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glibc/sysdeps/i386/stackguard-macros.h

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Split up stackguard-macros.h into sysdeps directories.
2012-05-15 23:34:30 +00:00
#include <stdint.h>
#define STACK_CHK_GUARD \
i386: Use __seg_gs qualifiers in {STACK, POINTER}_CHK_GUARD macros Use the __seg_gs named address space qualifiers to cast reads of the guard values in the TCB as %gs: prefixed addresses. Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Cc: H.J.Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
2025-09-09 16:41:54 +00:00
(*(uintptr_t __seg_gs *) offsetof (tcbhead_t, stack_guard))
BZ #15754: CVE-2013-4788 The pointer guard used for pointer mangling was not initialized for static applications resulting in the security feature being disabled. The pointer guard is now correctly initialized to a random value for static applications. Existing static applications need to be recompiled to take advantage of the fix. The test tst-ptrguard1-static and tst-ptrguard1 add regression coverage to ensure the pointer guards are sufficiently random and initialized to a default value.
2013-09-23 04:52:09 +00:00
#define POINTER_CHK_GUARD \
i386: Use __seg_gs qualifiers in {STACK, POINTER}_CHK_GUARD macros Use the __seg_gs named address space qualifiers to cast reads of the guard values in the TCB as %gs: prefixed addresses. Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Cc: H.J.Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
2025-09-09 16:41:54 +00:00
(*(uintptr_t __seg_gs *) offsetof (tcbhead_t, pointer_guard))