JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649
commit 6668e818f960b0f32110a9efa7c97351a5771b35
Author: Haiyue Wang <haiyue.wang@intel.com>
Date: Sat Jan 27 21:48:56 2024 +0800
bpf,token: Use BIT_ULL() to convert the bit mask
Replace the '(1ULL << *)' with the macro BIT_ULL(nr).
Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyue.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127134901.3698613-1-haiyue.wang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649
commit aeaa97b006ddc7a8bf13e4adfdd02b3526f648a7
Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Jan 23 18:21:15 2024 -0800
bpf: Fail BPF_TOKEN_CREATE if no delegation option was set on BPF FS
It's quite confusing in practice when it's possible to successfully
create a BPF token from BPF FS that didn't have any of delegate_xxx
mount options set up. While it's not wrong, it's actually more
meaningful to reject BPF_TOKEN_CREATE with specific error code (-ENOENT)
to let user-space know that no token delegation is setup up.
So, instead of creating empty BPF token that will be always ignored
because it doesn't have any of the allow_xxx bits set, reject it with
-ENOENT. If we ever need empty BPF token to be possible, we can support
that with extra flag passed into BPF_TOKEN_CREATE.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-19-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649
Conflicts: Context change due to missing commits e261301c851a ("lsm:
move the remaining LSM hook comments to security/security.c") and
e1ca7129db2c ("LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling lsm_ctx")
commit f568a3d49af9aed813a184353592efe29b0e3d16
Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Jan 23 18:21:08 2024 -0800
bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks
Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.
Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649
commit caf8f28e036c4ba1e823355da6c0c01c39e70ab9
Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Jan 23 18:21:03 2024 -0800
bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types,
derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we
perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649
commit a177fc2bf6fd83704854feaf7aae926b1df4f0b9
Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Jan 23 18:21:01 2024 -0800
bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649
commit 35f96de04127d332a5c5e8a155d31f452f88c76d
Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Jan 23 18:21:00 2024 -0800
bpf: Introduce BPF token object
Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is
currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init
user namespace anyways.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Jerome Marchand