Centos-kernel-stream-9/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
enum cp_error_code {
CP_EC = (1 << 15) - 1,
CP_RET = 1,
CP_IRET = 2,
CP_ENDBR = 3,
CP_RSTRORSSP = 4,
CP_SETSSBSY = 5,
CP_ENCL = 1 << 15,
};
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-27743 Conflicts: * arch/sparc/kernel/signal{32,_64}.c: all hunks dropped; * arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h: context conflicts due to RHEL backport commits 3e12b4978ebd ("x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature") and 6284997394d4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature"); * arch/x86/kernel/cet.c: context conflicts on the 1st and 2nd hunks due to RHEL backport commit 3579bfefb51e ("x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm") This patch is a backport of the following upstream commit: commit a5f6c2ace9974adf92ce65dacca8126d90adabfe Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Date: Mon Jun 12 17:10:53 2023 -0700 x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <raquini@redhat.com>
2024-09-27 14:42:54 +00:00
static const char cp_err[][10] = {
[0] = "unknown",
[1] = "near ret",
[2] = "far/iret",
[3] = "endbranch",
[4] = "rstorssp",
[5] = "setssbsy",
};
static const char *cp_err_string(unsigned long error_code)
{
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-27743 Conflicts: * arch/sparc/kernel/signal{32,_64}.c: all hunks dropped; * arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h: context conflicts due to RHEL backport commits 3e12b4978ebd ("x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature") and 6284997394d4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature"); * arch/x86/kernel/cet.c: context conflicts on the 1st and 2nd hunks due to RHEL backport commit 3579bfefb51e ("x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm") This patch is a backport of the following upstream commit: commit a5f6c2ace9974adf92ce65dacca8126d90adabfe Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Date: Mon Jun 12 17:10:53 2023 -0700 x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <raquini@redhat.com>
2024-09-27 14:42:54 +00:00
unsigned int cpec = error_code & CP_EC;
if (cpec >= ARRAY_SIZE(cp_err))
cpec = 0;
return cp_err[cpec];
}
static void do_unexpected_cp(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected %s #CP, error_code: %s\n",
user_mode(regs) ? "user mode" : "kernel mode",
cp_err_string(error_code));
}
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
static void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long ssp;
/*
* An exception was just taken from userspace. Since interrupts are disabled
* here, no scheduling should have messed with the registers yet and they
* will be whatever is live in userspace. So read the SSP before enabling
* interrupts so locking the fpregs to do it later is not required.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
tsk = current;
tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
/* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. */
if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
__ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)%s",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
cp_err_string(error_code),
error_code & CP_ENCL ? " in enclave" : "");
print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
pr_cont("\n");
}
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-27743 Conflicts: * arch/sparc/kernel/signal{32,_64}.c: all hunks dropped; * arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h: context conflicts due to RHEL backport commits 3e12b4978ebd ("x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature") and 6284997394d4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature"); * arch/x86/kernel/cet.c: context conflicts on the 1st and 2nd hunks due to RHEL backport commit 3579bfefb51e ("x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm") This patch is a backport of the following upstream commit: commit a5f6c2ace9974adf92ce65dacca8126d90adabfe Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Date: Mon Jun 12 17:10:53 2023 -0700 x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <raquini@redhat.com>
2024-09-27 14:42:54 +00:00
force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
}
static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
/* code label defined in asm below */
extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void);
static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
if ((error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR) {
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
return;
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-27743 Conflicts: * arch/sparc/kernel/signal{32,_64}.c: all hunks dropped; * arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h: context conflicts due to RHEL backport commits 3e12b4978ebd ("x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature") and 6284997394d4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature"); * arch/x86/kernel/cet.c: context conflicts on the 1st and 2nd hunks due to RHEL backport commit 3579bfefb51e ("x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm") This patch is a backport of the following upstream commit: commit a5f6c2ace9974adf92ce65dacca8126d90adabfe Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Date: Mon Jun 12 17:10:53 2023 -0700 x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <raquini@redhat.com>
2024-09-27 14:42:54 +00:00
}
x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-25415 Conflicts: Drift in cet.c file leads to major differences in application. The resulting code does remove the ibt_selftest_ip() reference and ib_selftest(). commit c6cfcbd8ca43766851a8c952e3b570727147020f Author: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Date: Fri Apr 7 17:16:41 2023 -0700 x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm The following warning is reported when frame pointers and kernel IBT are enabled: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ibt_selftest+0x11: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame The problem is that objtool interprets the indirect branch in ibt_selftest() as a sibling call, and GCC inserts a (partial) frame pointer prologue before it: 0000 000000000003f550 <ibt_selftest>: 0000 3f550: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 0004 3f554: e8 00 00 00 00 call 3f559 <ibt_selftest+0x9> 3f555: R_X86_64_PLT32 __fentry__-0x4 0009 3f559: 55 push %rbp 000a 3f55a: 48 8d 05 02 00 00 00 lea 0x2(%rip),%rax # 3f563 <ibt_selftest_ip> 0011 3f561: ff e0 jmp *%rax Note the inline asm is missing ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, so the 'push %rbp' happens before the indirect branch and the 'mov %rsp, %rbp' happens afterwards. Simplify the generated code and make it easier to understand for both tools and humans by moving the selftest to proper asm. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99a7e16b97bda97bf0a04aa141d6241cd8a839a2.1680912949.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
2024-02-06 21:14:20 +00:00
if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_noendbr)) {
regs->ax = 0;
return;
}
pr_err("Missing ENDBR: %pS\n", (void *)instruction_pointer(regs));
if (!ibt_fatal) {
printk(KERN_DEFAULT CUT_HERE);
__warn(__FILE__, __LINE__, (void *)regs->ip, TAINT_WARN, regs, NULL);
return;
}
BUG();
}
static int __init ibt_setup(char *str)
{
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
if (!strcmp(str, "warn"))
ibt_fatal = false;
return 1;
}
__setup("ibt=", ibt_setup);
x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-27743 Conflicts: * arch/sparc/kernel/signal{32,_64}.c: all hunks dropped; * arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h: context conflicts due to RHEL backport commits 3e12b4978ebd ("x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature") and 6284997394d4 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature"); * arch/x86/kernel/cet.c: context conflicts on the 1st and 2nd hunks due to RHEL backport commit 3579bfefb51e ("x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm") This patch is a backport of the following upstream commit: commit a5f6c2ace9974adf92ce65dacca8126d90adabfe Author: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Date: Mon Jun 12 17:10:53 2023 -0700 x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack. There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c. Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it. Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable. The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-28-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <raquini@redhat.com>
2024-09-27 14:42:54 +00:00
DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
do_user_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
else
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
} else {
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
do_kernel_cp_fault(regs, error_code);
else
do_unexpected_cp(regs, error_code);
}
}