Files
Centos-kernel-stream-9/net/xfrm
Xin Long edc3b9b927 xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete
JIRA: https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-180173
CVE: CVE-2026-46116

Conflicts:
- different context due to missing 0045e3d80613 and f531d13bdfe3 from
  upstream.

commit 14acf9652e5690de3c7486c6db5fb8dafd0a32a3
Author: Michal Kosiorek <mkosiorek121@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed Apr 29 10:54:51 2026 +0200

    xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete

    KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s
    hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable
    (reproduced on 6.12.47, also reachable via the same code path on
    torvalds/master and on the ipsec tree). Nine unique signatures cluster
    in the xfrm_state lifecycle, the load-bearing one being:

      BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __hlist_del include/linux/list.h:990 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:516 [inline]
      BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
      Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881198bcb70 by task kworker/u8:9/435

      Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
      Call Trace:
       __hlist_del / hlist_del_rcu
       __xfrm_state_delete
       xfrm_state_delete
       xfrm_state_flush
       xfrm_state_fini
       ops_exit_list
       cleanup_net

    The other observed signatures hit the same slab object from
    __xfrm_state_lookup, xfrm_alloc_spi, __xfrm_state_insert and an OOB
    write variant of __xfrm_state_delete, all on the byseq/byspi
    hash chains.

    __xfrm_state_delete() guards its byseq and byspi unhashes with
    value-based predicates:

            if (x->km.seq)
                    hlist_del_rcu(&x->byseq);
            if (x->id.spi)
                    hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi);

    while everywhere else in the file (e.g. state_cache, state_cache_input)
    the safer hlist_unhashed() check is used. xfrm_alloc_spi() sets
    x->id.spi = newspi inside xfrm_state_lock and then immediately inserts
    into byspi, but a path that observes x->id.spi != 0 outside of
    xfrm_state_lock can still skip-or-hit the byspi unhash inconsistently
    with whether x is actually on the list. The same holds for x->km.seq
    versus byseq, and the bydst/bysrc unhashes have no predicate at all,
    so a second __xfrm_state_delete() on the same object writes through
    LIST_POISON pprev.

    The defensive change here:

      - Use hlist_del_init_rcu() instead of hlist_del_rcu() on bydst,
        bysrc, byseq and byspi so a second deletion is a no-op rather
        than a write through LIST_POISON pprev. The byseq/byspi nodes
        are already initialised in xfrm_state_alloc().
      - Test hlist_unhashed() rather than the value predicate for
        byseq/byspi, so the unhash decision tracks list state rather than
        mutable scalar fields.

    Empirical verification: applied this patch on top of v6.12.47, rebuilt,
    and re-ran the same syzkaller harness for 1h16m on a previously-crashy
    configuration that produced ~100 hits each of slab-use-after-free
    Read in xfrm_alloc_spi / Read in __xfrm_state_lookup / Write in
    __xfrm_state_delete. After the patch, 7.1M execs across 32 VMs at
    ~1550 exec/sec produced zero xfrm_state UAF/OOB hits. /proc/slabinfo
    confirms the xfrm_state slab is actively allocated and freed during
    the run (~143 KiB resident), so the fuzzer is still exercising those
    code paths -- they just no longer crash.

    Reproduction:

      - Linux 6.12.47 x86_64 + KASAN_GENERIC + KASAN_INLINE + KCOV
      - syzkaller @ 746545b8b1e4c3a128db8652b340d3df90ce61db
      - 32 QEMU/KVM VMs x 2 vCPU on AWS c5.metal bare metal
      - 9 unique signatures collected in ~9h, all within xfrm_state
        lifecycle

    Fixes: fe9f1d8779 ("xfrm: add state hashtable keyed by seq")
    Fixes: 7b4dc3600e ("[XFRM]: Do not add a state whose SPI is zero to the SPI hash.")
    Reported-by: Michal Kosiorek <mkosiorek121@gmail.com>
    Tested-by: Michal Kosiorek <mkosiorek121@gmail.com>
    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
    Signed-off-by: Michal Kosiorek <mkosiorek121@gmail.com>
    Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lxin@redhat.com>
2026-07-30 10:49:58 -04:00
..
2025-10-13 14:35:03 +03:00