-bound writes when writing escape sequence
The iconv() function in the GNU C Library versions 2.39 and older may
overflow the output buffer passed to it by up to 4 bytes when converting
strings to the ISO-2022-CN-EXT character set, which may be used to
crash an application or overwrite a neighbouring variable.
ISO-2022-CN-EXT uses escape sequences to indicate character set changes
(as specified by RFC 1922). While the SOdesignation has the expected
bounds checks, neither SS2designation nor SS3designation have its;
allowing a write overflow of 1, 2, or 3 bytes with fixed values:
'$+I', '$+J', '$+K', '$+L', '$+M', or '$*H'.
CVE-Id: CVE-2024-2961
Public-Date: 2024-04-17
Vulnerable-Commit: 755104edc75c53f4a0e7440334e944ad3c6b32fc (2.1.93-169)
Fix-Commit: f9dc609e06b1136bb0408be9605ce7973a767ada (2.40)
Fix-Commit: 31da30f23cddd36db29d5b6a1c7619361b271fb4 (2.39-31)
Fix-Commit: e1135387deded5d73924f6ca20c72a35dc8e1bda (2.38-66)
Fix-Commit: 89ce64b269a897a7780e4c73a7412016381c6ecf (2.37-89)
Fix-Commit: 4ed98540a7fd19f458287e783ae59c41e64df7b5 (2.36-164)
Fix-Commit: 36280d1ce5e245aabefb877fe4d3c6cff95dabfa (2.35-315)
Fix-Commit: a8b0561db4b9847ebfbfec20075697d5492a363c (2.34-459)
Fix-Commit: ed4f16ff6bed3037266f1fa682ebd32a18fce29c (2.33-263)
Fix-Commit: 682ad4c8623e611a971839990ceef00346289cc9 (2.32-140)
Fix-Commit: 3703c32a8d304c1ee12126134ce69be965f38000 (2.31-154)
Reported-By: Charles Fol
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nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache
If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) fixed size cache is exhausted
by client requests then a subsequent client request for netgroup data
may result in a stack-based buffer overflow. This flaw was introduced
in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33599
Public-Date: 2024-04-23
Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
Fix-Commit: 69c58d5ef9f584ea198bd00f7964d364d0e6b921 (2.31-155)
Fix-Commit: a77064893bfe8a701770e2f53a4d33805bc47a5a (2.32-141)
Fix-Commit: 5c75001a96abcd50cbdb74df24c3f013188d076e (2.33-264)
Fix-Commit: 52f73e5c4e29b14e79167272297977f360ae1e97 (2.34-460)
Fix-Commit: 7a95873543ce225376faf13bb71c43dea6d24f86 (2.35-316)
Fix-Commit: caa3151ca460bdd9330adeedd68c3112d97bffe4 (2.36-165)
Fix-Commit: f75c298e747b2b8b41b1c2f551c011a52c41bfd1 (2.37-91)
Fix-Commit: 5968aebb86164034b8f8421b4abab2f837a5bdaf (2.38-72)
Fix-Commit: 1263d583d2e28afb8be53f8d6922f0842036f35d (2.39-35)
Fix-Commit: 87801a8fd06db1d654eea3e4f7626ff476a9bdaa (2.40)
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nscd: Null pointer crash after notfound response
If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) cache fails to add a not-found
netgroup response to the cache, the client request can result in a null
pointer dereference. This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the
cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33600
Public-Date: 2024-04-24
Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
Fix-Commit: b048a482f088e53144d26a61c390bed0210f49f2 (2.40)
Fix-Commit: 7835b00dbce53c3c87bbbb1754a95fb5e58187aa (2.40)
Fix-Commit: c99f886de54446cd4447db6b44be93dabbdc2f8b (2.39-37)
Fix-Commit: 5a508e0b508c8ad53bd0d2fb48fd71b242626341 (2.39-36)
Fix-Commit: 2ae9446c1b7a3064743b4a51c0bbae668ee43e4c (2.38-74)
Fix-Commit: 541ea5172aa658c4bd5c6c6d6fd13903c3d5bb0a (2.38-73)
Fix-Commit: a8070b31043c7585c36ba68a74298c4f7af075c3 (2.37-93)
Fix-Commit: 5eea50c4402e39588de98aa1d4469a79774703d4 (2.37-92)
Fix-Commit: f205b3af56740e3b014915b1bd3b162afe3407ef (2.36-167)
Fix-Commit: c34f470a615b136170abd16142da5dd0c024f7d1 (2.36-166)
Fix-Commit: bafadc589fbe21ae330e8c2af74db9da44a17660 (2.35-318)
Fix-Commit: 4370bef52b0f3f3652c6aa13d7a9bb3ac079746d (2.35-317)
Fix-Commit: 1f94122289a9bf7dba573f5d60327aaa2b85cf2e (2.34-462)
Fix-Commit: 966d6ac9e40222b84bb21674cc4f83c8d72a5a26 (2.34-461)
Fix-Commit: e3eef1b8fbdd3a7917af466ca9c4b7477251ca79 (2.33-266)
Fix-Commit: f20a8d696b13c6261b52a6434899121f8b19d5a7 (2.33-265)
Fix-Commit: be602180146de37582a3da3a0caa4b719645de9c (2.32-143)
Fix-Commit: 394eae338199078b7961b051c191539870742d7b (2.32-142)
Fix-Commit: 8d7949183760170c61e55def723c1d8050187874 (2.31-157)
Fix-Commit: 304ce5fe466c4762b21b36c26926a4657b59b53e (2.31-156)
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nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure
The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or
xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory
allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients. The
flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
Subsequent refactoring of the netgroup cache only added more uses of
xmalloc and xrealloc. Uses of xmalloc and xrealloc in other parts of
nscd only occur during startup of the daemon and so are not affected by
client requests that could trigger an out of memory followed by
termination.
CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33601
Public-Date: 2024-04-24
Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
Fix-Commit: c04a21e050d64a1193a6daab872bca2528bda44b (2.40)
Fix-Commit: a9a8d3eebb145779a18d90e3966009a1daa63cd8 (2.39-38)
Fix-Commit: 71af8ca864345d39b746d5cee84b94b430fad5db (2.38-75)
Fix-Commit: 6e106dc214d6a033a4e945d1c6cf58061f1c5f1f (2.37-94)
Fix-Commit: b6742463694b1dfdd5120b91ee21cf05d15ec2e2 (2.36-168)
Fix-Commit: 7a5864cac60e06000394128a5a2817b03542f5a3 (2.35-319)
Fix-Commit: 86f1d5f4129c373ac6fb6df5bcf38273838843cb (2.34-463)
Fix-Commit: 4d27d4b9a188786fc6a56745506cec2acfc51f83 (2.33-267)
Fix-Commit: 3ed195a8ec89da281e3c4bf887a13d281b72d8f4 (2.32-144)
Fix-Commit: bbf5a58ccb55679217f94de706164d15372fbbc0 (2.31-158)
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nscd: netgroup cache assumes NSS callback uses in-buffer strings
The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache can corrupt memory
when the NSS callback does not store all strings in the provided buffer.
The flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
There is no guarantee from the NSS callback API that the returned
strings are all within the buffer. However, the netgroup cache code
assumes that the NSS callback uses in-buffer strings and if it doesn't
the buffer resizing logic could lead to potential memory corruption.
CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33602
Public-Date: 2024-04-24
Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
Fix-Commit: c04a21e050d64a1193a6daab872bca2528bda44b (2.40)
Fix-Commit: a9a8d3eebb145779a18d90e3966009a1daa63cd8 (2.39-38)
Fix-Commit: 71af8ca864345d39b746d5cee84b94b430fad5db (2.38-75)
Fix-Commit: 6e106dc214d6a033a4e945d1c6cf58061f1c5f1f (2.37-94)
Fix-Commit: b6742463694b1dfdd5120b91ee21cf05d15ec2e2 (2.36-168)
Fix-Commit: 7a5864cac60e06000394128a5a2817b03542f5a3 (2.35-319)
Fix-Commit: 86f1d5f4129c373ac6fb6df5bcf38273838843cb (2.34-463)
Fix-Commit: 4d27d4b9a188786fc6a56745506cec2acfc51f83 (2.33-267)
Fix-Commit: 3ed195a8ec89da281e3c4bf887a13d281b72d8f4 (2.32-144)
Fix-Commit: bbf5a58ccb55679217f94de706164d15372fbbc0 (2.31-158)
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assert: Buffer overflow when printing assertion failure message
When the assert() function fails, it does not allocate enough space for the
assertion failure message string and size information, which may lead to a
buffer overflow if the message string size aligns to page size.
This bug can be triggered when an assertion in a program fails. The assertion
failure message is allocated to allow developers to see this failure in core
dumps and it typically includes, in addition to the invariant assertion
string and function name, the name of the program. If the name of the failing
program is user controlled, for example on a local system, this could allow an
attacker to control the assertion failure to trigger this buffer overflow.
The only viable vector for exploitation of this bug is local, if a setuid
program exists that has an existing bug that results in an assertion failure.
No such program has been discovered at the time of publishing this advisory,
but the presence of custom setuid programs, although strongly discouraged as a
security practice, cannot be discounted.
CVE-Id: CVE-2025-0395
Public-Date: 2025-01-22
Vulnerable-Commit: f8a3b5bf8fa1d0c43d2458e03cc109a04fdef194 (2.13-175)
Fix-Commit: 68ee0f704cb81e9ad0a78c644a83e1e9cd2ee578 (2.41)
Fix-Commit: cdb9ba84191ce72e86346fb8b1d906e7cd930ea2 (2.42)
Fix-Commit: 69fda28279b497bd405fdd442a6d8e4d3d5f681b (2.41-7)
Fix-Commit: 7d4b6bcae91f29d7b4daf15bab06b66cf1d2217c (2.40-66)
Fix-Commit: d6c156c326999f144cb5b73d29982108d549ad8a (2.40-71)
Fix-Commit: 808a84a8b81468b517a4d721fdc62069cb8c211f (2.39-146)
Fix-Commit: f6d48470aef9264d2d56f4c4533eb76db7f9c2e4 (2.39-150)
Fix-Commit: c32fd59314c343db88c3ea4a203870481d33c3d2 (2.38-122)
Fix-Commit: f984e2d7e8299726891a1a497a3c36cd5542a0bf (2.38-124)
Fix-Commit: a3d7865b098a3a67c44f7812208d9ce4718873ba (2.37-143)
Fix-Commit: b989519fe1683c204ac24ec92830e3fe3bfaccad (2.37-146)
Fix-Commit: 7971add7ee4171fdd8dfd17e7c04c4ed77a18845 (2.36-216)
Fix-Commit: 0487893d5c5bc6710d83d7c3152d888a0339559e (2.36-219)
Fix-Commit: 8b5d4be762419c4f6176261c6fea40ac559b88dc (2.35-370)
Fix-Commit: 8b3d09dc0d350191985f9d291cc30ce96f034b49 (2.35-373)
Fix-Commit: df4e1f4a5096b385c9bcc94424cf2eaa227b3761 (2.34-500)
Fix-Commit: 31eb872cb21449832ab47ad5db83281d240e1d03 (2.34-503)
Reported-By: Qualys Security Advisory
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elf: static setuid binary dlopen may incorrectly search LD_LIBRARY_PATH
A statically linked setuid binary that calls dlopen (including internal
dlopen calls after setlocale or calls to NSS functions such as getaddrinfo)
may incorrectly search LD_LIBRARY_PATH to determine which library to load,
leading to the execution of library code that is attacker controlled.
The only viable vector for exploitation of this bug is local, if a static
setuid program exists, and that program calls dlopen, then it may search
LD_LIBRARY_PATH to locate the SONAME to load. No such program has been
discovered at the time of publishing this advisory, but the presence of
custom setuid programs, although strongly discouraged as a security
practice, cannot be discounted.
CVE-Id: CVE-2025-4802
Public-Date: 2025-05-16
Vulnerable-Commit: 10e93d968716ab82931d593bada121c17c0a4b93 (2.27)
Fix-Commit: 5451fa962cd0a90a0e2ec1d8910a559ace02bba0 (2.39)
Fix-Commit: 3be3728df2f1912c80abd3288bc6e3a25ad679e4 (2.38-132)
Fix-Commit: 7403ede2d7752e59e0c47d5d33d73c2bf850e7be (2.37-154)
Fix-Commit: 2ef7850279b2931caf6d6d6743ebaa91839e1cf7 (2.36-227)
Fix-Commit: 621c65ccf12ddd415ceeb2234423bd1acd0fabb3 (2.35-387)
Fix-Commit: 35018c0fd20eac9ceaf60060fed2745b3177359d (2.34-517)
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power10: strcmp fails to save and restore nonvolatile vector registers
The Power 10 implementation of strcmp in
sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/le/power10/strcmp.S failed to save/restore
nonvolatile vector registers in the 32-byte aligned loop path. This
results in callers reading content from those registers in a different
context, potentially altering program logic.
There could be a program context where a user controlled string could
leak through strcmp into program code, thus altering its logic. There
is also a potential for sensitive strings passed into strcmp leaking
through the clobbered registers into parts of the calling program that
should otherwise not have had access to those strings.
The impact of this flaw is limited to applications running on Power 10
hardware that use the nonvolatile vector registers, i.e. v20 to v31
assuming that they have been treated in accordance with the OpenPower
psABI. It is possible to work around the issue for those specific
applications by setting the glibc.cpu.hwcaps tunable to "-arch_3_1" like
so:
export GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.hwcaps=-arch_3_1
CVE-Id: CVE-2025-5702
Public-Date: 2025-06-04
Vulnerable-Commit: 3367d8e180848030d1646f088759f02b8dfe0d6f (2.39)
Fix-Commit: 15808c77b35319e67ee0dc8f984a9a1a434701bc (2.42)
Fix-Commit: 0c76c951620f9e12df2a89b2c684878b55bb6795 (2.41-60)
Fix-Commit: 7e12550b8e3a11764a4a9090ce6bd3fc23fc8a8e (2.40-139)
Fix-Commit: 06a70769fd0b2e1f2a3085ad50ab620282bd77b3 (2.39-209)
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power10: strncmp fails to save and restore nonvolatile vector registers
The Power 10 implementation of strncmp in
sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/le/power10/strncmp.S failed to save/restore
nonvolatile vector registers in the 32-byte aligned loop path. This
results in callers reading content from those registers in a different
context, potentially altering program logic.
There could be a program context where a user controlled string could
leak through strncmp into program code, thus altering its logic. There
is also a potential for sensitive strings passed into strncmp leaking
through the clobbered registers into parts of the calling program that
should otherwise not have had access to those strings.
The impact of this flaw is limited to applications running on Power 10
hardware that use the nonvolatile vector registers, i.e. v20 to v31
assuming that they have been treated in accordance with the OpenPower
psABI. It is possible to work around the issue for those specific
applications by setting the glibc.cpu.hwcaps tunable to "-arch_3_1" like
so:
export GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.hwcaps=-arch_3_1
CVE-Id: CVE-2025-5745
Public-Date: 2025-06-05
Vulnerable-Commit: 23f0d81608d0ca6379894ef81670cf30af7fd081 (2.40)
Fix-Commit: 63c60101ce7c5eac42be90f698ba02099b41b965 (2.42)
Fix-Commit: 84bdbf8a6f2fdafd3661489dbb7f79835a52da82 (2.41-57)
Fix-Commit: 42a5a940c974d02540c8da26d6374c744d148cb9 (2.40-136)
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posix: Fix double-free after allocation failure in regcomp
The regcomp function in the GNU C library version from 2.4 to 2.41 is
subject to a double free if some previous allocation fails. It can be
accomplished either by a malloc failure or by using an interposed
malloc that injects random malloc failures. The double free can allow
buffer manipulation depending of how the regex is constructed.
This issue affects all architectures and ABIs supported by the GNU C
library.
CVE-Id: CVE-2025-8058
Public-Date: 2025-07-22
Vulnerable-Commit: 963d8d782fc98fb6dc3a66f0068795f9920c269d (2.3.3-1596)
Fix-Commit: 7ea06e994093fa0bcca0d0ee2c1db271d8d7885d (2.42)
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Integer overflow in memalign leads to heap corruption
Passing too large an alignment to the memalign suite of functions
(memalign, posix_memalign, aligned_alloc) in the GNU C Library version
2.30 to 2.42 may result in an integer overflow, which could consequently
result in a heap corruption.
Note that the attacker must have control over both, the size as well as
the alignment arguments of the memalign function to be able to exploit
this. The size parameter must be close enough to PTRDIFF_MAX so as to
overflow size_t along with the large alignment argument. This limits
the malicious inputs for the alignment for memalign to the range [1<<62
+ 1, 1<<63] and exactly 1<<63 for posix_memalign and aligned_alloc.
Typically the alignment argument passed to such functions is a known
constrained quantity (e.g. page size, block size, struct sizes) and is
not attacker controlled, because of which this may not be easily
exploitable in practice. An application bug could potentially result in
the input alignment being too large, e.g. due to a different buffer
overflow or integer overflow in the application or its dependent
libraries, but that is again an uncommon usage pattern given typical
sources of alignments.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-0861
Public-Date: 2026-01-14
Vulnerable-Commit: 9bf8e29ca136094f73f69f725f15c51facc97206 (2.30)
Fix-Commit: c9188d333717d3ceb7e3020011651f424f749f93 (2.43)
Fix-Commit: 7f19ef14fbce095d4c77395e258320cad2ea2b28 (2.30-153)
Fix-Commit: f18446d7b4a423090ee5e328c36b3c2a0f26041c (2.31-166)
Fix-Commit: 8aef9e7a7af9565c0324b4ecb38b30dfa3782fd8 (2.32-151)
Fix-Commit: 011293b4fd748cdd6f95874ba2b6aba9a3df8bff (2.33-275)
Fix-Commit: 2c77e52108a58956c9f674b36e1f59a4e3fdcf4d (2.34-525)
Fix-Commit: 499d1ccafccfe64df1b88deea2fa84d8180e8e8f (2.35-399)
Fix-Commit: fb6b8822175769b5794fb6ea04f2895483a29b61 (2.36-244)
Fix-Commit: 7b913d41a07836def826f2164c52541a9835f324 (2.37-172)
Fix-Commit: 744b63026a29f7eedbbc8e3a01a7f48a6eb0a085 (2.38-212)
Fix-Commit: fb22fd3f5b415dd4cd6f7b5741c2f0412374e242 (2.39-286)
Fix-Commit: bfc4dd9e526eacf3017dd8864ba0848e9d045dd4 (2.40-216)
Fix-Commit: 1e2c1ea4307197ccece0cda574bcfebf9080894c (2.41-121)
Fix-Commit: b0ec8fb689df862171f0f78994a3bdeb51313545 (2.42-49)
Reported-by: Igor Morgenstern, Aisle Research
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getnetbyaddr and getnetbyaddr_r leak stack contents to DNS resovler
Calling getnetbyaddr or getnetbyaddr_r with a configured nsswitch.conf
that specifies the library's DNS backend for networks and queries for a
zero-valued network in the GNU C Library version 2.0 to version 2.42
can leak stack contents to the configured DNS resolver.
A defect in the _nss_dns_getnetbyaddr_r function which implements
getnetbyaddr and getnetbyaddr_r in the dns-based network database can
pass stack contents unmodified to the configured DNS resolver as part of
the network DNS query when the network queried is the default network
i.e. net == 0x0. This stack contents leaking in the query is considered
a loss of confidentiality for the host making the query. Typically it
is rare to call these APIs with a net value of zero, and if an attacker
can control the net value it can only leak adjacent stack, and so loss
of confidentiality is spatially limited. The leak might be used to
accelerate an ASLR bypass by knowing pointer values, but also requires
network adjacent access to snoop between the application and the
DNS server; making the attack complexity higher.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-0915
Public-Date: 2026-01-15
Vulnerable-Commit: 5f0e6fc702296840d2daa39f83f6cb1e40073d58 (1.92-1)
Fix-Commit: e56ff82d5034ec66c6a78f517af6faa427f65b0b (2.43)
Fix-Commit: 453e6b8dbab935257eb0802b0c97bca6b67ba30e (2.42-50)
Fix-Commit: 15c9839a0b853f552b4ed9047841b6223f3c104d (2.41-122)
Fix-Commit: 329c775788b2c9ff3da774ccf59fba7b6b8ff08e (2.40-217)
Fix-Commit: 831f63b94ceb92fb14c0d1a7ddad35a0d1404c71 (2.39-287)
Fix-Commit: 49125ffc8e1674dc2a100dfdc5b78796f22e16f2 (2.38-213)
Fix-Commit: ddcaed5dfb05b2c1a6ea842fd6b643501365450a (2.37-173)
Fix-Commit: a6bf47887f24b2b394acb301a3189fda04bd4d4d (2.36-245)
Fix-Commit: 66f0cb057c9b4fb1249a5fec6ef4a63511a37899 (2.35-400)
Fix-Commit: 96863dee262225cfb79f9fe45e06fd188319c7b8 (2.34-526)
Fix-Commit: d210011f1536c8322157cbb4fe4229b35c834c08 (2.33-276)
Fix-Commit: 1bc1832cfc74c2a601220969f36e789a5e9f0ebe (2.32-152)
Reported-by: Igor Morgenstern, Aisle Research
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wordexp with WRDE_REUSE and WRDE_APPEND may return uninitialized memory
Calling wordexp with WRDE_REUSE in conjunction with WRDE_APPEND in the
GNU C Library version 2.0 to version 2.42 may cause the interface to
return uninitialized memory in the we_wordv member, which on subsequent
calls to wordfree may abort the process.
The implementation of WRDE_REUSE in conjunction with WRDE_APPEND fails
to clear the we_wordc member of the structure, and as such, when new
words are added internally, a leading we_wordc count number of entries
are skipped since they are assumed initialized. These skipped entries
are not initialized, but are the contents of a realloc-expanded array of
pointers. If the caller inspects the we_wordv array, it will
dereference invalid pointers and crash. If the caller calls wordfree,
the malloc implementation may detect the invalid pointers and abort the
process. Calls to wordexp using WRDE_REUSE and WRDE_APPEND have never
worked correctly and thus the existence of applications that make use of
this feature is unlikely.
CVE-Id: CVE-2025-15281
Public-Date: 2026-01-20
Vulnerable-Commit: 8f2ece695d8822e9ecc63ecd157e90bf17a6fe65 (1.93-260)
Fix-Commit: 80cc58ea2de214f85b0a1d902a3b668ad2ecb302 (2.43)
Fix-Commit: cbf39c26b25801e9bc88499b4fd361ac172d4125 (2.42-51)
Fix-Commit: fb4db64a04ad6c96cd1fbb7e02eb59323b1f2ac2 (2.41-123)
Fix-Commit: 9fe8576664d43b87ca19401fb6a975e217e47623 (2.40-218)
Fix-Commit: ce65d944e38a20cb70af2a48a4b8aa5d8fabe1cc (2.39-288)
Fix-Commit: d5409a1be010699794264162c551ba60f05ee6c3 (2.38-214)
Fix-Commit: ff2b172803f6bbd897755d2ce83ec4323a1a15b3 (2.37-174)
Fix-Commit: e97cfe2293ed097eb3d0b4c18274d22855e65130 (2.36-246)
Fix-Commit: bb59339d02faebac534a87eea50c83c948f35b77 (2.35-401)
Fix-Commit: 2b656ff94d72f93c84d8da2e7c76456c1994f02e (2.34-527)
Fix-Commit: 1d8ed2067a8a5d162a07670d0d063429679f17a0 (2.33-277)
Fix-Commit: 3a56c4ee4ea49b8f2391a2d8d6220013c4160a79 (2.32-153)
Fix-Commit: 28eb5caf895ced5d895cb02757e109004a2d33e5 (2.31-167)
Reported-by: Vitaly Simonovich
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
nscd client crash on x86_64 under high nscd load
Calling NSS-backed functions that support caching via nscd may call the
nscd client side code and in the GNU C Library version 2.36 under high
load on x86_64 systems, the client may call memcmp on inputs that are
concurrently modified by other processes or threads and crash.
The nscd client in the GNU C Library uses the memcmp function with
inputs that may be concurrently modified by another thread, potentially
resulting in spurious cache misses, which in itself is not a security
issue. However in the GNU C Library version 2.36 an optimized
implementation of memcmp was introduced for x86_64 which could crash
when invoked with such undefined behaviour, turning this into a
potential crash of the nscd client and the application that uses it.
This implementation was backported to the 2.35 branch, making the nscd
client in that branch vulnerable as well. Subsequently, the fix for
this issue was backported to all vulnerable branches in the GNU C
Library repository.
It is advised that distributions that may have cherry-picked the memcpy
SSE2 optimization in their copy of the GNU C Library, also apply the fix
to avoid the potential crash in the nscd client.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-3904
Public-Date: 2026-03-11
Vulnerable-Commit: 8804157ad9da39631703b92315460808eac86b0c (2.36)
Vulnerable-Commit: 5a8df6485c584e2b0e957ec6b9070437a724911a (2.35-89)
Fix-Commit: b712be52645282c706a5faa038242504feb06db5 (2.37)
Fix-Commit: 93967a2a7bbdcedb73e0b246713580c7c84d001e (2.36-84)
Fix-Commit: 6bcd5d8e3668d52388a6e0580611749f93e6871f (2.35-230)
+37
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
gethostbyaddr and gethostbyaddr_r may incorrectly handle DNS response
Calling gethostbyaddr or gethostbyaddr_r with a configured nsswitch.conf
that specifies the library's DNS backend in the GNU C Library version
2.34 to version 2.43 could, with a crafted response from the configured
DNS server, result in a violation of the DNS specification that causes
the application to treat a non-answer section of the DNS response as a
valid answer.
A defect in the getanswer_ptr function, which implements the iteration
and extraction of the answer from the DNS response, can cause it to
incorrectly transition from the answer section to the next section while
still treating it as an answer to the question. This can happen when
the answer contains only skipped records, and the subsequent section
contains a semantically invalid T_PTR record. This is considered a
security issue because it is a violation of the DNS specification that
leads to incorrect behaviour that could result in the wrong hostname
being returned to the caller. At the time of publication, no known
affected DNS server returns results that would be incorrectly
interpreted by the library. An attacker would either need to be network
adjacent or have compromised the DNS server to use this defect to hide
returned reverse DNS results from intrusion detection systems. Even
then, the inbound connection from the attacker, or the outbound
connection from the application, would be visible to the intrusion
detection system. At best, the defect can be used to obfuscate and
delay analysis of the evolving threat.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-4437
Public-Date: 2026-03-20
Vulnerable-Commit: 32e5db37684ffcbc6ae34fcc6cdcf28670506baa (2.34-323)
Vulnerable-Commit: def97e7f71a07517810f7263213d607e08ad21f1 (2.35-188)
Vulnerable-Commit: 77f523c473878ec0051582ef15161c6982879095 (2.36-30)
Vulnerable-Commit: e32547d661a43da63368e488b6cfa9c53b4dcf92 (2.37)
Fix-Commit: 5c6fca0c62ce5bd6e68e259f138097756cbafd4d (2.43-16)
Fix-Commit: 9f5f18aab40ec6b61fa49a007615e6077e9a979b (2.44)
Reported-by: Antonio Maini (0rbitingZer0) - 0rbitingZer0@proton.me
Reported-by: Kevin Farrell
+27
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
gethostbyaddr and gethostbyaddr_r return invalid DNS hostnames
Calling gethostbyaddr or gethostbyaddr_r with a configured nsswitch.conf
that specifies the library's DNS backend in the GNU C library version
2.34 to version 2.43 could result in an invalid DNS hostname being
returned to the caller in violation of the DNS specification.
A defect in the getanswer_ptr function, which implements the iteration
and extraction of the answer from a DNS response, can cause it to accept
an invalid DNS hostname that can contain shell metacharacters. An
application that uses the returned hostname in a shell, without guarding
for shell expansion, may be subject to shell injection attacks. At the
time of publication, no known affected DNS server returns results with
shell metacharacters in the results. An attacker would either need to
be network adjacent or have compromised the DNS server to use this
defect for shell injection. No known vulnerable application has been
identified.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-4438
Public-Date: 2026-03-20
Vulnerable-Commit: 32e5db37684ffcbc6ae34fcc6cdcf28670506baa (2.34-323)
Vulnerable-Commit: def97e7f71a07517810f7263213d607e08ad21f1 (2.35-188)
Vulnerable-Commit: 77f523c473878ec0051582ef15161c6982879095 (2.36-30)
Vulnerable-Commit: e32547d661a43da63368e488b6cfa9c53b4dcf92 (2.37)
Fix-Commit: dd9945c0ba40d2dbc9eb7c99291ba6b69bd66718 (2.43-17)
Fix-Commit: e10977481f4db4b2a3ce34fa4c3a1e26651ae312 (2.44)
Reported-by: Antonio Maini (0rbitingZer0) - 0rbitingZer0@proton.me
+15
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
iconv crash due to assertion failure with untrusted input
The iconv() function in the GNU C Library versions 2.43 and earlier may
crash due to an assertion failure when converting inputs from the
IBM1390 or IBM1399 character sets, which may be used to remotely crash
an application.
This vulnerability can be trivially mitigated by removing the IBM1390
and IBM1399 character sets from systems that do not need them.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-4046
Public-Date: 2026-03-12
Vulnerable-Commit: 0ecb606cb6cf65de1d9fc8a919bceb4be476c602 (2.3.3-1501)
Fix-Commit: d6f08d1cf027f4eb2ba289a6cc66853722d4badc (2.44)
Reported-by: Rocket Ma
+22
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
REJECTED: Static buffer overflow in deprecated nis_local_principal
REJECTED: CVE-2026-5358 is rejected for two reasons. Firstly it has been
discovered that no NIS+ client or server was ever released for any
Linux-based OS distributions and as such this makes the API provisional
and unused. Secondly it has been discovered that the NIS+ cold start
cache (/var/nis/NIS_COLD_START) cannot be bypassed and as such the API
can only be called with a trusted server from the pre-populated cache.
The use of a trusted server means no trust boundary is crossed and this
is therefore considered a normal bug.
NIS+ support in the GNU C Library was never officially supported even
though an incomplete implementation of the APIs was made pulibc. To the
best knowledge of the glibc security team no open-source NIS+ server
implementations were ever released for use with this API. Applications
should not use any of the NIS+ APIs and should move to modern identity
and access management services.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-5358
Public-Date: 2026-04-10
Rejected-Date: 2026-04-33
Reported-by: Rahul Hoysala
+23
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@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
scanf %mc off-by-one heap buffer overflow
Calling the scanf family of functions with a %mc (malloc'd character
match) in the GNU C Library version 2.7 to version 2.43 with a format
width specifier with an explicit width greater than 1024 could result in
a one byte heap buffer overflow.
The bug is in the buffer growth formula in __vfscanf_internal, which
under-allocates by one byte during realloc expansion, allowing a
controlled single-byte overwrite past the end of the heap buffer.
The impact is limited by the fact that to execute the overwrite you need
both user controlled input data and a specific choice of maximum width
that yields a smaller than needed allocation. The latter point has to
take into account malloc's particular chunk size rounding process. The
"%[width]mc" format specifier does not appear to have notable use in
major Linux-based OS distributions, due to which the real world impact
may be limited to bespoke use cases.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-5450
Public-Date: 2026-03-19
Vulnerable-Commit: 874aa52349cc111d1f6ea5dff24bb14c306714e0 (2.7)
Reported-by: Rocket Ma
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
Potential buffer under-read in ungetwc
Calling the ungetwc function on a FILE stream with wide characters
encoded in a character set that has overlaps between its single byte and
multi-byte character encodings, in the GNU C Library version 2.43 or
earlier, may result in an attempt to read bytes before an allocated
buffer, potentially resulting in unintentional disclosure of neighboring
data in the heap, or a program crash.
A bug in the wide character pushback implementation
(_IO_wdefault_pbackfail in libio/wgenops.c) causes ungetwc() to operate
on the regular character buffer (fp->_IO_read_ptr) instead of the actual
wide-stream read pointer (fp->_wide_data->_IO_read_ptr). The program
crash may happen in cases where fp->_IO_read_ptr is not initialized and
hence points to NULL. The buffer under-read requires a special situation
where the input character encoding is such that there are overlaps
between single byte representations and multibyte representations in
that encoding, resulting in spurious matches. The spurious match case
is not possible in the standard Unicode character sets.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-5928
Public-Date: 2026-03-17
Reported-by: Rocket Ma
Vulnerable-Commit: d64b6ad07585b8a37e5fecc9a47fcee766d52ede (2.1.1-89)
+24
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
Potential buffer overflow in ns_sprintrrf TSIG handling path
The deprecated functions ns_printrrf, ns_printrr and fp_nquery in the
GNU C Library version 2.2 and newer fail to enforce the caller-supplied
buffer length, and can result in an out-of-bounds write when printing
TSIG records.
A defect in the TSIG case handling within ns_sprintrrf performs a
formatted write using sprintf without checking the remaining buffer
length, and may write up to 6 bytes past the end of the buffer. If the
library is compiled with assertions, and the out-of-bounds write doesn't
terminate the process, then a subsequent check for "len <= *buflen" will
trigger an assertion failure.
These functions are for application debugging only and hence not in the
path of code executed by the DNS resolver. Further, they have been
deprecated since version 2.34 (2021-08-02) and should not be used by any
new applications. Applications should consider porting away from these
interfaces since they may be removed in future versions.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-5435
Public-Date: 2026-04-02
Vulnerable-Commit: b43b13ac2544b11f35be301d1589b51a8473e32b (2.2)
Reported-by: shinobu
+18
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
Buffer overread in ns_printrrf with corrupted RDATA field
The deprecated functions ns_printrrf, ns_printrr and fp_nquery in the
GNU C Library version 2.0.1 to version 2.43 fail to validate the RDATA
content against the RDATA length in a DNS response when processing A6,
CERT, LOC, TKEY or TSIG records, which may allow an attacker to craft a
DNS response, causing a target application to crash or read
uninitialized memory.
These functions are for application debugging only and hence not in the
path of code executed by the DNS resolver. Further, they have been
deprecated since version 2.34 and should not be used by any new
applications. Applications should consider porting away from these
interfaces since they may be removed in future versions.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-6238
Public-Date: 2026-04-11
Vulnerable-Commit: ee188d555b8c32ad9704a7440cab400af967292f (1.90)
+20
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@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
Potential stack-based buffer clash during tilde expansion in wordexp
Calling wordexp with a tilde (~) followed by an overly long username
in the GNU C Library version 2.2.3 to 2.43 may lead to a stack buffer
clash.
When expanding paths that begin with a tilde (~) followed by a username, the
internal parse_tilde function extracts the username to determine the user's
home directory. The implementation allocates memory for this username directly
on the stack using the strndupa macro. Because the size of this allocation
was determined by the length of the user-supplied input without any bounds
checks, passing an excessively long username e.g. thousands of characters,
forces the thread to exhaust its stack space. Thus if an application passes
untrusted, attacker-controlled input to the wordexp function, an attacker
can trigger a stack clash.
CVE-Id: CVE-2026-6791
Public-Date: 2026-06-22
Vulnerable-Commit: 344af000e1d6e9c7882b9bc48e71cb3f1b5fc03c (2.2.3-114)
Reported-by: storm
+92
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
GNU C Library Security Advisory Format
======================================
Security advisories in this directory follow a simple git commit log
format, with a heading and free-format description augmented with tags
to allow parsing key information. References to code changes are
specific to the glibc repository and follow a specific format:
Tag-name: <commit-ref> (release-version)
The <commit-ref> indicates a specific commit in the repository. The
release-version indicates the publicly consumable release in which this
commit is known to exist. The release-version is derived from the
git-describe format, (i.e. stripped out from glibc-2.34.NNN-gxxxx) and
is of the form 2.34-NNN. If the -NNN suffix is absent, it means that
the change is in that release tarball, otherwise the change is on the
release/2.YY/master branch and not in any released tarball.
The following tags are currently being used:
CVE-Id:
This is the CVE-Id assigned under the CVE Program
(https://www.cve.org/).
Public-Date:
The date this issue became publicly known.
Rejected-Date:
The most recent date the assigned advisory was rejected. If the advisory
is ever published again the Rejected-Date tag should be removed.
Vulnerable-Commit:
The commit that introduced this vulnerability. There could be multiple
entries, one for each release branch in the glibc repository; the
release-version portion of this tag should tell you which branch this is
on.
Fix-Commit:
The commit that fixed this vulnerability. There could be multiple
entries for each release branch in the glibc repository, indicating that
all of those commits contributed to fixing that issue in each of those
branches.
Reported-By:
The entity that reported this issue. There could be multiple entries, one for
each reporter.
Adding an Advisory
------------------
An advisory for a CVE needs to be added on the master branch in two steps:
1. Add the text of the advisory without any Fix-Commit tags along with
the fix for the CVE. Add the Vulnerable-Commit tag, if applicable.
The advisories directory does not exist in release branches, so keep
the advisory text commit distinct from the code changes, to ease
backports. Ask for the GLIBC-SA advisory number from the security
team.
2. Finish all backports on release branches and then back on the msater
branch, add all commit refs to the advisory using the Fix-Commit
tags. Don't bother adding the release-version subscript since the
next step will overwrite it.
3. Run the process-advisories.sh script in the scripts directory on the
advisory:
scripts/process-advisories.sh update GLIBC-SA-YYYY-NNNN
(replace YYYY-NNNN with the actual advisory number).
4. Verify the updated advisory and push the result.
Rejecting an Advisory
---------------------
Rejecting an advisory on the master branch can be done in one step:
1. Mark the advisory as rejected. Add the text "REJECTED: " as a prefix
to any short-form description. Add a new paragraph that starts with
"REJECTED: " and explains the reason for the rejection including
justification for why it no longer has security impact. Lastly add
a Rejected-Date tag to the advisory.
Getting a NEWS snippet from advisories
--------------------------------------
Run:
scripts/process-advisories.sh news
and copy the content into the NEWS file.
+3 -25
View File
@@ -409,9 +409,9 @@ $(addprefix $(objpfx)bench-,calloc-thread): $(libm-benchtests)
# Rules to build and execute the benchmarks. Do not put any benchmark
# parameters beyond this point.
# Benchmark programs must not run concurrently, however building them is
# safe in parallel. So '.NOTPARALLEL:' is used only when benchmarks run
# or when more than one group is going to run.
# We don't want the benchmark programs to run in parallel since that could
# affect their performance.
.NOTPARALLEL:
bench-extra-objs = json-lib.o
@@ -622,30 +622,8 @@ $(bench-link-targets): %: %.o $(objpfx)json-lib.o \
$(bench-link-targets): LDFLAGS += $(link-bench-bind-now)
$(objpfx)bench-%.c: %-inputs $(bench-deps)
$(make-target-directory)
{ if [ -n "$($*-INCLUDE)" ]; then \
cat $($*-INCLUDE); \
fi; \
$(PYTHON) scripts/bench.py $(patsubst %-inputs,%,$<); } > $@-tmp
mv -f $@-tmp $@
# Serialize the benchmark runs so their timing is not perturbed by a
# concurrent workload, while still building every benchmark program in parallel.
# Ordering is only needed when more than one benchmark group run: the combined
# 'bench' goal runs all three groups, and the bench* goals can also be combined
# on a single command line. A lone group needs no ordering -- make builds its
# programs in parallel and then runs its single recipe, which cannot overlap a
# compile.
ifneq (,$(filter bench,$(MAKECMDGOALS)))
bench-run-active := bench-set bench-func bench-malloc
else
bench-run-active := $(filter bench-set bench-func bench-malloc,$(MAKECMDGOALS))
endif
ifneq (,$(word 2,$(bench-run-active)))
# Hold every active run until all benchmark programs have been built.
$(bench-run-active): | bench-build
# And then run the active groups strictly one at a time.
bench-func: | $(filter bench-set,$(bench-run-active))
bench-malloc: | $(filter bench-set bench-func,$(bench-run-active))
endif
+2405 -3006
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+4911 -3006
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3446 -2004
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3 -11
View File
@@ -60,14 +60,6 @@ vpath %.c ../locale/programs
include ../Rules
# The catalog-generation tests below run gencat under specific locales,
# and tst-catgets reads the resulting catalog, so the build must wait for
# those locales to be generated. Without this dependency a parallel build
# races catgets against localedata and gencat can run before the locale
# exists (it then falls back to C and the test fails).
LOCALES := de_DE.ISO-8859-1 hr_HR.ISO-8859-2 ja_JP.SJIS
include ../gen-locales.mk
$(objpfx)gencat: $(gencat-modules:%=$(objpfx)%.o)
catgets-CPPFLAGS := -DNLSPATH='"$(localedir)/%L/%N:$(localedir)/%L/LC_MESSAGES/%N:$(localedir)/%l/%N:$(localedir)/%l/LC_MESSAGES/%N:"'
@@ -103,7 +95,7 @@ tst-catgets-ENV = NLSPATH="$(objpfx)%l/%N.cat" LANG=de \
ifeq ($(run-built-tests),yes)
# This test just checks whether the program produces any error or not.
# The result is not tested.
$(objpfx)test1.cat: test1.msg $(objpfx)gencat $(gen-locales)
$(objpfx)test1.cat: test1.msg $(objpfx)gencat
$(built-program-cmd-before-env) \
$(run-program-env) LC_ALL=hr_HR.ISO-8859-2 \
$(built-program-cmd-after-env) -H $(objpfx)test1.h $@ $<; \
@@ -111,7 +103,7 @@ $(objpfx)test1.cat: test1.msg $(objpfx)gencat $(gen-locales)
$(objpfx)test2.cat: test2.msg $(objpfx)gencat
$(built-program-cmd) -H $(objpfx)test2.h $@ $<; \
$(evaluate-test)
$(objpfx)de/libc.cat: $(objpfx)de.msg $(objpfx)gencat $(gen-locales)
$(objpfx)de/libc.cat: $(objpfx)de.msg $(objpfx)gencat
$(make-target-directory)
$(built-program-cmd-before-env) \
$(run-program-env) LC_ALL=de_DE.ISO-8859-1 \
@@ -124,7 +116,7 @@ $(objpfx)de.msg: xopen-msg.awk $(..)po/de.po
LC_ALL=C $(AWK) -f $^ $< > $@
$(objpfx)test-gencat.out: test-gencat.sh $(objpfx)test-gencat \
$(objpfx)sample.SJIS.cat $(gen-locales)
$(objpfx)sample.SJIS.cat
$(SHELL) $< $(common-objpfx) '$(test-program-cmd-before-env)' \
'$(run-program-env)' '$(test-program-cmd-after-env)'; \
$(evaluate-test)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ LIBC_START_MAIN (int (*main) (int, char **, char ** MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),
_dl_aux_init (auxvec);
# endif
__tunables_init (__environ, argv);
__tunables_init (__environ);
ARCH_INIT_CPU_FEATURES ();
+11 -21
View File
@@ -36,15 +36,10 @@
trampoline, read, 3 * fn, and do_test. */
#define NUM_FUNCTIONS 7
/* Avoid the read wrapper frame truncation on targets that add extra frames
between it and handle_signal (the cancellable syscall wrappers
__syscall_cancel*, or the i686 __kernel_vsyscall entry). */
#define MAX_FUNCTIONS 64
void
handle_signal (int signum)
{
void *addresses[MAX_FUNCTIONS];
void *addresses[NUM_FUNCTIONS];
char **symbols;
int n;
int i;
@@ -75,28 +70,23 @@ handle_signal (int signum)
return;
}
/* Skip the signal trampoline and any cancellable syscall wrapper frames
(__syscall_cancel*) and require the read syscall wrapper to be
present. */
for (i = 1; i < n; i++)
/* Do not check name for signal trampoline or cancellable syscall
wrappers (__syscall_cancel*). */
for (; i < n - 1; i++)
if (match (symbols[i], "read"))
break;
if (i == n)
if (i == n - 1)
{
FAIL ();
return;
}
/* The read wrapper must be followed by the three fn recursion frames. */
for (int j = 0; j < 3; j++)
{
i++;
if (i == n || !match (symbols[i], "fn"))
{
FAIL ();
return;
}
}
for (; i < n - 1; i++)
if (!match (symbols[i], "fn"))
{
FAIL ();
return;
}
/* Symbol names are not available for static functions, so we do not
check do_test. */
+1 -67
View File
@@ -225,7 +225,6 @@ ldconfig-modules := \
readlib \
static-stubs \
stringtable \
tunconf \
xmalloc \
xstrdup \
# ldconfig-modules
@@ -336,7 +335,6 @@ tests-internal := \
$(tests-static-internal) \
tst-tls1 \
tst-tls_tp_offset \
tst-tunconf1 \
# tests-internal
tests-static := $(tests-static-normal) $(tests-static-internal)
@@ -347,17 +345,6 @@ tests-static += \
tst-tls9-static \
# tests-static
tst-tunconf1-TUNABLES-only = \
glibc.malloc.tcache_count=5 \
glibc.malloc.perturb=41 \
glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=10002 \
glibc.malloc.trim_threshold=10002 \
glibc.malloc.arena_max=300
tst-tunconf1-ENV = \
MALLOC_MMAP_MAX_=200 \
MALLOC_TOP_PAD_=200 \
MALLOC_ARENA_MAX=400
static-dlopen-environment = \
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$(ld-library-path):$(common-objpfx)dlfcn
tst-tls9-static-ENV = $(static-dlopen-environment)
@@ -590,12 +577,10 @@ endif
tests-container += \
tst-dlopen-self-container \
tst-dlopen-tlsmodid-container \
tst-ldconfig-cache \
tst-pldd \
tst-preload-pthread-libc \
tst-ptrguard-static-dlopen \
tst-rootdir \
tst-tunconf1 \
# tests-container
test-srcs = \
@@ -727,7 +712,6 @@ tests-special += $(tests-execstack-special-$(have-z-execstack))
ifeq ($(run-built-tests),yes)
tests-special += \
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-X.out \
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-install.out \
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-p.out \
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-soname.out \
$(objpfx)tst-rtld-help.out \
@@ -750,9 +734,6 @@ one-hundred = $(foreach x,0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9, \
0$x 1$x 2$x 3$x 4$x 5$x 6$x 7$x 8$x 9$x)
tst-tls-many-dynamic-modules := \
$(foreach n,$(one-hundred),tst-tls-manydynamic$(n)mod)
tst-ldconfig-cache-modules := \
$(foreach n,01 02 03 04 05,tst-tls-manydynamic$(n)mod)
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-cache.out: $(tst-ldconfig-cache-modules:%=$(objpfx)%.so)
tst-tls-many-dynamic-modules-dep-suffixes = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 \
14 15 16 17 18 19
tst-tls-many-dynamic-modules-dep = \
@@ -1396,13 +1377,6 @@ modules-names += \
tst-ifunc-tls-write-lib \
tst-tls-tdata-reloc-lib \
# modules-names
ifeq (yes,$(have-gcc-ifunc))
tests += \
tst-ifunc-fault-dep-bindnow \
tst-ifunc-fault-dep-lazy \
# tests
modules-names += tst-ifunc-fault-mod
endif
ifneq (no,$(have-test-mtls-descriptor))
tests += tst-ifunc-tls-init-tlsdesc
modules-names += tst-ifunc-tls-init-tlsdesc-lib
@@ -1432,7 +1406,6 @@ tests-special += \
$(objpfx)check-execstack.out \
$(objpfx)check-initfini.out \
$(objpfx)check-localplt.out \
$(objpfx)check-symbol-version.out \
$(objpfx)check-textrel.out \
$(objpfx)check-wx-segment.out \
# tests-special
@@ -1468,7 +1441,6 @@ ifndef avoid-generated
# Makefile fragment to be included.
define include_dsosort_tests
$(objpfx)$(1).generated-makefile: $(1)
$$(make-target-directory)
$(PYTHON) $(..)scripts/dso-ordering-test.py \
--description-file $$< --objpfx $(objpfx) --output-makefile $$@T
mv $$@T $$@
@@ -1477,7 +1449,6 @@ endef
# Likewise, where the .def file itself is generated.
define include_dsosort_tests_objpfx
$(objpfx)$(1).generated-makefile: $(objpfx)$(1)
$$(make-target-directory)
$(PYTHON) $(..)scripts/dso-ordering-test.py \
--description-file $$< --objpfx $(objpfx) --output-makefile $$@T
mv $$@T $$@
@@ -1496,15 +1467,12 @@ $(eval $(call include_dsosort_tests,dso-sort-tests-1.def))
$(eval $(call include_dsosort_tests,dso-sort-tests-2.def))
$(objpfx)dso-sort-tests-all2.def: dso-sort-tests-all.py
$(make-target-directory)
$(PYTHON) $< 2 > $@
$(objpfx)dso-sort-tests-all3.def: dso-sort-tests-all.py
$(make-target-directory)
$(PYTHON) $< 3 > $@
$(objpfx)dso-sort-tests-all4.def: dso-sort-tests-all.py
$(make-target-directory)
$(PYTHON) $< 4 > $@
$(eval $(call include_dsosort_tests_objpfx,dso-sort-tests-all2.def))
@@ -1582,9 +1550,7 @@ $(objpfx)dl-allobjs.os: $(all-rtld-routines:%=$(objpfx)%.os)
# when compiled for libc.
rtld-stubbed-symbols = \
__libc_assert_fail \
__libc_single_threaded_internal \
__syscall_cancel_arch \
__syscall_do_cancel \
__syscall_cancel \
calloc \
free \
malloc \
@@ -2378,12 +2344,6 @@ $(objpfx)check-initfini.out: $(..)scripts/check-initfini.awk \
$(evaluate-test)
generated += check-initfini.out
$(objpfx)check-symbol-version.out: $(..)scripts/check-symbol-version.awk \
$(all-built-dso:=.dynsym)
LC_ALL=C $(AWK) -f $^ > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
generated += check-symbol-version.out
$(objpfx)tst-dlopenrpath: $(objpfx)tst-dlopenrpathmod.so
CFLAGS-tst-dlopenrpath.c += -DPFX=\"$(objpfx)\"
LDFLAGS-tst-dlopenrpathmod.so += -Wl,-rpath,\$$ORIGIN/test-subdir
@@ -2561,27 +2521,6 @@ $(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-bindnow.out: $(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-bindnow \
$(objpfx)ld.so
$(tst-ifunc-fault-script)
LDFLAGS-tst-ifunc-fault-dep-lazy = -Wl,-z,lazy
LDFLAGS-tst-ifunc-fault-dep-bindnow = -Wl,-z,now
define tst-ifunc-fault-dep-script
( $(test-wrapper) $(rtld-prefix) --verify $< \
&& $(test-wrapper-env) LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS=1 $(rtld-prefix) $< \
&& $(test-wrapper-env) LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS=1 LD_DEBUG=unused \
$(rtld-prefix) $< \
&& $(test-wrapper-env) LD_TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS=1 LD_WARN=yes LD_BIND_NOW=1 \
$(rtld-prefix) $< \
) > $@; $(evaluate-test)
endef
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-dep-lazy: $(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-mod.so
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-dep-bindnow: $(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-mod.so
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-dep-lazy.out: $(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-dep-lazy \
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-mod.so $(objpfx)ld.so
$(tst-ifunc-fault-dep-script)
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-dep-bindnow.out: \
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-dep-bindnow \
$(objpfx)tst-ifunc-fault-mod.so $(objpfx)ld.so
$(tst-ifunc-fault-dep-script)
LDFLAGS-tst-ifunc-plt-lib.so = -Wl,-z,lazy
tst-ifunc-plt-bindnow-ENV = LD_BIND_NOW=1
@@ -2885,11 +2824,6 @@ $(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-X.out : tst-ldconfig-X.sh $(objpfx)ldconfig
'$(run-program-env)' > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-install.out : tst-ldconfig-install.sh $(objpfx)ldconfig
$(SHELL) $< '$(common-objpfx)' '$(test-wrapper-env)' \
'$(run-program-env)' > $@; \
$(evaluate-test)
$(objpfx)tst-ldconfig-p.out : tst-ldconfig-p.sh $(objpfx)ldconfig
$(SHELL) $< '$(common-objpfx)' '$(sysconfdir)' '$(test-wrapper-env)' \
'$(run-program-env)' > $@; \
+2 -106
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
#include <dl-cache.h>
#include <version.h>
#include <stringtable.h>
#include <tunconf.h>
/* Used to store library names, paths, and other strings. */
static struct stringtable strings;
@@ -276,8 +275,7 @@ check_new_cache (struct cache_file_new *cache)
/* Print the extension information in *EXT. */
static void
print_extensions (struct cache_extension_all_loaded *ext,
const char *cache_data)
print_extensions (struct cache_extension_all_loaded *ext)
{
if (ext->sections[cache_extension_tag_generator].base != NULL)
{
@@ -286,65 +284,6 @@ print_extensions (struct cache_extension_all_loaded *ext,
ext->sections[cache_extension_tag_generator].size, stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
if (ext->sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].base != NULL)
{
struct tunable_header_cached *thc;
struct tunable_entry_cached *tec;
int i, count;
thc = (struct tunable_header_cached *)
ext->sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].base;
tec = thc->tunables;
count = thc->num_tunables;
printf("tunables sig 0x%08x ver 0x%08x count %u\n",
thc->signature, thc->version, thc->num_tunables);
/* Check that COUNT won't overflow our data block. */
assert (ext->sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].base
+ ext->sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].size
== (void *) & tec[count]);
for (i = 0; i < count; ++ i)
{
printf (" [%d] %s = %s [flags 0x%08x (",
i,
cache_data + tec[i].name_offset,
cache_data + tec[i].value_offset,
tec[i].flags);
if (tec[i].flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_PARSED)
printf ("parsed,");
if (tec[i].flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_NEGATIVE)
printf ("negative,");
if ((tec[i].flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_OVERRIDABLE)
== TUNCONF_OVERRIDE_ALLOW)
printf ("overridable");
else
printf ("nonoverridable");
switch (tec[i].flags & (TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_SECURE
| TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_UNSECURE))
{
case TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_SECURE:
printf(",nonsecure");
break;
case TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_UNSECURE:
printf(",onlysecure");
break;
case TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_SECURE | TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_UNSECURE:
printf(",ignore");
break;
case 0:
printf(",anysecure");
break;
}
switch (tec[i].flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_FILTER)
{
case TUNCONF_FILTER_PERPROC:
printf(",[proc]");
break;
}
if (tec[i].flag_offset != 0)
printf (",'%s'", cache_data + tec[i].flag_offset);
printf (")]\n");
}
}
}
/* Print the whole cache file, if a file contains the new cache format
@@ -455,7 +394,7 @@ print_cache (const char *cache_name)
cache_new->libs[i].hwcap, hwcaps_string,
cache_data + cache_new->libs[i].value);
}
print_extensions (&ext, cache_data);
print_extensions (&ext);
}
/* Cleanup. */
munmap (cache, cache_size);
@@ -527,18 +466,6 @@ write_extensions (int fd, uint32_t str_offset,
if (p->used)
hwcaps_array[p->section_index] = str_offset + p->name->offset;
struct tunable_header_cached *tunable_data;
size_t tunable_size;
size_t tunable_aligner = 0;
tunable_data = get_tunconf_ext (str_offset);
if (tunable_data == NULL)
{
/* There is no section for tunables data. */
hwcaps_offset -= sizeof (struct cache_extension_section);
}
/* This is the offset of the generator string. */
uint32_t generator_offset = hwcaps_offset;
if (hwcaps_count == 0)
@@ -571,23 +498,6 @@ write_extensions (int fd, uint32_t str_offset,
ext->sections[xid].size = hwcaps_size;
}
if (tunable_data != NULL)
{
uint32_t tunable_offset_ua;
uint32_t tunable_offset;
tunable_size = TUNCONF_SIZE (tunable_data);
tunable_offset_ua = generator_offset + strlen (generator);
tunable_offset = ALIGN_UP (tunable_offset_ua, 8);
tunable_aligner = tunable_offset - tunable_offset_ua;
++xid;
ext->sections[xid].tag = cache_extension_tag_tunables;
ext->sections[xid].flags = 0;
ext->sections[xid].offset = tunable_offset;
ext->sections[xid].size = tunable_size;
}
++xid;
ext->count = xid;
assert (xid <= cache_extension_count);
@@ -599,14 +509,6 @@ write_extensions (int fd, uint32_t str_offset,
|| write (fd, generator, strlen (generator)) != strlen (generator))
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Writing of cache extension data failed"));
if (tunable_data)
{
if (write (fd, " ", tunable_aligner) != tunable_aligner
|| write (fd, tunable_data, tunable_size) != tunable_size)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Writing of cache tunable data failed"));
free (tunable_data);
}
free (hwcaps_array);
free (ext);
}
@@ -1204,9 +1106,3 @@ out_fail:
free (temp_name);
free (file_entries);
}
struct stringtable_entry *
cache_store_string (const char *string)
{
return stringtable_add (&strings, string);
}
+90 -239
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
#include <assert.h>
#include <intprops.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <ldsodefs.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
@@ -27,22 +26,11 @@
#include <_itoa.h>
#include <dl-hwcaps.h>
#include <dl-isa-level.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "tunconf.h"
/* This is the starting address and the size of the mmap()ed file. */
static struct cache_file *cache;
static struct cache_file_new *cache_new;
static size_t cachesize;
static struct cache_extension_all_loaded ext;
static struct {
typeof ((*(struct __stat64_t64 *)0).st_mtime) mtime;
typeof ((*(struct __stat64_t64 *)0).st_ino) ino;
typeof ((*(struct __stat64_t64 *)0).st_size) size;
typeof ((*(struct __stat64_t64 *)0).st_dev) dev;
} cache_file_time, new_cache_file_time;
#ifdef SHARED
/* This is used to cache the priorities of glibc-hwcaps
@@ -65,7 +53,6 @@ glibc_hwcaps_priorities_free (void)
free (glibc_hwcaps_priorities);
glibc_hwcaps_priorities = NULL;
glibc_hwcaps_priorities_allocated = 0;
glibc_hwcaps_priorities_length = 0;
}
/* Ordered comparison of a hwcaps string from the cache on the left
@@ -97,6 +84,10 @@ glibc_hwcaps_compare (uint32_t left_index, struct dl_hwcaps_priority *right)
static void
glibc_hwcaps_priorities_init (void)
{
struct cache_extension_all_loaded ext;
if (!cache_extension_load (cache_new, cache, cachesize, &ext))
return;
uint32_t length = (ext.sections[cache_extension_tag_glibc_hwcaps].size
/ sizeof (uint32_t));
if (length > glibc_hwcaps_priorities_allocated)
@@ -383,168 +374,6 @@ _dl_cache_libcmp (const char *p1, const char *p2)
return *p1 - *p2;
}
/* Set the cache back to the "no cache" state, which may include
cleaning up a loaded cache. */
static void
_dl_maybe_unload_ldsocache (void)
{
if (cache != NULL)
__munmap (cache, cachesize);
cache = NULL;
cache_new = NULL;
cachesize = 0;
#ifdef SHARED
glibc_hwcaps_priorities_free ();
#endif
}
/* Returns TRUE if for any reason the cache needs to be reloaded
(including, the first time, loaded). */
static bool
_dl_check_ldsocache_needs_loading (void)
{
int rv;
static bool copy_old_time = 0;
struct __stat64_t64 new_cache_file_stat;
/* Save the previous stat every time. We only care when this
changes, and we only stat it here, so we can get away with doing
the copy now instead of at every single return statement in this
function. However, we only need to copy it if the previous stat
succeeded. The only way this could be subverted is if the admin
moves the file aside, then moves it back, but CACHE would be set
to NULL in the interim so that would be detected. */
if (copy_old_time)
cache_file_time = new_cache_file_time;
rv = __fstatat64_time64 (AT_FDCWD, LD_SO_CACHE, &new_cache_file_stat, 0);
copy_old_time = (rv >= 0);
/* No file to load, but there used to be. Assume user intentionally
deleted the cache and act accordingly. */
if (rv < 0 && cache != NULL)
{
_dl_maybe_unload_ldsocache ();
return false;
}
/* No file to load and no loaded cache, so nothing to do. */
if (rv < 0)
return false;
/* Store the fields we check, in order they're likely to differ. We
must do this even for the first load (CACHE == NULL below), so that
the next call copies an accurate NEW_CACHE_FILE_TIME into
CACHE_FILE_TIME and does not spuriously reload the unchanged cache. */
new_cache_file_time.mtime = new_cache_file_stat.st_mtime;
new_cache_file_time.ino = new_cache_file_stat.st_ino;
new_cache_file_time.size = new_cache_file_stat.st_size;
new_cache_file_time.dev = new_cache_file_stat.st_dev;
/* Any file is better than no file (likely the first time
through). */
if (cache == NULL)
return true;
/* At this point, NEW_CACHE_FILE_TIME is valid as well as
CACHE_FILE_TIME, so we compare them. */
return (memcmp (&new_cache_file_time, &cache_file_time,
sizeof(new_cache_file_time)));
}
/* Attempts to load and validate the cache. On return, CACHE is either
unchanged (still loaded or still not loaded) or valid. */
static void
_dl_maybe_load_ldsocache (void)
{
struct cache_file *tmp_cache = NULL;
struct cache_file_new *tmp_cache_new = NULL;
size_t tmp_cachesize = 0;
/* Read the contents of the file. */
void *file = _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file (LD_SO_CACHE, &tmp_cachesize,
PROT_READ);
/* We can handle three different cache file formats here:
- only the new format
- the old libc5/glibc2.0/2.1 format
- the old format with the new format in it
The following checks if the cache contains any of these formats. */
if (file != MAP_FAILED && tmp_cachesize > sizeof *cache_new
&& memcmp (file, CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW,
sizeof CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW - 1) == 0
/* Check for corruption, avoiding overflow. */
&& ((tmp_cachesize - sizeof *cache_new) / sizeof (struct file_entry_new)
>= ((struct cache_file_new *) file)->nlibs))
{
if (! cache_file_new_matches_endian (file))
{
__munmap (file, tmp_cachesize);
return;
}
tmp_cache_new = file;
tmp_cache = file;
}
else if (file != MAP_FAILED && tmp_cachesize > sizeof *cache
&& memcmp (file, CACHEMAGIC, sizeof CACHEMAGIC - 1) == 0
/* Check for corruption, avoiding overflow. */
&& ((tmp_cachesize - sizeof *cache) / sizeof (struct file_entry)
>= ((struct cache_file *) file)->nlibs))
{
size_t offset;
/* Looks ok. */
tmp_cache = file;
/* Check for new version. */
offset = ALIGN_CACHE (sizeof (struct cache_file)
+ tmp_cache->nlibs * sizeof (struct file_entry));
tmp_cache_new = (struct cache_file_new *) ((void *) tmp_cache + offset);
if (tmp_cachesize < (offset + sizeof (struct cache_file_new))
|| memcmp (tmp_cache_new->magic, CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW,
sizeof CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW - 1) != 0)
tmp_cache_new = NULL;
else
{
if (! cache_file_new_matches_endian (tmp_cache_new))
/* The old-format part of the cache is bogus as well
if the endianness does not match. (But it is
unclear how the new header can be located if the
endianness does not match.) */
{
__munmap (file, tmp_cachesize);
return;
}
}
}
else
{
if (file != MAP_FAILED)
__munmap (file, tmp_cachesize);
return;
}
struct cache_extension_all_loaded tmp_ext;
if (!cache_extension_load (tmp_cache_new, tmp_cache, tmp_cachesize, &tmp_ext))
{
/* The extension is corrupt, so the cache is corrupt. */
__munmap (file, tmp_cachesize);
return;
}
/* If we've gotten here, the loaded cache is good and we need to
save it. */
_dl_maybe_unload_ldsocache ();
cache = tmp_cache;
cache_new = tmp_cache_new;
cachesize = tmp_cachesize;
ext = tmp_ext;
assert (cache != NULL);
}
/* Look up NAME in ld.so.cache and return the file name stored there, or null
if none is found. The cache is loaded if it was not already. If loading
@@ -560,14 +389,81 @@ _dl_load_cache_lookup (const char *name)
if (__glibc_unlikely (GLRO(dl_debug_mask) & DL_DEBUG_LIBS))
_dl_debug_printf (" search cache=%s\n", LD_SO_CACHE);
if (_dl_check_ldsocache_needs_loading ())
_dl_maybe_load_ldsocache ();
if (cache == NULL)
{
/* Read the contents of the file. */
void *file = _dl_sysdep_read_whole_file (LD_SO_CACHE, &cachesize,
PROT_READ);
/* We can handle three different cache file formats here:
- only the new format
- the old libc5/glibc2.0/2.1 format
- the old format with the new format in it
The following checks if the cache contains any of these formats. */
if (file != MAP_FAILED && cachesize > sizeof *cache_new
&& memcmp (file, CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW,
sizeof CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW - 1) == 0
/* Check for corruption, avoiding overflow. */
&& ((cachesize - sizeof *cache_new) / sizeof (struct file_entry_new)
>= ((struct cache_file_new *) file)->nlibs))
{
if (! cache_file_new_matches_endian (file))
{
__munmap (file, cachesize);
file = (void *) -1;
}
cache_new = file;
cache = file;
}
else if (file != MAP_FAILED && cachesize > sizeof *cache
&& memcmp (file, CACHEMAGIC, sizeof CACHEMAGIC - 1) == 0
/* Check for corruption, avoiding overflow. */
&& ((cachesize - sizeof *cache) / sizeof (struct file_entry)
>= ((struct cache_file *) file)->nlibs))
{
size_t offset;
/* Looks ok. */
cache = file;
/* Check for new version. */
offset = ALIGN_CACHE (sizeof (struct cache_file)
+ cache->nlibs * sizeof (struct file_entry));
cache_new = (struct cache_file_new *) ((void *) cache + offset);
if (cachesize < (offset + sizeof (struct cache_file_new))
|| memcmp (cache_new->magic, CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW,
sizeof CACHEMAGIC_VERSION_NEW - 1) != 0)
cache_new = (void *) -1;
else
{
if (! cache_file_new_matches_endian (cache_new))
{
/* The old-format part of the cache is bogus as well
if the endianness does not match. (But it is
unclear how the new header can be located if the
endianness does not match.) */
cache = (void *) -1;
cache_new = (void *) -1;
__munmap (file, cachesize);
}
}
}
else
{
if (file != MAP_FAILED)
__munmap (file, cachesize);
cache = (void *) -1;
}
assert (cache != NULL);
}
if (cache == (void *) -1)
/* Previously looked for the cache file and didn't find it. */
return NULL;
const char *best;
if (cache_new != NULL)
if (cache_new != (void *) -1)
{
const char *string_table = (const char *) cache_new;
best = search_cache (string_table, cachesize,
@@ -606,67 +502,22 @@ _dl_load_cache_lookup (const char *name)
return result;
}
const struct tunable_header_cached *
_dl_load_cache_tunables (const char **data)
#ifndef MAP_COPY
/* If the system does not support MAP_COPY we cannot leave the file open
all the time since this would create problems when the file is replaced.
Therefore we provide this function to close the file and open it again
once needed. */
void
_dl_unload_cache (void)
{
struct cache_extension_all_loaded ext;
struct tunable_header_cached *thc;
struct tunable_entry_cached *tec;
int i, count;
if (_dl_check_ldsocache_needs_loading ())
_dl_maybe_load_ldsocache ();
if (cache_new)
*data = (const char *) cache_new;
else
return NULL;
if (!cache_extension_load (cache_new, cache, cachesize, &ext))
return NULL;
/* Validate length/contents here. */
if (ext.sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].size
< sizeof(struct tunable_header_cached))
return NULL;
thc = (struct tunable_header_cached *)
ext.sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].base;
/* Reject data produced by a different tunable cache format. */
if (thc->signature != TUNCONF_SIGNATURE || thc->version != TUNCONF_VERSION)
return NULL;
tec = thc->tunables;
count = thc->num_tunables;
if (ext.sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].base
+ ext.sections[cache_extension_tag_tunables].size
!= (void *) & tec[count])
return NULL;
/* Validate each entry. The string table lies between the file entries
and the end of the mapping; clamp its end to CACHESIZE so that a bogus
len_strings cannot make an offset point outside the mapped file. */
size_t s_start = (const char *) (&cache_new->libs[cache_new->nlibs]) - *data;
size_t s_end;
if (s_start >= cachesize
|| INT_ADD_WRAPV (s_start, cache_new->len_strings, &s_end))
return NULL;
if (s_end > cachesize)
s_end = cachesize;
for (i = 0; i < count; i ++)
if (cache != NULL && cache != (struct cache_file *) -1)
{
if (thc->tunables[i].name_offset < s_start
|| thc->tunables[i].name_offset >= s_end
|| thc->tunables[i].value_offset < s_start
|| thc->tunables[i].value_offset >= s_end)
return NULL;
if (thc->tunables[i].flag_offset != 0
&& (thc->tunables[i].flag_offset < s_start
|| thc->tunables[i].flag_offset >= s_end))
return NULL;
__munmap (cache, cachesize);
cache = NULL;
}
return thc;
#ifdef SHARED
/* This marks the glibc_hwcaps_priorities array as out-of-date. */
glibc_hwcaps_priorities_length = 0;
#endif
}
#endif
+5
View File
@@ -898,6 +898,11 @@ no more namespaces available for dlmopen()"));
struct dl_exception exception;
int errcode = _dl_catch_exception (&exception, dl_open_worker, &args);
#if defined USE_LDCONFIG && !defined MAP_COPY
/* We must unmap the cache file. */
_dl_unload_cache ();
#endif
/* Do this for both the error and success cases. The old value has
only been determined if the namespace ID was assigned (i.e., it
is not __LM_ID_CALLER). In the success case, we actually may
+2 -2
View File
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ _dl_relocate_static_pie (void)
/* Relocate ourselves so we can do normal function calls and data access
using the global offset table. IRELATIVE entries are deferred. */
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_PASS (DL_RELOC_NORMAL, main_map, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_NOIFUNC (main_map, NULL, 0, 0);
/* Initialize _r_debug_extended. */
struct r_debug *r = _dl_debug_initialize (0, LM_ID_BASE);
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ void
_dl_relocate_static_pie_ifunc (void)
{
struct link_map *main_map = _dl_get_dl_main_map ();
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_PASS (DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE, main_map, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_IFUNC (main_map, NULL, 0, 0);
main_map->l_relocated = 1;
}
#endif
+2 -4
View File
@@ -278,8 +278,7 @@ _dl_relocate_object_no_relro (struct link_map *l, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
IFUNC resolvers. Without this, a resolver would see the unrelocated
initialiser bytes that were placed into the slot by the early
_dl_allocate_tls_init. */
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_PASS (DL_RELOC_NORMAL, l, scope, lazy,
consider_profiling, skip_ifunc);
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_NOIFUNC (l, scope, lazy, consider_profiling);
#ifdef SHARED
/* Re-initialise the static TLS slot with the .tdata so the IRELATIVE
@@ -292,8 +291,7 @@ _dl_relocate_object_no_relro (struct link_map *l, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
_dl_init_static_tls (l);
#endif
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_PASS (DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE, l, scope, lazy,
0, skip_ifunc);
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_IFUNC (l, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc);
if ((consider_profiling || consider_symbind)
&& l->l_info[DT_PLTRELSZ] != NULL)
+14 -2
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,20 @@ typedef struct
tunable_num_t max;
} tunable_type_t;
/* Security level for tunables. This decides what to do with individual
tunables for AT_SECURE binaries. */
typedef enum
{
/* Erase the tunable for AT_SECURE binaries so that child processes don't
read it. */
TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_SXID_ERASE = 0,
/* Ignore the tunable for AT_SECURE binaries, but don't erase it, so that
child processes can read it. */
TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_SXID_IGNORE = 1,
/* Read the tunable. */
TUNABLE_SECLEVEL_NONE = 2,
} tunable_seclevel_t;
/* A tunable. */
struct _tunable
{
@@ -51,8 +65,6 @@ struct _tunable
tunable_val_t val; /* The value. */
bool initialized; /* Flag to indicate that the tunable is
initialized. */
bool locked; /* If set, modifications are not
allowed. */
/* Compatibility elements. */
const char env_alias[TUNABLE_ALIAS_MAX]; /* The compatibility environment
variable name. */
+3 -172
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
#define TUNABLES_INTERNAL 1
#include "dl-tunables.h"
#include "tunconf.h"
static char **
get_next_env (char **envp, char **name, char **val, char ***prev_envp)
@@ -72,9 +71,6 @@ do_tunable_update_val (tunable_t *cur, const tunable_val_t *valp,
{
tunable_num_t val, min, max;
if (cur->locked)
return;
switch (cur->type.type_code)
{
case TUNABLE_TYPE_STRING:
@@ -179,14 +175,6 @@ struct tunable_toset_t
enum { tunables_list_size = array_length (tunable_list) };
/* Records tunables that were set from GLIBC_TUNABLES during this call, so
that a legacy environment-variable alias does not override them (the
canonical GLIBC_TUNABLES form takes precedence over the aliases).
A tunable that was set only from the system-wide cache is deliberately not
recorded here, so an alias may still override an overridable cache default;
a nonoverridable one remains protected by tunable_t::locked. */
static bool tunable_set_by_env[tunables_list_size];
/* Parse the tunable string VALSTRING and set TUNABLES with the found tunables
and their respective values. The VALSTRING is parsed in place, with the
tunable start and size recorded in TUNABLES.
@@ -296,10 +284,6 @@ parse_tunables (const char *valstring)
if (!tunable_initialize (tunables[i].t, tunables[i].value,
tunables[i].len))
parse_tunable_print_error (&tunables[i]);
else
/* GLIBC_TUNABLES set this tunable; a legacy alias must not
override it. */
tunable_set_by_env[i] = true;
}
}
@@ -307,7 +291,7 @@ parse_tunables (const char *valstring)
ENV_ALIAS to find values. Later we will also use the tunable names to find
values. */
void
__tunables_init (char **envp, char **argv)
__tunables_init (char **envp)
{
char *envname = NULL;
char *envval = NULL;
@@ -318,155 +302,6 @@ __tunables_init (char **envp, char **argv)
if (MALLOC_DEFAULT_THP_PAGESIZE > 0)
TUNABLE_SET (glibc, malloc, hugetlb, 1);
#if defined(SHARED) && defined (USE_LDCONFIG)
const char *prog_name = (argv && argv[0]) ? argv[0] : "";
int prog_name_len = -1;
const char *base_name = NULL;
#ifdef PATH_MAX
char exebuf[PATH_MAX];
#else
char exebuf[256];
#endif
const struct tunable_header_cached *thc;
const char *td;
thc = _dl_load_cache_tunables (&td);
if (thc != NULL)
{
for (int t = 0; t < thc->num_tunables; ++ t)
{
const struct tunable_entry_cached *tec = &( thc->tunables[t] );
int tid = tec->tunable_id;
const char *name = td + tec->name_offset;
const char *value = td + tec->value_offset;
/* Check that we have the correct tunable, and search by
name if needed. We rely on order of operations here to
avoid mis-indexing tunables[]. */
if (tid < 0 || tid >= tunables_list_size
|| strcmp (name, tunable_list[tid].name) != 0)
{
/* It does not, search by name instead. */
tid = -1;
for (int i = 0; i < tunables_list_size; i++)
{
if (strcmp (name, tunable_list[i].name) == 0)
{
tid = i;
break;
}
}
if (tid == -1)
continue;
}
/* At this point, TID is valid for the tunable we want. */
if (tec->flags & TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_SECURE && __libc_enable_secure)
goto skip_due_to_filter;
if (tec->flags & TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_UNSECURE && !__libc_enable_secure)
goto skip_due_to_filter;
/* Apply selected filter, if any. */
switch (tec->flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_FILTER) {
case TUNCONF_FILTER_NONE:
break;
case TUNCONF_FILTER_PERPROC:
/* Perform one-time calculations that aren't needed if we
don't use this filter. */
if (prog_name_len == -1)
{
ssize_t n = readlink ("/proc/self/exe",
exebuf, sizeof (exebuf) - 1);
if (n > 0 && n < sizeof(exebuf)-1)
{
/* If /proc/self/exe exists and we can read it,
it's more reliable than argv[] so use it. */
exebuf[n] = '\0';
prog_name = exebuf;
}
else if (__libc_enable_secure)
prog_name = NULL;
if (prog_name != NULL)
{
const char *slash = NULL, *cp;
for (cp = prog_name; *cp; ++ cp)
if (*cp == '/')
slash = cp;
if (slash)
base_name = slash + 1;
else
base_name = prog_name;
prog_name_len = strlen (prog_name);
}
}
/* prog_name and the cached string are both NUL terminated. */
if (prog_name)
{
if (((const char *)(td + tec->flag_offset))[0] == '/')
{
if (strcmp (prog_name, td + tec->flag_offset) != 0)
goto skip_due_to_filter;
}
else
{
if (strcmp (base_name, td + tec->flag_offset) != 0)
goto skip_due_to_filter;
}
}
else
/* Program is AT_SECURE but the only source of program
name is argv[0], which is not secure, so we do not
match any name-based filter. */
goto skip_due_to_filter;
break;
default:
/* Unknown filter. */
goto skip_due_to_filter;
}
/* If the tunable is set here, any previously set
overridability flag is discarded. We need to reset the
overridability flag here so we can change the tunable,
and may set it later if this tunable also locks it. */
tunable_list[tid].locked = false;
/* See if the parsed type matches the desired type. */
if (tunable_list[tid].type.type_code == TUNABLE_TYPE_STRING)
{
/* This is a memory leak but there's no easy way around
it, as the mapping will go away if the disk file is
updated and the cache is reloaded. */
tunable_list[tid].val.strval.str = __strdup (value);
tunable_list[tid].val.strval.len = strlen (value);
tunable_list[tid].initialized = true;
}
else
{
tunable_val_t tval;
if (tec->flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_PARSED)
{
tval.numval = tec->parsed_value;
do_tunable_update_val (& tunable_list[tid],
&tval, NULL, NULL);
}
else
{
tunable_initialize (& tunable_list[tid],
value, strlen (value));
}
}
/* The overriability flag only applies to tunables
which aren't filtered out. */
if ((tec->flags & TUNCONF_FLAG_OVERRIDABLE)
== TUNCONF_OVERRIDE_DENY)
tunable_list[tid].locked = true;
skip_due_to_filter:;
}
}
#endif /* defined(SHARED) && defined (USE_LDCONFIG) */
/* Ignore tunables for AT_SECURE programs. */
if (__libc_enable_secure)
return;
@@ -510,13 +345,9 @@ __tunables_init (char **envp, char **argv)
for (int i = 0; i < tunable_num_env_alias; i++)
{
/* Skip aliases whose tunable was already set through GLIBC_TUNABLES,
which takes precedence over the alias. A value coming only from the
system-wide cache does not block the alias here: an overridable cache
default may still be overridden, while a nonoverridable one is
protected by tunable_t::locked. */
/* Skip over tunables that have either been set or already initialized. */
if (tunables_env_alias[i].t == NULL
|| tunable_set_by_env[tunable_env_alias_list[i]])
|| tunables_env_alias[i].t->initialized)
continue;
if (!tunable_initialize (tunables_env_alias[i].t,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ typedef void (*tunable_callback_t) (tunable_val_t *);
#include "dl-tunable-list.h"
extern void __tunables_init (char **, char **);
extern void __tunables_init (char **);
extern void __tunables_print (void);
extern bool __tunable_is_initialized (tunable_id_t);
extern void __tunable_get_val (tunable_id_t, void *, tunable_callback_t);
+9 -23
View File
@@ -45,13 +45,7 @@ elf_dynamic_is_Rel_irelative (const ElfW(Rel) *reloc, const ElfW(Sym) *sym)
return ((sym != NULL
&& ELFW(ST_TYPE) (sym->st_info) == STT_GNU_IFUNC
&& sym->st_shndx != SHN_UNDEF)
|| r_type == ELF_MACHINE_IRELATIVE
# ifdef ELF_MACHINE_IRELATIVE_PLT
/* Some ports resolve an IFUNC PLT slot for a local resolver with a
dedicated reloc that carries no symboli. */
|| r_type == ELF_MACHINE_IRELATIVE_PLT
# endif
);
|| r_type == ELF_MACHINE_IRELATIVE);
#else
return false;
#endif
@@ -79,23 +73,17 @@ elf_dynamic_Rel_audit_symbind (struct link_map *map,
/* Perform the relocations in MAP on the running program image as specified
by RELTAG, SZTAG. If LAZY is nonzero, this is the first pass on PLT
relocations; they should be set up to call _dl_runtime_resolve, rather
than fully resolved now. If SKIP_IFUNC is nonzero no IFUNC resolver is
called; this is required for the trace modes (ldd -u / ldd -r), which
relocate objects.
than fully resolved now.
IRELATIVE entries and relocations against an STT_GNU_IFUNC symbol defined
in MAP itself are always skipped (non-bootstrap); they are handled
IRELATIVE entries are always skipped (non-bootstrap); they are handled
separately by elf_dynamic_do_Rel_irelative after all other relocations
for both .rel.dyn and .rel.plt have been processed. Relocations against
an IFUNC symbol defined in *another* object are not deferred, since the
IFUNC symbol is only known after symbol resolution, and the defining object
has already been relocated at this point. */
for both .rel.dyn and .rel.plt have been processed. */
static inline void __attribute__ ((always_inline))
elf_dynamic_do_Rel (struct link_map *map, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
ElfW(Addr) reladdr, ElfW(Addr) relsize,
__typeof (((ElfW(Dyn) *) 0)->d_un.d_val) nrelative,
int lazy, int skip_ifunc)
int lazy)
{
const ElfW(Rel) *relative = (const void *) reladdr;
const ElfW(Rel) *r = relative + nrelative;
@@ -117,7 +105,7 @@ elf_dynamic_do_Rel (struct link_map *map, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
void *const r_addr_arg = (void *) (l_addr + r->r_offset);
const struct r_found_version *rversion = &map->l_versions[ndx];
elf_machine_rel (map, scope, r, sym, rversion, r_addr_arg, skip_ifunc);
elf_machine_rel (map, scope, r, sym, rversion, r_addr_arg, 0);
}
#else /* !RTLD_BOOTSTRAP */
#if !defined DO_RELA || !defined ELF_MACHINE_PLT_REL
@@ -132,7 +120,7 @@ elf_dynamic_do_Rel (struct link_map *map, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
const ElfW (Sym) *sym = &symtab[ELFW (R_SYM) (r->r_info)];
if (elf_dynamic_is_Rel_irelative (r, sym))
continue;
elf_machine_lazy_rel (map, scope, l_addr, r, skip_ifunc);
elf_machine_lazy_rel (map, scope, l_addr, r, 0);
}
}
else
@@ -164,8 +152,7 @@ elf_dynamic_do_Rel (struct link_map *map, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
if (elf_dynamic_is_Rel_irelative (r, sym))
continue;
elf_machine_rel (map, scope, r, sym, rversion, r_addr_arg,
skip_ifunc);
elf_machine_rel (map, scope, r, sym, rversion, r_addr_arg, 0);
elf_dynamic_Rel_audit_symbind (map, scope, r, sym, rversion,
r_addr_arg);
}
@@ -179,8 +166,7 @@ elf_dynamic_do_Rel (struct link_map *map, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
if (elf_dynamic_is_Rel_irelative (r, sym))
continue;
elf_machine_rel (map, scope, r, sym, NULL, r_addr_arg,
skip_ifunc);
elf_machine_rel (map, scope, r, sym, NULL, r_addr_arg, 0);
elf_dynamic_Rel_audit_symbind (map, scope, r, sym, NULL,
r_addr_arg);
}
+62 -49
View File
@@ -78,23 +78,18 @@ elf_machine_lazy_rel (struct link_map *map, struct r_scope_elem *scope[],
consumes precisely the very end of the DT_REL*, or DT_JMPREL and DT_REL*
are completely separate and there is a gap between them. */
/* Selects which relocations a pass processes. Splitting them allows the
caller to interleave TLS / stack-protector setup between the two passes,
so IFUNC resolvers see a fully-initialised TCB.
This is orthogonal to the skip_ifunc argument, which says whether an IFUNC
resolver may be run at all and is honoured by every pass. In particular
DL_RELOC_NORMAL also runs IFUNC resolvers, for relocations against an
IFUNC symbol defined in another object. */
enum elf_dynamic_reloc_pass
/* This controls which sub-passes _ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC runs. Used to
interleave TLS / stack-protector setup between the two passes so IFUNC
resolvers see a fully-initialised TCB. */
enum elf_dynamic_reloc_phase
{
DL_RELOC_ALL = 0, /* Non-IRELATIVE relocations, then IRELATIVE. */
DL_RELOC_NORMAL = 1, /* Non-IRELATIVE relocations only. */
DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE = 2, /* IRELATIVE relocations only. */
DL_RELOC_BOTH = 0, /* Non-IRELATIVE pass then IRELATIVE pass. */
DL_RELOC_NOIFUNC = 1, /* Non-IRELATIVE pass only. */
DL_RELOC_IFUNC = 2, /* IRELATIVE pass only. */
};
# define _ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC(RELOC, reloc, map, scope, do_lazy, skip_ifunc, \
test_rel, pass) \
test_rel, phase) \
do { \
struct { ElfW(Addr) start, size; \
__typeof (((ElfW(Dyn) *) 0)->d_un.d_val) nrelative; int lazy; } \
@@ -141,15 +136,14 @@ enum elf_dynamic_reloc_pass
by the linker. */ \
if (!DO_RTLD_BOOTSTRAP) \
{ \
if ((pass) != DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE) \
if ((phase) != DL_RELOC_IFUNC) \
for (int ranges_index = 0; ranges_index < 2; ++ranges_index) \
elf_dynamic_do_##reloc ((map), scope, \
ranges[ranges_index].start, \
ranges[ranges_index].size, \
ranges[ranges_index].nrelative, \
ranges[ranges_index].lazy, \
skip_ifunc); \
if ((pass) != DL_RELOC_NORMAL) \
ranges[ranges_index].lazy); \
if ((phase) != DL_RELOC_NOIFUNC) \
for (int ranges_index = 0; ranges_index < 2; ++ranges_index) \
elf_dynamic_do_##reloc##_irelative ((map), scope, \
ranges[ranges_index].start, \
@@ -164,8 +158,7 @@ enum elf_dynamic_reloc_pass
ranges[ranges_index].start, \
ranges[ranges_index].size, \
ranges[ranges_index].nrelative, \
ranges[ranges_index].lazy, \
skip_ifunc); \
ranges[ranges_index].lazy); \
} while (0)
# if ELF_MACHINE_NO_REL || ELF_MACHINE_NO_RELA
@@ -176,21 +169,37 @@ enum elf_dynamic_reloc_pass
# if ! ELF_MACHINE_NO_REL
# include "do-rel.h"
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, pass) \
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) \
_ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC (REL, Rel, map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, \
_ELF_CHECK_REL, pass)
_ELF_CHECK_REL, DL_RELOC_BOTH)
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL_NOIFUNC(map, scope, lazy) \
_ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC (REL, Rel, map, scope, lazy, 0, \
_ELF_CHECK_REL, DL_RELOC_NOIFUNC)
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL_IFUNCONLY(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) \
_ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC (REL, Rel, map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, \
_ELF_CHECK_REL, DL_RELOC_IFUNC)
# else
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, pass) /* Nothing. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) /* Nothing to do. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL_NOIFUNC(map, scope, lazy) /* Nothing to do. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL_IFUNCONLY(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) /* Nothing. */
# endif
# if ! ELF_MACHINE_NO_RELA
# define DO_RELA
# include "do-rel.h"
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, pass) \
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) \
_ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC (RELA, Rela, map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, \
_ELF_CHECK_REL, pass)
_ELF_CHECK_REL, DL_RELOC_BOTH)
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA_NOIFUNC(map, scope, lazy) \
_ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC (RELA, Rela, map, scope, lazy, 0, \
_ELF_CHECK_REL, DL_RELOC_NOIFUNC)
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA_IFUNCONLY(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) \
_ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELOC (RELA, Rela, map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, \
_ELF_CHECK_REL, DL_RELOC_IFUNC)
# else
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc, pass) /* Nothing. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) /* Nothing to do. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA_NOIFUNC(map, scope, lazy) /* Nothing to do. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA_IFUNCONLY(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) /* Nothing. */
# endif
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELR(map) \
@@ -231,33 +240,37 @@ enum elf_dynamic_reloc_pass
# else
# define DO_RTLD_BOOTSTRAP 0
# endif
/* Perform one relocation pass over MAP. PASS selects which relocations are
processed. It is orthogonal to SKIP_IFUNC, which suppresses running IFUNC
resolvers in whichever pass is selected.
Unless PASS is DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE, this also performs the machine-specific
PLT/GOT setup, the DT_RELR relocations, and the ELF_DYNAMIC_AFTER_RELOC
hook. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_PASS(pass, map, scope, lazy, consider_profile, \
skip_ifunc) \
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(map, scope, lazy, consider_profile, skip_ifunc) \
do { \
int edr_lazy = (lazy); \
if ((pass) != DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE) \
{ \
edr_lazy = elf_machine_runtime_setup ((map), (scope), (lazy), \
int edr_lazy = elf_machine_runtime_setup ((map), (scope), (lazy), \
(consider_profile)); \
if (!is_rtld_link_map (map) || DO_RTLD_BOOTSTRAP) \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELR (map); \
} \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL ((map), (scope), edr_lazy, skip_ifunc, (pass)); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA ((map), (scope), edr_lazy, skip_ifunc, (pass)); \
if ((pass) != DL_RELOC_IRELATIVE) \
ELF_DYNAMIC_AFTER_RELOC ((map), edr_lazy); \
if (!is_rtld_link_map (map) || DO_RTLD_BOOTSTRAP) \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELR (map); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL ((map), (scope), edr_lazy, skip_ifunc); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA ((map), (scope), edr_lazy, skip_ifunc); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_AFTER_RELOC ((map), (edr_lazy)); \
} while (0)
/* Run both passes back to back, for callers with nothing to interleave. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE(map, scope, lazy, consider_profile, skip_ifunc) \
ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_PASS (DL_RELOC_ALL, (map), (scope), (lazy), \
(consider_profile), skip_ifunc)
/* Like ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE but only processes the non-IRELATIVE pass.
The IRELATIVE pass must be completed later via ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_IFUNC.
Used by the static-pie startup so the TCB and stack-protector canary can
be initialised between the two passes. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_NOIFUNC(map, scope, lazy, consider_profile) \
do { \
int edr_lazy = elf_machine_runtime_setup ((map), (scope), (lazy), \
(consider_profile)); \
if (!is_rtld_link_map (map) || DO_RTLD_BOOTSTRAP) \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELR (map); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL_NOIFUNC ((map), (scope), edr_lazy); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA_NOIFUNC ((map), (scope), edr_lazy); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_AFTER_RELOC ((map), (edr_lazy)); \
} while (0)
/* IRELATIVE-only companion to ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_NOIFUNC. */
# define ELF_DYNAMIC_RELOCATE_IFUNC(map, scope, lazy, skip_ifunc) \
do { \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_REL_IFUNCONLY ((map), (scope), (lazy), skip_ifunc); \
ELF_DYNAMIC_DO_RELA_IFUNCONLY ((map), (scope), (lazy), skip_ifunc); \
} while (0)
#endif
-1
View File
@@ -847,7 +847,6 @@ typedef struct
#define NT_RISCV_VECTOR 0x901 /* RISC-V vector registers */
#define NT_RISCV_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 0x902 /* RISC-V tagged
address control */
#define NT_RISCV_USER_CFI 0x903 /* RISC-V shadow stack state */
#define NT_LOONGARCH_CPUCFG 0xa00 /* LoongArch CPU config registers. */
#define NT_LOONGARCH_CSR 0xa01 /* LoongArch control and
status registers. */
+2 -4
View File
@@ -47,10 +47,8 @@ ldconfig_parse_config_1 (const char *filename, bool do_chroot,
opt_chroot - If non-NULL, all paths are relative to this.
callback - for each non-blank line in the file, this function is
called with the line and it's location. Will also be called
with a NULL line at the start and end of each file, for
file-scoped config items.
callback - for each non-blank line in the file, this function is called
with the line and it's location.
*/
void
+5 -183
View File
@@ -44,17 +44,12 @@
#include <dl-cache.h>
#include <dl-hwcaps.h>
#include <dl-is_dso.h>
#include "tunconf.h"
#ifndef LD_SO_CONF
# define LD_SO_CONF SYSCONFDIR "/ld.so.conf"
#endif
#ifndef TUNABLES_CONF
# define TUNABLES_CONF SYSCONFDIR "/tunables.conf"
#endif
/* Get libc version number. */
#include <version.h>
@@ -109,18 +104,12 @@ static int opt_manual_link;
/* Should we ignore an old auxiliary cache file? */
static int opt_ignore_aux_cache;
/* Install a pre-existing cache file instead of generating a new one. */
static int opt_install;
/* Cache file to use. */
static char *cache_file;
/* Configuration file for libraries. */
/* Configuration file. */
static const char *config_file;
/* Configuration file for tunables. */
static const char *tunconfig_file;
/* Name and version of program. */
static void print_version (FILE *stream, struct argp_state *state);
void (*argp_program_version_hook) (FILE *, struct argp_state *)
@@ -138,13 +127,11 @@ static const struct argp_option options[] =
{ NULL, 'X', NULL, 0, N_("Don't update symbolic links"), 0},
{ NULL, 'r', N_("ROOT"), 0, N_("Change to and use ROOT as root directory"), 0},
{ NULL, 'C', N_("CACHE"), 0, N_("Use CACHE as cache file"), 0},
{ NULL, 'f', N_("CONF"), 0, N_("Use CONF as configuration file for libraries"), 0},
{ NULL, 't', N_("TUNCONF"), 0, N_("Use TUNCONF as configuration file for tunables"), 0},
{ NULL, 'f', N_("CONF"), 0, N_("Use CONF as configuration file"), 0},
{ NULL, 'n', NULL, 0, N_("Only process directories specified on the command line. Don't build cache."), 0},
{ NULL, 'l', NULL, 0, N_("Manually link individual libraries."), 0},
{ "format", 'c', N_("FORMAT"), 0, N_("Format to use: new (default), old, or compat"), 0},
{ "ignore-aux-cache", 'i', NULL, 0, N_("Ignore auxiliary cache file"), 0},
{ "install", 'I', NULL, 0, N_("Install pre-existing cache file"), 0},
{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
@@ -177,9 +164,6 @@ parse_opt (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
case 'f':
config_file = arg;
break;
case 't':
tunconfig_file = arg;
break;
case 'i':
opt_ignore_aux_cache = 1;
break;
@@ -213,9 +197,6 @@ parse_opt (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
else if (strcmp (arg, "new") == 0)
opt_format = opt_format_new;
break;
case 'I':
opt_install = 1;
break;
default:
return ARGP_ERR_UNKNOWN;
}
@@ -440,11 +421,8 @@ add_dir_1 (const char *line, const char *from_file, int from_line)
}
static void
add_dir_callback (char *line, const char *from_file, int from_line)
add_dir_callback (const char *line, const char *from_file, int from_line)
{
/* Denotes file boundaries. Not needed here. */
if (line == NULL)
return;
if (!strncasecmp (line, "hwcap", 5) && isblank (line[5]))
error (0, 0, _("%s:%u: hwcap directive ignored"), from_file, from_line);
else
@@ -1048,155 +1026,6 @@ search_dirs (void)
}
}
static void
install_cache_file (const char *source_arg)
{
int e;
if (source_arg == NULL)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("Missing source file name"));
const char *source = (opt_chroot
? chroot_canon (opt_chroot, source_arg)
: source_arg);
if (source == NULL)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Can't find %s"), source_arg);
int src_fd = open (source, O_RDONLY);
if (src_fd < 0)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Can't open %s"), source);
char *dest = xmalloc (strlen (cache_file) + 1 + 1);
/* This matches the temp file created by cache.c, and should be
on the same filesystem as the cache file. */
sprintf (dest, "%s~", cache_file);
int dest_fd;
struct stat st;
if (fstat (src_fd, &st) < 0)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Can't stat %s"), source);
char buf[512];
ssize_t r, w = 0, sz = 0;
char *bp = buf;
/* Read the first part of the file and verify it looks
reasonable. */
while (sz < sizeof (buf)
&& (r = read (src_fd, bp, sizeof (buf) - sz)) > 0)
{
sz += r;
bp += r;
}
if (r < 0)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Error reading file %s"), source);
if (! ((sz >= sizeof (CACHEMAGIC)
&& memcmp (buf, CACHEMAGIC,
sizeof (CACHEMAGIC) - 1) == 0)
|| (sz >= sizeof (CACHEMAGIC_NEW)
&& memcmp (buf, CACHEMAGIC_NEW,
sizeof (CACHEMAGIC_NEW) - 1) == 0)))
{
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0,
_("File %s does not look like an ld.so.cache file"),
source);
}
/* Now write that first part out. */
dest_fd = open (dest, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW,
S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
if (dest_fd < 0)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Can't create %s"), dest);
r = sz;
bp = buf;
while (r > 0 && (w = write (dest_fd, bp, r)) > 0)
{
r -= w;
bp += w;
}
if (w < 0)
{
e = errno;
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, e, _("Error writing file %s"), dest);
}
/* At this point, sz contains the number of bytes copied so far.
Copy the rest of the file. */
while ((r = read (src_fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
{
bp = buf;
while (r > 0 && (w = write (dest_fd, bp, r)) > 0)
{
bp += w;
r -= w;
sz += w;
}
if (w <= 0)
break;
}
if (r < 0)
{
e = errno;
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, e, _("Error reading file %s"), source);
}
if (w < 0)
{
e = errno;
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, e, _("Error writing file %s"), dest);
}
close (src_fd);
/* Make sure we copied it all. */
if (sz < st.st_size)
{
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("Unable to copy file %s to %s"),
source, dest);
}
/* Make sure user can always read the cache file */
if (fchmod (dest_fd, S_IROTH|S_IRGRP|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR))
{
e = errno;
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, e,
_("Changing access rights of %s to %#o failed"), dest,
S_IROTH|S_IRGRP|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
}
if (fsync (dest_fd) != 0)
{
e = errno;
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, e, _("Writing to %s failed"), dest);
}
if (rename (dest, cache_file) < 0)
{
e = errno;
unlink (dest);
close (dest_fd);
error (EXIT_FAILURE, e, _("Can't rename %s to %s"),
dest, cache_file);
}
if (close (dest_fd) != 0)
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("Writing to %s failed"), dest);
exit (0);
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv)
@@ -1216,8 +1045,8 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
argp_parse (&argp, argc, argv, 0, &remaining, NULL);
/* Remaining arguments are additional directories if opt_manual_link
and opt_install are not set. */
if (remaining != argc && !opt_manual_link && !opt_install)
is not set. */
if (remaining != argc && !opt_manual_link)
{
int i;
for (i = remaining; i < argc; ++i)
@@ -1260,9 +1089,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
if (config_file == NULL)
config_file = LD_SO_CONF;
if (tunconfig_file == NULL)
tunconfig_file = TUNABLES_CONF;
if (opt_print_cache)
{
if (opt_chroot != NULL)
@@ -1313,8 +1139,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
exit (0);
}
if (opt_install)
install_cache_file (argv[remaining]);
if (opt_build_cache)
init_cache ();
@@ -1340,8 +1164,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
search_dirs ();
parse_tunconf (tunconfig_file, opt_chroot);
if (opt_build_cache)
{
save_cache (cache_file);
+5
View File
@@ -2371,6 +2371,11 @@ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
/* Auditing checkpoint: we have added all objects. */
_dl_audit_activity_nsid (LM_ID_BASE, LA_ACT_CONSISTENT);
#if defined USE_LDCONFIG && !defined MAP_COPY
/* We must munmap() the cache file. */
_dl_unload_cache ();
#endif
/* Once we return, _dl_sysdep_start will invoke
the DT_INIT functions and then *USER_ENTRY. */
}
-137
View File
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
/* Test ldconfig cache is correctly used when changed.
Copyright (C) 2026 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the
License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; see the file COPYING.LIB. If
not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
/* What we're testing for: We initially load ld.so.cache at startup
and remember it. If we detect that ld.so.cache has changed, and we
can load it successfully, we replace our remember it. If it
doesn't change, or if the new version is corrupted, we continue
using the old remembered copy. */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <support/support.h>
#include <support/check.h>
#include <support/xstdio.h>
#include <support/xstdlib.h>
#include <support/xdlfcn.h>
#include <support/xunistd.h>
/* Verify that we can (or can't) load one of our test objects. */
static void
try (int i, int invert)
{
char dlname[100];
char symname[100];
int (*proc)(int);
void *dl;
/* These match the objects copied by tst-ldconfig-cache.script,
copied from tst-tls-manydynamic*.so. */
sprintf (dlname, "libcache%d.so", i);
sprintf (symname, "set_value_%02d", i);
dl = dlopen (dlname, RTLD_NOW);
if (invert)
{
/* This is a negative test; if the object doesn't load the test
passes. */
TEST_VERIFY (dl == NULL);
return;
}
else
{
/* This is a positive test; if the object doesn't load the test
fails. */
if (dl == NULL)
FAIL_EXIT1 ("error: dlopen: %s\n", dlerror ());
}
proc = xdlsym (dl, symname);
/* We don't need to call the symbol, just make sure it exists. */
TEST_VERIFY (proc != NULL);
xdlclose (dl);
}
/* Cause corruption in the cache that should prevent loading it. */
static void
corrupt (void)
{
int fd = xopen ("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDWR, 0);
char bytes[] = { 15, 32, 184, 4 };
xwrite (fd, bytes, sizeof(bytes));
xclose (fd);
}
/* Regenerate the cache from ld.so.conf. */
static void
ldconfig (void)
{
char *cmd = xasprintf("%s/ldconfig -X", support_install_rootsbindir);
xsystem (cmd);
free(cmd);
}
/* Change ld.so.conf to refer to the new directory, and generate a new
cache. */
static void
newpath (const char *p)
{
FILE *f = xfopen ("/etc/ld.so.conf", "w");
fprintf (f, "%s\n", p);
xfclose (f);
ldconfig ();
}
static int
do_test (void)
{
/* Test that the cache we started with can still load objects in
/a. */
try (1, 0);
/* Create a new cache that doesn't include /a but corrupt it. Test
that we still use the cache with /a in it. */
newpath ("/c");
corrupt ();
try (2, 0);
/* Regenerate a clean cache with /a in it and verify we can load
objects in /a. */
newpath ("/a");
try (3, 0);
/* Generate a new cache with /b but not /a and make sure objects
in /a can't be loaded. */
newpath ("/b");
try (3, 1);
/* But objects in /b can be loaded. */
try (4, 0);
/* Even multiple times. */
try (5, 0);
return 0;
}
#include <support/test-driver.c>
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
/lib
/lib64
/a
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
mkdirp 0755 /a
cp $B/elf/tst-tls-manydynamic01mod.so /a/libcache1.so
cp $B/elf/tst-tls-manydynamic02mod.so /a/libcache2.so
cp $B/elf/tst-tls-manydynamic03mod.so /a/libcache3.so
mkdirp 0755 /b
cp $B/elf/tst-tls-manydynamic04mod.so /b/libcache4.so
cp $B/elf/tst-tls-manydynamic05mod.so /b/libcache5.so
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Test that ldconfig --install installs a pre-built cache file.
# Copyright (C) 2026 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
# This file is part of the GNU C Library.
# The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
# modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
# version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
# The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# Lesser General Public License for more details.
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
# License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
# <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
set -e
common_objpfx=$1
test_wrapper_env=$2
run_program_env=$3
testroot="${common_objpfx}elf/tst-ldconfig-install-directory"
cleanup () {
rm -rf "$testroot"
}
trap cleanup 0
rm -rf "$testroot"
mkdir -p "$testroot/etc"
ldconfig="${common_objpfx}elf/ldconfig"
run_ldconfig () {
${test_wrapper_env} ${run_program_env} "$ldconfig" "$@"
}
errors=0
fail () {
echo "error: $1"
errors=1
}
# Build a pre-built cache to install.
source="$testroot/prebuilt-ld.so.cache"
mkdir -p "$testroot/lib"
run_ldconfig -X -f /dev/null -C "$source" "$testroot/lib"
test -r "$source" || fail "ldconfig did not create the pre-built cache"
# Pad the source past the 512-byte internal copy buffer so that the multi-block
# copy path is exercised, while leaving the cache magic at the start intact.
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=4 >> "$source" 2>/dev/null
dest="$testroot/etc/ld.so.cache"
temp="$dest~"
run_ldconfig --install -f /dev/null -C "$dest" "$source"
# The destination must exist and be byte-identical to the source.
if test -r "$dest"; then
if cmp -s "$source" "$dest"; then
echo "info: installed cache matches the source"
else
fail "installed cache differs from the source"
fi
else
fail "destination cache file was not created"
fi
# The temporary file used during the atomic rename must not be left behind.
if test -e "$temp"; then
fail "temporary file $temp was left behind"
fi
# The installed cache must be world-readable (0644).
if test -r "$dest"; then
mode=$(ls -l "$dest" | cut -c1-10)
case "$mode" in
(-rw-r--r--) echo "info: installed cache has expected permissions" ;;
(*) fail "installed cache has unexpected permissions: $mode" ;;
esac
fi
# A second install over an existing cache must also succeed.
run_ldconfig --install -f /dev/null -C "$dest" "$source"
if cmp -s "$source" "$dest"; then
echo "info: re-install over an existing cache works"
else
fail "re-install produced a different cache"
fi
# Error case: a source file that is not a cache must be rejected, and no
# destination must be produced.
rm -f "$dest"
notcache="$testroot/not-a-cache"
echo "this is not an ld.so.cache file" > "$notcache"
if run_ldconfig --install -f /dev/null -C "$dest" "$notcache" 2>"$testroot/err"; then
fail "ldconfig accepted a file that is not a cache"
else
if grep -q "does not look like an ld.so.cache file" "$testroot/err"; then
echo "info: non-cache source correctly rejected"
else
fail "unexpected error message for non-cache source"
cat "$testroot/err"
fi
fi
test -e "$dest" && fail "destination created from an invalid source"
# Error case: a missing source argument must be diagnosed.
if run_ldconfig --install -f /dev/null -C "$dest" 2>"$testroot/err"; then
fail "ldconfig accepted --install without a source file"
else
grep -q "Missing source file name" "$testroot/err" \
|| fail "unexpected error message for missing source"
fi
# Error case: a nonexistent source must be diagnosed.
if run_ldconfig --install -f /dev/null -C "$dest" \
"$testroot/does-not-exist" 2>"$testroot/err"; then
fail "ldconfig accepted a nonexistent source file"
fi
exit $errors
-81
View File
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
/* Test that the tunables cache can override env vars.
Copyright (C) 2026 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <support/check.h>
#include "dl-tunables.h"
static int
do_test (void)
{
size_t tcache_count = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, tcache_count, size_t, NULL);
size_t tcache_max = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, tcache_max, size_t, NULL);
int32_t perturb = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, perturb, int32_t, NULL);
size_t mmap_threshold = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, mmap_threshold, size_t, NULL);
size_t trim_threshold = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, trim_threshold, size_t, NULL);
printf("tcache count is %zu (should be 5, from env)\n", tcache_count);
TEST_COMPARE ((long)tcache_count, 5);
printf("tcache max is %zu (should be 4, from /etc)\n", tcache_max);
TEST_COMPARE ((long)tcache_max, 4);
/* This is set by the environment but blocked by the config. */
printf("perturb is %" PRId32 " (should be 42, from /etc)\n",
perturb);
TEST_COMPARE (perturb, 42);
/* This is blocked by the general config, enabled by filter, set in env. */
printf("mmap_threshold is %zu (should be 10002, from env)\n",
mmap_threshold);
TEST_COMPARE ((long)mmap_threshold, 10002);
/* This is allowed by the general config, blocked by filter, set in env. */
printf("trim_threshold is %zu (should be 10001, from filter)\n",
trim_threshold);
TEST_COMPARE ((long)trim_threshold, 10001);
/* Interaction with legacy environment-variable aliases (MALLOC_*). */
int32_t mmap_max = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, mmap_max, int32_t, NULL);
size_t top_pad = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, top_pad, size_t, NULL);
size_t arena_max = TUNABLE_GET_FULL (glibc, malloc, arena_max, size_t, NULL);
/* Overridable cache default (100); the MALLOC_MMAP_MAX_ alias overrides
it, just like GLIBC_TUNABLES would. */
printf("mmap_max is %" PRId32 " (should be 200, from MALLOC_MMAP_MAX_ alias)"
"\n",
mmap_max);
TEST_COMPARE (mmap_max, 200);
/* Nonoverridable cache default (100); the MALLOC_TOP_PAD_ alias must not
override it. */
printf("top_pad is %zu (should be 100, from /etc nonoverridable)\n",
top_pad);
TEST_COMPARE ((long)top_pad, 100);
/* Set both by GLIBC_TUNABLES (300) and by the MALLOC_ARENA_MAX alias
(400); the canonical GLIBC_TUNABLES form wins. */
printf("arena_max is %zu (should be 300, from GLIBC_TUNABLES)\n", arena_max);
TEST_COMPARE ((long)arena_max, 300);
return 0;
}
#include <support/test-driver.c>
-31
View File
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# These test the parser for both the overridability characters as well as
# tunables that either never exist, or only exist on some platforms.
-glibc.cpu.cached_memopt=1
+glibc.cpu.hwcaps=some,random,string
@glibc.test_secure=1
$glibc.test_unsecure=1
# These are checked inside the test case
glibc.malloc.tcache_max=6
$glibc.malloc.tcache_count=3
-glibc.malloc.perturb=42
-glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=10000
overridable glibc.malloc.trim_threshold=10000
# Interaction with legacy environment-variable aliases (MALLOC_*), checked
# in the test case:
# - mmap_max: overridable cache default, must be overridable by the
# MALLOC_MMAP_MAX_ alias just like by GLIBC_TUNABLES.
# - top_pad: nonoverridable cache default, must NOT be overridable by the
# MALLOC_TOP_PAD_ alias.
glibc.malloc.mmap_max=100
-glibc.malloc.top_pad=100
[proc:/bin/ls]
glibc.malloc.tcache_max=7
[proc:tst-tunconf1]
glibc.malloc.tcache_max=4
+glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=10001
nonoverridable glibc.malloc.trim_threshold=10001
View File
View File
-440
View File
@@ -1,440 +0,0 @@
/* Manage /etc/tunables.*
Copyright (C) 1999-2023 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
by the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
#include <alloca.h>
#include <argp.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <error.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <glob.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#include <libintl.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <programs/xmalloc.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdio_ext.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#define TUNABLES_INTERNAL
#include <elf/dl-tunables.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <ldconfig.h>
#include <dl-cache.h>
#include <version.h>
#include <stringtable.h>
#include <array_length.h>
#include "tunconf.h"
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
#ifndef TUNABLES_CONF
# define TUNABLES_CONF SYSCONFDIR "/tunables.conf"
#endif
#ifndef TUNABLES_CACHE
# define TUNABLES_CACHE SYSCONFDIR "/tunables.cache"
#endif
/* Tunable Override Policies. */
typedef enum {
TOP_ALLOW = 0, /* let the environment variable override */
TOP_DENY /* no override allowed */
} TOP;
struct tunable_entry_int {
struct stringtable_entry *name;
struct stringtable_entry *value;
struct stringtable_entry *filter;
TOP top;
bool exclude_secure:1;
bool exclude_nonsecure:1;
int tunable_id;
int value_is_negative:1;
int value_was_parsed:1;
unsigned long long value_ull;
signed long long value_sll;
long filter_flags;
struct tunable_entry_int *next;
};
struct tunable_entry_int *entry_list;
static int filter_flags = 0;
static char *filter_string = NULL;
/*----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static void
clear_filter (void)
{
free (filter_string);
filter_string = NULL;
filter_flags = 0;
}
/* Filters are lines the are bracketed, like
[prog:foo]
*/
static void
parse_filter (char *line, const char *filename, int lineno)
{
const char *colon = NULL;
const char *right_bracket = NULL;
const char *cp;
for (cp = line; *cp != 0; ++cp)
{
if (*cp == ':')
colon = cp;
if (*cp == ']')
{
right_bracket = cp;
break;
}
}
/* Special case: [] means "no filter" */
if (right_bracket != NULL && right_bracket == line + 1)
{
clear_filter ();
return;
}
if (colon == NULL)
{
error_at_line (0, 0, filename, lineno,
"syntax error, filter line ignored: `%s' (missing ':')\n",
line);
return;
}
if (right_bracket == NULL)
{
error_at_line (0, 0, filename, lineno,
"syntax error, filter line ignored: `%s' (missing ']')\n",
line);
return;
}
if (filter_string != NULL)
{
clear_filter ();
}
if (colon - line - 1 == 4 && memcmp ("proc", line + 1, 4) == 0)
{
/* Consider this example: [proc:foo] ..." */
/* We allocate 4 bytes, [0] through [3]. */
filter_string = (char *) xmalloc (right_bracket - colon);
/* We copy "foo" for 3 bytes, [0] through [2]. */
memcpy (filter_string, colon + 1, right_bracket - colon - 1);
/* [3] = 0 so now "foo\0". */
filter_string [right_bracket - colon - 1] = 0;
filter_flags = TUNCONF_FILTER_PERPROC;
}
else
error_at_line (0, 0, filename, lineno,
"unrecognized filter `%.*s', ignored\n",
(int)(colon - line - 1), line + 1);
}
static void
add_tunable (char *line, const char *filename, int lineno)
{
TOP top = TOP_ALLOW;
char *name;
char *value;
char *eq;
char *orig_line;
struct tunable_entry_int *entry;
int i, id;
static struct tunable_entry_int **entry_list_next = &entry_list;
bool exclude_secure = 1, exclude_nonsecure = 0;
/* Denotes file boundaries. */
if (line == NULL)
{
clear_filter();
return;
}
orig_line = line;
/* Leading whitespace has already been stripped. */
/* Canonicalize the line. */
for (i=0; line[i]; i++)
{
if (line[i] == '\t')
line[i] = ' ';
if (line[i] == '\n' || line[i] == '\r')
{
line[i] = '\0';
break;
}
}
/* Parse modifiers. */
while (*line)
{
int prefix_len;
#define TUN_PREFIX(s) \
prefix_len = sizeof(s) - 1, \
strncmp (line, s " ", prefix_len + 1) == 0
if (TUN_PREFIX("overridable"))
{
top = TOP_ALLOW;
/* The line++ below skips the space. */
line += prefix_len;
}
else if (TUN_PREFIX ("nonoverridable"))
{
top = TOP_DENY;
line += prefix_len;
}
else if (TUN_PREFIX ("onlysecure"))
{
exclude_nonsecure = 1;
exclude_secure = 0;
line += prefix_len;
}
else if (TUN_PREFIX ("nonsecure"))
{
exclude_secure = 1;
exclude_nonsecure = 0;
line += prefix_len;
}
else if (TUN_PREFIX ("anysecure"))
{
exclude_secure = 0;
exclude_nonsecure = 0;
line += prefix_len;
}
else switch (*line)
{
case '+':
top = TOP_ALLOW;
break;
case '-':
top = TOP_DENY;
break;
case '@':
exclude_nonsecure = 1;
exclude_secure = 0;
break;
case '$':
exclude_nonsecure = 0;
exclude_secure = 1;
break;
case '*':
exclude_nonsecure = 0;
exclude_secure = 0;
break;
case '[':
parse_filter (line, filename, lineno);
return;
case ' ':
break;
default:
goto done;
}
line ++;
}
done:
/* NAME now points to the start of the tunable name. */
name = line;
/* Look for the '=' separator. */
eq = strchr (line, '=');
if (eq == NULL)
{
error_at_line (0, 0, filename, lineno,
"syntax error, line ignored: `%s' (missing '=')",
orig_line);
return;
}
if (eq == name)
{
error_at_line (0, 0, filename, lineno,
"syntax error, line ignored: `%s' (missing tunable name)",
orig_line);
return;
}
/* At this point, EQ actually points to '='. */
value = eq + 1;
while (*value && isspace(*value))
value ++;
if (*value == 0)
{
error_at_line (0, 0, filename, lineno,
"syntax error, line ignored: `%s' (missing value)",
orig_line);
return;
}
/* VALUE now points to the start of the value. */
/* Split the string into name and value c-strings. */
*eq = 0;
/* Trim trailing whitespace off NAME. */
while (*name && isspace (name[strlen(name)-1]))
name[strlen(name)-1] = 0;
/* Trim trailing whitespace off VALUE. */
while (*value && isspace (value[strlen(value)-1]))
value[strlen(value)-1] = 0;
id = -1;
for (i = 0; i < array_length (tunable_list); i ++)
if (strcmp (tunable_list[i].name, name) == 0)
{
id = i;
break;
}
if (id == -1)
printf ("%s:%d: Warning: tunable %s not recognized.\n",
filename, lineno, name);
entry = (struct tunable_entry_int *) xcalloc (sizeof (struct tunable_entry_int), 1);
entry->name = cache_store_string (name);
entry->value = cache_store_string (value);
entry->tunable_id = id;
entry->top = top;
entry->exclude_secure = exclude_secure;
entry->exclude_nonsecure = exclude_nonsecure;
if (filter_flags)
{
entry->filter_flags = filter_flags;
entry->filter = cache_store_string (filter_string);
}
if (value[0] == '-')
{
entry->value_is_negative = 1;
if (sscanf (value, "%lld", &entry->value_sll) == 1)
entry->value_was_parsed = 1;
}
else
{
entry->value_is_negative = 0;
if (sscanf (value, "%llu", &entry->value_ull) == 1)
entry->value_was_parsed = 1;
}
*entry_list_next = entry;
entry_list_next = & (entry->next);
}
void
parse_tunconf (const char *filename, char *opt_chroot)
{
ldconfig_parse_config (filename, opt_chroot, add_tunable);
}
struct tunable_header_cached *
get_tunconf_ext (uint32_t string_table_offset)
{
struct tunable_entry_int *tei;
struct tunable_header_cached *thc;
size_t count;
size_t size;
/* First, count the number of entries we have. */
tei = entry_list;
count = 0;
while (tei != NULL)
{
++ count;
tei = tei->next;
}
if (count == 0)
return NULL;
/* Allocate enough space for the whole cached block. */
size = sizeof (struct tunable_header_cached)
+ sizeof (struct tunable_entry_cached) * count;
thc = (struct tunable_header_cached *) xmalloc (size);
/* Now, fill in the structures. */
thc->signature = TUNCONF_SIGNATURE;
thc->version = TUNCONF_VERSION;
thc->num_tunables = count;
thc->unused_1 = 0;
tei = entry_list;
count = 0;
while (tei != NULL)
{
struct tunable_entry_cached *tec;
tec = & ( thc->tunables[count] );
tec->flags = 0;
if (tei->value_was_parsed)
tec->flags |= TUNCONF_FLAG_PARSED;
if (tei->value_is_negative)
tec->flags |= TUNCONF_FLAG_NEGATIVE;
switch (tei->top)
{
case TOP_ALLOW:
tec->flags |= TUNCONF_OVERRIDE_ALLOW;
break;
case TOP_DENY:
tec->flags |= TUNCONF_OVERRIDE_DENY;
break;
}
if (tei->exclude_secure)
tec->flags |= TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_SECURE;
if (tei->exclude_nonsecure)
tec->flags |= TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_UNSECURE;
tec->tunable_id = tei->tunable_id;
tec->name_offset = tei->name->offset + string_table_offset;
tec->value_offset = tei->value->offset + string_table_offset;
if (tei->filter_flags != 0)
{
tec->flag_offset = tei->filter->offset + string_table_offset;
tec->flags |= tei->filter_flags;
}
else
tec->flag_offset = 0;
tec->unused_1 = 0;
if (tei->value_is_negative)
tec->parsed_value = (uint64_t) tei->value_sll;
else
tec->parsed_value = (uint64_t) tei->value_ull;
++ count;
tei = tei->next;
}
return thc;
}
-45
View File
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
#define TUNCONF_SIGNATURE 0x7c3ba94f
#define TUNCONF_VERSION 0x01000000
#define TUNCONF_FLAG_PARSED 0x00000001
#define TUNCONF_FLAG_NEGATIVE 0x00000002
#define TUNCONF_FLAG_OVERRIDABLE 0x0000000C
#define TUNCONF_OVERRIDE_DENY 0x00000004
#define TUNCONF_OVERRIDE_ALLOW 0x00000000
#define TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_SECURE 0x00000010
#define TUNCONF_EXCLUDE_UNSECURE 0x00000020
#define TUNCONF_FLAG_FILTER 0x0000ff00
#define TUNCONF_FILTER_NONE 0x00000000
#define TUNCONF_FILTER_PERPROC 0x00000100
/* An array of [num_tunables] of these follows the below. */
struct tunable_entry_cached {
uint32_t flags;
uint32_t tunable_id;
uint32_t name_offset;
uint32_t value_offset;
uint32_t flag_offset;
uint32_t unused_1; /* for alignment */
uint64_t parsed_value;
};
/* One of these is at the beginning of the tunable data block. */
struct tunable_header_cached {
uint32_t signature;
uint32_t version;
uint32_t num_tunables;
uint32_t unused_1; /* for alignment */
struct tunable_entry_cached tunables[0 /* num_tunables */];
};
void parse_tunconf (const char *filename, char *opt_chroot);
struct tunable_header_cached * get_tunconf_ext (uint32_t str_offset);
#define TUNCONF_SIZE(thc_p) (sizeof(struct tunable_header_cached) \
+ thc_p->num_tunables * sizeof (struct tunable_entry_cached))
extern const struct tunable_header_cached *
_dl_load_cache_tunables (const char **data);
-7
View File
@@ -257,10 +257,3 @@ $(addprefix $(objpfx),$(tests-static) $(xtests-static)): $(srcdir)/libpthread_sy
else
$(addprefix $(objpfx),$(tests) $(test-srcs)): $(srcdir)/libpthread_syms.a $(objpfx)libpthread.a
endif
# Like rt, these tests prefer to be run serially.
ifeq (yes-yes,$(run-built-tests)-$(serialize-tests))
ifneq ($(filter %tests,$(MAKECMDGOALS)),)
.NOTPARALLEL:
endif
endif
+1 -4
View File
@@ -76,8 +76,7 @@ tests = bug-iconv1 bug-iconv2 tst-loading tst-e2big tst-iconv4 bug-iconv4 \
tst-iconv6 bug-iconv5 bug-iconv6 tst-iconv7 bug-iconv8 bug-iconv9 \
bug-iconv10 bug-iconv11 bug-iconv12 tst-iconv-big5-hkscs-to-2ucs4 \
bug-iconv13 bug-iconv14 bug-iconv15 \
tst-iconv-iso-2022-cn-ext tst-bug33980 \
tst-jisx0213-progress
tst-iconv-iso-2022-cn-ext tst-bug33980
ifeq ($(have-thread-library),yes)
tests += bug-iconv3
endif
@@ -336,8 +335,6 @@ $(objpfx)tst-iconv-iso-2022-cn-ext.out: $(addprefix $(objpfx), $(gconv-modules))
$(addprefix $(objpfx),$(modules.so))
$(objpfx)tst-bug33980.out: $(addprefix $(objpfx), $(gconv-modules)) \
$(addprefix $(objpfx),$(modules.so))
$(objpfx)tst-jisx0213-progress.out: \
$(addprefix $(objpfx), $(gconv-modules)) $(addprefix $(objpfx),$(modules.so))
$(objpfx)iconv-test.out: run-iconv-test.sh \
$(addprefix $(objpfx), $(gconv-modules)) \
-3
View File
@@ -224,9 +224,6 @@
STANDARD_FROM_LOOP_ERR_HANDLER (1); \
} \
} \
else \
/* There was a pending character. Clear it. */ \
*statep = 0; \
\
put32 (outptr, ch); \
outptr += 4; \
-3
View File
@@ -226,9 +226,6 @@
STANDARD_FROM_LOOP_ERR_HANDLER (1); \
} \
} \
else \
/* There was a pending character. Clear it. */ \
*statep = 0; \
\
put32 (outptr, ch); \
outptr += 4; \
-124
View File
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
/* Test JISX0213 combining character conversion progress (bug 34556, bug 34568).
Copyright (C) 2026 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
/* Certain JISX0213 byte sequences map to a combining sequence, for
example U+304B (HIRAGANA LETTER KA) followed by U+309A (COMBINING
SEMI-VOICED SOUND MARK). When converting to internal encoding
(actually UTF-32) with a small output buffer, the first code point
is emitted and the second is queued in the converter state. This
test verifies that the queued code point is consumed exactly once
on retry, so that the conversion makes progress and terminates. */
#include <errno.h>
#include <iconv.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <support/check.h>
#include <support/support.h>
static void
test_one (const char *charset, const char *input, size_t outbufsize)
{
printf ("info: %s: testing output buffer size %zu\n", charset, outbufsize);
/* Expected UTF-32 output. */
static const wchar_t expected[] = { 0x304b, 0x309a, 'A' };
/* Use WCHAR_T encoding to avoid the BOM. */
iconv_t cd = iconv_open ("WCHAR_T", charset);
TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (cd != (iconv_t) -1);
char result[64];
size_t result_len = 0;
char *inptr = (char *) input;
size_t inleft = strlen (input);
char outbuf[64];
int iterations = 0;
while (inleft > 0)
{
char *outptr = outbuf;
size_t outleft = outbufsize;
size_t inleft_before = inleft;
size_t ret = iconv (cd, &inptr, &inleft, &outptr, &outleft);
size_t produced = outptr - outbuf;
TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (result_len + produced <= sizeof (result));
memcpy (result + result_len, outbuf, produced);
result_len += produced;
if (ret == (size_t) -1 && errno == E2BIG)
{
if (produced == 0 && inleft == inleft_before)
{
/* Output buffer too small for a single code point. */
TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (outbufsize < 4);
break;
}
/* Bound iterations to detect non-progress bugs. */
if (++iterations < 10)
continue;
else
{
FAIL ("%s: no progress", charset);
goto out;
}
}
if (ret == (size_t) -1)
FAIL_EXIT1 ("outbufsize %zu: iconv: %m", outbufsize);
break;
}
/* Flush pending converter state. */
{
char *outptr = outbuf;
size_t outleft = outbufsize;
size_t ret = iconv (cd, NULL, NULL, &outptr, &outleft);
TEST_VERIFY (ret == 0);
size_t produced = outptr - outbuf;
memcpy (result + result_len, outbuf, produced);
result_len += produced;
}
if (outbufsize >= 4)
{
TEST_COMPARE (inleft, 0);
TEST_COMPARE_BLOB (result, result_len,
expected, sizeof (expected));
}
out:
TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (iconv_close (cd) == 0);
}
static int
do_test (void)
{
for (size_t outbufsize = 1; outbufsize <= 16; outbufsize++)
{
test_one ("EUC-JISX0213", "\244\367A", outbufsize);
test_one ("SHIFT_JISX0213", "\202\365A", outbufsize);
}
return 0;
}
#include <support/test-driver.c>
+1 -1
View File
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@
/* Major and minor version number of the GNU C library package. Use
these macros to test for features in specific releases. */
#define __GLIBC__ 2
#define __GLIBC_MINOR__ 44
#define __GLIBC_MINOR__ 43
#define __GLIBC_PREREQ(maj, min) \
((__GLIBC__ << 16) + __GLIBC_MINOR__ >= ((maj) << 16) + (min))
-2
View File
@@ -91,8 +91,6 @@ enum
#define IPPROTO_MPLS IPPROTO_MPLS
IPPROTO_ETHERNET = 143, /* Ethernet-within-IPv6 Encapsulation. */
#define IPPROTO_ETHERNET IPPROTO_ETHERNET
IPPROTO_AGGFRAG = 144, /* AGGFRAG in ESP (RFC 9347). */
#define IPPROTO_AGGFRAG IPPROTO_AGGFRAG
IPPROTO_RAW = 255, /* Raw IP packets. */
#define IPPROTO_RAW IPPROTO_RAW
IPPROTO_SMC = 256, /* Shared Memory Communications. */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ test_program_prefix=$2
objpfx=$3
# Create the locale directories.
mkdir -p ${objpfx}domaindir/existing-locale/LC_MESSAGES
mkdir -p ${objpfx}localedir/existing-locale/LC_MESSAGES
msgfmt -o ${objpfx}domaindir/existing-locale/LC_MESSAGES/translit.mo \
translit.po
+1 -3
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <kernel_stat.h>
#if !XSTAT_IS_XSTAT64
#ifndef __OFF_T_MATCHES_OFF64_T
# include "ftw-common.c"
versioned_symbol (libc, __new_nftw, nftw, GLIBC_2_3_3);
+1 -4
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,6 @@
#define ftw __rename_ftw
#define nftw __rename_nftw
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <kernel_stat.h>
#include <shlib-compat.h>
#include "ftw-common.c"
@@ -47,7 +44,7 @@ versioned_symbol (libc, __new_nftw64, nftw64, GLIBC_2_3_3);
compat_symbol (libc, __old_nftw64, nftw64, GLIBC_2_1);
#endif
#if XSTAT_IS_XSTAT64
#ifdef __OFF_T_MATCHES_OFF64_T
weak_alias (__ftw64, ftw)
versioned_symbol (libc, __new_nftw64, nftw, GLIBC_2_3_3);
# if SHLIB_COMPAT(libc, GLIBC_2_1, GLIBC_2_3_3)
-1
View File
@@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ tests = \
tst-fgetwc \
tst-fgetws \
tst-file-init-race \
tst-fopen-ccs-empty \
tst-fopenloc2 \
tst-fputws \
tst-freopen \
+5 -7
View File
@@ -355,14 +355,12 @@ _IO_new_file_fopen (FILE *fp, const char *filename, const char *mode,
*((char *) __mempcpy (ccs, cs + 5, endp - (cs + 5))) = '\0';
strip (ccs, ccs);
/* After stripping, ccs[2] == '\0' means the charset name is empty.
This is not a valid charset and would cause problems downstream.
Reject it with EINVAL (BZ #34574, CVE-2026-18374). */
if (ccs[2] == '\0' || __wcsmbs_named_conv (&fcts, ccs) != 0)
if (__wcsmbs_named_conv (&fcts, ccs[2] == '\0'
? upstr (ccs, cs + 5) : ccs) != 0)
{
/* Either the charset name is empty after strip(), or conversion
modules cannot be loaded. This means we cannot proceed since
the user explicitly asked for character conversion. */
/* Something went wrong, we cannot load the conversion modules.
This means we cannot proceed since the user explicitly asked
for these. */
(void) _IO_file_close_it (fp);
free (ccs);
__set_errno (EINVAL);
-62
View File
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
/* Test fopen with an empty ",ccs=" value in the mode string (bug 34574).
Copyright (C) 2026 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
<https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <support/check.h>
#include <support/support.h>
#include <support/temp_file.h>
#include <support/xunistd.h>
static void
check_fopen_fails (const char *path, const char *mode)
{
errno = 0;
FILE *fp = fopen (path, mode);
TEST_VERIFY (fp == NULL);
TEST_COMPARE (errno, EINVAL);
if (fp != NULL)
fclose (fp);
}
static int
do_test (void)
{
char *path;
xclose (create_temp_file ("tst-fopen-ccs-empty", &path));
/* The value is blank and the mode string continues well past it. */
enum { size = 1024 * 1024 };
char *mode = xmalloc (size);
memset (mode, 'X', size);
mode[size - 1] = '\0';
static const char prefix[] = "w,ccs= ,";
memcpy (mode, prefix, sizeof (prefix) - 1);
check_fopen_fails (path, mode);
free (mode);
check_fopen_fails (path, "w,ccs=");
check_fopen_fails (path, "w,ccs=,");
free (path);
return 0;
}
#include <support/test-driver.c>
+7 -15
View File
@@ -32,25 +32,17 @@ generate_locale ()
out=$3
flags=$4
ret=0
# Use a staging area to avoid writing to locales concurrently.
# While this process is running, $$ is sufficiently unique.
stage="${common_objpfx}localedata/gen-locale.$$.tmp"
mkdir "$stage" 2>/dev/null || true
${localedef_before_env} ${run_program_env} I18NPATH=../localedata \
${localedef_after_env} $flags -f $charmap -i $input \
$stage/$out || ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 0 ] ; then
# Ignore errors in case some other process has created the same locale.
# This rename operation should be atomic, and it should fail if the
# $out locale already exists (rename fails with ENOTEMPTY).
mv $stage/$out ${common_objpfx}localedata/. 2>/dev/null || true
rm -rf $stage
${common_objpfx}localedata/$out || ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
# The makefile checks the timestamp of the LC_CTYPE file,
# but localedef won't have touched it if it was able to
# hard-link it to an existing file.
touch ${common_objpfx}localedata/$out/LC_CTYPE
else
rm -rf $stage
echo "Charmap: \"${charmap}\" Inputfile: \"${input}\"" \
"Outputdir: \"${out}\" failed (exit status $ret)"
"Outputdir: \"${out}\" failed"
exit 1
fi
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "C locale"
source ""
address ""
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language ""
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ title "Aragonese locale for Spain"
source "Softaragones"
address ""
contact "Jordi Mallach Pérez, Juan Pablo Martínez"
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org, softaragones@softaragones.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org, softaragones@softaragones.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Aragonese"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for United Arab Emirates"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Bahrain"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Algeria"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Egypt"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for India"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Iraq"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Jordan"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Kuwait"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Lebanon"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ title "Arabic language locale for Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"
source "IBM Globalization Center of Competency, Yamato Software Laboratory"
address "1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato-shi, Kanagawa-ken, 242-8502, Japan"
contact ""
email "libc-alpha@sourceware.org"
email "bug-glibc-locales@gnu.org"
tel ""
fax ""
language "Arabic"

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