Centos-kernel-stream-9/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
#include <linux/btf.h> /* for struct btf and btf_id() */
#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
#include <linux/tnum.h>
/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
/* size of tmp_str_buf in bpf_verifier.
* we need at least 306 bytes to fit full stack mask representation
* (in the "-8,-16,...,-512" form)
*/
#define TMP_STR_BUF_LEN 320
/* Patch buffer size */
#define INSN_BUF_SIZE 32
/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
* "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
* relevant for states_equal() checks).
* Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
* straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
* (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
* should not propagate to its parent).
* A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
* them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
* but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
* mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
*/
enum bpf_reg_liveness {
REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
bpf: verifier: mark verified-insn with sub-register zext flag eBPF ISA specification requires high 32-bit cleared when low 32-bit sub-register is written. This applies to destination register of ALU32 etc. JIT back-ends must guarantee this semantic when doing code-gen. x86_64 and AArch64 ISA has the same semantics, so the corresponding JIT back-end doesn't need to do extra work. However, 32-bit arches (arm, x86, nfp etc.) and some other 64-bit arches (PowerPC, SPARC etc) need to do explicit zero extension to meet this requirement, otherwise code like the following will fail. u64_value = (u64) u32_value ... other uses of u64_value This is because compiler could exploit the semantic described above and save those zero extensions for extending u32_value to u64_value, these JIT back-ends are expected to guarantee this through inserting extra zero extensions which however could be a significant increase on the code size. Some benchmarks show there could be ~40% sub-register writes out of total insns, meaning at least ~40% extra code-gen. One observation is these extra zero extensions are not always necessary. Take above code snippet for example, it is possible u32_value will never be casted into a u64, the value of high 32-bit of u32_value then could be ignored and extra zero extension could be eliminated. This patch implements this idea, insns defining sub-registers will be marked when the high 32-bit of the defined sub-register matters. For those unmarked insns, it is safe to eliminate high 32-bit clearnace for them. Algo: - Split read flags into READ32 and READ64. - Record index of insn that does sub-register write. Keep the index inside reg state and update it during verifier insn walking. - A full register read on a sub-register marks its definition insn as needing zero extension on dst register. A new sub-register write overrides the old one. - When propagating read64 during path pruning, also mark any insn defining a sub-register that is read in the pruned path as full-register. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-05-24 22:25:12 +00:00
REG_LIVE_READ32 = 0x1, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
REG_LIVE_READ64 = 0x2, /* likewise, but full 64-bit content matters */
REG_LIVE_READ = REG_LIVE_READ32 | REG_LIVE_READ64,
REG_LIVE_WRITTEN = 0x4, /* reg was written first, screening off later reads */
REG_LIVE_DONE = 0x8, /* liveness won't be updating this register anymore */
};
bpf: Migrate release_on_unlock logic to non-owning ref semantics Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2178930 commit 6a3cd3318ff65622415e34e8ee39d76331e7c869 Author: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Date: Sun Feb 12 01:27:07 2023 -0800 bpf: Migrate release_on_unlock logic to non-owning ref semantics This patch introduces non-owning reference semantics to the verifier, specifically linked_list API kfunc handling. release_on_unlock logic for refs is refactored - with small functional changes - to implement these semantics, and bpf_list_push_{front,back} are migrated to use them. When a list node is pushed to a list, the program still has a pointer to the node: n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); bpf_spin_lock(&l); bpf_list_push_back(&l, n); /* n still points to the just-added node */ bpf_spin_unlock(&l); What the verifier considers n to be after the push, and thus what can be done with n, are changed by this patch. Common properties both before/after this patch: * After push, n is only a valid reference to the node until end of critical section * After push, n cannot be pushed to any list * After push, the program can read the node's fields using n Before: * After push, n retains the ref_obj_id which it received on bpf_obj_new, but the associated bpf_reference_state's release_on_unlock field is set to true * release_on_unlock field and associated logic is used to implement "n is only a valid ref until end of critical section" * After push, n cannot be written to, the node must be removed from the list before writing to its fields * After push, n is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED After: * After push, n's ref is released and ref_obj_id set to 0. NON_OWN_REF type flag is added to reg's type, indicating that it's a non-owning reference. * NON_OWN_REF flag and logic is used to implement "n is only a valid ref until end of critical section" * n can be written to (except for special fields e.g. bpf_list_node, timer, ...) Summary of specific implementation changes to achieve the above: * release_on_unlock field, ref_set_release_on_unlock helper, and logic to "release on unlock" based on that field are removed * The anonymous active_lock struct used by bpf_verifier_state is pulled out into a named struct bpf_active_lock. * NON_OWN_REF type flag is introduced along with verifier logic changes to handle non-owning refs * Helpers are added to use NON_OWN_REF flag to implement non-owning ref semantics as described above * invalidate_non_owning_refs - helper to clobber all non-owning refs matching a particular bpf_active_lock identity. Replaces release_on_unlock logic in process_spin_lock. * ref_set_non_owning - set NON_OWN_REF type flag after doing some sanity checking * ref_convert_owning_non_owning - convert owning reference w/ specified ref_obj_id to non-owning references. Set NON_OWN_REF flag for each reg with that ref_obj_id and 0-out its ref_obj_id * Update linked_list selftests to account for minor semantic differences introduced by this patch * Writes to a release_on_unlock node ref are not allowed, while writes to non-owning reference pointees are. As a result the linked_list "write after push" failure tests are no longer scenarios that should fail. * The test##missing_lock##op and test##incorrect_lock##op macro-generated failure tests need to have a valid node argument in order to have the same error output as before. Otherwise verification will fail early and the expected error output won't be seen. Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230212092715.1422619-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2023-05-10 05:17:22 +00:00
/* For every reg representing a map value or allocated object pointer,
* we consider the tuple of (ptr, id) for them to be unique in verifier
* context and conside them to not alias each other for the purposes of
* tracking lock state.
*/
struct bpf_active_lock {
/* This can either be reg->map_ptr or reg->btf. If ptr is NULL,
* there's no active lock held, and other fields have no
* meaning. If non-NULL, it indicates that a lock is held and
* id member has the reg->id of the register which can be >= 0.
*/
void *ptr;
/* This will be reg->id */
u32 id;
};
bpf: add iterator kfuncs registration and validation logic Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 215bf4962f6c9605710012fad222a5fec001b3ad Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:15 2023 -0800 bpf: add iterator kfuncs registration and validation logic Add ability to register kfuncs that implement BPF open-coded iterator contract and enforce naming and function proto convention. Enforcement happens at the time of kfunc registration and significantly simplifies the rest of iterators logic in the verifier. More details follow in subsequent patches, but we enforce the following conditions. All kfuncs (constructor, next, destructor) have to be named consistenly as bpf_iter_<type>_{new,next,destroy}(), respectively. <type> represents iterator type, and iterator state should be represented as a matching `struct bpf_iter_<type>` state type. Also, all iter kfuncs should have a pointer to this `struct bpf_iter_<type>` as the very first argument. Additionally: - Constructor, i.e., bpf_iter_<type>_new(), can have arbitrary extra number of arguments. Return type is not enforced either. - Next method, i.e., bpf_iter_<type>_next(), has to return a pointer type and should have exactly one argument: `struct bpf_iter_<type> *` (const/volatile/restrict and typedefs are ignored). - Destructor, i.e., bpf_iter_<type>_destroy(), should return void and should have exactly one argument, similar to the next method. - struct bpf_iter_<type> size is enforced to be positive and a multiple of 8 bytes (to fit stack slots correctly). Such strictness and consistency allows to build generic helpers abstracting important, but boilerplate, details to be able to use open-coded iterators effectively and ergonomically (see bpf_for_each() in subsequent patches). It also simplifies the verifier logic in some places. At the same time, this doesn't hurt generality of possible iterator implementations. Win-win. Constructor kfunc is marked with a new KF_ITER_NEW flags, next method is marked with KF_ITER_NEXT (and should also have KF_RET_NULL, of course), while destructor kfunc is marked as KF_ITER_DESTROY. Additionally, we add a trivial kfunc name validation: it should be a valid non-NULL and non-empty string. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-3-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
#define ITER_PREFIX "bpf_iter_"
bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 06accc8779c1d558a5b5a21f2ac82b0c95827ddd Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:16 2023 -0800 bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Teach verifier about the concept of the open-coded (or inline) iterators. This patch adds generic iterator loop verification logic, new STACK_ITER stack slot type to contain iterator state, and necessary kfunc plumbing for iterator's constructor, destructor and next methods. Next patch implements first specific iterator (numbers iterator for implementing for() loop logic). Such split allows to have more focused commits for verifier logic and separate commit that we could point later to demonstrating what does it take to add a new kind of iterator. Each kind of iterator has its own associated struct bpf_iter_<type>, where <type> denotes a specific type of iterator. struct bpf_iter_<type> state is supposed to live on BPF program stack, so there will be no way to change its size later on without breaking backwards compatibility, so choose wisely! But given this struct is specific to a given <type> of iterator, this allows a lot of flexibility: simple iterators could be fine with just one stack slot (8 bytes), like numbers iterator in the next patch, while some other more complicated iterators might need way more to keep their iterator state. Either way, such design allows to avoid runtime memory allocations, which otherwise would be necessary if we fixed on-the-stack size and it turned out to be too small for a given iterator implementation. The way BPF verifier logic is implemented, there are no artificial restrictions on a number of active iterators, it should work correctly using multiple active iterators at the same time. This also means you can have multiple nested iteration loops. struct bpf_iter_<type> reference can be safely passed to subprograms as well. General flow is easiest to demonstrate with a simple example using number iterator implemented in next patch. Here's the simplest possible loop: struct bpf_iter_num it; int *v; bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 2, 5); while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { bpf_printk("X = %d", *v); } bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); Above snippet should output "X = 2", "X = 3", "X = 4". Note that 5 is exclusive and is not returned. This matches similar APIs (e.g., slices in Go or Rust) that implement a range of elements, where end index is non-inclusive. In the above example, we see a trio of function: - constructor, bpf_iter_num_new(), which initializes iterator state (struct bpf_iter_num it) on the stack. If any of the input arguments are invalid, constructor should make sure to still initialize it such that subsequent bpf_iter_num_next() calls will return NULL. I.e., on error, return error and construct empty iterator. - next method, bpf_iter_num_next(), which accepts pointer to iterator state and produces an element. Next method should always return a pointer. The contract between BPF verifier is that next method will always eventually return NULL when elements are exhausted. Once NULL is returned, subsequent next calls should keep returning NULL. In the case of numbers iterator, bpf_iter_num_next() returns a pointer to an int (storage for this integer is inside the iterator state itself), which can be dereferenced after corresponding NULL check. - once done with the iterator, it's mandated that user cleans up its state with the call to destructor, bpf_iter_num_destroy() in this case. Destructor frees up any resources and marks stack space used by struct bpf_iter_num as usable for something else. Any other iterator implementation will have to implement at least these three methods. It is enforced that for any given type of iterator only applicable constructor/destructor/next are callable. I.e., verifier ensures you can't pass number iterator state into, say, cgroup iterator's next method. It is important to keep the naming pattern consistent to be able to create generic macros to help with BPF iter usability. E.g., one of the follow up patches adds generic bpf_for_each() macro to bpf_misc.h in selftests, which allows to utilize iterator "trio" nicely without having to code the above somewhat tedious loop explicitly every time. This is enforced at kfunc registration point by one of the previous patches in this series. At the implementation level, iterator state tracking for verification purposes is very similar to dynptr. We add STACK_ITER stack slot type, reserve necessary number of slots, depending on sizeof(struct bpf_iter_<type>), and keep track of necessary extra state in the "main" slot, which is marked with non-zero ref_obj_id. Other slots are also marked as STACK_ITER, but have zero ref_obj_id. This is simpler than having a separate "is_first_slot" flag. Another big distinction is that STACK_ITER is *always refcounted*, which simplifies implementation without sacrificing usability. So no need for extra "iter_id", no need to anticipate reuse of STACK_ITER slots for new constructors, etc. Keeping it simple here. As far as the verification logic goes, there are two extensive comments: in process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() explaining some important and sometimes subtle aspects. Please refer to them for details. But from 10,000-foot point of view, next methods are the points of forking a verification state, which are conceptually similar to what verifier is doing when validating conditional jump. We branch out at a `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction and simulate two outcomes: NULL (iteration is done) and non-NULL (new element is returned). NULL is simulated first and is supposed to reach exit without looping. After that non-NULL case is validated and it either reaches exit (for trivial examples with no real loop), or reaches another `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction with the state equivalent to already (partially) validated one. State equivalency at that point means we technically are going to be looping forever without "breaking out" out of established "state envelope" (i.e., subsequent iterations don't add any new knowledge or constraints to the verifier state, so running 1, 2, 10, or a million of them doesn't matter). But taking into account the contract stating that iterator next method *has to* return NULL eventually, we can conclude that loop body is safe and will eventually terminate. Given we validated logic outside of the loop (NULL case), and concluded that loop body is safe (though potentially looping many times), verifier can claim safety of the overall program logic. The rest of the patch is necessary plumbing for state tracking, marking, validation, and necessary further kfunc plumbing to allow implementing iterator constructor, destructor, and next methods. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
enum bpf_iter_state {
BPF_ITER_STATE_INVALID, /* for non-first slot */
BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE,
BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED,
};
struct bpf_reg_state {
/* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */
enum bpf_reg_type type;
/*
* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only.
* Or constant delta between "linked" scalars with the same ID.
*/
s32 off;
union {
/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
int range;
/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
*/
struct {
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
/* To distinguish map lookups from outer map
* the map_uid is non-zero for registers
* pointing to inner maps.
*/
u32 map_uid;
};
/* for PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
struct {
struct btf *btf;
u32 btf_id;
};
bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF libbpf analyzes bpf C program, searches in-kernel BTF for given type name and stores it into expected_attach_type. The kernel verifier expects this btf_id to point to something like: typedef void (*btf_trace_kfree_skb)(void *, struct sk_buff *skb, void *loc); which represents signature of raw_tracepoint "kfree_skb". Then btf_ctx_access() matches ctx+0 access in bpf program with 'skb' and 'ctx+8' access with 'loc' arguments of "kfree_skb" tracepoint. In first case it passes btf_id of 'struct sk_buff *' back to the verifier core and 'void *' in second case. Then the verifier tracks PTR_TO_BTF_ID as any other pointer type. Like PTR_TO_SOCKET points to 'struct bpf_sock', PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK points to 'struct bpf_tcp_sock', and so on. PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to in-kernel structs. If 1234 is btf_id of 'struct sk_buff' in vmlinux's BTF then PTR_TO_BTF_ID#1234 points to one of in kernel skbs. When PTR_TO_BTF_ID#1234 is dereferenced (like r2 = *(u64 *)r1 + 32) the btf_struct_access() checks which field of 'struct sk_buff' is at offset 32. Checks that size of access matches type definition of the field and continues to track the dereferenced type. If that field was a pointer to 'struct net_device' the r2's type will be PTR_TO_BTF_ID#456. Where 456 is btf_id of 'struct net_device' in vmlinux's BTF. Such verifier analysis prevents "cheating" in BPF C program. The program cannot cast arbitrary pointer to 'struct sk_buff *' and access it. C compiler would allow type cast, of course, but the verifier will notice type mismatch based on BPF assembly and in-kernel BTF. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-7-ast@kernel.org
2019-10-16 03:25:00 +00:00
bpf: Invalidate slices on destruction of dynptrs on stack Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2178930 commit f8064ab90d6644bc8338d2d7ff6a0d6e7a1b2ef3 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Sat Jan 21 05:52:33 2023 +0530 bpf: Invalidate slices on destruction of dynptrs on stack The previous commit implemented destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot. It destroys the dynptr which given spi belongs to, but still doesn't invalidate the slices that belong to such a dynptr. While for the case of referenced dynptr, we don't allow their overwrite and return an error early, we still allow it and destroy the dynptr for unreferenced dynptr. To be able to enable precise and scoped invalidation of dynptr slices in this case, we must be able to associate the source dynptr of slices that have been obtained using bpf_dynptr_data. When doing destruction, only slices belonging to the dynptr being destructed should be invalidated, and nothing else. Currently, dynptr slices belonging to different dynptrs are indistinguishible. Hence, allocate a unique id to each dynptr (CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR and those on stack). This will be stored as part of reg->id. Whenever using bpf_dynptr_data, transfer this unique dynptr id to the returned PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL slice pointer, and store it in a new per-PTR_TO_MEM dynptr_id register state member. Finally, after establishing such a relationship between dynptrs and their slices, implement precise invalidation logic that only invalidates slices belong to the destroyed dynptr in destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot. Acked-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230121002241.2113993-5-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2023-05-09 08:34:07 +00:00
struct { /* for PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL */
u32 mem_size;
u32 dynptr_id; /* for dynptr slices */
};
bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it This commit adds a new MPSC ring buffer implementation into BPF ecosystem, which allows multiple CPUs to submit data to a single shared ring buffer. On the consumption side, only single consumer is assumed. Motivation ---------- There are two distinctive motivators for this work, which are not satisfied by existing perf buffer, which prompted creation of a new ring buffer implementation. - more efficient memory utilization by sharing ring buffer across CPUs; - preserving ordering of events that happen sequentially in time, even across multiple CPUs (e.g., fork/exec/exit events for a task). These two problems are independent, but perf buffer fails to satisfy both. Both are a result of a choice to have per-CPU perf ring buffer. Both can be also solved by having an MPSC implementation of ring buffer. The ordering problem could technically be solved for perf buffer with some in-kernel counting, but given the first one requires an MPSC buffer, the same solution would solve the second problem automatically. Semantics and APIs ------------------ Single ring buffer is presented to BPF programs as an instance of BPF map of type BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF. Two other alternatives considered, but ultimately rejected. One way would be to, similar to BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY, make BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF could represent an array of ring buffers, but not enforce "same CPU only" rule. This would be more familiar interface compatible with existing perf buffer use in BPF, but would fail if application needed more advanced logic to lookup ring buffer by arbitrary key. HASH_OF_MAPS addresses this with current approach. Additionally, given the performance of BPF ringbuf, many use cases would just opt into a simple single ring buffer shared among all CPUs, for which current approach would be an overkill. Another approach could introduce a new concept, alongside BPF map, to represent generic "container" object, which doesn't necessarily have key/value interface with lookup/update/delete operations. This approach would add a lot of extra infrastructure that has to be built for observability and verifier support. It would also add another concept that BPF developers would have to familiarize themselves with, new syntax in libbpf, etc. But then would really provide no additional benefits over the approach of using a map. BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF doesn't support lookup/update/delete operations, but so doesn't few other map types (e.g., queue and stack; array doesn't support delete, etc). The approach chosen has an advantage of re-using existing BPF map infrastructure (introspection APIs in kernel, libbpf support, etc), being familiar concept (no need to teach users a new type of object in BPF program), and utilizing existing tooling (bpftool). For common scenario of using a single ring buffer for all CPUs, it's as simple and straightforward, as would be with a dedicated "container" object. On the other hand, by being a map, it can be combined with ARRAY_OF_MAPS and HASH_OF_MAPS map-in-maps to implement a wide variety of topologies, from one ring buffer for each CPU (e.g., as a replacement for perf buffer use cases), to a complicated application hashing/sharding of ring buffers (e.g., having a small pool of ring buffers with hashed task's tgid being a look up key to preserve order, but reduce contention). Key and value sizes are enforced to be zero. max_entries is used to specify the size of ring buffer and has to be a power of 2 value. There are a bunch of similarities between perf buffer (BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) and new BPF ring buffer semantics: - variable-length records; - if there is no more space left in ring buffer, reservation fails, no blocking; - memory-mappable data area for user-space applications for ease of consumption and high performance; - epoll notifications for new incoming data; - but still the ability to do busy polling for new data to achieve the lowest latency, if necessary. BPF ringbuf provides two sets of APIs to BPF programs: - bpf_ringbuf_output() allows to *copy* data from one place to a ring buffer, similarly to bpf_perf_event_output(); - bpf_ringbuf_reserve()/bpf_ringbuf_commit()/bpf_ringbuf_discard() APIs split the whole process into two steps. First, a fixed amount of space is reserved. If successful, a pointer to a data inside ring buffer data area is returned, which BPF programs can use similarly to a data inside array/hash maps. Once ready, this piece of memory is either committed or discarded. Discard is similar to commit, but makes consumer ignore the record. bpf_ringbuf_output() has disadvantage of incurring extra memory copy, because record has to be prepared in some other place first. But it allows to submit records of the length that's not known to verifier beforehand. It also closely matches bpf_perf_event_output(), so will simplify migration significantly. bpf_ringbuf_reserve() avoids the extra copy of memory by providing a memory pointer directly to ring buffer memory. In a lot of cases records are larger than BPF stack space allows, so many programs have use extra per-CPU array as a temporary heap for preparing sample. bpf_ringbuf_reserve() avoid this needs completely. But in exchange, it only allows a known constant size of memory to be reserved, such that verifier can verify that BPF program can't access memory outside its reserved record space. bpf_ringbuf_output(), while slightly slower due to extra memory copy, covers some use cases that are not suitable for bpf_ringbuf_reserve(). The difference between commit and discard is very small. Discard just marks a record as discarded, and such records are supposed to be ignored by consumer code. Discard is useful for some advanced use-cases, such as ensuring all-or-nothing multi-record submission, or emulating temporary malloc()/free() within single BPF program invocation. Each reserved record is tracked by verifier through existing reference-tracking logic, similar to socket ref-tracking. It is thus impossible to reserve a record, but forget to submit (or discard) it. bpf_ringbuf_query() helper allows to query various properties of ring buffer. Currently 4 are supported: - BPF_RB_AVAIL_DATA returns amount of unconsumed data in ring buffer; - BPF_RB_RING_SIZE returns the size of ring buffer; - BPF_RB_CONS_POS/BPF_RB_PROD_POS returns current logical possition of consumer/producer, respectively. Returned values are momentarily snapshots of ring buffer state and could be off by the time helper returns, so this should be used only for debugging/reporting reasons or for implementing various heuristics, that take into account highly-changeable nature of some of those characteristics. One such heuristic might involve more fine-grained control over poll/epoll notifications about new data availability in ring buffer. Together with BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP/BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP flags for output/commit/discard helpers, it allows BPF program a high degree of control and, e.g., more efficient batched notifications. Default self-balancing strategy, though, should be adequate for most applications and will work reliable and efficiently already. Design and implementation ------------------------- This reserve/commit schema allows a natural way for multiple producers, either on different CPUs or even on the same CPU/in the same BPF program, to reserve independent records and work with them without blocking other producers. This means that if BPF program was interruped by another BPF program sharing the same ring buffer, they will both get a record reserved (provided there is enough space left) and can work with it and submit it independently. This applies to NMI context as well, except that due to using a spinlock during reservation, in NMI context, bpf_ringbuf_reserve() might fail to get a lock, in which case reservation will fail even if ring buffer is not full. The ring buffer itself internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters (which might wrap around on 32-bit architectures, that's not a problem): - consumer counter shows up to which logical position consumer consumed the data; - producer counter denotes amount of data reserved by all producers. Each time a record is reserved, producer that "owns" the record will successfully advance producer counter. At that point, data is still not yet ready to be consumed, though. Each record has 8 byte header, which contains the length of reserved record, as well as two extra bits: busy bit to denote that record is still being worked on, and discard bit, which might be set at commit time if record is discarded. In the latter case, consumer is supposed to skip the record and move on to the next one. Record header also encodes record's relative offset from the beginning of ring buffer data area (in pages). This allows bpf_ringbuf_commit()/bpf_ringbuf_discard() to accept only the pointer to the record itself, without requiring also the pointer to ring buffer itself. Ring buffer memory location will be restored from record metadata header. This significantly simplifies verifier, as well as improving API usability. Producer counter increments are serialized under spinlock, so there is a strict ordering between reservations. Commits, on the other hand, are completely lockless and independent. All records become available to consumer in the order of reservations, but only after all previous records where already committed. It is thus possible for slow producers to temporarily hold off submitted records, that were reserved later. Reservation/commit/consumer protocol is verified by litmus tests in Documentation/litmus-test/bpf-rb. One interesting implementation bit, that significantly simplifies (and thus speeds up as well) implementation of both producers and consumers is how data area is mapped twice contiguously back-to-back in the virtual memory. This allows to not take any special measures for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual memory. See comment and a simple ASCII diagram showing this visually in bpf_ringbuf_area_alloc(). Another feature that distinguishes BPF ringbuf from perf ring buffer is a self-pacing notifications of new data being availability. bpf_ringbuf_commit() implementation will send a notification of new record being available after commit only if consumer has already caught up right up to the record being committed. If not, consumer still has to catch up and thus will see new data anyways without needing an extra poll notification. Benchmarks (see tools/testing/selftests/bpf/benchs/bench_ringbuf.c) show that this allows to achieve a very high throughput without having to resort to tricks like "notify only every Nth sample", which are necessary with perf buffer. For extreme cases, when BPF program wants more manual control of notifications, commit/discard/output helpers accept BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP and BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP flags, which give full control over notifications of data availability, but require extra caution and diligence in using this API. Comparison to alternatives -------------------------- Before considering implementing BPF ring buffer from scratch existing alternatives in kernel were evaluated, but didn't seem to meet the needs. They largely fell into few categores: - per-CPU buffers (perf, ftrace, etc), which don't satisfy two motivations outlined above (ordering and memory consumption); - linked list-based implementations; while some were multi-producer designs, consuming these from user-space would be very complicated and most probably not performant; memory-mapping contiguous piece of memory is simpler and more performant for user-space consumers; - io_uring is SPSC, but also requires fixed-sized elements. Naively turning SPSC queue into MPSC w/ lock would have subpar performance compared to locked reserve + lockless commit, as with BPF ring buffer. Fixed sized elements would be too limiting for BPF programs, given existing BPF programs heavily rely on variable-sized perf buffer already; - specialized implementations (like a new printk ring buffer, [0]) with lots of printk-specific limitations and implications, that didn't seem to fit well for intended use with BPF programs. [0] https://lwn.net/Articles/779550/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200529075424.3139988-2-andriin@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2020-05-29 07:54:20 +00:00
bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120968 commit 97e03f521050c092919591e668107b3d69c5f426 Author: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Date: Mon May 23 14:07:07 2022 -0700 bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs This patch adds the bulk of the verifier work for supporting dynamic pointers (dynptrs) in bpf. A bpf_dynptr is opaque to the bpf program. It is a 16-byte structure defined internally as: struct bpf_dynptr_kern { void *data; u32 size; u32 offset; } __aligned(8); The upper 8 bits of *size* is reserved (it contains extra metadata about read-only status and dynptr type). Consequently, a dynptr only supports memory less than 16 MB. There are different types of dynptrs (eg malloc, ringbuf, ...). In this patchset, the most basic one, dynptrs to a bpf program's local memory, is added. For now only local memory that is of reg type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE is supported. In the verifier, dynptr state information will be tracked in stack slots. When the program passes in an uninitialized dynptr (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_UNINIT), the stack slots corresponding to the frame pointer where the dynptr resides at are marked STACK_DYNPTR. For helper functions that take in initialized dynptrs (eg bpf_dynptr_read + bpf_dynptr_write which are added later in this patchset), the verifier enforces that the dynptr has been initialized properly by checking that their corresponding stack slots have been marked as STACK_DYNPTR. The 6th patch in this patchset adds test cases that the verifier should successfully reject, such as for example attempting to use a dynptr after doing a direct write into it inside the bpf program. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220523210712.3641569-2-joannelkoong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <ykaliuta@redhat.com>
2022-10-06 12:02:47 +00:00
/* For dynptr stack slots */
struct {
enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
/* A dynptr is 16 bytes so it takes up 2 stack slots.
* We need to track which slot is the first slot
* to protect against cases where the user may try to
* pass in an address starting at the second slot of the
* dynptr.
*/
bool first_slot;
} dynptr;
bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 06accc8779c1d558a5b5a21f2ac82b0c95827ddd Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:16 2023 -0800 bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Teach verifier about the concept of the open-coded (or inline) iterators. This patch adds generic iterator loop verification logic, new STACK_ITER stack slot type to contain iterator state, and necessary kfunc plumbing for iterator's constructor, destructor and next methods. Next patch implements first specific iterator (numbers iterator for implementing for() loop logic). Such split allows to have more focused commits for verifier logic and separate commit that we could point later to demonstrating what does it take to add a new kind of iterator. Each kind of iterator has its own associated struct bpf_iter_<type>, where <type> denotes a specific type of iterator. struct bpf_iter_<type> state is supposed to live on BPF program stack, so there will be no way to change its size later on without breaking backwards compatibility, so choose wisely! But given this struct is specific to a given <type> of iterator, this allows a lot of flexibility: simple iterators could be fine with just one stack slot (8 bytes), like numbers iterator in the next patch, while some other more complicated iterators might need way more to keep their iterator state. Either way, such design allows to avoid runtime memory allocations, which otherwise would be necessary if we fixed on-the-stack size and it turned out to be too small for a given iterator implementation. The way BPF verifier logic is implemented, there are no artificial restrictions on a number of active iterators, it should work correctly using multiple active iterators at the same time. This also means you can have multiple nested iteration loops. struct bpf_iter_<type> reference can be safely passed to subprograms as well. General flow is easiest to demonstrate with a simple example using number iterator implemented in next patch. Here's the simplest possible loop: struct bpf_iter_num it; int *v; bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 2, 5); while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { bpf_printk("X = %d", *v); } bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); Above snippet should output "X = 2", "X = 3", "X = 4". Note that 5 is exclusive and is not returned. This matches similar APIs (e.g., slices in Go or Rust) that implement a range of elements, where end index is non-inclusive. In the above example, we see a trio of function: - constructor, bpf_iter_num_new(), which initializes iterator state (struct bpf_iter_num it) on the stack. If any of the input arguments are invalid, constructor should make sure to still initialize it such that subsequent bpf_iter_num_next() calls will return NULL. I.e., on error, return error and construct empty iterator. - next method, bpf_iter_num_next(), which accepts pointer to iterator state and produces an element. Next method should always return a pointer. The contract between BPF verifier is that next method will always eventually return NULL when elements are exhausted. Once NULL is returned, subsequent next calls should keep returning NULL. In the case of numbers iterator, bpf_iter_num_next() returns a pointer to an int (storage for this integer is inside the iterator state itself), which can be dereferenced after corresponding NULL check. - once done with the iterator, it's mandated that user cleans up its state with the call to destructor, bpf_iter_num_destroy() in this case. Destructor frees up any resources and marks stack space used by struct bpf_iter_num as usable for something else. Any other iterator implementation will have to implement at least these three methods. It is enforced that for any given type of iterator only applicable constructor/destructor/next are callable. I.e., verifier ensures you can't pass number iterator state into, say, cgroup iterator's next method. It is important to keep the naming pattern consistent to be able to create generic macros to help with BPF iter usability. E.g., one of the follow up patches adds generic bpf_for_each() macro to bpf_misc.h in selftests, which allows to utilize iterator "trio" nicely without having to code the above somewhat tedious loop explicitly every time. This is enforced at kfunc registration point by one of the previous patches in this series. At the implementation level, iterator state tracking for verification purposes is very similar to dynptr. We add STACK_ITER stack slot type, reserve necessary number of slots, depending on sizeof(struct bpf_iter_<type>), and keep track of necessary extra state in the "main" slot, which is marked with non-zero ref_obj_id. Other slots are also marked as STACK_ITER, but have zero ref_obj_id. This is simpler than having a separate "is_first_slot" flag. Another big distinction is that STACK_ITER is *always refcounted*, which simplifies implementation without sacrificing usability. So no need for extra "iter_id", no need to anticipate reuse of STACK_ITER slots for new constructors, etc. Keeping it simple here. As far as the verification logic goes, there are two extensive comments: in process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() explaining some important and sometimes subtle aspects. Please refer to them for details. But from 10,000-foot point of view, next methods are the points of forking a verification state, which are conceptually similar to what verifier is doing when validating conditional jump. We branch out at a `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction and simulate two outcomes: NULL (iteration is done) and non-NULL (new element is returned). NULL is simulated first and is supposed to reach exit without looping. After that non-NULL case is validated and it either reaches exit (for trivial examples with no real loop), or reaches another `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction with the state equivalent to already (partially) validated one. State equivalency at that point means we technically are going to be looping forever without "breaking out" out of established "state envelope" (i.e., subsequent iterations don't add any new knowledge or constraints to the verifier state, so running 1, 2, 10, or a million of them doesn't matter). But taking into account the contract stating that iterator next method *has to* return NULL eventually, we can conclude that loop body is safe and will eventually terminate. Given we validated logic outside of the loop (NULL case), and concluded that loop body is safe (though potentially looping many times), verifier can claim safety of the overall program logic. The rest of the patch is necessary plumbing for state tracking, marking, validation, and necessary further kfunc plumbing to allow implementing iterator constructor, destructor, and next methods. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
/* For bpf_iter stack slots */
struct {
/* BTF container and BTF type ID describing
* struct bpf_iter_<type> of an iterator state
*/
struct btf *btf;
u32 btf_id;
/* packing following two fields to fit iter state into 16 bytes */
enum bpf_iter_state state:2;
int depth:30;
} iter;
/* Max size from any of the above. */
struct {
unsigned long raw1;
unsigned long raw2;
} raw;
bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper The bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper is introduced which iterates all map elements with a callback function. The helper signature looks like long bpf_for_each_map_elem(map, callback_fn, callback_ctx, flags) and for each map element, the callback_fn will be called. For example, like hashmap, the callback signature may look like long callback_fn(map, key, val, callback_ctx) There are two known use cases for this. One is from upstream ([1]) where a for_each_map_elem helper may help implement a timeout mechanism in a more generic way. Another is from our internal discussion for a firewall use case where a map contains all the rules. The packet data can be compared to all these rules to decide allow or deny the packet. For array maps, users can already use a bounded loop to traverse elements. Using this helper can avoid using bounded loop. For other type of maps (e.g., hash maps) where bounded loop is hard or impossible to use, this helper provides a convenient way to operate on all elements. For callback_fn, besides map and map element, a callback_ctx, allocated on caller stack, is also passed to the callback function. This callback_ctx argument can provide additional input and allow to write to caller stack for output. If the callback_fn returns 0, the helper will iterate through next element if available. If the callback_fn returns 1, the helper will stop iterating and returns to the bpf program. Other return values are not used for now. Currently, this helper is only available with jit. It is possible to make it work with interpreter with so effort but I leave it as the future work. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210122205415.113822-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210226204925.3884923-1-yhs@fb.com
2021-02-26 20:49:25 +00:00
u32 subprogno; /* for PTR_TO_FUNC */
};
/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
* the actual value.
* For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
* from the pointed-to object, and is shared with all bpf_reg_states
* with the same id as us.
*/
struct tnum var_off;
/* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
* result in a bad access.
* These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual
* contents of the register.
*/
s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
s32 s32_min_value; /* minimum possible (s32)value */
s32 s32_max_value; /* maximum possible (s32)value */
u32 u32_min_value; /* minimum possible (u32)value */
u32 u32_max_value; /* maximum possible (u32)value */
/* For PTR_TO_PACKET, used to find other pointers with the same variable
* offset, so they can share range knowledge.
* For PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL this is used to share which map value we
* came from, when one is tested for != NULL.
bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it This commit adds a new MPSC ring buffer implementation into BPF ecosystem, which allows multiple CPUs to submit data to a single shared ring buffer. On the consumption side, only single consumer is assumed. Motivation ---------- There are two distinctive motivators for this work, which are not satisfied by existing perf buffer, which prompted creation of a new ring buffer implementation. - more efficient memory utilization by sharing ring buffer across CPUs; - preserving ordering of events that happen sequentially in time, even across multiple CPUs (e.g., fork/exec/exit events for a task). These two problems are independent, but perf buffer fails to satisfy both. Both are a result of a choice to have per-CPU perf ring buffer. Both can be also solved by having an MPSC implementation of ring buffer. The ordering problem could technically be solved for perf buffer with some in-kernel counting, but given the first one requires an MPSC buffer, the same solution would solve the second problem automatically. Semantics and APIs ------------------ Single ring buffer is presented to BPF programs as an instance of BPF map of type BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF. Two other alternatives considered, but ultimately rejected. One way would be to, similar to BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY, make BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF could represent an array of ring buffers, but not enforce "same CPU only" rule. This would be more familiar interface compatible with existing perf buffer use in BPF, but would fail if application needed more advanced logic to lookup ring buffer by arbitrary key. HASH_OF_MAPS addresses this with current approach. Additionally, given the performance of BPF ringbuf, many use cases would just opt into a simple single ring buffer shared among all CPUs, for which current approach would be an overkill. Another approach could introduce a new concept, alongside BPF map, to represent generic "container" object, which doesn't necessarily have key/value interface with lookup/update/delete operations. This approach would add a lot of extra infrastructure that has to be built for observability and verifier support. It would also add another concept that BPF developers would have to familiarize themselves with, new syntax in libbpf, etc. But then would really provide no additional benefits over the approach of using a map. BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF doesn't support lookup/update/delete operations, but so doesn't few other map types (e.g., queue and stack; array doesn't support delete, etc). The approach chosen has an advantage of re-using existing BPF map infrastructure (introspection APIs in kernel, libbpf support, etc), being familiar concept (no need to teach users a new type of object in BPF program), and utilizing existing tooling (bpftool). For common scenario of using a single ring buffer for all CPUs, it's as simple and straightforward, as would be with a dedicated "container" object. On the other hand, by being a map, it can be combined with ARRAY_OF_MAPS and HASH_OF_MAPS map-in-maps to implement a wide variety of topologies, from one ring buffer for each CPU (e.g., as a replacement for perf buffer use cases), to a complicated application hashing/sharding of ring buffers (e.g., having a small pool of ring buffers with hashed task's tgid being a look up key to preserve order, but reduce contention). Key and value sizes are enforced to be zero. max_entries is used to specify the size of ring buffer and has to be a power of 2 value. There are a bunch of similarities between perf buffer (BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY) and new BPF ring buffer semantics: - variable-length records; - if there is no more space left in ring buffer, reservation fails, no blocking; - memory-mappable data area for user-space applications for ease of consumption and high performance; - epoll notifications for new incoming data; - but still the ability to do busy polling for new data to achieve the lowest latency, if necessary. BPF ringbuf provides two sets of APIs to BPF programs: - bpf_ringbuf_output() allows to *copy* data from one place to a ring buffer, similarly to bpf_perf_event_output(); - bpf_ringbuf_reserve()/bpf_ringbuf_commit()/bpf_ringbuf_discard() APIs split the whole process into two steps. First, a fixed amount of space is reserved. If successful, a pointer to a data inside ring buffer data area is returned, which BPF programs can use similarly to a data inside array/hash maps. Once ready, this piece of memory is either committed or discarded. Discard is similar to commit, but makes consumer ignore the record. bpf_ringbuf_output() has disadvantage of incurring extra memory copy, because record has to be prepared in some other place first. But it allows to submit records of the length that's not known to verifier beforehand. It also closely matches bpf_perf_event_output(), so will simplify migration significantly. bpf_ringbuf_reserve() avoids the extra copy of memory by providing a memory pointer directly to ring buffer memory. In a lot of cases records are larger than BPF stack space allows, so many programs have use extra per-CPU array as a temporary heap for preparing sample. bpf_ringbuf_reserve() avoid this needs completely. But in exchange, it only allows a known constant size of memory to be reserved, such that verifier can verify that BPF program can't access memory outside its reserved record space. bpf_ringbuf_output(), while slightly slower due to extra memory copy, covers some use cases that are not suitable for bpf_ringbuf_reserve(). The difference between commit and discard is very small. Discard just marks a record as discarded, and such records are supposed to be ignored by consumer code. Discard is useful for some advanced use-cases, such as ensuring all-or-nothing multi-record submission, or emulating temporary malloc()/free() within single BPF program invocation. Each reserved record is tracked by verifier through existing reference-tracking logic, similar to socket ref-tracking. It is thus impossible to reserve a record, but forget to submit (or discard) it. bpf_ringbuf_query() helper allows to query various properties of ring buffer. Currently 4 are supported: - BPF_RB_AVAIL_DATA returns amount of unconsumed data in ring buffer; - BPF_RB_RING_SIZE returns the size of ring buffer; - BPF_RB_CONS_POS/BPF_RB_PROD_POS returns current logical possition of consumer/producer, respectively. Returned values are momentarily snapshots of ring buffer state and could be off by the time helper returns, so this should be used only for debugging/reporting reasons or for implementing various heuristics, that take into account highly-changeable nature of some of those characteristics. One such heuristic might involve more fine-grained control over poll/epoll notifications about new data availability in ring buffer. Together with BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP/BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP flags for output/commit/discard helpers, it allows BPF program a high degree of control and, e.g., more efficient batched notifications. Default self-balancing strategy, though, should be adequate for most applications and will work reliable and efficiently already. Design and implementation ------------------------- This reserve/commit schema allows a natural way for multiple producers, either on different CPUs or even on the same CPU/in the same BPF program, to reserve independent records and work with them without blocking other producers. This means that if BPF program was interruped by another BPF program sharing the same ring buffer, they will both get a record reserved (provided there is enough space left) and can work with it and submit it independently. This applies to NMI context as well, except that due to using a spinlock during reservation, in NMI context, bpf_ringbuf_reserve() might fail to get a lock, in which case reservation will fail even if ring buffer is not full. The ring buffer itself internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters (which might wrap around on 32-bit architectures, that's not a problem): - consumer counter shows up to which logical position consumer consumed the data; - producer counter denotes amount of data reserved by all producers. Each time a record is reserved, producer that "owns" the record will successfully advance producer counter. At that point, data is still not yet ready to be consumed, though. Each record has 8 byte header, which contains the length of reserved record, as well as two extra bits: busy bit to denote that record is still being worked on, and discard bit, which might be set at commit time if record is discarded. In the latter case, consumer is supposed to skip the record and move on to the next one. Record header also encodes record's relative offset from the beginning of ring buffer data area (in pages). This allows bpf_ringbuf_commit()/bpf_ringbuf_discard() to accept only the pointer to the record itself, without requiring also the pointer to ring buffer itself. Ring buffer memory location will be restored from record metadata header. This significantly simplifies verifier, as well as improving API usability. Producer counter increments are serialized under spinlock, so there is a strict ordering between reservations. Commits, on the other hand, are completely lockless and independent. All records become available to consumer in the order of reservations, but only after all previous records where already committed. It is thus possible for slow producers to temporarily hold off submitted records, that were reserved later. Reservation/commit/consumer protocol is verified by litmus tests in Documentation/litmus-test/bpf-rb. One interesting implementation bit, that significantly simplifies (and thus speeds up as well) implementation of both producers and consumers is how data area is mapped twice contiguously back-to-back in the virtual memory. This allows to not take any special measures for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual memory. See comment and a simple ASCII diagram showing this visually in bpf_ringbuf_area_alloc(). Another feature that distinguishes BPF ringbuf from perf ring buffer is a self-pacing notifications of new data being availability. bpf_ringbuf_commit() implementation will send a notification of new record being available after commit only if consumer has already caught up right up to the record being committed. If not, consumer still has to catch up and thus will see new data anyways without needing an extra poll notification. Benchmarks (see tools/testing/selftests/bpf/benchs/bench_ringbuf.c) show that this allows to achieve a very high throughput without having to resort to tricks like "notify only every Nth sample", which are necessary with perf buffer. For extreme cases, when BPF program wants more manual control of notifications, commit/discard/output helpers accept BPF_RB_NO_WAKEUP and BPF_RB_FORCE_WAKEUP flags, which give full control over notifications of data availability, but require extra caution and diligence in using this API. Comparison to alternatives -------------------------- Before considering implementing BPF ring buffer from scratch existing alternatives in kernel were evaluated, but didn't seem to meet the needs. They largely fell into few categores: - per-CPU buffers (perf, ftrace, etc), which don't satisfy two motivations outlined above (ordering and memory consumption); - linked list-based implementations; while some were multi-producer designs, consuming these from user-space would be very complicated and most probably not performant; memory-mapping contiguous piece of memory is simpler and more performant for user-space consumers; - io_uring is SPSC, but also requires fixed-sized elements. Naively turning SPSC queue into MPSC w/ lock would have subpar performance compared to locked reserve + lockless commit, as with BPF ring buffer. Fixed sized elements would be too limiting for BPF programs, given existing BPF programs heavily rely on variable-sized perf buffer already; - specialized implementations (like a new printk ring buffer, [0]) with lots of printk-specific limitations and implications, that didn't seem to fit well for intended use with BPF programs. [0] https://lwn.net/Articles/779550/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200529075424.3139988-2-andriin@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2020-05-29 07:54:20 +00:00
* For PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL this is used to identify memory allocation
* for the purpose of tracking that it's freed.
* For PTR_TO_SOCKET this is used to share which pointers retain the
* same reference to the socket, to determine proper reference freeing.
bpf: Dynptr support for ring buffers Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120968 commit bc34dee65a65e9c920c420005b8a43f2a721a458 Author: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Date: Mon May 23 14:07:09 2022 -0700 bpf: Dynptr support for ring buffers Currently, our only way of writing dynamically-sized data into a ring buffer is through bpf_ringbuf_output but this incurs an extra memcpy cost. bpf_ringbuf_reserve + bpf_ringbuf_commit avoids this extra memcpy, but it can only safely support reservation sizes that are statically known since the verifier cannot guarantee that the bpf program won’t access memory outside the reserved space. The bpf_dynptr abstraction allows for dynamically-sized ring buffer reservations without the extra memcpy. There are 3 new APIs: long bpf_ringbuf_reserve_dynptr(void *ringbuf, u32 size, u64 flags, struct bpf_dynptr *ptr); void bpf_ringbuf_submit_dynptr(struct bpf_dynptr *ptr, u64 flags); void bpf_ringbuf_discard_dynptr(struct bpf_dynptr *ptr, u64 flags); These closely follow the functionalities of the original ringbuf APIs. For example, all ringbuffer dynptrs that have been reserved must be either submitted or discarded before the program exits. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220523210712.3641569-4-joannelkoong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <ykaliuta@redhat.com>
2022-10-06 12:02:48 +00:00
* For stack slots that are dynptrs, this is used to track references to
* the dynptr to determine proper reference freeing.
bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 06accc8779c1d558a5b5a21f2ac82b0c95827ddd Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:16 2023 -0800 bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Teach verifier about the concept of the open-coded (or inline) iterators. This patch adds generic iterator loop verification logic, new STACK_ITER stack slot type to contain iterator state, and necessary kfunc plumbing for iterator's constructor, destructor and next methods. Next patch implements first specific iterator (numbers iterator for implementing for() loop logic). Such split allows to have more focused commits for verifier logic and separate commit that we could point later to demonstrating what does it take to add a new kind of iterator. Each kind of iterator has its own associated struct bpf_iter_<type>, where <type> denotes a specific type of iterator. struct bpf_iter_<type> state is supposed to live on BPF program stack, so there will be no way to change its size later on without breaking backwards compatibility, so choose wisely! But given this struct is specific to a given <type> of iterator, this allows a lot of flexibility: simple iterators could be fine with just one stack slot (8 bytes), like numbers iterator in the next patch, while some other more complicated iterators might need way more to keep their iterator state. Either way, such design allows to avoid runtime memory allocations, which otherwise would be necessary if we fixed on-the-stack size and it turned out to be too small for a given iterator implementation. The way BPF verifier logic is implemented, there are no artificial restrictions on a number of active iterators, it should work correctly using multiple active iterators at the same time. This also means you can have multiple nested iteration loops. struct bpf_iter_<type> reference can be safely passed to subprograms as well. General flow is easiest to demonstrate with a simple example using number iterator implemented in next patch. Here's the simplest possible loop: struct bpf_iter_num it; int *v; bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 2, 5); while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { bpf_printk("X = %d", *v); } bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); Above snippet should output "X = 2", "X = 3", "X = 4". Note that 5 is exclusive and is not returned. This matches similar APIs (e.g., slices in Go or Rust) that implement a range of elements, where end index is non-inclusive. In the above example, we see a trio of function: - constructor, bpf_iter_num_new(), which initializes iterator state (struct bpf_iter_num it) on the stack. If any of the input arguments are invalid, constructor should make sure to still initialize it such that subsequent bpf_iter_num_next() calls will return NULL. I.e., on error, return error and construct empty iterator. - next method, bpf_iter_num_next(), which accepts pointer to iterator state and produces an element. Next method should always return a pointer. The contract between BPF verifier is that next method will always eventually return NULL when elements are exhausted. Once NULL is returned, subsequent next calls should keep returning NULL. In the case of numbers iterator, bpf_iter_num_next() returns a pointer to an int (storage for this integer is inside the iterator state itself), which can be dereferenced after corresponding NULL check. - once done with the iterator, it's mandated that user cleans up its state with the call to destructor, bpf_iter_num_destroy() in this case. Destructor frees up any resources and marks stack space used by struct bpf_iter_num as usable for something else. Any other iterator implementation will have to implement at least these three methods. It is enforced that for any given type of iterator only applicable constructor/destructor/next are callable. I.e., verifier ensures you can't pass number iterator state into, say, cgroup iterator's next method. It is important to keep the naming pattern consistent to be able to create generic macros to help with BPF iter usability. E.g., one of the follow up patches adds generic bpf_for_each() macro to bpf_misc.h in selftests, which allows to utilize iterator "trio" nicely without having to code the above somewhat tedious loop explicitly every time. This is enforced at kfunc registration point by one of the previous patches in this series. At the implementation level, iterator state tracking for verification purposes is very similar to dynptr. We add STACK_ITER stack slot type, reserve necessary number of slots, depending on sizeof(struct bpf_iter_<type>), and keep track of necessary extra state in the "main" slot, which is marked with non-zero ref_obj_id. Other slots are also marked as STACK_ITER, but have zero ref_obj_id. This is simpler than having a separate "is_first_slot" flag. Another big distinction is that STACK_ITER is *always refcounted*, which simplifies implementation without sacrificing usability. So no need for extra "iter_id", no need to anticipate reuse of STACK_ITER slots for new constructors, etc. Keeping it simple here. As far as the verification logic goes, there are two extensive comments: in process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() explaining some important and sometimes subtle aspects. Please refer to them for details. But from 10,000-foot point of view, next methods are the points of forking a verification state, which are conceptually similar to what verifier is doing when validating conditional jump. We branch out at a `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction and simulate two outcomes: NULL (iteration is done) and non-NULL (new element is returned). NULL is simulated first and is supposed to reach exit without looping. After that non-NULL case is validated and it either reaches exit (for trivial examples with no real loop), or reaches another `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction with the state equivalent to already (partially) validated one. State equivalency at that point means we technically are going to be looping forever without "breaking out" out of established "state envelope" (i.e., subsequent iterations don't add any new knowledge or constraints to the verifier state, so running 1, 2, 10, or a million of them doesn't matter). But taking into account the contract stating that iterator next method *has to* return NULL eventually, we can conclude that loop body is safe and will eventually terminate. Given we validated logic outside of the loop (NULL case), and concluded that loop body is safe (though potentially looping many times), verifier can claim safety of the overall program logic. The rest of the patch is necessary plumbing for state tracking, marking, validation, and necessary further kfunc plumbing to allow implementing iterator constructor, destructor, and next methods. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
* Similarly to dynptrs, we use ID to track "belonging" of a reference
* to a specific instance of bpf_iter.
*/
/*
* Upper bit of ID is used to remember relationship between "linked"
* registers. Example:
* r1 = r2; both will have r1->id == r2->id == N
* r1 += 10; r1->id == N | BPF_ADD_CONST and r1->off == 10
*/
#define BPF_ADD_CONST (1U << 31)
u32 id;
bpf: Fix bpf_tcp_sock and bpf_sk_fullsock issue related to bpf_sk_release Lorenz Bauer [thanks!] reported that a ptr returned by bpf_tcp_sock(sk) can still be accessed after bpf_sk_release(sk). Both bpf_tcp_sock() and bpf_sk_fullsock() have the same issue. This patch addresses them together. A simple reproducer looks like this: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(); /* if (!sk) ... */ tp = bpf_tcp_sock(sk); /* if (!tp) ... */ bpf_sk_release(sk); snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd; /* oops! The verifier does not complain. */ The problem is the verifier did not scrub the register's states of the tcp_sock ptr (tp) after bpf_sk_release(sk). [ Note that when calling bpf_tcp_sock(sk), the sk is not always refcount-acquired. e.g. bpf_tcp_sock(skb->sk). The verifier works fine for this case. ] Currently, the verifier does not track if a helper's return ptr (in REG_0) is "carry"-ing one of its argument's refcount status. To carry this info, the reg1->id needs to be stored in reg0. One approach was tried, like "reg0->id = reg1->id", when calling "bpf_tcp_sock()". The main idea was to avoid adding another "ref_obj_id" for the same reg. However, overlapping the NULL marking and ref tracking purpose in one "id" does not work well: ref_sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(); fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(ref_sk); tp = bpf_tcp_sock(ref_sk); if (!fullsock) { bpf_sk_release(ref_sk); return 0; } /* fullsock_reg->id is marked for NOT-NULL. * Same for tp_reg->id because they have the same id. */ /* oops. verifier did not complain about the missing !tp check */ snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd; Hence, a new "ref_obj_id" is needed in "struct bpf_reg_state". With a new ref_obj_id, when bpf_sk_release(sk) is called, the verifier can scrub all reg states which has a ref_obj_id match. It is done with the changes in release_reg_references() in this patch. While fixing it, sk_to_full_sk() is removed from bpf_tcp_sock() and bpf_sk_fullsock() to avoid these helpers from returning another ptr. It will make bpf_sk_release(tp) possible: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(); /* if (!sk) ... */ tp = bpf_tcp_sock(sk); /* if (!tp) ... */ bpf_sk_release(tp); A separate helper "bpf_get_listener_sock()" will be added in a later patch to do sk_to_full_sk(). Misc change notes: - To allow bpf_sk_release(tp), the arg of bpf_sk_release() is changed from ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET to ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON. ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET is removed from bpf.h since no helper is using it. - arg_type_is_refcounted() is renamed to arg_type_may_be_refcounted() because ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON is the only one and skb->sk is not refcounted. All bpf_sk_release(), bpf_sk_fullsock() and bpf_tcp_sock() take ARG_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON. - check_refcount_ok() ensures is_acquire_function() cannot take arg_type_may_be_refcounted() as its argument. - The check_func_arg() can only allow one refcount-ed arg. It is guaranteed by check_refcount_ok() which ensures at most one arg can be refcounted. Hence, it is a verifier internal error if >1 refcount arg found in check_func_arg(). - In release_reference(), release_reference_state() is called first to ensure a match on "reg->ref_obj_id" can be found before scrubbing the reg states with release_reg_references(). - reg_is_refcounted() is no longer needed. 1. In mark_ptr_or_null_regs(), its usage is replaced by "ref_obj_id && ref_obj_id == id" because, when is_null == true, release_reference_state() should only be called on the ref_obj_id obtained by a acquire helper (i.e. is_acquire_function() == true). Otherwise, the following would happen: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(); /* if (!sk) { ... } */ fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk); if (!fullsock) { /* * release_reference_state(fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id) * where fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id == sk_reg->ref_obj_id. * * Hence, the following bpf_sk_release(sk) will fail * because the ref state has already been released in the * earlier release_reference_state(fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id). */ bpf_sk_release(sk); } 2. In release_reg_references(), the current reg_is_refcounted() call is unnecessary because the id check is enough. - The type_is_refcounted() and type_is_refcounted_or_null() are no longer needed also because reg_is_refcounted() is removed. Fixes: 655a51e536c0 ("bpf: Add struct bpf_tcp_sock and BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock") Reported-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-03-12 17:23:02 +00:00
/* PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK could be a ptr returned
* from a pointer-cast helper, bpf_sk_fullsock() and
* bpf_tcp_sock().
*
* Consider the following where "sk" is a reference counted
* pointer returned from "sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();":
*
* 1: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
* 2: if (!sk) { return 0; }
* 3: fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);
* 4: if (!fullsock) { bpf_sk_release(sk); return 0; }
* 5: tp = bpf_tcp_sock(fullsock);
* 6: if (!tp) { bpf_sk_release(sk); return 0; }
* 7: bpf_sk_release(sk);
* 8: snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd; // verifier will complain
*
* After bpf_sk_release(sk) at line 7, both "fullsock" ptr and
* "tp" ptr should be invalidated also. In order to do that,
* the reg holding "fullsock" and "sk" need to remember
* the original refcounted ptr id (i.e. sk_reg->id) in ref_obj_id
* such that the verifier can reset all regs which have
* ref_obj_id matching the sk_reg->id.
*
* sk_reg->ref_obj_id is set to sk_reg->id at line 1.
* sk_reg->id will stay as NULL-marking purpose only.
* After NULL-marking is done, sk_reg->id can be reset to 0.
*
* After "fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);" at line 3,
* fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id is set to sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
*
* After "tp = bpf_tcp_sock(fullsock);" at line 5,
* tp_reg->ref_obj_id is set to fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id
* which is the same as sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
*
* From the verifier perspective, if sk, fullsock and tp
* are not NULL, they are the same ptr with different
* reg->type. In particular, bpf_sk_release(tp) is also
* allowed and has the same effect as bpf_sk_release(sk).
*/
u32 ref_obj_id;
/* parentage chain for liveness checking */
struct bpf_reg_state *parent;
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
/* Inside the callee two registers can be both PTR_TO_STACK like
* R1=fp-8 and R2=fp-8, but one of them points to this function stack
* while another to the caller's stack. To differentiate them 'frameno'
* is used which is an index in bpf_verifier_state->frame[] array
* pointing to bpf_func_state.
*/
u32 frameno;
bpf: verifier: mark verified-insn with sub-register zext flag eBPF ISA specification requires high 32-bit cleared when low 32-bit sub-register is written. This applies to destination register of ALU32 etc. JIT back-ends must guarantee this semantic when doing code-gen. x86_64 and AArch64 ISA has the same semantics, so the corresponding JIT back-end doesn't need to do extra work. However, 32-bit arches (arm, x86, nfp etc.) and some other 64-bit arches (PowerPC, SPARC etc) need to do explicit zero extension to meet this requirement, otherwise code like the following will fail. u64_value = (u64) u32_value ... other uses of u64_value This is because compiler could exploit the semantic described above and save those zero extensions for extending u32_value to u64_value, these JIT back-ends are expected to guarantee this through inserting extra zero extensions which however could be a significant increase on the code size. Some benchmarks show there could be ~40% sub-register writes out of total insns, meaning at least ~40% extra code-gen. One observation is these extra zero extensions are not always necessary. Take above code snippet for example, it is possible u32_value will never be casted into a u64, the value of high 32-bit of u32_value then could be ignored and extra zero extension could be eliminated. This patch implements this idea, insns defining sub-registers will be marked when the high 32-bit of the defined sub-register matters. For those unmarked insns, it is safe to eliminate high 32-bit clearnace for them. Algo: - Split read flags into READ32 and READ64. - Record index of insn that does sub-register write. Keep the index inside reg state and update it during verifier insn walking. - A full register read on a sub-register marks its definition insn as needing zero extension on dst register. A new sub-register write overrides the old one. - When propagating read64 during path pruning, also mark any insn defining a sub-register that is read in the pruned path as full-register. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-05-24 22:25:12 +00:00
/* Tracks subreg definition. The stored value is the insn_idx of the
* writing insn. This is safe because subreg_def is used before any insn
* patching which only happens after main verification finished.
*/
s32 subreg_def;
enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
bpf: precise scalar_value tracking Introduce precision tracking logic that helps cilium programs the most: old clang old clang new clang new clang with all patches with all patches bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801 bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925 Consider code: 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 655: (bf) r7 = r0 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 657: (bf) r2 = r10 658: (07) r2 += -48 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 665: (bf) r8 = r7 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 667: (bf) r2 = r8 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 670: (bf) r1 = r8 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 672: (57) r1 &= 255 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f)) 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 675: (0f) r0 += r1 At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment. R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly. The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way: last_idx 675 first_idx 664 regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255 regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1 regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8 regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7 regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised: R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state last_idx 663 first_idx 655 regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48 regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10 regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7 // mark R0 to be precise: R0_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0 last_idx 654 first_idx 644 regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value // nothing further to backtrack Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view. More details in the patch comments. It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-15 19:12:25 +00:00
/* if (!precise && SCALAR_VALUE) min/max/tnum don't affect safety */
bool precise;
};
enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
bpf: teach verifier to recognize zero initialized stack programs with function calls are often passing various pointers via stack. When all calls are inlined llvm flattens stack accesses and optimizes away extra branches. When functions are not inlined it becomes the job of the verifier to recognize zero initialized stack to avoid exploring paths that program will not take. The following program would fail otherwise: ptr = &buffer_on_stack; *ptr = 0; ... func_call(.., ptr, ...) { if (..) *ptr = bpf_map_lookup(); } ... if (*ptr != 0) { // Access (*ptr)->field is valid. // Without stack_zero tracking such (*ptr)->field access // will be rejected } since stack slots are no longer uniform invalid | spill | misc add liveness marking to all slots, but do it in 8 byte chunks. So if nothing was read or written in [fp-16, fp-9] range it will be marked as LIVE_NONE. If any byte in that range was read, it will be marked LIVE_READ and stacksafe() check will perform byte-by-byte verification. If all bytes in the range were written the slot will be marked as LIVE_WRITTEN. This significantly speeds up state equality comparison and reduces total number of states processed. before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2051 2003 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3287 3164 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1080 1080 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 24980 12361 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34308 16605 bpf_netdev.o 15404 10962 bpf_overlay.o 7191 6679 Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:08 +00:00
STACK_MISC, /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
STACK_ZERO, /* BPF program wrote constant zero */
bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120968 commit 97e03f521050c092919591e668107b3d69c5f426 Author: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Date: Mon May 23 14:07:07 2022 -0700 bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs This patch adds the bulk of the verifier work for supporting dynamic pointers (dynptrs) in bpf. A bpf_dynptr is opaque to the bpf program. It is a 16-byte structure defined internally as: struct bpf_dynptr_kern { void *data; u32 size; u32 offset; } __aligned(8); The upper 8 bits of *size* is reserved (it contains extra metadata about read-only status and dynptr type). Consequently, a dynptr only supports memory less than 16 MB. There are different types of dynptrs (eg malloc, ringbuf, ...). In this patchset, the most basic one, dynptrs to a bpf program's local memory, is added. For now only local memory that is of reg type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE is supported. In the verifier, dynptr state information will be tracked in stack slots. When the program passes in an uninitialized dynptr (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_UNINIT), the stack slots corresponding to the frame pointer where the dynptr resides at are marked STACK_DYNPTR. For helper functions that take in initialized dynptrs (eg bpf_dynptr_read + bpf_dynptr_write which are added later in this patchset), the verifier enforces that the dynptr has been initialized properly by checking that their corresponding stack slots have been marked as STACK_DYNPTR. The 6th patch in this patchset adds test cases that the verifier should successfully reject, such as for example attempting to use a dynptr after doing a direct write into it inside the bpf program. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220523210712.3641569-2-joannelkoong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <ykaliuta@redhat.com>
2022-10-06 12:02:47 +00:00
/* A dynptr is stored in this stack slot. The type of dynptr
* is stored in bpf_stack_state->spilled_ptr.dynptr.type
*/
STACK_DYNPTR,
bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 06accc8779c1d558a5b5a21f2ac82b0c95827ddd Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:16 2023 -0800 bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Teach verifier about the concept of the open-coded (or inline) iterators. This patch adds generic iterator loop verification logic, new STACK_ITER stack slot type to contain iterator state, and necessary kfunc plumbing for iterator's constructor, destructor and next methods. Next patch implements first specific iterator (numbers iterator for implementing for() loop logic). Such split allows to have more focused commits for verifier logic and separate commit that we could point later to demonstrating what does it take to add a new kind of iterator. Each kind of iterator has its own associated struct bpf_iter_<type>, where <type> denotes a specific type of iterator. struct bpf_iter_<type> state is supposed to live on BPF program stack, so there will be no way to change its size later on without breaking backwards compatibility, so choose wisely! But given this struct is specific to a given <type> of iterator, this allows a lot of flexibility: simple iterators could be fine with just one stack slot (8 bytes), like numbers iterator in the next patch, while some other more complicated iterators might need way more to keep their iterator state. Either way, such design allows to avoid runtime memory allocations, which otherwise would be necessary if we fixed on-the-stack size and it turned out to be too small for a given iterator implementation. The way BPF verifier logic is implemented, there are no artificial restrictions on a number of active iterators, it should work correctly using multiple active iterators at the same time. This also means you can have multiple nested iteration loops. struct bpf_iter_<type> reference can be safely passed to subprograms as well. General flow is easiest to demonstrate with a simple example using number iterator implemented in next patch. Here's the simplest possible loop: struct bpf_iter_num it; int *v; bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 2, 5); while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { bpf_printk("X = %d", *v); } bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); Above snippet should output "X = 2", "X = 3", "X = 4". Note that 5 is exclusive and is not returned. This matches similar APIs (e.g., slices in Go or Rust) that implement a range of elements, where end index is non-inclusive. In the above example, we see a trio of function: - constructor, bpf_iter_num_new(), which initializes iterator state (struct bpf_iter_num it) on the stack. If any of the input arguments are invalid, constructor should make sure to still initialize it such that subsequent bpf_iter_num_next() calls will return NULL. I.e., on error, return error and construct empty iterator. - next method, bpf_iter_num_next(), which accepts pointer to iterator state and produces an element. Next method should always return a pointer. The contract between BPF verifier is that next method will always eventually return NULL when elements are exhausted. Once NULL is returned, subsequent next calls should keep returning NULL. In the case of numbers iterator, bpf_iter_num_next() returns a pointer to an int (storage for this integer is inside the iterator state itself), which can be dereferenced after corresponding NULL check. - once done with the iterator, it's mandated that user cleans up its state with the call to destructor, bpf_iter_num_destroy() in this case. Destructor frees up any resources and marks stack space used by struct bpf_iter_num as usable for something else. Any other iterator implementation will have to implement at least these three methods. It is enforced that for any given type of iterator only applicable constructor/destructor/next are callable. I.e., verifier ensures you can't pass number iterator state into, say, cgroup iterator's next method. It is important to keep the naming pattern consistent to be able to create generic macros to help with BPF iter usability. E.g., one of the follow up patches adds generic bpf_for_each() macro to bpf_misc.h in selftests, which allows to utilize iterator "trio" nicely without having to code the above somewhat tedious loop explicitly every time. This is enforced at kfunc registration point by one of the previous patches in this series. At the implementation level, iterator state tracking for verification purposes is very similar to dynptr. We add STACK_ITER stack slot type, reserve necessary number of slots, depending on sizeof(struct bpf_iter_<type>), and keep track of necessary extra state in the "main" slot, which is marked with non-zero ref_obj_id. Other slots are also marked as STACK_ITER, but have zero ref_obj_id. This is simpler than having a separate "is_first_slot" flag. Another big distinction is that STACK_ITER is *always refcounted*, which simplifies implementation without sacrificing usability. So no need for extra "iter_id", no need to anticipate reuse of STACK_ITER slots for new constructors, etc. Keeping it simple here. As far as the verification logic goes, there are two extensive comments: in process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() explaining some important and sometimes subtle aspects. Please refer to them for details. But from 10,000-foot point of view, next methods are the points of forking a verification state, which are conceptually similar to what verifier is doing when validating conditional jump. We branch out at a `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction and simulate two outcomes: NULL (iteration is done) and non-NULL (new element is returned). NULL is simulated first and is supposed to reach exit without looping. After that non-NULL case is validated and it either reaches exit (for trivial examples with no real loop), or reaches another `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction with the state equivalent to already (partially) validated one. State equivalency at that point means we technically are going to be looping forever without "breaking out" out of established "state envelope" (i.e., subsequent iterations don't add any new knowledge or constraints to the verifier state, so running 1, 2, 10, or a million of them doesn't matter). But taking into account the contract stating that iterator next method *has to* return NULL eventually, we can conclude that loop body is safe and will eventually terminate. Given we validated logic outside of the loop (NULL case), and concluded that loop body is safe (though potentially looping many times), verifier can claim safety of the overall program logic. The rest of the patch is necessary plumbing for state tracking, marking, validation, and necessary further kfunc plumbing to allow implementing iterator constructor, destructor, and next methods. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
STACK_ITER,
};
#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 06accc8779c1d558a5b5a21f2ac82b0c95827ddd Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:16 2023 -0800 bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Teach verifier about the concept of the open-coded (or inline) iterators. This patch adds generic iterator loop verification logic, new STACK_ITER stack slot type to contain iterator state, and necessary kfunc plumbing for iterator's constructor, destructor and next methods. Next patch implements first specific iterator (numbers iterator for implementing for() loop logic). Such split allows to have more focused commits for verifier logic and separate commit that we could point later to demonstrating what does it take to add a new kind of iterator. Each kind of iterator has its own associated struct bpf_iter_<type>, where <type> denotes a specific type of iterator. struct bpf_iter_<type> state is supposed to live on BPF program stack, so there will be no way to change its size later on without breaking backwards compatibility, so choose wisely! But given this struct is specific to a given <type> of iterator, this allows a lot of flexibility: simple iterators could be fine with just one stack slot (8 bytes), like numbers iterator in the next patch, while some other more complicated iterators might need way more to keep their iterator state. Either way, such design allows to avoid runtime memory allocations, which otherwise would be necessary if we fixed on-the-stack size and it turned out to be too small for a given iterator implementation. The way BPF verifier logic is implemented, there are no artificial restrictions on a number of active iterators, it should work correctly using multiple active iterators at the same time. This also means you can have multiple nested iteration loops. struct bpf_iter_<type> reference can be safely passed to subprograms as well. General flow is easiest to demonstrate with a simple example using number iterator implemented in next patch. Here's the simplest possible loop: struct bpf_iter_num it; int *v; bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 2, 5); while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { bpf_printk("X = %d", *v); } bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); Above snippet should output "X = 2", "X = 3", "X = 4". Note that 5 is exclusive and is not returned. This matches similar APIs (e.g., slices in Go or Rust) that implement a range of elements, where end index is non-inclusive. In the above example, we see a trio of function: - constructor, bpf_iter_num_new(), which initializes iterator state (struct bpf_iter_num it) on the stack. If any of the input arguments are invalid, constructor should make sure to still initialize it such that subsequent bpf_iter_num_next() calls will return NULL. I.e., on error, return error and construct empty iterator. - next method, bpf_iter_num_next(), which accepts pointer to iterator state and produces an element. Next method should always return a pointer. The contract between BPF verifier is that next method will always eventually return NULL when elements are exhausted. Once NULL is returned, subsequent next calls should keep returning NULL. In the case of numbers iterator, bpf_iter_num_next() returns a pointer to an int (storage for this integer is inside the iterator state itself), which can be dereferenced after corresponding NULL check. - once done with the iterator, it's mandated that user cleans up its state with the call to destructor, bpf_iter_num_destroy() in this case. Destructor frees up any resources and marks stack space used by struct bpf_iter_num as usable for something else. Any other iterator implementation will have to implement at least these three methods. It is enforced that for any given type of iterator only applicable constructor/destructor/next are callable. I.e., verifier ensures you can't pass number iterator state into, say, cgroup iterator's next method. It is important to keep the naming pattern consistent to be able to create generic macros to help with BPF iter usability. E.g., one of the follow up patches adds generic bpf_for_each() macro to bpf_misc.h in selftests, which allows to utilize iterator "trio" nicely without having to code the above somewhat tedious loop explicitly every time. This is enforced at kfunc registration point by one of the previous patches in this series. At the implementation level, iterator state tracking for verification purposes is very similar to dynptr. We add STACK_ITER stack slot type, reserve necessary number of slots, depending on sizeof(struct bpf_iter_<type>), and keep track of necessary extra state in the "main" slot, which is marked with non-zero ref_obj_id. Other slots are also marked as STACK_ITER, but have zero ref_obj_id. This is simpler than having a separate "is_first_slot" flag. Another big distinction is that STACK_ITER is *always refcounted*, which simplifies implementation without sacrificing usability. So no need for extra "iter_id", no need to anticipate reuse of STACK_ITER slots for new constructors, etc. Keeping it simple here. As far as the verification logic goes, there are two extensive comments: in process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() explaining some important and sometimes subtle aspects. Please refer to them for details. But from 10,000-foot point of view, next methods are the points of forking a verification state, which are conceptually similar to what verifier is doing when validating conditional jump. We branch out at a `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction and simulate two outcomes: NULL (iteration is done) and non-NULL (new element is returned). NULL is simulated first and is supposed to reach exit without looping. After that non-NULL case is validated and it either reaches exit (for trivial examples with no real loop), or reaches another `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction with the state equivalent to already (partially) validated one. State equivalency at that point means we technically are going to be looping forever without "breaking out" out of established "state envelope" (i.e., subsequent iterations don't add any new knowledge or constraints to the verifier state, so running 1, 2, 10, or a million of them doesn't matter). But taking into account the contract stating that iterator next method *has to* return NULL eventually, we can conclude that loop body is safe and will eventually terminate. Given we validated logic outside of the loop (NULL case), and concluded that loop body is safe (though potentially looping many times), verifier can claim safety of the overall program logic. The rest of the patch is necessary plumbing for state tracking, marking, validation, and necessary further kfunc plumbing to allow implementing iterator constructor, destructor, and next methods. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
#define BPF_REGMASK_ARGS ((1 << BPF_REG_1) | (1 << BPF_REG_2) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_3) | (1 << BPF_REG_4) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_5))
bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120968 commit 97e03f521050c092919591e668107b3d69c5f426 Author: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Date: Mon May 23 14:07:07 2022 -0700 bpf: Add verifier support for dynptrs This patch adds the bulk of the verifier work for supporting dynamic pointers (dynptrs) in bpf. A bpf_dynptr is opaque to the bpf program. It is a 16-byte structure defined internally as: struct bpf_dynptr_kern { void *data; u32 size; u32 offset; } __aligned(8); The upper 8 bits of *size* is reserved (it contains extra metadata about read-only status and dynptr type). Consequently, a dynptr only supports memory less than 16 MB. There are different types of dynptrs (eg malloc, ringbuf, ...). In this patchset, the most basic one, dynptrs to a bpf program's local memory, is added. For now only local memory that is of reg type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE is supported. In the verifier, dynptr state information will be tracked in stack slots. When the program passes in an uninitialized dynptr (ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_UNINIT), the stack slots corresponding to the frame pointer where the dynptr resides at are marked STACK_DYNPTR. For helper functions that take in initialized dynptrs (eg bpf_dynptr_read + bpf_dynptr_write which are added later in this patchset), the verifier enforces that the dynptr has been initialized properly by checking that their corresponding stack slots have been marked as STACK_DYNPTR. The 6th patch in this patchset adds test cases that the verifier should successfully reject, such as for example attempting to use a dynptr after doing a direct write into it inside the bpf program. Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220523210712.3641569-2-joannelkoong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <ykaliuta@redhat.com>
2022-10-06 12:02:47 +00:00
#define BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_dynptr_kern)
#define BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS (BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE / BPF_REG_SIZE)
struct bpf_stack_state {
struct bpf_reg_state spilled_ptr;
u8 slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE];
};
struct bpf_reference_state {
/* Track each reference created with a unique id, even if the same
* instruction creates the reference multiple times (eg, via CALL).
*/
int id;
/* Instruction where the allocation of this reference occurred. This
* is used purely to inform the user of a reference leak.
*/
int insn_idx;
bpf: Fix reference state management for synchronous callbacks Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2166911 commit 9d9d00ac29d0ef7ce426964de46fa6b380357d0a Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Tue Aug 23 03:31:25 2022 +0200 bpf: Fix reference state management for synchronous callbacks Currently, verifier verifies callback functions (sync and async) as if they will be executed once, (i.e. it explores execution state as if the function was being called once). The next insn to explore is set to start of subprog and the exit from nested frame is handled using curframe > 0 and prepare_func_exit. In case of async callback it uses a customized variant of push_stack simulating a kind of branch to set up custom state and execution context for the async callback. While this approach is simple and works when callback really will be executed only once, it is unsafe for all of our current helpers which are for_each style, i.e. they execute the callback multiple times. A callback releasing acquired references of the caller may do so multiple times, but currently verifier sees it as one call inside the frame, which then returns to caller. Hence, it thinks it released some reference that the cb e.g. got access through callback_ctx (register filled inside cb from spilled typed register on stack). Similarly, it may see that an acquire call is unpaired inside the callback, so the caller will copy the reference state of callback and then will have to release the register with new ref_obj_ids. But again, the callback may execute multiple times, but the verifier will only account for acquired references for a single symbolic execution of the callback, which will cause leaks. Note that for async callback case, things are different. While currently we have bpf_timer_set_callback which only executes it once, even for multiple executions it would be safe, as reference state is NULL and check_reference_leak would force program to release state before BPF_EXIT. The state is also unaffected by analysis for the caller frame. Hence async callback is safe. Since we want the reference state to be accessible, e.g. for pointers loaded from stack through callback_ctx's PTR_TO_STACK, we still have to copy caller's reference_state to callback's bpf_func_state, but we enforce that whatever references it adds to that reference_state has been released before it hits BPF_EXIT. This requires introducing a new callback_ref member in the reference state to distinguish between caller vs callee references. Hence, check_reference_leak now errors out if it sees we are in callback_fn and we have not released callback_ref refs. Since there can be multiple nested callbacks, like frame 0 -> cb1 -> cb2 etc. we need to also distinguish between whether this particular ref belongs to this callback frame or parent, and only error for our own, so we store state->frameno (which is always non-zero for callbacks). In short, callbacks can read parent reference_state, but cannot mutate it, to be able to use pointers acquired by the caller. They must only undo their changes (by releasing their own acquired_refs before BPF_EXIT) on top of caller reference_state before returning (at which point the caller and callback state will match anyway, so no need to copy it back to caller). Fixes: 69c087ba6225 ("bpf: Add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823013125.24938-1-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-02-03 13:47:50 +00:00
/* There can be a case like:
* main (frame 0)
* cb (frame 1)
* func (frame 3)
* cb (frame 4)
* Hence for frame 4, if callback_ref just stored boolean, it would be
* impossible to distinguish nested callback refs. Hence store the
* frameno and compare that to callback_ref in check_reference_leak when
* exiting a callback function.
*/
int callback_ref;
};
struct bpf_retval_range {
s32 minval;
s32 maxval;
};
/* state of the program:
* type of all registers and stack info
*/
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
struct bpf_func_state {
struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
/* index of call instruction that called into this func */
int callsite;
/* stack frame number of this function state from pov of
* enclosing bpf_verifier_state.
* 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
*/
u32 frameno;
bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access Before this patch, variable offset access to the stack was dissalowed for regular instructions, but was allowed for "indirect" accesses (i.e. helpers). This patch removes the restriction, allowing reading and writing to the stack through stack pointers with variable offsets. This makes stack-allocated buffers more usable in programs, and brings stack pointers closer to other types of pointers. The motivation is being able to use stack-allocated buffers for data manipulation. When the stack size limit is sufficient, allocating buffers on the stack is simpler than per-cpu arrays, or other alternatives. In unpriviledged programs, variable-offset reads and writes are disallowed (they were already disallowed for the indirect access case) because the speculative execution checking code doesn't support them. Additionally, when writing through a variable-offset stack pointer, if any pointers are in the accessible range, there's possilibities of later leaking pointers because the write cannot be tracked precisely. Writes with variable offset mark the whole range as initialized, even though we don't know which stack slots are actually written. This is in order to not reject future reads to these slots. Note that this doesn't affect writes done through helpers; like before, helpers need the whole stack range to be initialized to begin with. All the stack slots are in range are considered scalars after the write; variable-offset register spills are not tracked. For reads, all the stack slots in the variable range needs to be initialized (but see above about what writes do), otherwise the read is rejected. All register spilled in stack slots that might be read are marked as having been read, however reads through such pointers don't do register filling; the target register will always be either a scalar or a constant zero. Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210207011027.676572-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
2021-02-07 01:10:24 +00:00
/* subprog number == index within subprog_info
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
* zero == main subprog
*/
u32 subprogno;
bpf: Implement verifier support for validation of async callbacks. Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.redhat.com/2041365 commit bfc6bb74e4f16ab264fa73398a7a79d7d2afac2e Author: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Date: Wed Jul 14 17:54:14 2021 -0700 bpf: Implement verifier support for validation of async callbacks. bpf_for_each_map_elem() and bpf_timer_set_callback() helpers are relying on PTR_TO_FUNC infra in the verifier to validate addresses to subprograms and pass them into the helpers as function callbacks. In case of bpf_for_each_map_elem() the callback is invoked synchronously and the verifier treats it as a normal subprogram call by adding another bpf_func_state and new frame in __check_func_call(). bpf_timer_set_callback() doesn't invoke the callback directly. The subprogram will be called asynchronously from bpf_timer_cb(). Teach the verifier to validate such async callbacks as special kind of jump by pushing verifier state into stack and let pop_stack() process it. Special care needs to be taken during state pruning. The call insn doing bpf_timer_set_callback has to be a prune_point. Otherwise short timer callbacks might not have prune points in front of bpf_timer_set_callback() which means is_state_visited() will be called after this call insn is processed in __check_func_call(). Which means that another async_cb state will be pushed to be walked later and the verifier will eventually hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ limit. Since push_async_cb() looks like another push_stack() branch the infinite loop detection will trigger false positive. To recognize this case mark such states as in_async_callback_fn. To distinguish infinite loop in async callback vs the same callback called with different arguments for different map and timer add async_entry_cnt to bpf_func_state. Enforce return zero from async callbacks. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-9-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2022-01-17 13:13:18 +00:00
/* Every bpf_timer_start will increment async_entry_cnt.
* It's used to distinguish:
* void foo(void) { for(;;); }
* void foo(void) { bpf_timer_set_callback(,foo); }
*/
u32 async_entry_cnt;
struct bpf_retval_range callback_ret_range;
bpf: rearrange bpf_func_state fields to save a bit of memory JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 45b5623f2d721c25d1a2fdc8c4600fb4b7b61c75 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Sat Dec 2 09:56:55 2023 -0800 bpf: rearrange bpf_func_state fields to save a bit of memory It's a trivial rearrangement saving 8 bytes. We have 4 bytes of padding at the end which can be filled with another field without increasing struct bpf_func_state. copy_func_state() logic remains correct without any further changes. BEFORE ====== struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_reg_state regs[11]; /* 0 1320 */ /* --- cacheline 20 boundary (1280 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */ int callsite; /* 1320 4 */ u32 frameno; /* 1324 4 */ u32 subprogno; /* 1328 4 */ u32 async_entry_cnt; /* 1332 4 */ bool in_callback_fn; /* 1336 1 */ /* XXX 7 bytes hole, try to pack */ /* --- cacheline 21 boundary (1344 bytes) --- */ struct tnum callback_ret_range; /* 1344 16 */ bool in_async_callback_fn; /* 1360 1 */ bool in_exception_callback_fn; /* 1361 1 */ /* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */ int acquired_refs; /* 1364 4 */ struct bpf_reference_state * refs; /* 1368 8 */ int allocated_stack; /* 1376 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct bpf_stack_state * stack; /* 1384 8 */ /* size: 1392, cachelines: 22, members: 13 */ /* sum members: 1379, holes: 3, sum holes: 13 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ }; AFTER ===== struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_reg_state regs[11]; /* 0 1320 */ /* --- cacheline 20 boundary (1280 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */ int callsite; /* 1320 4 */ u32 frameno; /* 1324 4 */ u32 subprogno; /* 1328 4 */ u32 async_entry_cnt; /* 1332 4 */ struct tnum callback_ret_range; /* 1336 16 */ /* --- cacheline 21 boundary (1344 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ bool in_callback_fn; /* 1352 1 */ bool in_async_callback_fn; /* 1353 1 */ bool in_exception_callback_fn; /* 1354 1 */ /* XXX 1 byte hole, try to pack */ int acquired_refs; /* 1356 4 */ struct bpf_reference_state * refs; /* 1360 8 */ struct bpf_stack_state * stack; /* 1368 8 */ int allocated_stack; /* 1376 4 */ /* size: 1384, cachelines: 22, members: 13 */ /* sum members: 1379, holes: 1, sum holes: 1 */ /* padding: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ }; Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231202175705.885270-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 10:44:34 +00:00
bool in_callback_fn;
bpf: Implement verifier support for validation of async callbacks. Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.redhat.com/2041365 commit bfc6bb74e4f16ab264fa73398a7a79d7d2afac2e Author: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Date: Wed Jul 14 17:54:14 2021 -0700 bpf: Implement verifier support for validation of async callbacks. bpf_for_each_map_elem() and bpf_timer_set_callback() helpers are relying on PTR_TO_FUNC infra in the verifier to validate addresses to subprograms and pass them into the helpers as function callbacks. In case of bpf_for_each_map_elem() the callback is invoked synchronously and the verifier treats it as a normal subprogram call by adding another bpf_func_state and new frame in __check_func_call(). bpf_timer_set_callback() doesn't invoke the callback directly. The subprogram will be called asynchronously from bpf_timer_cb(). Teach the verifier to validate such async callbacks as special kind of jump by pushing verifier state into stack and let pop_stack() process it. Special care needs to be taken during state pruning. The call insn doing bpf_timer_set_callback has to be a prune_point. Otherwise short timer callbacks might not have prune points in front of bpf_timer_set_callback() which means is_state_visited() will be called after this call insn is processed in __check_func_call(). Which means that another async_cb state will be pushed to be walked later and the verifier will eventually hit BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ limit. Since push_async_cb() looks like another push_stack() branch the infinite loop detection will trigger false positive. To recognize this case mark such states as in_async_callback_fn. To distinguish infinite loop in async callback vs the same callback called with different arguments for different map and timer add async_entry_cnt to bpf_func_state. Enforce return zero from async callbacks. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210715005417.78572-9-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2022-01-17 13:13:18 +00:00
bool in_async_callback_fn;
bpf: Add support for custom exception callbacks JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit b9ae0c9dd0aca79bffc17be51c2dc148d1f72708 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 13 01:32:03 2023 +0200 bpf: Add support for custom exception callbacks By default, the subprog generated by the verifier to handle a thrown exception hardcodes a return value of 0. To allow user-defined logic and modification of the return value when an exception is thrown, introduce the 'exception_callback:' declaration tag, which marks a callback as the default exception handler for the program. The format of the declaration tag is 'exception_callback:<value>', where <value> is the name of the exception callback. Each main program can be tagged using this BTF declaratiion tag to associate it with an exception callback. In case the tag is absent, the default callback is used. As such, the exception callback cannot be modified at runtime, only set during verification. Allowing modification of the callback for the current program execution at runtime leads to issues when the programs begin to nest, as any per-CPU state maintaing this information will have to be saved and restored. We don't want it to stay in bpf_prog_aux as this takes a global effect for all programs. An alternative solution is spilling the callback pointer at a known location on the program stack on entry, and then passing this location to bpf_throw as a parameter. However, since exceptions are geared more towards a use case where they are ideally never invoked, optimizing for this use case and adding to the complexity has diminishing returns. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-7-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:02:37 +00:00
bool in_exception_callback_fn;
bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit bb124da69c47dd98d69361ec13244ece50bec63e Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Nov 21 04:07:00 2023 +0200 bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations In some cases verifier can't infer convergence of the bpf_loop() iteration. E.g. for the following program: static int cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context* ctx) { ctx->i++; return 0; } SEC("?raw_tp") int prog(void *_) { struct num_context ctx = { .i = 0 }; __u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 }; bpf_loop(2, cb, &ctx, 0); return choice_arr[ctx.i]; } Each 'cb' simulation would eventually return to 'prog' and reach 'return choice_arr[ctx.i]' statement. At which point ctx.i would be marked precise, thus forcing verifier to track multitude of separate states with {.i=0}, {.i=1}, ... at bpf_loop() callback entry. This commit allows "brute force" handling for such cases by limiting number of callback body simulations using 'umax' value of the first bpf_loop() parameter. For this, extend bpf_func_state with 'callback_depth' field. Increment this field when callback visiting state is pushed to states traversal stack. For frame #N it's 'callback_depth' field counts how many times callback with frame depth N+1 had been executed. Use bpf_func_state specifically to allow independent tracking of callback depths when multiple nested bpf_loop() calls are present. Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-11-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:04:13 +00:00
/* For callback calling functions that limit number of possible
* callback executions (e.g. bpf_loop) keeps track of current
* simulated iteration number.
* Value in frame N refers to number of times callback with frame
* N+1 was simulated, e.g. for the following call:
*
* bpf_loop(..., fn, ...); | suppose current frame is N
* | fn would be simulated in frame N+1
* | number of simulations is tracked in frame N
*/
u32 callback_depth;
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
/* The following fields should be last. See copy_func_state() */
int acquired_refs;
struct bpf_reference_state *refs;
/* The state of the stack. Each element of the array describes BPF_REG_SIZE
* (i.e. 8) bytes worth of stack memory.
* stack[0] represents bytes [*(r10-8)..*(r10-1)]
* stack[1] represents bytes [*(r10-16)..*(r10-9)]
* ...
* stack[allocated_stack/8 - 1] represents [*(r10-allocated_stack)..*(r10-allocated_stack+7)]
*/
struct bpf_stack_state *stack;
/* Size of the current stack, in bytes. The stack state is tracked below, in
* `stack`. allocated_stack is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE.
*/
bpf: rearrange bpf_func_state fields to save a bit of memory JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 45b5623f2d721c25d1a2fdc8c4600fb4b7b61c75 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Sat Dec 2 09:56:55 2023 -0800 bpf: rearrange bpf_func_state fields to save a bit of memory It's a trivial rearrangement saving 8 bytes. We have 4 bytes of padding at the end which can be filled with another field without increasing struct bpf_func_state. copy_func_state() logic remains correct without any further changes. BEFORE ====== struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_reg_state regs[11]; /* 0 1320 */ /* --- cacheline 20 boundary (1280 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */ int callsite; /* 1320 4 */ u32 frameno; /* 1324 4 */ u32 subprogno; /* 1328 4 */ u32 async_entry_cnt; /* 1332 4 */ bool in_callback_fn; /* 1336 1 */ /* XXX 7 bytes hole, try to pack */ /* --- cacheline 21 boundary (1344 bytes) --- */ struct tnum callback_ret_range; /* 1344 16 */ bool in_async_callback_fn; /* 1360 1 */ bool in_exception_callback_fn; /* 1361 1 */ /* XXX 2 bytes hole, try to pack */ int acquired_refs; /* 1364 4 */ struct bpf_reference_state * refs; /* 1368 8 */ int allocated_stack; /* 1376 4 */ /* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */ struct bpf_stack_state * stack; /* 1384 8 */ /* size: 1392, cachelines: 22, members: 13 */ /* sum members: 1379, holes: 3, sum holes: 13 */ /* last cacheline: 48 bytes */ }; AFTER ===== struct bpf_func_state { struct bpf_reg_state regs[11]; /* 0 1320 */ /* --- cacheline 20 boundary (1280 bytes) was 40 bytes ago --- */ int callsite; /* 1320 4 */ u32 frameno; /* 1324 4 */ u32 subprogno; /* 1328 4 */ u32 async_entry_cnt; /* 1332 4 */ struct tnum callback_ret_range; /* 1336 16 */ /* --- cacheline 21 boundary (1344 bytes) was 8 bytes ago --- */ bool in_callback_fn; /* 1352 1 */ bool in_async_callback_fn; /* 1353 1 */ bool in_exception_callback_fn; /* 1354 1 */ /* XXX 1 byte hole, try to pack */ int acquired_refs; /* 1356 4 */ struct bpf_reference_state * refs; /* 1360 8 */ struct bpf_stack_state * stack; /* 1368 8 */ int allocated_stack; /* 1376 4 */ /* size: 1384, cachelines: 22, members: 13 */ /* sum members: 1379, holes: 1, sum holes: 1 */ /* padding: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 40 bytes */ }; Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231202175705.885270-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 10:44:34 +00:00
int allocated_stack;
};
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Tue Dec 5 10:42:39 2023 -0800 bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset. To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's checked most frequently during backtracking. This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches. There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states). File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF) -------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%) Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between bpf and bpf-next trees. Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is present. Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that. [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/ Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Reported-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205184248.1502704-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 10:59:58 +00:00
#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
/* instruction history flags, used in bpf_jmp_history_entry.flags field */
enum {
/* instruction references stack slot through PTR_TO_STACK register;
* we also store stack's frame number in lower 3 bits (MAX_CALL_FRAMES is 8)
* and accessed stack slot's index in next 6 bits (MAX_BPF_STACK is 512,
* 8 bytes per slot, so slot index (spi) is [0, 63])
*/
INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK = 0x7, /* 3 bits */
INSN_F_SPI_MASK = 0x3f, /* 6 bits */
INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT = 3, /* shifted 3 bits to the left */
INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS = BIT(9), /* we need 10 bits total */
};
static_assert(INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES);
static_assert(INSN_F_SPI_MASK + 1 >= MAX_BPF_STACK / 8);
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry {
bpf: precise scalar_value tracking Introduce precision tracking logic that helps cilium programs the most: old clang old clang new clang new clang with all patches with all patches bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801 bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925 Consider code: 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 655: (bf) r7 = r0 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 657: (bf) r2 = r10 658: (07) r2 += -48 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 665: (bf) r8 = r7 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 667: (bf) r2 = r8 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 670: (bf) r1 = r8 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 672: (57) r1 &= 255 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f)) 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 675: (0f) r0 += r1 At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment. R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly. The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way: last_idx 675 first_idx 664 regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255 regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1 regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8 regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7 regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised: R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state last_idx 663 first_idx 655 regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48 regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10 regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7 // mark R0 to be precise: R0_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0 last_idx 654 first_idx 644 regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value // nothing further to backtrack Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view. More details in the patch comments. It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-15 19:12:25 +00:00
u32 idx;
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Tue Dec 5 10:42:39 2023 -0800 bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset. To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's checked most frequently during backtracking. This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches. There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states). File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF) -------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%) Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between bpf and bpf-next trees. Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is present. Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that. [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/ Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Reported-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205184248.1502704-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 10:59:58 +00:00
/* insn idx can't be bigger than 1 million */
u32 prev_idx : 22;
/* special flags, e.g., whether insn is doing register stack spill/load */
u32 flags : 10;
bpf: Track equal scalars history on per-instruction level JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 Conflicts: Context change due to already aplied commit 3878ae04e9fc ("bpf: Fix incorrect delta propagation between linked registers") commit 4bf79f9be434e000c8e12fe83b2f4402480f1460 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Thu Jul 18 13:23:53 2024 -0700 bpf: Track equal scalars history on per-instruction level Use bpf_verifier_state->jmp_history to track which registers were updated by find_equal_scalars() (renamed to collect_linked_regs()) when conditional jump was verified. Use recorded information in backtrack_insn() to propagate precision. E.g. for the following program: while verifying instructions 1: r1 = r0 | 2: if r1 < 8 goto ... | push r0,r1 as linked registers in jmp_history 3: if r0 > 16 goto ... | push r0,r1 as linked registers in jmp_history 4: r2 = r10 | 5: r2 += r0 v mark_chain_precision(r0) while doing mark_chain_precision(r0) 5: r2 += r0 | mark r0 precise 4: r2 = r10 | 3: if r0 > 16 goto ... | mark r0,r1 as precise 2: if r1 < 8 goto ... | mark r0,r1 as precise 1: r1 = r0 v Technically, do this as follows: - Use 10 bits to identify each register that gains range because of sync_linked_regs(): - 3 bits for frame number; - 6 bits for register or stack slot number; - 1 bit to indicate if register is spilled. - Use u64 as a vector of 6 such records + 4 bits for vector length. - Augment struct bpf_jmp_history_entry with a field 'linked_regs' representing such vector. - When doing check_cond_jmp_op() remember up to 6 registers that gain range because of sync_linked_regs() in such a vector. - Don't propagate range information and reset IDs for registers that don't fit in 6-value vector. - Push a pair {instruction index, linked registers vector} to bpf_verifier_state->jmp_history. - When doing backtrack_insn() check if any of recorded linked registers is currently marked precise, if so mark all linked registers as precise. This also requires fixes for two test_verifier tests: - precise: test 1 - precise: test 2 Both tests contain the following instruction sequence: 19: (bf) r2 = r9 ; R2=scalar(id=3) R9=scalar(id=3) 20: (a5) if r2 < 0x8 goto pc+1 ; R2=scalar(id=3,umin=8) 21: (95) exit 22: (07) r2 += 1 ; R2_w=scalar(id=3+1,...) 23: (bf) r1 = r10 ; R1_w=fp0 R10=fp0 24: (07) r1 += -8 ; R1_w=fp-8 25: (b7) r3 = 0 ; R3_w=0 26: (85) call bpf_probe_read_kernel#113 The call to bpf_probe_read_kernel() at (26) forces r2 to be precise. Previously, this forced all registers with same id to become precise immediately when mark_chain_precision() is called. After this change, the precision is propagated to registers sharing same id only when 'if' instruction is backtracked. Hence verification log for both tests is changed: regs=r2,r9 -> regs=r2 for instructions 25..20. Fixes: 904e6ddf4133 ("bpf: Use scalar ids in mark_chain_precision()") Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240718202357.1746514-2-eddyz87@gmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZ0xidVCqB47XnkXcNhkPWF6_nTV7yt+_Lf0kcFEut2Mg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-05 15:38:51 +00:00
/* additional registers that need precision tracking when this
* jump is backtracked, vector of six 10-bit records
*/
u64 linked_regs;
bpf: precise scalar_value tracking Introduce precision tracking logic that helps cilium programs the most: old clang old clang new clang new clang with all patches with all patches bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801 bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925 Consider code: 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 655: (bf) r7 = r0 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 657: (bf) r2 = r10 658: (07) r2 += -48 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 665: (bf) r8 = r7 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 667: (bf) r2 = r8 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 670: (bf) r1 = r8 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 672: (57) r1 &= 255 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f)) 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 675: (0f) r0 += r1 At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment. R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly. The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way: last_idx 675 first_idx 664 regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255 regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1 regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8 regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7 regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised: R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state last_idx 663 first_idx 655 regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48 regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10 regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7 // mark R0 to be precise: R0_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0 last_idx 654 first_idx 644 regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value // nothing further to backtrack Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view. More details in the patch comments. It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-15 19:12:25 +00:00
};
bpf: states_equal() must build idmap for all function frames Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 commit 5dd9cdbc9dec3e99b19e483767e247d15ca8cc0d Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Fri Dec 9 15:57:29 2022 +0200 bpf: states_equal() must build idmap for all function frames verifier.c:states_equal() must maintain register ID mapping across all function frames. Otherwise the following example might be erroneously marked as safe: main: fp[-24] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; frame[0].fp[-24].id == 1 fp[-32] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; frame[0].fp[-32].id == 2 r1 = &fp[-24] r2 = &fp[-32] call foo() r0 = 0 exit foo: 0: r9 = r1 1: r8 = r2 2: r7 = ktime_get_ns() 3: r6 = ktime_get_ns() 4: if (r6 > r7) goto skip_assign 5: r9 = r8 skip_assign: ; <--- checkpoint 6: r9 = *r9 ; (a) frame[1].r9.id == 2 ; (b) frame[1].r9.id == 1 7: if r9 == 0 goto exit: ; mark_ptr_or_null_regs() transfers != 0 info ; for all regs sharing ID: ; (a) r9 != 0 => &frame[0].fp[-32] != 0 ; (b) r9 != 0 => &frame[0].fp[-24] != 0 8: r8 = *r8 ; (a) r8 == &frame[0].fp[-32] ; (b) r8 == &frame[0].fp[-32] 9: r0 = *r8 ; (a) safe ; (b) unsafe exit: 10: exit While processing call to foo() verifier considers the following execution paths: (a) 0-10 (b) 0-4,6-10 (There is also path 0-7,10 but it is not interesting for the issue at hand. (a) is verified first.) Suppose that checkpoint is created at (6) when path (a) is verified, next path (b) is verified and (6) is reached. If states_equal() maintains separate 'idmap' for each frame the mapping at (6) for frame[1] would be empty and regsafe(r9)::check_ids() would add a pair 2->1 and return true, which is an error. If states_equal() maintains single 'idmap' for all frames the mapping at (6) would be { 1->1, 2->2 } and regsafe(r9)::check_ids() would return false when trying to add a pair 2->1. This issue was suggested in the following discussion: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzbFB5g4oUfyxk9rHy-PJSLQ3h8q9mV=rVoXfr_JVm8+1Q@mail.gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209135733.28851-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-21 14:24:31 +00:00
/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES)
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state {
/* call stack tracking */
struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
/*
* 'branches' field is the number of branches left to explore:
* 0 - all possible paths from this state reached bpf_exit or
* were safely pruned
* 1 - at least one path is being explored.
* This state hasn't reached bpf_exit
* 2 - at least two paths are being explored.
* This state is an immediate parent of two children.
* One is fallthrough branch with branches==1 and another
* state is pushed into stack (to be explored later) also with
* branches==1. The parent of this state has branches==1.
* The verifier state tree connected via 'parent' pointer looks like:
* 1
* 1
* 2 -> 1 (first 'if' pushed into stack)
* 1
* 2 -> 1 (second 'if' pushed into stack)
* 1
* 1
* 1 bpf_exit.
*
* Once do_check() reaches bpf_exit, it calls update_branch_counts()
* and the verifier state tree will look:
* 1
* 1
* 2 -> 1 (first 'if' pushed into stack)
* 1
* 1 -> 1 (second 'if' pushed into stack)
* 0
* 0
* 0 bpf_exit.
* After pop_stack() the do_check() will resume at second 'if'.
*
* If is_state_visited() sees a state with branches > 0 it means
* there is a loop. If such state is exactly equal to the current state
* it's an infinite loop. Note states_equal() checks for states
* equivalency, so two states being 'states_equal' does not mean
* infinite loop. The exact comparison is provided by
* states_maybe_looping() function. It's a stronger pre-check and
* much faster than states_equal().
*
* This algorithm may not find all possible infinite loops or
* loop iteration count may be too high.
* In such cases BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS limit kicks in.
*/
u32 branches;
bpf: convert explored_states to hash table All prune points inside a callee bpf function most likely will have different callsites. For example, if function foo() is called from two callsites the half of explored states in all prune points in foo() will be useless for subsequent walking of one of those callsites. Fortunately explored_states pruning heuristics keeps the number of states per prune point small, but walking these states is still a waste of cpu time when the callsite of the current state is different from the callsite of the explored state. To improve pruning logic convert explored_states into hash table and use simple insn_idx ^ callsite hash to select hash bucket. This optimization has no effect on programs without bpf2bpf calls and drastically improves programs with calls. In the later case it reduces total memory consumption in 1M scale tests by almost 3 times (peak_states drops from 5752 to 2016). Care should be taken when comparing the states for equivalency. Since the same hash bucket can now contain states with different indices the insn_idx has to be part of verifier_state and compared. Different hash table sizes and different hash functions were explored, but the results were not significantly better vs this patch. They can be improved in the future. Hit/miss heuristic is not counting index miscompare as a miss. Otherwise verifier stats become unstable when experimenting with different hash functions. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-05-22 03:17:07 +00:00
u32 insn_idx;
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
u32 curframe;
bpf: Migrate release_on_unlock logic to non-owning ref semantics Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2178930 commit 6a3cd3318ff65622415e34e8ee39d76331e7c869 Author: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Date: Sun Feb 12 01:27:07 2023 -0800 bpf: Migrate release_on_unlock logic to non-owning ref semantics This patch introduces non-owning reference semantics to the verifier, specifically linked_list API kfunc handling. release_on_unlock logic for refs is refactored - with small functional changes - to implement these semantics, and bpf_list_push_{front,back} are migrated to use them. When a list node is pushed to a list, the program still has a pointer to the node: n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); bpf_spin_lock(&l); bpf_list_push_back(&l, n); /* n still points to the just-added node */ bpf_spin_unlock(&l); What the verifier considers n to be after the push, and thus what can be done with n, are changed by this patch. Common properties both before/after this patch: * After push, n is only a valid reference to the node until end of critical section * After push, n cannot be pushed to any list * After push, the program can read the node's fields using n Before: * After push, n retains the ref_obj_id which it received on bpf_obj_new, but the associated bpf_reference_state's release_on_unlock field is set to true * release_on_unlock field and associated logic is used to implement "n is only a valid ref until end of critical section" * After push, n cannot be written to, the node must be removed from the list before writing to its fields * After push, n is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED After: * After push, n's ref is released and ref_obj_id set to 0. NON_OWN_REF type flag is added to reg's type, indicating that it's a non-owning reference. * NON_OWN_REF flag and logic is used to implement "n is only a valid ref until end of critical section" * n can be written to (except for special fields e.g. bpf_list_node, timer, ...) Summary of specific implementation changes to achieve the above: * release_on_unlock field, ref_set_release_on_unlock helper, and logic to "release on unlock" based on that field are removed * The anonymous active_lock struct used by bpf_verifier_state is pulled out into a named struct bpf_active_lock. * NON_OWN_REF type flag is introduced along with verifier logic changes to handle non-owning refs * Helpers are added to use NON_OWN_REF flag to implement non-owning ref semantics as described above * invalidate_non_owning_refs - helper to clobber all non-owning refs matching a particular bpf_active_lock identity. Replaces release_on_unlock logic in process_spin_lock. * ref_set_non_owning - set NON_OWN_REF type flag after doing some sanity checking * ref_convert_owning_non_owning - convert owning reference w/ specified ref_obj_id to non-owning references. Set NON_OWN_REF flag for each reg with that ref_obj_id and 0-out its ref_obj_id * Update linked_list selftests to account for minor semantic differences introduced by this patch * Writes to a release_on_unlock node ref are not allowed, while writes to non-owning reference pointees are. As a result the linked_list "write after push" failure tests are no longer scenarios that should fail. * The test##missing_lock##op and test##incorrect_lock##op macro-generated failure tests need to have a valid node argument in order to have the same error output as before. Otherwise verification will fail early and the expected error output won't be seen. Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230212092715.1422619-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2023-05-10 05:17:22 +00:00
struct bpf_active_lock active_lock;
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-01-02 23:58:34 +00:00
bool speculative;
bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 commit 9bb00b2895cbfe0ad410457b605d0a72524168c1 Author: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Date: Wed Nov 23 21:32:17 2022 -0800 bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() Add two kfunc's bpf_rcu_read_lock() and bpf_rcu_read_unlock(). These two kfunc's can be used for all program types. The following is an example about how rcu pointer are used w.r.t. bpf_rcu_read_lock()/bpf_rcu_read_unlock(). struct task_struct { ... struct task_struct *last_wakee; struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; ... }; Let us say prog does 'task = bpf_get_current_task_btf()' to get a 'task' pointer. The basic rules are: - 'real_parent = task->real_parent' should be inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region. This is to simulate rcu_dereference() operation. The 'real_parent' is marked as MEM_RCU only if (1). task->real_parent is inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region, and (2). task is a trusted ptr. So MEM_RCU marked ptr can be 'trusted' inside the bpf_rcu_read_lock region. - 'last_wakee = real_parent->last_wakee' should be inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region since it tries to access rcu protected memory. - the ptr 'last_wakee' will be marked as PTR_UNTRUSTED since in general it is not clear whether the object pointed by 'last_wakee' is valid or not even inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region. The verifier will reset all rcu pointer register states to untrusted at bpf_rcu_read_unlock() kfunc call site, so any such rcu pointer won't be trusted any more outside the bpf_rcu_read_lock() region. The current implementation does not support nested rcu read lock region in the prog. Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124053217.2373910-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-21 09:53:15 +00:00
bool active_rcu_lock;
u32 active_preempt_lock;
/* If this state was ever pointed-to by other state's loop_entry field
* this flag would be set to true. Used to avoid freeing such states
* while they are still in use.
*/
bool used_as_loop_entry;
bool in_sleepable;
bpf: precise scalar_value tracking Introduce precision tracking logic that helps cilium programs the most: old clang old clang new clang new clang with all patches with all patches bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801 bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925 Consider code: 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 655: (bf) r7 = r0 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 657: (bf) r2 = r10 658: (07) r2 += -48 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 665: (bf) r8 = r7 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 667: (bf) r2 = r8 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 670: (bf) r1 = r8 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 672: (57) r1 &= 255 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f)) 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 675: (0f) r0 += r1 At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment. R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly. The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way: last_idx 675 first_idx 664 regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255 regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1 regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8 regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7 regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised: R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state last_idx 663 first_idx 655 regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48 regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10 regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7 // mark R0 to be precise: R0_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0 last_idx 654 first_idx 644 regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value // nothing further to backtrack Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view. More details in the patch comments. It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-15 19:12:25 +00:00
/* first and last insn idx of this verifier state */
u32 first_insn_idx;
u32 last_insn_idx;
/* If this state is a part of states loop this field points to some
* parent of this state such that:
* - it is also a member of the same states loop;
* - DFS states traversal starting from initial state visits loop_entry
* state before this state.
* Used to compute topmost loop entry for state loops.
* State loops might appear because of open coded iterators logic.
* See get_loop_entry() for more information.
*/
struct bpf_verifier_state *loop_entry;
bpf: precise scalar_value tracking Introduce precision tracking logic that helps cilium programs the most: old clang old clang new clang new clang with all patches with all patches bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801 bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925 Consider code: 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 655: (bf) r7 = r0 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 657: (bf) r2 = r10 658: (07) r2 += -48 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 665: (bf) r8 = r7 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 667: (bf) r2 = r8 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 670: (bf) r1 = r8 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 672: (57) r1 &= 255 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f)) 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 675: (0f) r0 += r1 At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment. R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly. The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way: last_idx 675 first_idx 664 regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255 regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1 regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8 regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7 regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised: R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state last_idx 663 first_idx 655 regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48 regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10 regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7 // mark R0 to be precise: R0_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0 last_idx 654 first_idx 644 regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value // nothing further to backtrack Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view. More details in the patch comments. It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-15 19:12:25 +00:00
/* jmp history recorded from first to last.
* backtracking is using it to go from last to first.
* For most states jmp_history_cnt is [0-3].
* For loops can go up to ~40.
*/
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Tue Dec 5 10:42:39 2023 -0800 bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset. To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's checked most frequently during backtracking. This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches. There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states). File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF) -------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%) Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between bpf and bpf-next trees. Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is present. Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that. [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/ Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Reported-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205184248.1502704-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 10:59:58 +00:00
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *jmp_history;
bpf: precise scalar_value tracking Introduce precision tracking logic that helps cilium programs the most: old clang old clang new clang new clang with all patches with all patches bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805 bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801 bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754 bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925 Consider code: 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 655: (bf) r7 = r0 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 657: (bf) r2 = r10 658: (07) r2 += -48 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 665: (bf) r8 = r7 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 667: (bf) r2 = r8 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 670: (bf) r1 = r8 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 672: (57) r1 &= 255 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f)) 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 675: (0f) r0 += r1 At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment. R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly. The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way: last_idx 675 first_idx 664 regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1 regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12 regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255 regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1 regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1 regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8 regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535 regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7 regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21 // this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised: R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state last_idx 663 first_idx 655 regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7 regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00 regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48 regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10 regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29 regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7 // mark R0 to be precise: R0_rw=invP(id=0) parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0 last_idx 654 first_idx 644 regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value // nothing further to backtrack Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view. More details in the patch comments. It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-15 19:12:25 +00:00
u32 jmp_history_cnt;
bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 Conflicts: missing vma_task iterator commit 2793a8b015f7f1caadb9bce9c63dc659f7522676 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Oct 24 03:09:13 2023 +0300 bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks Convergence for open coded iterators is computed in is_state_visited() by examining states with branches count > 1 and using states_equal(). states_equal() computes sub-state relation using read and precision marks. Read and precision marks are propagated from children states, thus are not guaranteed to be complete inside a loop when branches count > 1. This could be demonstrated using the following unsafe program: 1. r7 = -16 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) { 4. if (r6 != 42) { 5. r7 = -32 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 7. continue 8. } 9. r0 = r10 10. r0 += r7 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0) 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 13. } Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3 with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3 with r7=-32. Because instructions at 9-12 had not been visitied yet existing checkpoint at 3 does not have read or precision mark for r7. Thus states_equal() would return true and verifier would discard current state, thus unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught. This commit fixes this loophole by introducing exact state comparisons for iterator convergence logic: - registers are compared using regs_exact() regardless of read or precision marks; - stack slots have to have identical type. Unfortunately, this is too strict even for simple programs like below: i = 0; while(iter_next(&it)) i++; At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and eventually instruction processing limit would be reached. To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly. This a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs, however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on the second. Test case iter_task_vma_for_each() presents one of such cases: unsigned int seen = 0; ... bpf_for_each(task_vma, vma, task, 0) { if (seen >= 1000) break; ... seen++; } Here clang generates the following code: <LBB0_4>: 24: r8 = r6 ; stash current value of ... body ... 'seen' 29: r1 = r10 30: r1 += -0x8 31: call bpf_iter_task_vma_next 32: r6 += 0x1 ; seen++; 33: if r0 == 0x0 goto +0x2 <LBB0_6> ; exit on next() == NULL 34: r7 += 0x10 35: if r8 < 0x3e7 goto -0xc <LBB0_4> ; loop on seen < 1000 <LBB0_6>: ... exit ... Note that counter in r6 is copied to r8 and then incremented, conditional jump is done using r8. Because of this precision mark for r6 lags one state behind of precision mark on r8 and widening logic kicks in. Adding barrier_var(seen) after conditional is sufficient to force clang use the same register for both counting and conditional jump. This issue was discussed in the thread [1] which was started by Andrew Werner <awerner32@gmail.com> demonstrating a similar bug in callback functions handling. The callbacks would be addressed in a followup patch. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/97a90da09404c65c8e810cf83c94ac703705dc0e.camel@gmail.com/ Co-developed-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024000917.12153-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:44 +00:00
u32 dfs_depth;
bpf: verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit ab5cfac139ab8576fb54630d4cca23c3e690ee90 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Nov 21 04:06:56 2023 +0200 bpf: verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times Prior to this patch callbacks were handled as regular function calls, execution of callback body was modeled exactly once. This patch updates callbacks handling logic as follows: - introduces a function push_callback_call() that schedules callback body verification in env->head stack; - updates prepare_func_exit() to reschedule callback body verification upon BPF_EXIT; - as calls to bpf_*_iter_next(), calls to callback invoking functions are marked as checkpoints; - is_state_visited() is updated to stop callback based iteration when some identical parent state is found. Paths with callback function invoked zero times are now verified first, which leads to necessity to modify some selftests: - the following negative tests required adding release/unlock/drop calls to avoid previously masked unrelated error reports: - cb_refs.c:underflow_prog - exceptions_fail.c:reject_rbtree_add_throw - exceptions_fail.c:reject_with_cp_reference - the following precision tracking selftests needed change in expected log trace: - verifier_subprog_precision.c:callback_result_precise (note: r0 precision is no longer propagated inside callback and I think this is a correct behavior) - verifier_subprog_precision.c:parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback - verifier_subprog_precision.c:parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback Reported-by: Andrew Werner <awerner32@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/ Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-7-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:04:12 +00:00
u32 callback_unroll_depth;
bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649 commit 011832b97b311bb9e3c27945bc0d1089a14209c9 Author: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Date: Tue Mar 5 19:19:26 2024 -0800 bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction Introduce may_goto instruction that from the verifier pov is similar to open coded iterators bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() and bpf_loop() helper, but it doesn't iterate any objects. In assembly 'may_goto' is a nop most of the time until bpf runtime has to terminate the program for whatever reason. In the current implementation may_goto has a hidden counter, but other mechanisms can be used. For programs written in C the later patch introduces 'cond_break' macro that combines 'may_goto' with 'break' statement and has similar semantics: cond_break is a nop until bpf runtime has to break out of this loop. It can be used in any normal "for" or "while" loop, like for (i = zero; i < cnt; cond_break, i++) { The verifier recognizes that may_goto is used in the program, reserves additional 8 bytes of stack, initializes them in subprog prologue, and replaces may_goto instruction with: aux_reg = *(u64 *)(fp - 40) if aux_reg == 0 goto pc+off aux_reg -= 1 *(u64 *)(fp - 40) = aux_reg may_goto instruction can be used by LLVM to implement __builtin_memcpy, __builtin_strcmp. may_goto is not a full substitute for bpf_for() macro. bpf_for() doesn't have induction variable that verifiers sees, so 'i' in bpf_for(i, 0, 100) is seen as imprecise and bounded. But when the code is written as: for (i = 0; i < 100; cond_break, i++) the verifier see 'i' as precise constant zero, hence cond_break (aka may_goto) doesn't help to converge the loop. A static or global variable can be used as a workaround: static int zero = 0; for (i = zero; i < 100; cond_break, i++) // works! may_goto works well with arena pointers that don't need to be bounds checked on access. Load/store from arena returns imprecise unbounded scalar and loops with may_goto pass the verifier. Reserve new opcode BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND for may_goto insn. JCOND stands for conditional pseudo jump. Since goto_or_nop insn was proposed, it may use the same opcode. may_goto vs goto_or_nop can be distinguished by src_reg: code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND src_reg = 0 - may_goto src_reg = 1 - goto_or_nop Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Tested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240306031929.42666-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-06-24 16:11:03 +00:00
u32 may_goto_depth;
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
};
bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit dfab99df147b0d364f0c199f832ff2aedfb2265a Author: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Date: Wed Oct 18 14:17:43 2023 +0800 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to use them directly. This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU. Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED. It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg search STACK_ITER. Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:38 +00:00
#define bpf_get_spilled_reg(slot, frame, mask) \
(((slot < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) && \
((1 << frame->stack[slot].slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE - 1]) & (mask))) \
? &frame->stack[slot].spilled_ptr : NULL)
/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled register. */
bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit dfab99df147b0d364f0c199f832ff2aedfb2265a Author: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Date: Wed Oct 18 14:17:43 2023 +0800 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to use them directly. This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU. Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED. It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg search STACK_ITER. Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:38 +00:00
#define bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(iter, frame, reg, mask) \
for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask); \
iter < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; \
bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit dfab99df147b0d364f0c199f832ff2aedfb2265a Author: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Date: Wed Oct 18 14:17:43 2023 +0800 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to use them directly. This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU. Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED. It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg search STACK_ITER. Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:38 +00:00
iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask))
bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit dfab99df147b0d364f0c199f832ff2aedfb2265a Author: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Date: Wed Oct 18 14:17:43 2023 +0800 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to use them directly. This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU. Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED. It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg search STACK_ITER. Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:38 +00:00
#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(__vst, __state, __reg, __mask, __expr) \
bpf: Add helper macro bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2166911 commit b239da34203f49c40b5d656220c39647c3ff0b3c Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Sun Sep 4 22:41:28 2022 +0200 bpf: Add helper macro bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate For a lot of use cases in future patches, we will want to modify the state of registers part of some same 'group' (e.g. same ref_obj_id). It won't just be limited to releasing reference state, but setting a type flag dynamically based on certain actions, etc. Hence, we need a way to easily pass a callback to the function that iterates over all registers in current bpf_verifier_state in all frames upto (and including) the curframe. While in C++ we would be able to easily use a lambda to pass state and the callback together, sadly we aren't using C++ in the kernel. The next best thing to avoid defining a function for each case seems like statement expressions in GNU C. The kernel already uses them heavily, hence they can passed to the macro in the style of a lambda. The statement expression will then be substituted in the for loop bodies. Variables __state and __reg are set to current bpf_func_state and reg for each invocation of the expression inside the passed in verifier state. Then, convert mark_ptr_or_null_regs, clear_all_pkt_pointers, release_reference, find_good_pkt_pointers, find_equal_scalars to use bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220904204145.3089-16-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-02-03 13:48:48 +00:00
({ \
struct bpf_verifier_state *___vstate = __vst; \
int ___i, ___j; \
for (___i = 0; ___i <= ___vstate->curframe; ___i++) { \
struct bpf_reg_state *___regs; \
__state = ___vstate->frame[___i]; \
___regs = __state->regs; \
for (___j = 0; ___j < MAX_BPF_REG; ___j++) { \
__reg = &___regs[___j]; \
(void)(__expr); \
} \
bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit dfab99df147b0d364f0c199f832ff2aedfb2265a Author: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Date: Wed Oct 18 14:17:43 2023 +0800 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to use them directly. This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU. Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED. It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg search STACK_ITER. Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:38 +00:00
bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(___j, __state, __reg, __mask) { \
bpf: Add helper macro bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2166911 commit b239da34203f49c40b5d656220c39647c3ff0b3c Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Sun Sep 4 22:41:28 2022 +0200 bpf: Add helper macro bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate For a lot of use cases in future patches, we will want to modify the state of registers part of some same 'group' (e.g. same ref_obj_id). It won't just be limited to releasing reference state, but setting a type flag dynamically based on certain actions, etc. Hence, we need a way to easily pass a callback to the function that iterates over all registers in current bpf_verifier_state in all frames upto (and including) the curframe. While in C++ we would be able to easily use a lambda to pass state and the callback together, sadly we aren't using C++ in the kernel. The next best thing to avoid defining a function for each case seems like statement expressions in GNU C. The kernel already uses them heavily, hence they can passed to the macro in the style of a lambda. The statement expression will then be substituted in the for loop bodies. Variables __state and __reg are set to current bpf_func_state and reg for each invocation of the expression inside the passed in verifier state. Then, convert mark_ptr_or_null_regs, clear_all_pkt_pointers, release_reference, find_good_pkt_pointers, find_equal_scalars to use bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220904204145.3089-16-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-02-03 13:48:48 +00:00
if (!__reg) \
continue; \
(void)(__expr); \
} \
} \
})
bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit dfab99df147b0d364f0c199f832ff2aedfb2265a Author: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Date: Wed Oct 18 14:17:43 2023 +0800 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to use them directly. This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU. Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED. It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg search STACK_ITER. Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:03:38 +00:00
/* Invoke __expr over regsiters in __vst, setting __state and __reg */
#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(__vst, __state, __reg, __expr) \
bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(__vst, __state, __reg, 1 << STACK_SPILL, __expr)
/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
struct bpf_verifier_state state;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
bpf: improve verification speed by droping states Branch instructions, branch targets and calls in a bpf program are the places where the verifier remembers states that led to successful verification of the program. These states are used to prune brute force program analysis. For unprivileged programs there is a limit of 64 states per such 'branching' instructions (maximum length is tracked by max_states_per_insn counter introduced in the previous patch). Simply reducing this threshold to 32 or lower increases insn_processed metric to the point that small valid programs get rejected. For root programs there is no limit and cilium programs can have max_states_per_insn to be 100 or higher. Walking 100+ states multiplied by number of 'branching' insns during verification consumes significant amount of cpu time. Turned out simple LRU-like mechanism can be used to remove states that unlikely will be helpful in future search pruning. This patch introduces hit_cnt and miss_cnt counters: hit_cnt - this many times this state successfully pruned the search miss_cnt - this many times this state was not equivalent to other states (and that other states were added to state list) The heuristic introduced in this patch is: if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) /* drop this state from future considerations */ Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn (allow more states to be considered for pruning) and slow verification speed, but do not meaningfully reduce insn_processed metric. Lower numbers drop too many states and insn_processed increases too much. Many different formulas were considered. This one is simple and works well enough in practice. (the analysis was done on selftests/progs/* and on cilium programs) The end result is this heuristic improves verification speed by 10 times. Large synthetic programs that used to take a second more now take 1/10 of a second. In cases where max_states_per_insn used to be 100 or more, now it's ~10. There is a slight increase in insn_processed for cilium progs: before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1831 1838 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3029 3218 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26309 26935 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 33517 34439 bpf_netdev.o 9713 9721 bpf_overlay.o 6184 6184 bpf_lcx_jit.o 37335 39389 And 2-3 times improvement in the verification speed. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-04-02 04:27:41 +00:00
int miss_cnt, hit_cnt;
};
bpf: Inline calls to bpf_loop when callback is known Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2137876 commit 1ade23711971b0eececf0d7fedc29d3c1d2fce01 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 21 02:53:42 2022 +0300 bpf: Inline calls to bpf_loop when callback is known Calls to `bpf_loop` are replaced with direct loops to avoid indirection. E.g. the following: bpf_loop(10, foo, NULL, 0); Is replaced by equivalent of the following: for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) foo(i, NULL); This transformation could be applied when: - callback is known and does not change during program execution; - flags passed to `bpf_loop` are always zero. Inlining logic works as follows: - During execution simulation function `update_loop_inline_state` tracks the following information for each `bpf_loop` call instruction: - is callback known and constant? - are flags constant and zero? - Function `optimize_bpf_loop` increases stack depth for functions where `bpf_loop` calls can be inlined and invokes `inline_bpf_loop` to apply the inlining. The additional stack space is used to spill registers R6, R7 and R8. These registers are used as loop counter, loop maximal bound and callback context parameter; Measurements using `benchs/run_bench_bpf_loop.sh` inside QEMU / KVM on i7-4710HQ CPU show a drop in latency from 14 ns/op to 2 ns/op. Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620235344.569325-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2022-10-31 09:29:05 +00:00
struct bpf_loop_inline_state {
unsigned int initialized:1; /* set to true upon first entry */
unsigned int fit_for_inline:1; /* true if callback function is the same
* at each call and flags are always zero
*/
bpf: Inline calls to bpf_loop when callback is known Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2137876 commit 1ade23711971b0eececf0d7fedc29d3c1d2fce01 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 21 02:53:42 2022 +0300 bpf: Inline calls to bpf_loop when callback is known Calls to `bpf_loop` are replaced with direct loops to avoid indirection. E.g. the following: bpf_loop(10, foo, NULL, 0); Is replaced by equivalent of the following: for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) foo(i, NULL); This transformation could be applied when: - callback is known and does not change during program execution; - flags passed to `bpf_loop` are always zero. Inlining logic works as follows: - During execution simulation function `update_loop_inline_state` tracks the following information for each `bpf_loop` call instruction: - is callback known and constant? - are flags constant and zero? - Function `optimize_bpf_loop` increases stack depth for functions where `bpf_loop` calls can be inlined and invokes `inline_bpf_loop` to apply the inlining. The additional stack space is used to spill registers R6, R7 and R8. These registers are used as loop counter, loop maximal bound and callback context parameter; Measurements using `benchs/run_bench_bpf_loop.sh` inside QEMU / KVM on i7-4710HQ CPU show a drop in latency from 14 ns/op to 2 ns/op. Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620235344.569325-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2022-10-31 09:29:05 +00:00
u32 callback_subprogno; /* valid when fit_for_inline is true */
};
/* pointer and state for maps */
struct bpf_map_ptr_state {
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
bool poison;
bool unpriv;
};
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-01-02 23:58:34 +00:00
/* Possible states for alu_state member. */
bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack, potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program to avoid such data leaking issue. However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to extract any restricted stack content via side-channel. Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after the work in 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case. Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2021-04-29 15:19:37 +00:00
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC (1U << 0)
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST (1U << 1)
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-01-02 23:58:34 +00:00
#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2)
#define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER (1U << 3)
bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack, potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program to avoid such data leaking issue. However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to extract any restricted stack content via side-channel. Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after the work in 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case. Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2021-04-29 15:19:37 +00:00
#define BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE (1U << 4)
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-01-02 23:58:34 +00:00
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
union {
enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
struct bpf_map_ptr_state map_ptr_state;
bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs Typical JIT does several passes over bpf instructions to compute total size and relative offsets of jumps and calls. With multitple bpf functions calling each other all relative calls will have invalid offsets intially therefore we need to additional last pass over the program to emit calls with correct offsets. For example in case of three bpf functions: main: call foo call bpf_map_lookup exit foo: call bar exit bar: exit We will call bpf_int_jit_compile() indepedently for main(), foo() and bar() x64 JIT typically does 4-5 passes to converge. After these initial passes the image for these 3 functions will be good except call targets, since start addresses of foo() and bar() are unknown when we were JITing main() (note that call bpf_map_lookup will be resolved properly during initial passes). Once start addresses of 3 functions are known we patch call_insn->imm to point to right functions and call bpf_int_jit_compile() again which needs only one pass. Additional safety checks are done to make sure this last pass doesn't produce image that is larger or smaller than previous pass. When constant blinding is on it's applied to all functions at the first pass, since doing it once again at the last pass can change size of the JITed code. Tested on x64 and arm64 hw with JIT on/off, blinding on/off. x64 jits bpf-to-bpf calls correctly while arm64 falls back to interpreter. All other JITs that support normal BPF_CALL will behave the same way since bpf-to-bpf call is equivalent to bpf-to-kernel call from JITs point of view. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:15 +00:00
s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-01-02 23:58:34 +00:00
u32 alu_limit; /* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
bpf: implement lookup-free direct value access for maps This generic extension to BPF maps allows for directly loading an address residing inside a BPF map value as a single BPF ldimm64 instruction! The idea is similar to what BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD does today, which is a special src_reg flag for ldimm64 instruction that indicates that inside the first part of the double insns's imm field is a file descriptor which the verifier then replaces as a full 64bit address of the map into both imm parts. For the newly added BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE src_reg flag, the idea is the following: the first part of the double insns's imm field is again a file descriptor corresponding to the map, and the second part of the imm field is an offset into the value. The verifier will then replace both imm parts with an address that points into the BPF map value at the given value offset for maps that support this operation. Currently supported is array map with single entry. It is possible to support more than just single map element by reusing both 16bit off fields of the insns as a map index, so full array map lookup could be expressed that way. It hasn't been implemented here due to lack of concrete use case, but could easily be done so in future in a compatible way, since both off fields right now have to be 0 and would correctly denote a map index 0. The BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE is a distinct flag as otherwise with BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD we could not differ offset 0 between load of map pointer versus load of map's value at offset 0, and changing BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD's encoding into off by one to differ between regular map pointer and map value pointer would add unnecessary complexity and increases barrier for debugability thus less suitable. Using the second part of the imm field as an offset into the value does /not/ come with limitations since maximum possible value size is in u32 universe anyway. This optimization allows for efficiently retrieving an address to a map value memory area without having to issue a helper call which needs to prepare registers according to calling convention, etc, without needing the extra NULL test, and without having to add the offset in an additional instruction to the value base pointer. The verifier then treats the destination register as PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE with constant reg->off from the user passed offset from the second imm field, and guarantees that this is within bounds of the map value. Any subsequent operations are normally treated as typical map value handling without anything extra needed from verification side. The two map operations for direct value access have been added to array map for now. In future other types could be supported as well depending on the use case. The main use case for this commit is to allow for BPF loader support for global variables that reside in .data/.rodata/.bss sections such that we can directly load the address of them with minimal additional infrastructure required. Loader support has been added in subsequent commits for libbpf library. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-04-09 21:20:03 +00:00
struct {
u32 map_index; /* index into used_maps[] */
u32 map_off; /* offset from value base address */
};
struct {
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type; /* type of pseudo_btf_id */
union {
struct {
struct btf *btf;
u32 btf_id; /* btf_id for struct typed var */
};
u32 mem_size; /* mem_size for non-struct typed var */
};
} btf_var;
bpf: Inline calls to bpf_loop when callback is known Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2137876 commit 1ade23711971b0eececf0d7fedc29d3c1d2fce01 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 21 02:53:42 2022 +0300 bpf: Inline calls to bpf_loop when callback is known Calls to `bpf_loop` are replaced with direct loops to avoid indirection. E.g. the following: bpf_loop(10, foo, NULL, 0); Is replaced by equivalent of the following: for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) foo(i, NULL); This transformation could be applied when: - callback is known and does not change during program execution; - flags passed to `bpf_loop` are always zero. Inlining logic works as follows: - During execution simulation function `update_loop_inline_state` tracks the following information for each `bpf_loop` call instruction: - is callback known and constant? - are flags constant and zero? - Function `optimize_bpf_loop` increases stack depth for functions where `bpf_loop` calls can be inlined and invokes `inline_bpf_loop` to apply the inlining. The additional stack space is used to spill registers R6, R7 and R8. These registers are used as loop counter, loop maximal bound and callback context parameter; Measurements using `benchs/run_bench_bpf_loop.sh` inside QEMU / KVM on i7-4710HQ CPU show a drop in latency from 14 ns/op to 2 ns/op. Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620235344.569325-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2022-10-31 09:29:05 +00:00
/* if instruction is a call to bpf_loop this field tracks
* the state of the relevant registers to make decision about inlining
*/
struct bpf_loop_inline_state loop_inline_state;
};
bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit d2dcc67df910dd85253a701b6a5b747f955d28f5 Author: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Date: Sat Apr 15 13:18:07 2023 -0700 bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail Consider this code snippet: struct node { long key; bpf_list_node l; bpf_rb_node r; bpf_refcount ref; } int some_bpf_prog(void *ctx) { struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(/*...*/), *m; bpf_spin_lock(&glock); bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->r, /* ... */); m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n); bpf_rbtree_add(&other_tree, &m->r, /* ... */); bpf_spin_unlock(&glock); /* ... */ } After bpf_refcount_acquire, n and m point to the same underlying memory, and that node's bpf_rb_node field is being used by the some_tree insert, so overwriting it as a result of the second insert is an error. In order to properly support refcounted nodes, the rbtree and list insert functions must be allowed to fail. This patch adds such support. The kfuncs bpf_rbtree_add, bpf_list_push_{front,back} are modified to return an int indicating success/failure, with 0 -> success, nonzero -> failure. bpf_obj_drop on failure ======================= Currently the only reason an insert can fail is the example above: the bpf_{list,rb}_node is already in use. When such a failure occurs, the insert kfuncs will bpf_obj_drop the input node. This allows the insert operations to logically fail without changing their verifier owning ref behavior, namely the unconditional release_reference of the input owning ref. With insert that always succeeds, ownership of the node is always passed to the collection, since the node always ends up in the collection. With a possibly-failed insert w/ bpf_obj_drop, ownership of the node is always passed either to the collection (success), or to bpf_obj_drop (failure). Regardless, it's correct to continue unconditionally releasing the input owning ref, as something is always taking ownership from the calling program on insert. Keeping owning ref behavior unchanged results in a nice default UX for insert functions that can fail. If the program's reaction to a failed insert is "fine, just get rid of this owning ref for me and let me go on with my business", then there's no reason to check for failure since that's default behavior. e.g.: long important_failures = 0; int some_bpf_prog(void *ctx) { struct node *n, *m, *o; /* all bpf_obj_new'd */ bpf_spin_lock(&glock); bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */); bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &m->node, /* ... */); if (bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &o->node, /* ... */)) { important_failures++; } bpf_spin_unlock(&glock); } If we instead chose to pass ownership back to the program on failed insert - by returning NULL on success or an owning ref on failure - programs would always have to do something with the returned ref on failure. The most likely action is probably "I'll just get rid of this owning ref and go about my business", which ideally would look like: if (n = bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */)) bpf_obj_drop(n); But bpf_obj_drop isn't allowed in a critical section and inserts must occur within one, so in reality error handling would become a hard-to-parse mess. For refcounted nodes, we can replicate the "pass ownership back to program on failure" logic with this patch's semantics, albeit in an ugly way: struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(/* ... */), *m; bpf_spin_lock(&glock); m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n); if (bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */)) { /* Do something with m */ } bpf_spin_unlock(&glock); bpf_obj_drop(m); bpf_refcount_acquire is used to simulate "return owning ref on failure". This should be an uncommon occurrence, though. Addition of two verifier-fixup'd args to collection inserts =========================================================== The actual bpf_obj_drop kfunc is bpf_obj_drop_impl(void *, struct btf_struct_meta *), with bpf_obj_drop macro populating the second arg with 0 and the verifier later filling in the arg during insn fixup. Because bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} now might do bpf_obj_drop, these kfuncs need a btf_struct_meta parameter that can be passed to bpf_obj_drop_impl. Similarly, because the 'node' param to those insert functions is the bpf_{list,rb}_node within the node type, and bpf_obj_drop expects a pointer to the beginning of the node, the insert functions need to be able to find the beginning of the node struct. A second verifier-populated param is necessary: the offset of {list,rb}_node within the node type. These two new params allow the insert kfuncs to correctly call __bpf_obj_drop_impl: beginning_of_node = bpf_rb_node_ptr - offset if (already_inserted) __bpf_obj_drop_impl(beginning_of_node, btf_struct_meta->record); Similarly to other kfuncs with "hidden" verifier-populated params, the insert functions are renamed with _impl prefix and a macro is provided for common usage. For example, bpf_rbtree_add kfunc is now bpf_rbtree_add_impl and bpf_rbtree_add is now a macro which sets "hidden" args to 0. Due to the two new args BPF progs will need to be recompiled to work with the new _impl kfuncs. This patch also rewrites the "hidden argument" explanation to more directly say why the BPF program writer doesn't need to populate the arguments with anything meaningful. How does this new logic affect non-owning references? ===================================================== Currently, non-owning refs are valid until the end of the critical section in which they're created. We can make this guarantee because, if a non-owning ref exists, the referent was added to some collection. The collection will drop() its nodes when it goes away, but it can't go away while our program is accessing it, so that's not a problem. If the referent is removed from the collection in the same CS that it was added in, it can't be bpf_obj_drop'd until after CS end. Those are the only two ways to free the referent's memory and neither can happen until after the non-owning ref's lifetime ends. On first glance, having these collection insert functions potentially bpf_obj_drop their input seems like it breaks the "can't be bpf_obj_drop'd until after CS end" line of reasoning. But we care about the memory not being _freed_ until end of CS end, and a previous patch in the series modified bpf_obj_drop such that it doesn't free refcounted nodes until refcount == 0. So the statement can be more accurately rewritten as "can't be free'd until after CS end". We can prove that this rewritten statement holds for any non-owning reference produced by collection insert functions: * If the input to the insert function is _not_ refcounted * We have an owning reference to the input, and can conclude it isn't in any collection * Inserting a node in a collection turns owning refs into non-owning, and since our input type isn't refcounted, there's no way to obtain additional owning refs to the same underlying memory * Because our node isn't in any collection, the insert operation cannot fail, so bpf_obj_drop will not execute * If bpf_obj_drop is guaranteed not to execute, there's no risk of memory being free'd * Otherwise, the input to the insert function is refcounted * If the insert operation fails due to the node's list_head or rb_root already being in some collection, there was some previous successful insert which passed refcount to the collection * We have an owning reference to the input, it must have been acquired via bpf_refcount_acquire, which bumped the refcount * refcount must be >= 2 since there's a valid owning reference and the node is already in a collection * Insert triggering bpf_obj_drop will decr refcount to >= 1, never resulting in a free So although we may do bpf_obj_drop during the critical section, this will never result in memory being free'd, and no changes to non-owning ref logic are needed in this patch. Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-6-davemarchevsky@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:07:11 +00:00
union {
/* remember the size of type passed to bpf_obj_new to rewrite R1 */
u64 obj_new_size;
/* remember the offset of node field within type to rewrite */
u64 insert_off;
};
bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 Conflicts: Context change from already backported commit 997849c4b969 ("bpf: Zeroing allocated object from slab in bpf memory allocator" commit 958cf2e273f0929c66169e0788031310e8118722 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Fri Nov 18 07:26:03 2022 +0530 bpf: Introduce bpf_obj_new Introduce type safe memory allocator bpf_obj_new for BPF programs. The kernel side kfunc is named bpf_obj_new_impl, as passing hidden arguments to kfuncs still requires having them in prototype, unlike BPF helpers which always take 5 arguments and have them checked using bpf_func_proto in verifier, ignoring unset argument types. Introduce __ign suffix to ignore a specific kfunc argument during type checks, then use this to introduce support for passing type metadata to the bpf_obj_new_impl kfunc. The user passes BTF ID of the type it wants to allocates in program BTF, the verifier then rewrites the first argument as the size of this type, after performing some sanity checks (to ensure it exists and it is a struct type). The second argument is also fixed up and passed by the verifier. This is the btf_struct_meta for the type being allocated. It would be needed mostly for the offset array which is required for zero initializing special fields while leaving the rest of storage in unitialized state. It would also be needed in the next patch to perform proper destruction of the object's special fields. Under the hood, bpf_obj_new will call bpf_mem_alloc and bpf_mem_free, using the any context BPF memory allocator introduced recently. To this end, a global instance of the BPF memory allocator is initialized on boot to be used for this purpose. This 'bpf_global_ma' serves all allocations for bpf_obj_new. In the future, bpf_obj_new variants will allow specifying a custom allocator. Note that now that bpf_obj_new can be used to allocate objects that can be linked to BPF linked list (when future linked list helpers are available), we need to also free the elements using bpf_mem_free. However, since the draining of elements is done outside the bpf_spin_lock, we need to do migrate_disable around the call since bpf_list_head_free can be called from map free path where migration is enabled. Otherwise, when called from BPF programs migration is already disabled. A convenience macro is included in the bpf_experimental.h header to hide over the ugly details of the implementation, leading to user code looking similar to a language level extension which allocates and constructs fields of a user type. struct bar { struct bpf_list_node node; }; struct foo { struct bpf_spin_lock lock; struct bpf_list_head head __contains(bar, node); }; void prog(void) { struct foo *f; f = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*f)); if (!f) return; ... } A key piece of this story is still missing, i.e. the free function, which will come in the next patch. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221118015614.2013203-14-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-20 16:30:25 +00:00
struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta;
bpf: Constant map key tracking for prog array pokes Add tracking of constant keys into tail call maps. The signature of bpf_tail_call_proto is that arg1 is ctx, arg2 map pointer and arg3 is a index key. The direct call approach for tail calls can be enabled if the verifier asserted that for all branches leading to the tail call helper invocation, the map pointer and index key were both constant and the same. Tracking of map pointers we already do from prior work via c93552c443eb ("bpf: properly enforce index mask to prevent out-of-bounds speculation") and 09772d92cd5a ("bpf: avoid retpoline for lookup/update/ delete calls on maps"). Given the tail call map index key is not on stack but directly in the register, we can add similar tracking approach and later in fixup_bpf_calls() add a poke descriptor to the progs poke_tab with the relevant information for the JITing phase. We internally reuse insn->imm for the rewritten BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL instruction in order to point into the prog's poke_tab, and keep insn->imm as 0 as indicator that current indirect tail call emission must be used. Note that publishing to the tracker must happen at the end of fixup_bpf_calls() since adding elements to the poke_tab reallocates its memory, so we need to wait until its in final state. Future work can generalize and add similar approach to optimize plain array map lookups. Difference there is that we need to look into the key value that sits on stack. For clarity in bpf_insn_aux_data, map_state has been renamed into map_ptr_state, so we get map_{ptr,key}_state as trackers. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e8db37f6b2ae60402fa40216c96738ee9b316c32.1574452833.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2019-11-22 20:07:59 +00:00
u64 map_key_state; /* constant (32 bit) key tracking for maps */
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
bpf: Introduce function-by-function verification New llvm and old llvm with libbpf help produce BTF that distinguish global and static functions. Unlike arguments of static function the arguments of global functions cannot be removed or optimized away by llvm. The compiler has to use exactly the arguments specified in a function prototype. The argument type information allows the verifier validate each global function independently. For now only supported argument types are pointer to context and scalars. In the future pointers to structures, sizes, pointer to packet data can be supported as well. Consider the following example: static int f1(int ...) { ... } int f3(int b); int f2(int a) { f1(a) + f3(a); } int f3(int b) { ... } int main(...) { f1(...) + f2(...) + f3(...); } The verifier will start its safety checks from the first global function f2(). It will recursively descend into f1() because it's static. Then it will check that arguments match for the f3() invocation inside f2(). It will not descend into f3(). It will finish f2() that has to be successfully verified for all possible values of 'a'. Then it will proceed with f3(). That function also has to be safe for all possible values of 'b'. Then it will start subprog 0 (which is main() function). It will recursively descend into f1() and will skip full check of f2() and f3(), since they are global. The order of processing global functions doesn't affect safety, since all global functions must be proven safe based on their arguments only. Such function by function verification can drastically improve speed of the verification and reduce complexity. Note that the stack limit of 512 still applies to the call chain regardless whether functions were static or global. The nested level of 8 also still applies. The same recursion prevention checks are in place as well. The type information and static/global kind is preserved after the verification hence in the above example global function f2() and f3() can be replaced later by equivalent functions with the same types that are loaded and verified later without affecting safety of this main() program. Such replacement (re-linking) of global functions is a subject of future patches. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200110064124.1760511-3-ast@kernel.org
2020-01-10 06:41:20 +00:00
u32 seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */
bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5: A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed. af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast" (low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then redirected to the "zero page". The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus, there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10 and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency operation. However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store and is thus bypassed as well: [...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value 31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below 32: (bf) r9 = r10 // JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg: // r9 -> r15 (callee saved) // r10 -> rbp // train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9 // and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table. 33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576) 34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580) 36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584) 38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588) 40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 [...] 543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp // to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain // in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is // disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context: // // ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12 // ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp // ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx // ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc // ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken // [...] // ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea // ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx // ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp // ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12 // ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12 // ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret 545: (18) r1 = map[id:4] 547: (bf) r2 = r7 548: (b7) r3 = 0 549: (b7) r4 = 4 550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288 // instruction 551 inserted by verifier \ 551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here // storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow". 552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 / // following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency // misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes. 553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16) // in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative // domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below. 554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally, fp-16 can still be r2. Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/ the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on r10 would look as follows: [...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value [...] // longer store forward prediction training sequence than before. 2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588) 2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0 2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592) 2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0 2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store // forward prediction training. 2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. 2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0 2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0 2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0 2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0 2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0 2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0 2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0 2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0 2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0 2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0 2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0 2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0 2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0 2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0 2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0 2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0 2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0 2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0 2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0 2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0 2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0 2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the // sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier. 2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here 2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy. // load from stack intended to bypass stores. 2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 [...] Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share execution resources. This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for several reasons outlined as follows: 1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast" read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and therefore also must be subject to mitigation. 2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr) condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near these pointer types. While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]: [...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of completeness. [...] From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills to the BPF stack: [...] // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. [...] 2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value // of 943576462 before store ... 2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462 2112: (af) r11 ^= r7 2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11 2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462 2116: (af) r2 ^= r11 // ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg. 2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) [...] While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes: [...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...] The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says: [...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...] One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088 where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills. The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate the latter cost. [0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf [1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/ [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf Fixes: af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") Fixes: f7cf25b2026d ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants") Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2021-07-13 08:18:31 +00:00
bool sanitize_stack_spill; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */
bpf: verifier: mark verified-insn with sub-register zext flag eBPF ISA specification requires high 32-bit cleared when low 32-bit sub-register is written. This applies to destination register of ALU32 etc. JIT back-ends must guarantee this semantic when doing code-gen. x86_64 and AArch64 ISA has the same semantics, so the corresponding JIT back-end doesn't need to do extra work. However, 32-bit arches (arm, x86, nfp etc.) and some other 64-bit arches (PowerPC, SPARC etc) need to do explicit zero extension to meet this requirement, otherwise code like the following will fail. u64_value = (u64) u32_value ... other uses of u64_value This is because compiler could exploit the semantic described above and save those zero extensions for extending u32_value to u64_value, these JIT back-ends are expected to guarantee this through inserting extra zero extensions which however could be a significant increase on the code size. Some benchmarks show there could be ~40% sub-register writes out of total insns, meaning at least ~40% extra code-gen. One observation is these extra zero extensions are not always necessary. Take above code snippet for example, it is possible u32_value will never be casted into a u64, the value of high 32-bit of u32_value then could be ignored and extra zero extension could be eliminated. This patch implements this idea, insns defining sub-registers will be marked when the high 32-bit of the defined sub-register matters. For those unmarked insns, it is safe to eliminate high 32-bit clearnace for them. Algo: - Split read flags into READ32 and READ64. - Record index of insn that does sub-register write. Keep the index inside reg state and update it during verifier insn walking. - A full register read on a sub-register marks its definition insn as needing zero extension on dst register. A new sub-register write overrides the old one. - When propagating read64 during path pruning, also mark any insn defining a sub-register that is read in the pruned path as full-register. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-05-24 22:25:12 +00:00
bool zext_dst; /* this insn zero extends dst reg */
bool needs_zext; /* alu op needs to clear upper bits */
bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 commit 9bb00b2895cbfe0ad410457b605d0a72524168c1 Author: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Date: Wed Nov 23 21:32:17 2022 -0800 bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() Add two kfunc's bpf_rcu_read_lock() and bpf_rcu_read_unlock(). These two kfunc's can be used for all program types. The following is an example about how rcu pointer are used w.r.t. bpf_rcu_read_lock()/bpf_rcu_read_unlock(). struct task_struct { ... struct task_struct *last_wakee; struct task_struct __rcu *real_parent; ... }; Let us say prog does 'task = bpf_get_current_task_btf()' to get a 'task' pointer. The basic rules are: - 'real_parent = task->real_parent' should be inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region. This is to simulate rcu_dereference() operation. The 'real_parent' is marked as MEM_RCU only if (1). task->real_parent is inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region, and (2). task is a trusted ptr. So MEM_RCU marked ptr can be 'trusted' inside the bpf_rcu_read_lock region. - 'last_wakee = real_parent->last_wakee' should be inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region since it tries to access rcu protected memory. - the ptr 'last_wakee' will be marked as PTR_UNTRUSTED since in general it is not clear whether the object pointed by 'last_wakee' is valid or not even inside bpf_rcu_read_lock region. The verifier will reset all rcu pointer register states to untrusted at bpf_rcu_read_unlock() kfunc call site, so any such rcu pointer won't be trusted any more outside the bpf_rcu_read_lock() region. The current implementation does not support nested rcu read lock region in the prog. Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124053217.2373910-1-yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-21 09:53:15 +00:00
bool storage_get_func_atomic; /* bpf_*_storage_get() with atomic memory alloc */
bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 06accc8779c1d558a5b5a21f2ac82b0c95827ddd Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Wed Mar 8 10:41:16 2023 -0800 bpf: add support for open-coded iterator loops Teach verifier about the concept of the open-coded (or inline) iterators. This patch adds generic iterator loop verification logic, new STACK_ITER stack slot type to contain iterator state, and necessary kfunc plumbing for iterator's constructor, destructor and next methods. Next patch implements first specific iterator (numbers iterator for implementing for() loop logic). Such split allows to have more focused commits for verifier logic and separate commit that we could point later to demonstrating what does it take to add a new kind of iterator. Each kind of iterator has its own associated struct bpf_iter_<type>, where <type> denotes a specific type of iterator. struct bpf_iter_<type> state is supposed to live on BPF program stack, so there will be no way to change its size later on without breaking backwards compatibility, so choose wisely! But given this struct is specific to a given <type> of iterator, this allows a lot of flexibility: simple iterators could be fine with just one stack slot (8 bytes), like numbers iterator in the next patch, while some other more complicated iterators might need way more to keep their iterator state. Either way, such design allows to avoid runtime memory allocations, which otherwise would be necessary if we fixed on-the-stack size and it turned out to be too small for a given iterator implementation. The way BPF verifier logic is implemented, there are no artificial restrictions on a number of active iterators, it should work correctly using multiple active iterators at the same time. This also means you can have multiple nested iteration loops. struct bpf_iter_<type> reference can be safely passed to subprograms as well. General flow is easiest to demonstrate with a simple example using number iterator implemented in next patch. Here's the simplest possible loop: struct bpf_iter_num it; int *v; bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 2, 5); while ((v = bpf_iter_num_next(&it))) { bpf_printk("X = %d", *v); } bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it); Above snippet should output "X = 2", "X = 3", "X = 4". Note that 5 is exclusive and is not returned. This matches similar APIs (e.g., slices in Go or Rust) that implement a range of elements, where end index is non-inclusive. In the above example, we see a trio of function: - constructor, bpf_iter_num_new(), which initializes iterator state (struct bpf_iter_num it) on the stack. If any of the input arguments are invalid, constructor should make sure to still initialize it such that subsequent bpf_iter_num_next() calls will return NULL. I.e., on error, return error and construct empty iterator. - next method, bpf_iter_num_next(), which accepts pointer to iterator state and produces an element. Next method should always return a pointer. The contract between BPF verifier is that next method will always eventually return NULL when elements are exhausted. Once NULL is returned, subsequent next calls should keep returning NULL. In the case of numbers iterator, bpf_iter_num_next() returns a pointer to an int (storage for this integer is inside the iterator state itself), which can be dereferenced after corresponding NULL check. - once done with the iterator, it's mandated that user cleans up its state with the call to destructor, bpf_iter_num_destroy() in this case. Destructor frees up any resources and marks stack space used by struct bpf_iter_num as usable for something else. Any other iterator implementation will have to implement at least these three methods. It is enforced that for any given type of iterator only applicable constructor/destructor/next are callable. I.e., verifier ensures you can't pass number iterator state into, say, cgroup iterator's next method. It is important to keep the naming pattern consistent to be able to create generic macros to help with BPF iter usability. E.g., one of the follow up patches adds generic bpf_for_each() macro to bpf_misc.h in selftests, which allows to utilize iterator "trio" nicely without having to code the above somewhat tedious loop explicitly every time. This is enforced at kfunc registration point by one of the previous patches in this series. At the implementation level, iterator state tracking for verification purposes is very similar to dynptr. We add STACK_ITER stack slot type, reserve necessary number of slots, depending on sizeof(struct bpf_iter_<type>), and keep track of necessary extra state in the "main" slot, which is marked with non-zero ref_obj_id. Other slots are also marked as STACK_ITER, but have zero ref_obj_id. This is simpler than having a separate "is_first_slot" flag. Another big distinction is that STACK_ITER is *always refcounted*, which simplifies implementation without sacrificing usability. So no need for extra "iter_id", no need to anticipate reuse of STACK_ITER slots for new constructors, etc. Keeping it simple here. As far as the verification logic goes, there are two extensive comments: in process_iter_next_call() and iter_active_depths_differ() explaining some important and sometimes subtle aspects. Please refer to them for details. But from 10,000-foot point of view, next methods are the points of forking a verification state, which are conceptually similar to what verifier is doing when validating conditional jump. We branch out at a `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction and simulate two outcomes: NULL (iteration is done) and non-NULL (new element is returned). NULL is simulated first and is supposed to reach exit without looping. After that non-NULL case is validated and it either reaches exit (for trivial examples with no real loop), or reaches another `call bpf_iter_<type>_next` instruction with the state equivalent to already (partially) validated one. State equivalency at that point means we technically are going to be looping forever without "breaking out" out of established "state envelope" (i.e., subsequent iterations don't add any new knowledge or constraints to the verifier state, so running 1, 2, 10, or a million of them doesn't matter). But taking into account the contract stating that iterator next method *has to* return NULL eventually, we can conclude that loop body is safe and will eventually terminate. Given we validated logic outside of the loop (NULL case), and concluded that loop body is safe (though potentially looping many times), verifier can claim safety of the overall program logic. The rest of the patch is necessary plumbing for state tracking, marking, validation, and necessary further kfunc plumbing to allow implementing iterator constructor, destructor, and next methods. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308184121.1165081-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:10 +00:00
bool is_iter_next; /* bpf_iter_<type>_next() kfunc call */
bool call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr; /* {this,per}_cpu_ptr() with prog percpu alloc */
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-01-02 23:58:34 +00:00
u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */
bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 commit 5b5f51bff1b66cedb62b5ba74a1878341204e057 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Mon Jul 22 16:38:36 2024 -0700 bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls GCC and LLVM define a no_caller_saved_registers function attribute. This attribute means that function scratches only some of the caller saved registers defined by ABI. For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined in the function prototype. This commit introduces flag bpf_func_prot->allow_nocsr. If this flag is set for some helper function, verifier assumes that it follows no_caller_saved_registers calling convention. The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old kernels that don't understand no_caller_saved_registers calls (nocsr for short): - clang generates a simple pattern for nocsr calls, e.g.: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; call %[to_be_inlined] r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; - kernel removes unnecessary spills and fills, if called function is inlined by verifier or current JIT (with assumption that patch inserted by verifier or JIT honors nocsr contract, e.g. does not scratch r3-r5 for the example above), e.g. the code above would be transformed to: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; call %[to_be_inlined] r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; Technically, the transformation is split into the following phases: - function mark_nocsr_patterns(), called from bpf_check() searches and marks potential patterns in instruction auxiliary data; - upon stack read or write access, function check_nocsr_stack_contract() is used to verify if stack offsets, presumably reserved for nocsr patterns, are used only from those patterns; - function remove_nocsr_spills_fills(), called from bpf_check(), applies the rewrite for valid patterns. See comment in mark_nocsr_pattern_for_call() for more details. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722233844.1406874-3-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-05 16:15:59 +00:00
/* true if STX or LDX instruction is a part of a spill/fill
* pattern for a bpf_fastcall call.
bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 commit 5b5f51bff1b66cedb62b5ba74a1878341204e057 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Mon Jul 22 16:38:36 2024 -0700 bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls GCC and LLVM define a no_caller_saved_registers function attribute. This attribute means that function scratches only some of the caller saved registers defined by ABI. For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined in the function prototype. This commit introduces flag bpf_func_prot->allow_nocsr. If this flag is set for some helper function, verifier assumes that it follows no_caller_saved_registers calling convention. The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old kernels that don't understand no_caller_saved_registers calls (nocsr for short): - clang generates a simple pattern for nocsr calls, e.g.: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; call %[to_be_inlined] r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; - kernel removes unnecessary spills and fills, if called function is inlined by verifier or current JIT (with assumption that patch inserted by verifier or JIT honors nocsr contract, e.g. does not scratch r3-r5 for the example above), e.g. the code above would be transformed to: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; call %[to_be_inlined] r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; Technically, the transformation is split into the following phases: - function mark_nocsr_patterns(), called from bpf_check() searches and marks potential patterns in instruction auxiliary data; - upon stack read or write access, function check_nocsr_stack_contract() is used to verify if stack offsets, presumably reserved for nocsr patterns, are used only from those patterns; - function remove_nocsr_spills_fills(), called from bpf_check(), applies the rewrite for valid patterns. See comment in mark_nocsr_pattern_for_call() for more details. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722233844.1406874-3-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-05 16:15:59 +00:00
*/
u8 fastcall_pattern:1;
bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 commit 5b5f51bff1b66cedb62b5ba74a1878341204e057 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Mon Jul 22 16:38:36 2024 -0700 bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls GCC and LLVM define a no_caller_saved_registers function attribute. This attribute means that function scratches only some of the caller saved registers defined by ABI. For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined in the function prototype. This commit introduces flag bpf_func_prot->allow_nocsr. If this flag is set for some helper function, verifier assumes that it follows no_caller_saved_registers calling convention. The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old kernels that don't understand no_caller_saved_registers calls (nocsr for short): - clang generates a simple pattern for nocsr calls, e.g.: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; call %[to_be_inlined] r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; - kernel removes unnecessary spills and fills, if called function is inlined by verifier or current JIT (with assumption that patch inserted by verifier or JIT honors nocsr contract, e.g. does not scratch r3-r5 for the example above), e.g. the code above would be transformed to: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; call %[to_be_inlined] r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; Technically, the transformation is split into the following phases: - function mark_nocsr_patterns(), called from bpf_check() searches and marks potential patterns in instruction auxiliary data; - upon stack read or write access, function check_nocsr_stack_contract() is used to verify if stack offsets, presumably reserved for nocsr patterns, are used only from those patterns; - function remove_nocsr_spills_fills(), called from bpf_check(), applies the rewrite for valid patterns. See comment in mark_nocsr_pattern_for_call() for more details. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722233844.1406874-3-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-05 16:15:59 +00:00
/* for CALL instructions, a number of spill/fill pairs in the
* bpf_fastcall pattern.
bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 commit 5b5f51bff1b66cedb62b5ba74a1878341204e057 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Mon Jul 22 16:38:36 2024 -0700 bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls GCC and LLVM define a no_caller_saved_registers function attribute. This attribute means that function scratches only some of the caller saved registers defined by ABI. For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined in the function prototype. This commit introduces flag bpf_func_prot->allow_nocsr. If this flag is set for some helper function, verifier assumes that it follows no_caller_saved_registers calling convention. The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old kernels that don't understand no_caller_saved_registers calls (nocsr for short): - clang generates a simple pattern for nocsr calls, e.g.: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; call %[to_be_inlined] r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; - kernel removes unnecessary spills and fills, if called function is inlined by verifier or current JIT (with assumption that patch inserted by verifier or JIT honors nocsr contract, e.g. does not scratch r3-r5 for the example above), e.g. the code above would be transformed to: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; call %[to_be_inlined] r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; Technically, the transformation is split into the following phases: - function mark_nocsr_patterns(), called from bpf_check() searches and marks potential patterns in instruction auxiliary data; - upon stack read or write access, function check_nocsr_stack_contract() is used to verify if stack offsets, presumably reserved for nocsr patterns, are used only from those patterns; - function remove_nocsr_spills_fills(), called from bpf_check(), applies the rewrite for valid patterns. See comment in mark_nocsr_pattern_for_call() for more details. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722233844.1406874-3-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-05 16:15:59 +00:00
*/
u8 fastcall_spills_num:3;
bpf: Introduce function-by-function verification New llvm and old llvm with libbpf help produce BTF that distinguish global and static functions. Unlike arguments of static function the arguments of global functions cannot be removed or optimized away by llvm. The compiler has to use exactly the arguments specified in a function prototype. The argument type information allows the verifier validate each global function independently. For now only supported argument types are pointer to context and scalars. In the future pointers to structures, sizes, pointer to packet data can be supported as well. Consider the following example: static int f1(int ...) { ... } int f3(int b); int f2(int a) { f1(a) + f3(a); } int f3(int b) { ... } int main(...) { f1(...) + f2(...) + f3(...); } The verifier will start its safety checks from the first global function f2(). It will recursively descend into f1() because it's static. Then it will check that arguments match for the f3() invocation inside f2(). It will not descend into f3(). It will finish f2() that has to be successfully verified for all possible values of 'a'. Then it will proceed with f3(). That function also has to be safe for all possible values of 'b'. Then it will start subprog 0 (which is main() function). It will recursively descend into f1() and will skip full check of f2() and f3(), since they are global. The order of processing global functions doesn't affect safety, since all global functions must be proven safe based on their arguments only. Such function by function verification can drastically improve speed of the verification and reduce complexity. Note that the stack limit of 512 still applies to the call chain regardless whether functions were static or global. The nested level of 8 also still applies. The same recursion prevention checks are in place as well. The type information and static/global kind is preserved after the verification hence in the above example global function f2() and f3() can be replaced later by equivalent functions with the same types that are loaded and verified later without affecting safety of this main() program. Such replacement (re-linking) of global functions is a subject of future patches. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200110064124.1760511-3-ast@kernel.org
2020-01-10 06:41:20 +00:00
/* below fields are initialized once */
unsigned int orig_idx; /* original instruction index */
bpf: decouple prune and jump points Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 Conflicts: Context change due to missing commit e1be43d9b5d0 ("overflow: Implement size_t saturating arithmetic helpers") commit bffdeaa8a5af7200b0e74c9d5a41167f86626a36 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Tue Dec 6 15:33:43 2022 -0800 bpf: decouple prune and jump points BPF verifier marks some instructions as prune points. Currently these prune points serve two purposes. It's a point where verifier tries to find previously verified state and check current state's equivalence to short circuit verification for current code path. But also currently it's a point where jump history, used for precision backtracking, is updated. This is done so that non-linear flow of execution could be properly backtracked. Such coupling is coincidental and unnecessary. Some prune points are not part of some non-linear jump path, so don't need update of jump history. On the other hand, not all instructions which have to be recorded in jump history necessarily are good prune points. This patch splits prune and jump points into independent flags. Currently all prune points are marked as jump points to minimize amount of changes in this patch, but next patch will perform some optimization of prune vs jmp point placement. No functional changes are intended. Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206233345.438540-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-21 13:50:59 +00:00
bool jmp_point;
bpf: ensure state checkpointing at iter_next() call sites Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 4b5ce570dbef57a20acdd71b0c65376009012354 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Mar 9 22:01:49 2023 -0800 bpf: ensure state checkpointing at iter_next() call sites State equivalence check and checkpointing performed in is_state_visited() employs certain heuristics to try to save memory by avoiding state checkpoints if not enough jumps and instructions happened since last checkpoint. This leads to unpredictability of whether a particular instruction will be checkpointed and how regularly. While normally this is not causing much problems (except inconveniences for predictable verifier tests, which we overcome with BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag), turns out it's not the case for open-coded iterators. Checking and saving state checkpoints at iter_next() call is crucial for fast convergence of open-coded iterator loop logic, so we need to force it. If we don't do that, is_state_visited() might skip saving a checkpoint, causing unnecessarily long sequence of not checkpointed instructions and jumps, leading to exhaustion of jump history buffer, and potentially other undesired outcomes. It is expected that with correct open-coded iterators convergence will happen quickly, so we don't run a risk of exhausting memory. This patch adds, in addition to prune and jump instruction marks, also a "forced checkpoint" mark, and makes sure that any iter_next() call instruction is marked as such. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230310060149.625887-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-10 13:32:11 +00:00
bool prune_point;
/* ensure we check state equivalence and save state checkpoint and
* this instruction, regardless of any heuristics
*/
bool force_checkpoint;
bpf: verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit ab5cfac139ab8576fb54630d4cca23c3e690ee90 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Nov 21 04:06:56 2023 +0200 bpf: verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times Prior to this patch callbacks were handled as regular function calls, execution of callback body was modeled exactly once. This patch updates callbacks handling logic as follows: - introduces a function push_callback_call() that schedules callback body verification in env->head stack; - updates prepare_func_exit() to reschedule callback body verification upon BPF_EXIT; - as calls to bpf_*_iter_next(), calls to callback invoking functions are marked as checkpoints; - is_state_visited() is updated to stop callback based iteration when some identical parent state is found. Paths with callback function invoked zero times are now verified first, which leads to necessity to modify some selftests: - the following negative tests required adding release/unlock/drop calls to avoid previously masked unrelated error reports: - cb_refs.c:underflow_prog - exceptions_fail.c:reject_rbtree_add_throw - exceptions_fail.c:reject_with_cp_reference - the following precision tracking selftests needed change in expected log trace: - verifier_subprog_precision.c:callback_result_precise (note: r0 precision is no longer propagated inside callback and I think this is a correct behavior) - verifier_subprog_precision.c:parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback - verifier_subprog_precision.c:parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback Reported-by: Andrew Werner <awerner32@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/ Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-7-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:04:12 +00:00
/* true if instruction is a call to a helper function that
* accepts callback function as a parameter.
*/
bool calls_callback;
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
#define MAX_USED_BTFS 64 /* max number of BTFs accessed by one BPF program */
#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024
struct bpf_verifier_log {
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
/* Logical start and end positions of a "log window" of the verifier log.
* start_pos == 0 means we haven't truncated anything.
* Once truncation starts to happen, start_pos + len_total == end_pos,
* except during log reset situations, in which (end_pos - start_pos)
* might get smaller than len_total (see bpf_vlog_reset()).
* Generally, (end_pos - start_pos) gives number of useful data in
* user log buffer.
*/
u64 start_pos;
u64 end_pos;
char __user *ubuf;
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
u32 level;
u32 len_total;
bpf: Keep track of total log content size in both fixed and rolling modes Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit fa1c7d5cc404ac3b6e6b4ab6d00b07c76bd819be Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:57 2023 -0700 bpf: Keep track of total log content size in both fixed and rolling modes Change how we do accounting in BPF_LOG_FIXED mode and adopt log->end_pos as *logical* log position. This means that we can go beyond physical log buffer size now and be able to tell what log buffer size should be to fit entire log contents without -ENOSPC. To do this for BPF_LOG_FIXED mode, we need to remove a short-circuiting logic of not vsnprintf()'ing further log content once we filled up user-provided buffer, which is done by bpf_verifier_log_needed() checks. We modify these checks to always keep going if log->level is non-zero (i.e., log is requested), even if log->ubuf was NULL'ed out due to copying data to user-space, or if entire log buffer is physically full. We adopt bpf_verifier_vlog() routine to work correctly with log->ubuf == NULL condition, performing log formatting into temporary kernel buffer, doing all the necessary accounting, but just avoiding copying data out if buffer is full or NULL'ed out. With these changes, it's now possible to do this sort of determination of log contents size in both BPF_LOG_FIXED and default rolling log mode. We need to keep in mind bpf_vlog_reset(), though, which shrinks log contents after successful verification of a particular code path. This log reset means that log->end_pos isn't always increasing, so to return back to users what should be the log buffer size to fit all log content without causing -ENOSPC even in the presence of log resetting, we need to keep maximum over "lifetime" of logging. We do this accounting in bpf_vlog_update_len_max() helper. A related and subtle aspect is that with this logical log->end_pos even in BPF_LOG_FIXED mode we could temporary "overflow" buffer, but then reset it back with bpf_vlog_reset() to a position inside user-supplied log_buf. In such situation we still want to properly maintain terminating zero. We will eventually return -ENOSPC even if final log buffer is small (we detect this through log->len_max check). This behavior is simpler to reason about and is consistent with current behavior of verifier log. Handling of this required a small addition to bpf_vlog_reset() logic to avoid doing put_user() beyond physical log buffer dimensions. Another issue to keep in mind is that we limit log buffer size to 32-bit value and keep such log length as u32, but theoretically verifier could produce huge log stretching beyond 4GB. Instead of keeping (and later returning) 64-bit log length, we cap it at UINT_MAX. Current UAPI makes it impossible to specify log buffer size bigger than 4GB anyways, so we don't really loose anything here and keep everything consistently 32-bit in UAPI. This property will be utilized in next patch. Doing the same determination of maximum log buffer for rolling mode is trivial, as log->end_pos and log->start_pos are already logical positions, so there is nothing new there. These changes do incidentally fix one small issue with previous logging logic. Previously, if use provided log buffer of size N, and actual log output was exactly N-1 bytes + terminating \0, kernel logic coun't distinguish this condition from log truncation scenario which would end up with truncated log contents of N-1 bytes + terminating \0 as well. But now with log->end_pos being logical position that could go beyond actual log buffer size, we can distinguish these two conditions, which we do in this patch. This plays nicely with returning log_size_actual (implemented in UAPI in the next patch), as we can now guarantee that if user takes such log_size_actual and provides log buffer of that exact size, they will not get -ENOSPC in return. All in all, all these changes do conceptually unify fixed and rolling log modes much better, and allow a nice feature requested by users: knowing what should be the size of the buffer to avoid -ENOSPC. We'll plumb this through the UAPI and the code in the next patch. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-12-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:54 +00:00
u32 len_max;
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE];
};
#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL1 1
#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 2
#define BPF_LOG_STATS 4
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
#define BPF_LOG_FIXED 8
#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL (BPF_LOG_LEVEL1 | BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
#define BPF_LOG_MASK (BPF_LOG_LEVEL | BPF_LOG_STATS | BPF_LOG_FIXED)
#define BPF_LOG_KERNEL (BPF_LOG_MASK + 1) /* kernel internal flag */
bpf: Right align verifier states in verifier logs. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2069046 Upstream Status: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git commit 2e5766483c8c5cf886b4dc647a1741738dde7d79 Author: Christy Lee <christylee@fb.com> Date: Thu Dec 16 19:42:45 2021 -0800 bpf: Right align verifier states in verifier logs. Make the verifier logs more readable, print the verifier states on the corresponding instruction line. If the previous line was not a bpf instruction, then print the verifier states on its own line. Before: Validating test_pkt_access_subprog3() func#3... 86: R1=invP(id=0) R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 ; int test_pkt_access_subprog3(int val, struct __sk_buff *skb) 86: (bf) r6 = r2 87: R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) 87: (bc) w7 = w1 88: R1=invP(id=0) R7_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ; return get_skb_len(skb) * get_skb_ifindex(val, skb, get_constant(123)); 88: (bf) r1 = r6 89: R1_w=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) 89: (85) call pc+9 Func#4 is global and valid. Skipping. 90: R0_w=invP(id=0) 90: (bc) w8 = w0 91: R0_w=invP(id=0) R8_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ; return get_skb_len(skb) * get_skb_ifindex(val, skb, get_constant(123)); 91: (b7) r1 = 123 92: R1_w=invP123 92: (85) call pc+65 Func#5 is global and valid. Skipping. 93: R0=invP(id=0) After: 86: R1=invP(id=0) R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0 ; int test_pkt_access_subprog3(int val, struct __sk_buff *skb) 86: (bf) r6 = r2 ; R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) 87: (bc) w7 = w1 ; R1=invP(id=0) R7_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ; return get_skb_len(skb) * get_skb_ifindex(val, skb, get_constant(123)); 88: (bf) r1 = r6 ; R1_w=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6_w=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) 89: (85) call pc+9 Func#4 is global and valid. Skipping. 90: R0_w=invP(id=0) 90: (bc) w8 = w0 ; R0_w=invP(id=0) R8_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ; return get_skb_len(skb) * get_skb_ifindex(val, skb, get_constant(123)); 91: (b7) r1 = 123 ; R1_w=invP123 92: (85) call pc+65 Func#5 is global and valid. Skipping. 93: R0=invP(id=0) Signed-off-by: Christy Lee <christylee@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2022-06-10 13:12:51 +00:00
#define BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT 8U
#define BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT 40U
static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_needed(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
{
bpf: Keep track of total log content size in both fixed and rolling modes Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit fa1c7d5cc404ac3b6e6b4ab6d00b07c76bd819be Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:57 2023 -0700 bpf: Keep track of total log content size in both fixed and rolling modes Change how we do accounting in BPF_LOG_FIXED mode and adopt log->end_pos as *logical* log position. This means that we can go beyond physical log buffer size now and be able to tell what log buffer size should be to fit entire log contents without -ENOSPC. To do this for BPF_LOG_FIXED mode, we need to remove a short-circuiting logic of not vsnprintf()'ing further log content once we filled up user-provided buffer, which is done by bpf_verifier_log_needed() checks. We modify these checks to always keep going if log->level is non-zero (i.e., log is requested), even if log->ubuf was NULL'ed out due to copying data to user-space, or if entire log buffer is physically full. We adopt bpf_verifier_vlog() routine to work correctly with log->ubuf == NULL condition, performing log formatting into temporary kernel buffer, doing all the necessary accounting, but just avoiding copying data out if buffer is full or NULL'ed out. With these changes, it's now possible to do this sort of determination of log contents size in both BPF_LOG_FIXED and default rolling log mode. We need to keep in mind bpf_vlog_reset(), though, which shrinks log contents after successful verification of a particular code path. This log reset means that log->end_pos isn't always increasing, so to return back to users what should be the log buffer size to fit all log content without causing -ENOSPC even in the presence of log resetting, we need to keep maximum over "lifetime" of logging. We do this accounting in bpf_vlog_update_len_max() helper. A related and subtle aspect is that with this logical log->end_pos even in BPF_LOG_FIXED mode we could temporary "overflow" buffer, but then reset it back with bpf_vlog_reset() to a position inside user-supplied log_buf. In such situation we still want to properly maintain terminating zero. We will eventually return -ENOSPC even if final log buffer is small (we detect this through log->len_max check). This behavior is simpler to reason about and is consistent with current behavior of verifier log. Handling of this required a small addition to bpf_vlog_reset() logic to avoid doing put_user() beyond physical log buffer dimensions. Another issue to keep in mind is that we limit log buffer size to 32-bit value and keep such log length as u32, but theoretically verifier could produce huge log stretching beyond 4GB. Instead of keeping (and later returning) 64-bit log length, we cap it at UINT_MAX. Current UAPI makes it impossible to specify log buffer size bigger than 4GB anyways, so we don't really loose anything here and keep everything consistently 32-bit in UAPI. This property will be utilized in next patch. Doing the same determination of maximum log buffer for rolling mode is trivial, as log->end_pos and log->start_pos are already logical positions, so there is nothing new there. These changes do incidentally fix one small issue with previous logging logic. Previously, if use provided log buffer of size N, and actual log output was exactly N-1 bytes + terminating \0, kernel logic coun't distinguish this condition from log truncation scenario which would end up with truncated log contents of N-1 bytes + terminating \0 as well. But now with log->end_pos being logical position that could go beyond actual log buffer size, we can distinguish these two conditions, which we do in this patch. This plays nicely with returning log_size_actual (implemented in UAPI in the next patch), as we can now guarantee that if user takes such log_size_actual and provides log buffer of that exact size, they will not get -ENOSPC in return. All in all, all these changes do conceptually unify fixed and rolling log modes much better, and allow a nice feature requested by users: knowing what should be the size of the buffer to avoid -ENOSPC. We'll plumb this through the UAPI and the code in the next patch. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-12-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:54 +00:00
return log && log->level;
}
bpf: introduce function calls (function boundaries) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. Since the beginning of bpf all bpf programs were represented as a single function and program authors were forced to use always_inline for all functions in their C code. That was causing llvm to unnecessary inflate the code size and forcing developers to move code to header files with little code reuse. With a bit of additional complexity teach verifier to recognize arbitrary function calls from one bpf function to another as long as all of functions are presented to the verifier as a single bpf program. New program layout: r6 = r1 // some code .. r1 = .. // arg1 r2 = .. // arg2 call pc+1 // function call pc-relative exit .. = r1 // access arg1 .. = r2 // access arg2 .. call pc+20 // second level of function call ... It allows for better optimized code and finally allows to introduce the core bpf libraries that can be reused in different projects, since programs are no longer limited by single elf file. With function calls bpf can be compiled into multiple .o files. This patch is the first step. It detects programs that contain multiple functions and checks that calls between them are valid. It splits the sequence of bpf instructions (one program) into a set of bpf functions that call each other. Calls to only known functions are allowed. In the future the verifier may allow calls to unresolved functions and will do dynamic linking. This logic supports statically linked bpf functions only. Such function boundary detection could have been done as part of control flow graph building in check_cfg(), but it's cleaner to separate function boundary detection vs control flow checks within a subprogram (function) into logically indepedent steps. Follow up patches may split check_cfg() further, but not check_subprogs(). Only allow bpf-to-bpf calls for root only and for non-hw-offloaded programs. These restrictions can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:05 +00:00
#define BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS 256
bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 4ba1d0f23414135e4f426dae4cb5cdc2ce246f89 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:13:25 2023 -0800 bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup btf_prepare_func_args() is used to understand expectations and restrictions on global subprog arguments. But current implementation is hard to extend, as it intermixes BTF-based func prototype parsing and interpretation logic with setting up register state at subprog entry. Worse still, those registers are not completely set up inside btf_prepare_func_args(), requiring some more logic later in do_check_common(). Like calling mark_reg_unknown() and similar initialization operations. This intermixing of BTF interpretation and register state setup is problematic. First, it causes duplication of BTF parsing logic for global subprog verification (to set up initial state of global subprog) and global subprog call sites analysis (when we need to check that whatever is being passed into global subprog matches expectations), performed in btf_check_subprog_call(). Given we want to extend global func argument with tags later, this duplication is problematic. So refactor btf_prepare_func_args() to do only BTF-based func proto and args parsing, returning high-level argument "expectations" only, with no regard to specifics of register state. I.e., if it's a context argument, instead of setting register state to PTR_TO_CTX, we return ARG_PTR_TO_CTX enum for that argument as "an argument specification" for further processing inside do_check_common(). Similarly for SCALAR arguments, PTR_TO_MEM, etc. This allows to reuse btf_prepare_func_args() in following patches at global subprog call site analysis time. It also keeps register setup code consistently in one place, do_check_common(). Besides all this, we cache this argument specs information inside env->subprog_info, eliminating the need to redo these potentially expensive BTF traversals, especially if BPF program's BTF is big and/or there are lots of global subprog calls. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 12:27:29 +00:00
struct bpf_subprog_arg_info {
enum bpf_arg_type arg_type;
union {
u32 mem_size;
u32 btf_id;
bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 4ba1d0f23414135e4f426dae4cb5cdc2ce246f89 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:13:25 2023 -0800 bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup btf_prepare_func_args() is used to understand expectations and restrictions on global subprog arguments. But current implementation is hard to extend, as it intermixes BTF-based func prototype parsing and interpretation logic with setting up register state at subprog entry. Worse still, those registers are not completely set up inside btf_prepare_func_args(), requiring some more logic later in do_check_common(). Like calling mark_reg_unknown() and similar initialization operations. This intermixing of BTF interpretation and register state setup is problematic. First, it causes duplication of BTF parsing logic for global subprog verification (to set up initial state of global subprog) and global subprog call sites analysis (when we need to check that whatever is being passed into global subprog matches expectations), performed in btf_check_subprog_call(). Given we want to extend global func argument with tags later, this duplication is problematic. So refactor btf_prepare_func_args() to do only BTF-based func proto and args parsing, returning high-level argument "expectations" only, with no regard to specifics of register state. I.e., if it's a context argument, instead of setting register state to PTR_TO_CTX, we return ARG_PTR_TO_CTX enum for that argument as "an argument specification" for further processing inside do_check_common(). Similarly for SCALAR arguments, PTR_TO_MEM, etc. This allows to reuse btf_prepare_func_args() in following patches at global subprog call site analysis time. It also keeps register setup code consistently in one place, do_check_common(). Besides all this, we cache this argument specs information inside env->subprog_info, eliminating the need to redo these potentially expensive BTF traversals, especially if BPF program's BTF is big and/or there are lots of global subprog calls. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 12:27:29 +00:00
};
};
struct bpf_subprog_info {
/* 'start' has to be the first field otherwise find_subprog() won't work */
u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
bpf: Add bpf_line_info support This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2018-12-08 00:42:25 +00:00
u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649 commit 011832b97b311bb9e3c27945bc0d1089a14209c9 Author: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Date: Tue Mar 5 19:19:26 2024 -0800 bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction Introduce may_goto instruction that from the verifier pov is similar to open coded iterators bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() and bpf_loop() helper, but it doesn't iterate any objects. In assembly 'may_goto' is a nop most of the time until bpf runtime has to terminate the program for whatever reason. In the current implementation may_goto has a hidden counter, but other mechanisms can be used. For programs written in C the later patch introduces 'cond_break' macro that combines 'may_goto' with 'break' statement and has similar semantics: cond_break is a nop until bpf runtime has to break out of this loop. It can be used in any normal "for" or "while" loop, like for (i = zero; i < cnt; cond_break, i++) { The verifier recognizes that may_goto is used in the program, reserves additional 8 bytes of stack, initializes them in subprog prologue, and replaces may_goto instruction with: aux_reg = *(u64 *)(fp - 40) if aux_reg == 0 goto pc+off aux_reg -= 1 *(u64 *)(fp - 40) = aux_reg may_goto instruction can be used by LLVM to implement __builtin_memcpy, __builtin_strcmp. may_goto is not a full substitute for bpf_for() macro. bpf_for() doesn't have induction variable that verifiers sees, so 'i' in bpf_for(i, 0, 100) is seen as imprecise and bounded. But when the code is written as: for (i = 0; i < 100; cond_break, i++) the verifier see 'i' as precise constant zero, hence cond_break (aka may_goto) doesn't help to converge the loop. A static or global variable can be used as a workaround: static int zero = 0; for (i = zero; i < 100; cond_break, i++) // works! may_goto works well with arena pointers that don't need to be bounds checked on access. Load/store from arena returns imprecise unbounded scalar and loops with may_goto pass the verifier. Reserve new opcode BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND for may_goto insn. JCOND stands for conditional pseudo jump. Since goto_or_nop insn was proposed, it may use the same opcode. may_goto vs goto_or_nop can be distinguished by src_reg: code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND src_reg = 0 - may_goto src_reg = 1 - goto_or_nop Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Tested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240306031929.42666-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-06-24 16:11:03 +00:00
u16 stack_extra;
/* offsets in range [stack_depth .. fastcall_stack_off)
* are used for bpf_fastcall spills and fills.
bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 commit 5b5f51bff1b66cedb62b5ba74a1878341204e057 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Mon Jul 22 16:38:36 2024 -0700 bpf: no_caller_saved_registers attribute for helper calls GCC and LLVM define a no_caller_saved_registers function attribute. This attribute means that function scratches only some of the caller saved registers defined by ABI. For BPF the set of such registers could be defined as follows: - R0 is scratched only if function is non-void; - R1-R5 are scratched only if corresponding parameter type is defined in the function prototype. This commit introduces flag bpf_func_prot->allow_nocsr. If this flag is set for some helper function, verifier assumes that it follows no_caller_saved_registers calling convention. The contract between kernel and clang allows to simultaneously use such functions and maintain backwards compatibility with old kernels that don't understand no_caller_saved_registers calls (nocsr for short): - clang generates a simple pattern for nocsr calls, e.g.: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1; *(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r2; call %[to_be_inlined] r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16); r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8); r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; - kernel removes unnecessary spills and fills, if called function is inlined by verifier or current JIT (with assumption that patch inserted by verifier or JIT honors nocsr contract, e.g. does not scratch r3-r5 for the example above), e.g. the code above would be transformed to: r1 = 1; r2 = 2; call %[to_be_inlined] r0 = r1; r0 += r2; exit; Technically, the transformation is split into the following phases: - function mark_nocsr_patterns(), called from bpf_check() searches and marks potential patterns in instruction auxiliary data; - upon stack read or write access, function check_nocsr_stack_contract() is used to verify if stack offsets, presumably reserved for nocsr patterns, are used only from those patterns; - function remove_nocsr_spills_fills(), called from bpf_check(), applies the rewrite for valid patterns. See comment in mark_nocsr_pattern_for_call() for more details. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722233844.1406874-3-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-05 16:15:59 +00:00
*/
s16 fastcall_stack_off;
bool has_tail_call: 1;
bool tail_call_reachable: 1;
bool has_ld_abs: 1;
bool is_cb: 1;
bool is_async_cb: 1;
bool is_exception_cb: 1;
bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 4ba1d0f23414135e4f426dae4cb5cdc2ce246f89 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:13:25 2023 -0800 bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup btf_prepare_func_args() is used to understand expectations and restrictions on global subprog arguments. But current implementation is hard to extend, as it intermixes BTF-based func prototype parsing and interpretation logic with setting up register state at subprog entry. Worse still, those registers are not completely set up inside btf_prepare_func_args(), requiring some more logic later in do_check_common(). Like calling mark_reg_unknown() and similar initialization operations. This intermixing of BTF interpretation and register state setup is problematic. First, it causes duplication of BTF parsing logic for global subprog verification (to set up initial state of global subprog) and global subprog call sites analysis (when we need to check that whatever is being passed into global subprog matches expectations), performed in btf_check_subprog_call(). Given we want to extend global func argument with tags later, this duplication is problematic. So refactor btf_prepare_func_args() to do only BTF-based func proto and args parsing, returning high-level argument "expectations" only, with no regard to specifics of register state. I.e., if it's a context argument, instead of setting register state to PTR_TO_CTX, we return ARG_PTR_TO_CTX enum for that argument as "an argument specification" for further processing inside do_check_common(). Similarly for SCALAR arguments, PTR_TO_MEM, etc. This allows to reuse btf_prepare_func_args() in following patches at global subprog call site analysis time. It also keeps register setup code consistently in one place, do_check_common(). Besides all this, we cache this argument specs information inside env->subprog_info, eliminating the need to redo these potentially expensive BTF traversals, especially if BPF program's BTF is big and/or there are lots of global subprog calls. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 12:27:29 +00:00
bool args_cached: 1;
/* true if bpf_fastcall stack region is used by functions that can't be inlined */
bool keep_fastcall_stack: 1;
bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 4ba1d0f23414135e4f426dae4cb5cdc2ce246f89 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:13:25 2023 -0800 bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup btf_prepare_func_args() is used to understand expectations and restrictions on global subprog arguments. But current implementation is hard to extend, as it intermixes BTF-based func prototype parsing and interpretation logic with setting up register state at subprog entry. Worse still, those registers are not completely set up inside btf_prepare_func_args(), requiring some more logic later in do_check_common(). Like calling mark_reg_unknown() and similar initialization operations. This intermixing of BTF interpretation and register state setup is problematic. First, it causes duplication of BTF parsing logic for global subprog verification (to set up initial state of global subprog) and global subprog call sites analysis (when we need to check that whatever is being passed into global subprog matches expectations), performed in btf_check_subprog_call(). Given we want to extend global func argument with tags later, this duplication is problematic. So refactor btf_prepare_func_args() to do only BTF-based func proto and args parsing, returning high-level argument "expectations" only, with no regard to specifics of register state. I.e., if it's a context argument, instead of setting register state to PTR_TO_CTX, we return ARG_PTR_TO_CTX enum for that argument as "an argument specification" for further processing inside do_check_common(). Similarly for SCALAR arguments, PTR_TO_MEM, etc. This allows to reuse btf_prepare_func_args() in following patches at global subprog call site analysis time. It also keeps register setup code consistently in one place, do_check_common(). Besides all this, we cache this argument specs information inside env->subprog_info, eliminating the need to redo these potentially expensive BTF traversals, especially if BPF program's BTF is big and/or there are lots of global subprog calls. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 12:27:29 +00:00
u8 arg_cnt;
struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS];
};
struct bpf_verifier_env;
struct backtrack_state {
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
u32 frame;
u32 reg_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
u64 stack_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
};
bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-9957 commit 1ffc85d9298e0ca0137ba65c93a786143fe167b8 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 13 18:38:23 2023 +0300 bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier: 1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ... 2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ... 3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ... 4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 5: r6 = r7 6: if (r6 > X) goto ... --- checkpoint --- 7: r9 += r7 8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range. Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states: I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers, thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical. If the path 1-6 is taken by verifier first, and checkpoint is created at (6) the path [1-4, 6] would be considered safe. Changes in this commit: - check_ids() is modified to disallow mapping multiple old_id to the same cur_id. - check_scalar_ids() is added, unlike check_ids() it treats ID zero as a unique scalar ID. - check_scalar_ids() needs to generate temporary unique IDs, field 'tmp_id_gen' is added to bpf_verifier_env::idmap_scratch to facilitate this. - regsafe() is updated to: - use check_scalar_ids() for precise scalar registers. - compare scalar registers using memcmp only for explore_alu_limits branch. This simplifies control flow for scalar case, and has no measurable performance impact. - check_alu_op() is updated to avoid generating bpf_reg_state::id for constant scalar values when processing BPF_MOV. ID is needed to propagate range information for identical values, but there is nothing to propagate for constants. Fixes: 75748837b7e5 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.") Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230613153824.3324830-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2023-10-11 11:01:19 +00:00
struct bpf_id_pair {
u32 old;
u32 cur;
};
struct bpf_idmap {
u32 tmp_id_gen;
struct bpf_id_pair map[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
};
struct bpf_idset {
u32 count;
u32 ids[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
};
/* single container for all structs
* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
*/
struct bpf_verifier_env {
u32 insn_idx;
u32 prev_insn_idx;
struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
struct module *attach_btf_mod; /* The owner module of prog->aux->attach_btf */
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
bool test_state_freq; /* test verifier with different pruning frequency */
bool test_reg_invariants; /* fail verification on register invariants violations */
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_state; /* current verifier state */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
bpf: improve verification speed by droping states Branch instructions, branch targets and calls in a bpf program are the places where the verifier remembers states that led to successful verification of the program. These states are used to prune brute force program analysis. For unprivileged programs there is a limit of 64 states per such 'branching' instructions (maximum length is tracked by max_states_per_insn counter introduced in the previous patch). Simply reducing this threshold to 32 or lower increases insn_processed metric to the point that small valid programs get rejected. For root programs there is no limit and cilium programs can have max_states_per_insn to be 100 or higher. Walking 100+ states multiplied by number of 'branching' insns during verification consumes significant amount of cpu time. Turned out simple LRU-like mechanism can be used to remove states that unlikely will be helpful in future search pruning. This patch introduces hit_cnt and miss_cnt counters: hit_cnt - this many times this state successfully pruned the search miss_cnt - this many times this state was not equivalent to other states (and that other states were added to state list) The heuristic introduced in this patch is: if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) /* drop this state from future considerations */ Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn (allow more states to be considered for pruning) and slow verification speed, but do not meaningfully reduce insn_processed metric. Lower numbers drop too many states and insn_processed increases too much. Many different formulas were considered. This one is simple and works well enough in practice. (the analysis was done on selftests/progs/* and on cilium programs) The end result is this heuristic improves verification speed by 10 times. Large synthetic programs that used to take a second more now take 1/10 of a second. In cases where max_states_per_insn used to be 100 or more, now it's ~10. There is a slight increase in insn_processed for cilium progs: before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1831 1838 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3029 3218 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26309 26935 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 33517 34439 bpf_netdev.o 9713 9721 bpf_overlay.o 6184 6184 bpf_lcx_jit.o 37335 39389 And 2-3 times improvement in the verification speed. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-04-02 04:27:41 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *free_list;
struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
struct btf_mod_pair used_btfs[MAX_USED_BTFS]; /* array of BTF's used by BPF program */
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
u32 used_btf_cnt; /* number of used BTF objects */
u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
bpf: Implement support for adding hidden subprogs JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit 335d1c5b545284d75ef96ee42e461eacefe865bb Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 13 01:32:00 2023 +0200 bpf: Implement support for adding hidden subprogs Introduce support in the verifier for generating a subprogram and include it as part of a BPF program dynamically after the do_check phase is complete. The first user will be the next patch which generates default exception callbacks if none are set for the program. The phase of invocation will be do_misc_fixups. Note that this is an internal verifier function, and should be used with instruction blocks which uphold the invariants stated in check_subprogs. Since these subprogs are always appended to the end of the instruction sequence of the program, it becomes relatively inexpensive to do the related adjustments to the subprog_info of the program. Only the fake exit subprogram is shifted forward, making room for our new subprog. This is useful to insert a new subprogram, get it JITed, and obtain its function pointer. The next patch will use this functionality to insert a default exception callback which will be invoked after unwinding the stack. Note that these added subprograms are invisible to userspace, and never reported in BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_ID etc. For now, only a single subprogram is supported, but more can be easily supported in the future. To this end, two function counts are introduced now, the existing func_cnt, and real_func_cnt, the latter including hidden programs. This allows us to conver the JIT code to use the real_func_cnt for management of resources while syscall path continues working with existing func_cnt. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-4-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:02:36 +00:00
u32 hidden_subprog_cnt; /* number of hidden subprogs */
bpf: Implement BPF exceptions JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit f18b03fabaa9b7c80e80b72a621f481f0d706ae0 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 13 01:32:01 2023 +0200 bpf: Implement BPF exceptions This patch implements BPF exceptions, and introduces a bpf_throw kfunc to allow programs to throw exceptions during their execution at runtime. A bpf_throw invocation is treated as an immediate termination of the program, returning back to its caller within the kernel, unwinding all stack frames. This allows the program to simplify its implementation, by testing for runtime conditions which the verifier has no visibility into, and assert that they are true. In case they are not, the program can simply throw an exception from the other branch. BPF exceptions are explicitly *NOT* an unlikely slowpath error handling primitive, and this objective has guided design choices of the implementation of the them within the kernel (with the bulk of the cost for unwinding the stack offloaded to the bpf_throw kfunc). The implementation of this mechanism requires use of add_hidden_subprog mechanism introduced in the previous patch, which generates a couple of instructions to move R1 to R0 and exit. The JIT then rewrites the prologue of this subprog to take the stack pointer and frame pointer as inputs and reset the stack frame, popping all callee-saved registers saved by the main subprog. The bpf_throw function then walks the stack at runtime, and invokes this exception subprog with the stack and frame pointers as parameters. Reviewers must take note that currently the main program is made to save all callee-saved registers on x86_64 during entry into the program. This is because we must do an equivalent of a lightweight context switch when unwinding the stack, therefore we need the callee-saved registers of the caller of the BPF program to be able to return with a sane state. Note that we have to additionally handle r12, even though it is not used by the program, because when throwing the exception the program makes an entry into the kernel which could clobber r12 after saving it on the stack. To be able to preserve the value we received on program entry, we push r12 and restore it from the generated subprogram when unwinding the stack. For now, bpf_throw invocation fails when lingering resources or locks exist in that path of the program. In a future followup, bpf_throw will be extended to perform frame-by-frame unwinding to release lingering resources for each stack frame, removing this limitation. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-5-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:02:36 +00:00
int exception_callback_subprog;
bool explore_alu_limits;
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
/* Allow access to uninitialized stack memory. Writes with fixed offset are
* always allowed, so this refers to reads (with fixed or variable offset),
* to writes with variable offset and to indirect (helper) accesses.
*/
bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access Before this patch, variable offset access to the stack was dissalowed for regular instructions, but was allowed for "indirect" accesses (i.e. helpers). This patch removes the restriction, allowing reading and writing to the stack through stack pointers with variable offsets. This makes stack-allocated buffers more usable in programs, and brings stack pointers closer to other types of pointers. The motivation is being able to use stack-allocated buffers for data manipulation. When the stack size limit is sufficient, allocating buffers on the stack is simpler than per-cpu arrays, or other alternatives. In unpriviledged programs, variable-offset reads and writes are disallowed (they were already disallowed for the indirect access case) because the speculative execution checking code doesn't support them. Additionally, when writing through a variable-offset stack pointer, if any pointers are in the accessible range, there's possilibities of later leaking pointers because the write cannot be tracked precisely. Writes with variable offset mark the whole range as initialized, even though we don't know which stack slots are actually written. This is in order to not reject future reads to these slots. Note that this doesn't affect writes done through helpers; like before, helpers need the whole stack range to be initialized to begin with. All the stack slots are in range are considered scalars after the write; variable-offset register spills are not tracked. For reads, all the stack slots in the variable range needs to be initialized (but see above about what writes do), otherwise the read is rejected. All register spilled in stack slots that might be read are marked as having been read, however reads through such pointers don't do register filling; the target register will always be either a scalar or a constant zero. Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210207011027.676572-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
2021-02-07 01:10:24 +00:00
bool allow_uninit_stack;
bool bpf_capable;
bool bypass_spec_v1;
bool bypass_spec_v4;
bool seen_direct_write;
bpf: Implement BPF exceptions JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit f18b03fabaa9b7c80e80b72a621f481f0d706ae0 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 13 01:32:01 2023 +0200 bpf: Implement BPF exceptions This patch implements BPF exceptions, and introduces a bpf_throw kfunc to allow programs to throw exceptions during their execution at runtime. A bpf_throw invocation is treated as an immediate termination of the program, returning back to its caller within the kernel, unwinding all stack frames. This allows the program to simplify its implementation, by testing for runtime conditions which the verifier has no visibility into, and assert that they are true. In case they are not, the program can simply throw an exception from the other branch. BPF exceptions are explicitly *NOT* an unlikely slowpath error handling primitive, and this objective has guided design choices of the implementation of the them within the kernel (with the bulk of the cost for unwinding the stack offloaded to the bpf_throw kfunc). The implementation of this mechanism requires use of add_hidden_subprog mechanism introduced in the previous patch, which generates a couple of instructions to move R1 to R0 and exit. The JIT then rewrites the prologue of this subprog to take the stack pointer and frame pointer as inputs and reset the stack frame, popping all callee-saved registers saved by the main subprog. The bpf_throw function then walks the stack at runtime, and invokes this exception subprog with the stack and frame pointers as parameters. Reviewers must take note that currently the main program is made to save all callee-saved registers on x86_64 during entry into the program. This is because we must do an equivalent of a lightweight context switch when unwinding the stack, therefore we need the callee-saved registers of the caller of the BPF program to be able to return with a sane state. Note that we have to additionally handle r12, even though it is not used by the program, because when throwing the exception the program makes an entry into the kernel which could clobber r12 after saving it on the stack. To be able to preserve the value we received on program entry, we push r12 and restore it from the generated subprogram when unwinding the stack. For now, bpf_throw invocation fails when lingering resources or locks exist in that path of the program. In a future followup, bpf_throw will be extended to perform frame-by-frame unwinding to release lingering resources for each stack frame, removing this limitation. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-5-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:02:36 +00:00
bool seen_exception;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
const struct bpf_line_info *prev_linfo;
struct bpf_verifier_log log;
bpf: Implement support for adding hidden subprogs JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23643 commit 335d1c5b545284d75ef96ee42e461eacefe865bb Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 13 01:32:00 2023 +0200 bpf: Implement support for adding hidden subprogs Introduce support in the verifier for generating a subprogram and include it as part of a BPF program dynamically after the do_check phase is complete. The first user will be the next patch which generates default exception callbacks if none are set for the program. The phase of invocation will be do_misc_fixups. Note that this is an internal verifier function, and should be used with instruction blocks which uphold the invariants stated in check_subprogs. Since these subprogs are always appended to the end of the instruction sequence of the program, it becomes relatively inexpensive to do the related adjustments to the subprog_info of the program. Only the fake exit subprogram is shifted forward, making room for our new subprog. This is useful to insert a new subprogram, get it JITed, and obtain its function pointer. The next patch will use this functionality to insert a default exception callback which will be invoked after unwinding the stack. Note that these added subprograms are invisible to userspace, and never reported in BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_ID etc. For now, only a single subprogram is supported, but more can be easily supported in the future. To this end, two function counts are introduced now, the existing func_cnt, and real_func_cnt, the latter including hidden programs. This allows us to conver the JIT code to use the real_func_cnt for management of resources while syscall path continues working with existing func_cnt. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-4-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2024-03-06 11:02:36 +00:00
struct bpf_subprog_info subprog_info[BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS + 2]; /* max + 2 for the fake and exception subprogs */
union {
bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-9957 commit 1ffc85d9298e0ca0137ba65c93a786143fe167b8 Author: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 13 18:38:23 2023 +0300 bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier: 1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ... 2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ... 3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ... 4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 5: r6 = r7 6: if (r6 > X) goto ... --- checkpoint --- 7: r9 += r7 8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range. Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states: I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers, thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical. If the path 1-6 is taken by verifier first, and checkpoint is created at (6) the path [1-4, 6] would be considered safe. Changes in this commit: - check_ids() is modified to disallow mapping multiple old_id to the same cur_id. - check_scalar_ids() is added, unlike check_ids() it treats ID zero as a unique scalar ID. - check_scalar_ids() needs to generate temporary unique IDs, field 'tmp_id_gen' is added to bpf_verifier_env::idmap_scratch to facilitate this. - regsafe() is updated to: - use check_scalar_ids() for precise scalar registers. - compare scalar registers using memcmp only for explore_alu_limits branch. This simplifies control flow for scalar case, and has no measurable performance impact. - check_alu_op() is updated to avoid generating bpf_reg_state::id for constant scalar values when processing BPF_MOV. ID is needed to propagate range information for identical values, but there is nothing to propagate for constants. Fixes: 75748837b7e5 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.") Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230613153824.3324830-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2023-10-11 11:01:19 +00:00
struct bpf_idmap idmap_scratch;
struct bpf_idset idset_scratch;
};
struct {
int *insn_state;
int *insn_stack;
int cur_stack;
} cfg;
struct backtrack_state bt;
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Tue Dec 5 10:42:39 2023 -0800 bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it *and* potentially adjusting offset. To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's checked most frequently during backtracking. This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of verified states, explored in the subsequent patches. There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states). File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF) -------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%) Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between bpf and bpf-next trees. Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is present. Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that. [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/ Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Reported-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu@epfl.ch> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205184248.1502704-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 10:59:58 +00:00
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *cur_hist_ent;
bpf: Introduce function-by-function verification New llvm and old llvm with libbpf help produce BTF that distinguish global and static functions. Unlike arguments of static function the arguments of global functions cannot be removed or optimized away by llvm. The compiler has to use exactly the arguments specified in a function prototype. The argument type information allows the verifier validate each global function independently. For now only supported argument types are pointer to context and scalars. In the future pointers to structures, sizes, pointer to packet data can be supported as well. Consider the following example: static int f1(int ...) { ... } int f3(int b); int f2(int a) { f1(a) + f3(a); } int f3(int b) { ... } int main(...) { f1(...) + f2(...) + f3(...); } The verifier will start its safety checks from the first global function f2(). It will recursively descend into f1() because it's static. Then it will check that arguments match for the f3() invocation inside f2(). It will not descend into f3(). It will finish f2() that has to be successfully verified for all possible values of 'a'. Then it will proceed with f3(). That function also has to be safe for all possible values of 'b'. Then it will start subprog 0 (which is main() function). It will recursively descend into f1() and will skip full check of f2() and f3(), since they are global. The order of processing global functions doesn't affect safety, since all global functions must be proven safe based on their arguments only. Such function by function verification can drastically improve speed of the verification and reduce complexity. Note that the stack limit of 512 still applies to the call chain regardless whether functions were static or global. The nested level of 8 also still applies. The same recursion prevention checks are in place as well. The type information and static/global kind is preserved after the verification hence in the above example global function f2() and f3() can be replaced later by equivalent functions with the same types that are loaded and verified later without affecting safety of this main() program. Such replacement (re-linking) of global functions is a subject of future patches. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200110064124.1760511-3-ast@kernel.org
2020-01-10 06:41:20 +00:00
u32 pass_cnt; /* number of times do_check() was called */
bpf: introduce function calls (function boundaries) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. Since the beginning of bpf all bpf programs were represented as a single function and program authors were forced to use always_inline for all functions in their C code. That was causing llvm to unnecessary inflate the code size and forcing developers to move code to header files with little code reuse. With a bit of additional complexity teach verifier to recognize arbitrary function calls from one bpf function to another as long as all of functions are presented to the verifier as a single bpf program. New program layout: r6 = r1 // some code .. r1 = .. // arg1 r2 = .. // arg2 call pc+1 // function call pc-relative exit .. = r1 // access arg1 .. = r2 // access arg2 .. call pc+20 // second level of function call ... It allows for better optimized code and finally allows to introduce the core bpf libraries that can be reused in different projects, since programs are no longer limited by single elf file. With function calls bpf can be compiled into multiple .o files. This patch is the first step. It detects programs that contain multiple functions and checks that calls between them are valid. It splits the sequence of bpf instructions (one program) into a set of bpf functions that call each other. Calls to only known functions are allowed. In the future the verifier may allow calls to unresolved functions and will do dynamic linking. This logic supports statically linked bpf functions only. Such function boundary detection could have been done as part of control flow graph building in check_cfg(), but it's cleaner to separate function boundary detection vs control flow checks within a subprogram (function) into logically indepedent steps. Follow up patches may split check_cfg() further, but not check_subprogs(). Only allow bpf-to-bpf calls for root only and for non-hw-offloaded programs. These restrictions can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:05 +00:00
u32 subprog_cnt;
/* number of instructions analyzed by the verifier */
u32 prev_insn_processed, insn_processed;
/* number of jmps, calls, exits analyzed so far */
u32 prev_jmps_processed, jmps_processed;
/* total verification time */
u64 verification_time;
/* maximum number of verifier states kept in 'branching' instructions */
u32 max_states_per_insn;
/* total number of allocated verifier states */
u32 total_states;
/* some states are freed during program analysis.
* this is peak number of states. this number dominates kernel
* memory consumption during verification
*/
u32 peak_states;
/* longest register parentage chain walked for liveness marking */
u32 longest_mark_read_walk;
bpfptr_t fd_array;
bpf: Only print scratched registers and stack slots to verifier logs. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2069046 Upstream Status: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git commit 0f55f9ed21f96630c6ec96805d42f92c0b458b37 Author: Christy Lee <christylee@fb.com> Date: Thu Dec 16 13:33:56 2021 -0800 bpf: Only print scratched registers and stack slots to verifier logs. When printing verifier state for any log level, print full verifier state only on function calls or on errors. Otherwise, only print the registers and stack slots that were accessed. Log size differences: verif_scale_loop6 before: 234566564 verif_scale_loop6 after: 72143943 69% size reduction kfree_skb before: 166406 kfree_skb after: 55386 69% size reduction Before: 156: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0) 157: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP0 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=00000000 fp-16_w=00\ 000000 fp-24_w=00000000 fp-32_w=00000000 fp-40_w=00000000 fp-48_w=00000000 fp-56_w=00000000 fp-64_w=00000000 fp-72_w=00000000 fp-80_w=00000\ 000 fp-88_w=00000000 fp-96_w=00000000 fp-104_w=00000000 fp-112_w=00000000 fp-120_w=00000000 fp-128_w=00000000 fp-136_w=00000000 fp-144_w=00\ 000000 fp-152_w=00000000 fp-160_w=00000000 fp-168_w=00000000 fp-176_w=00000000 fp-184_w=00000000 fp-192_w=00000000 fp-200_w=00000000 fp-208\ _w=00000000 fp-216_w=00000000 fp-224_w=00000000 fp-232_w=00000000 fp-240_w=00000000 fp-248_w=00000000 fp-256_w=00000000 fp-264_w=00000000 f\ p-272_w=00000000 fp-280_w=00000000 fp-288_w=00000000 fp-296_w=00000000 fp-304_w=00000000 fp-312_w=00000000 fp-320_w=00000000 fp-328_w=00000\ 000 fp-336_w=00000000 fp-344_w=00000000 fp-352_w=00000000 fp-360_w=00000000 fp-368_w=00000000 fp-376_w=00000000 fp-384_w=00000000 fp-392_w=\ 00000000 fp-400_w=00000000 fp-408_w=00000000 fp-416_w=00000000 fp-424_w=00000000 fp-432_w=00000000 fp-440_w=00000000 fp-448_w=00000000 ; return skb->len; 157: (95) exit Func#4 is safe for any args that match its prototype Validating get_constant() func#5... 158: R1=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 ; int get_constant(long val) 158: (bf) r0 = r1 159: R0_w=invP(id=1) R1=invP(id=1) R10=fp0 ; return val - 122; 159: (04) w0 += -122 160: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1=invP(id=1) R10=fp0 ; return val - 122; 160: (95) exit Func#5 is safe for any args that match its prototype Validating get_skb_ifindex() func#6... 161: R1=invP(id=0) R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 ; int get_skb_ifindex(int val, struct __sk_buff *skb, int var) 161: (bc) w0 = w3 162: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1=invP(id=0) R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 After: 156: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0) 157: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) ; return skb->len; 157: (95) exit Func#4 is safe for any args that match its prototype Validating get_constant() func#5... 158: R1=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 ; int get_constant(long val) 158: (bf) r0 = r1 159: R0_w=invP(id=1) R1=invP(id=1) ; return val - 122; 159: (04) w0 += -122 160: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ; return val - 122; 160: (95) exit Func#5 is safe for any args that match its prototype Validating get_skb_ifindex() func#6... 161: R1=invP(id=0) R2=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R3=invP(id=0) R10=fp0 ; int get_skb_ifindex(int val, struct __sk_buff *skb, int var) 161: (bc) w0 = w3 162: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R3=invP(id=0) Signed-off-by: Christy Lee <christylee@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211216213358.3374427-2-christylee@fb.com Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2022-06-10 13:12:51 +00:00
/* bit mask to keep track of whether a register has been accessed
* since the last time the function state was printed
*/
u32 scratched_regs;
/* Same as scratched_regs but for stack slots */
u64 scratched_stack_slots;
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
u64 prev_log_pos, prev_insn_print_pos;
bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-30773 commit 92424801261d1564a0bb759da3cf3ccd69fdf5a2 Author: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Date: Thu Jun 13 13:53:08 2024 +0200 bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in one of the probes: [...] 13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8) R6_w=scalar() 14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0 15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff 16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff 17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff)) 18: (44) w6 |= 2 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) 19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1 REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000, 0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) 19: R6_w=0x7fffffff 20: (95) exit from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: R0=0x7fffffff R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ; R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2; 0xfffffffd)) 23: (95) exit from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm 24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0 [...] What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value, meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1, true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2). Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant. Internally, the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized as scalar to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now, for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101). When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This is because the verifier creates a "fake" register initialized to the value of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in regs_refine_cond_op(): [...] t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off)); reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); reg2->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg2->var_off, t); [...] Since the verifier is analyzing the false branch of the conditional jump, reg1 is equal to false_reg1 and reg2 is equal to false_reg2, i.e. the reg2 is the "fake" register that was meant to hold a constant value. The resulting var_off of the intersection says that both registers now hold a known value of var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0) or in other words: this operation manages to make the verifier think that the "constant" value that was passed in the jump operation now holds a different value. Normally this would not be an issue since it should not influence the true branch, however, false_reg2 and true_reg2 are pointers to the same "fake" register. Meaning, the false branch can influence the results of the true branch. In line 24, the verifier assumes R6_w=0, but the actual runtime value in this case is 1. The fix is simply not passing in the same "fake" register location as inputs to reg_set_min_max(), but instead making a copy. Moving the fake_reg into the env also reduces stack consumption by 120 bytes. With this, the verifier successfully rejects invalid accesses from the test program. [0] https://github.com/google/buzzer Fixes: 67420501e868 ("bpf: generalize reg_set_min_max() to handle non-const register comparisons") Reported-by: Juan José López Jaimez <jjlopezjaimez@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613115310.25383-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-10-24 13:38:09 +00:00
/* buffer used to temporary hold constants as scalar registers */
struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg[2];
/* buffer used to generate temporary string representations,
* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string
*/
char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN];
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE];
bpf: Add gen_epilogue to bpf_verifier_ops JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-63880 commit 169c31761c8d7f606f3ee628829c27998626c4f0 Author: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Date: Thu Aug 29 14:08:25 2024 -0700 bpf: Add gen_epilogue to bpf_verifier_ops This patch adds a .gen_epilogue to the bpf_verifier_ops. It is similar to the existing .gen_prologue. Instead of allowing a subsystem to run code at the beginning of a bpf prog, it allows the subsystem to run code just before the bpf prog exit. One of the use case is to allow the upcoming bpf qdisc to ensure that the skb->dev is the same as the qdisc->dev_queue->dev. The bpf qdisc struct_ops implementation could either fix it up or drop the skb. Another use case could be in bpf_tcp_ca.c to enforce snd_cwnd has sane value (e.g. non zero). The epilogue can do the useful thing (like checking skb->dev) if it can access the bpf prog's ctx. Unlike prologue, r1 may not hold the ctx pointer. This patch saves the r1 in the stack if the .gen_epilogue has returned some instructions in the "epilogue_buf". The existing .gen_prologue is done in convert_ctx_accesses(). The new .gen_epilogue is done in the convert_ctx_accesses() also. When it sees the (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) instruction, it will be patched with the earlier generated "epilogue_buf". The epilogue patching is only done for the main prog. Only one epilogue will be patched to the main program. When the bpf prog has multiple BPF_EXIT instructions, a BPF_JA is used to goto the earlier patched epilogue. Majority of the archs support (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA): x86, arm, s390, risv64, loongarch, powerpc and arc. This patch keeps it simple and always use (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA). A new macro BPF_JMP32_A is added to generate the (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) insn. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240829210833.388152-4-martin.lau@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-12-18 14:37:20 +00:00
struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE];
};
bpf: prepare btf_prepare_func_args() for handling static subprogs JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit e26080d0da87f20222ca6712b65f95a856fadee0 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:13:27 2023 -0800 bpf: prepare btf_prepare_func_args() for handling static subprogs Generalize btf_prepare_func_args() to support both global and static subprogs. We are going to utilize this property in the next patch, reusing btf_prepare_func_args() for subprog call logic instead of reparsing BTF information in a completely separate implementation. btf_prepare_func_args() now detects whether subprog is global or static makes slight logic adjustments for static func cases, like not failing fatally (-EFAULT) for conditions that are allowable for static subprogs. Somewhat subtle (but major!) difference is the handling of pointer arguments. Both global and static functions need to handle special context arguments (which are pointers to predefined type names), but static subprogs give up on any other pointers, falling back to marking subprog as "unreliable", disabling the use of BTF type information altogether. For global functions, though, we are assuming that such pointers to unrecognized types are just pointers to fixed-sized memory region (or error out if size cannot be established, like for `void *` pointers). This patch accommodates these small differences and sets up a stage for refactoring in the next patch, eliminating a separate BTF-based parsing logic in btf_check_func_arg_match(). Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 12:27:29 +00:00
static inline struct bpf_func_info_aux *subprog_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
{
return &env->prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog];
}
bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23644 commit 4ba1d0f23414135e4f426dae4cb5cdc2ce246f89 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:13:25 2023 -0800 bpf: abstract away global subprog arg preparation logic from reg state setup btf_prepare_func_args() is used to understand expectations and restrictions on global subprog arguments. But current implementation is hard to extend, as it intermixes BTF-based func prototype parsing and interpretation logic with setting up register state at subprog entry. Worse still, those registers are not completely set up inside btf_prepare_func_args(), requiring some more logic later in do_check_common(). Like calling mark_reg_unknown() and similar initialization operations. This intermixing of BTF interpretation and register state setup is problematic. First, it causes duplication of BTF parsing logic for global subprog verification (to set up initial state of global subprog) and global subprog call sites analysis (when we need to check that whatever is being passed into global subprog matches expectations), performed in btf_check_subprog_call(). Given we want to extend global func argument with tags later, this duplication is problematic. So refactor btf_prepare_func_args() to do only BTF-based func proto and args parsing, returning high-level argument "expectations" only, with no regard to specifics of register state. I.e., if it's a context argument, instead of setting register state to PTR_TO_CTX, we return ARG_PTR_TO_CTX enum for that argument as "an argument specification" for further processing inside do_check_common(). Similarly for SCALAR arguments, PTR_TO_MEM, etc. This allows to reuse btf_prepare_func_args() in following patches at global subprog call site analysis time. It also keeps register setup code consistently in one place, do_check_common(). Besides all this, we cache this argument specs information inside env->subprog_info, eliminating the need to redo these potentially expensive BTF traversals, especially if BPF program's BTF is big and/or there are lots of global subprog calls. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215011334.2307144-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-04-15 12:27:29 +00:00
static inline struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
{
return &env->subprog_info[subprog];
}
__printf(2, 0) void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const char *fmt, va_list args);
__printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const char *fmt, ...);
bpf: Implement accurate raw_tp context access via BTF libbpf analyzes bpf C program, searches in-kernel BTF for given type name and stores it into expected_attach_type. The kernel verifier expects this btf_id to point to something like: typedef void (*btf_trace_kfree_skb)(void *, struct sk_buff *skb, void *loc); which represents signature of raw_tracepoint "kfree_skb". Then btf_ctx_access() matches ctx+0 access in bpf program with 'skb' and 'ctx+8' access with 'loc' arguments of "kfree_skb" tracepoint. In first case it passes btf_id of 'struct sk_buff *' back to the verifier core and 'void *' in second case. Then the verifier tracks PTR_TO_BTF_ID as any other pointer type. Like PTR_TO_SOCKET points to 'struct bpf_sock', PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK points to 'struct bpf_tcp_sock', and so on. PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to in-kernel structs. If 1234 is btf_id of 'struct sk_buff' in vmlinux's BTF then PTR_TO_BTF_ID#1234 points to one of in kernel skbs. When PTR_TO_BTF_ID#1234 is dereferenced (like r2 = *(u64 *)r1 + 32) the btf_struct_access() checks which field of 'struct sk_buff' is at offset 32. Checks that size of access matches type definition of the field and continues to track the dereferenced type. If that field was a pointer to 'struct net_device' the r2's type will be PTR_TO_BTF_ID#456. Where 456 is btf_id of 'struct net_device' in vmlinux's BTF. Such verifier analysis prevents "cheating" in BPF C program. The program cannot cast arbitrary pointer to 'struct sk_buff *' and access it. C compiler would allow type cast, of course, but the verifier will notice type mismatch based on BPF assembly and in-kernel BTF. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-7-ast@kernel.org
2019-10-16 03:25:00 +00:00
__printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const char *fmt, ...);
int bpf_vlog_init(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 log_level,
char __user *log_buf, u32 log_size);
bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2221599 commit 1216640938035e63bdbd32438e91c9bcc1fd8ee1 Author: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Date: Thu Apr 6 16:41:49 2023 -0700 bpf: Switch BPF verifier log to be a rotating log by default Currently, if user-supplied log buffer to collect BPF verifier log turns out to be too small to contain full log, bpf() syscall returns -ENOSPC, fails BPF program verification/load, and preserves first N-1 bytes of the verifier log (where N is the size of user-supplied buffer). This is problematic in a bunch of common scenarios, especially when working with real-world BPF programs that tend to be pretty complex as far as verification goes and require big log buffers. Typically, it's when debugging tricky cases at log level 2 (verbose). Also, when BPF program is successfully validated, log level 2 is the only way to actually see verifier state progression and all the important details. Even with log level 1, it's possible to get -ENOSPC even if the final verifier log fits in log buffer, if there is a code path that's deep enough to fill up entire log, even if normally it would be reset later on (there is a logic to chop off successfully validated portions of BPF verifier log). In short, it's not always possible to pre-size log buffer. Also, what's worse, in practice, the end of the log most often is way more important than the beginning, but verifier stops emitting log as soon as initial log buffer is filled up. This patch switches BPF verifier log behavior to effectively behave as rotating log. That is, if user-supplied log buffer turns out to be too short, verifier will keep overwriting previously written log, effectively treating user's log buffer as a ring buffer. -ENOSPC is still going to be returned at the end, to notify user that log contents was truncated, but the important last N bytes of the log would be returned, which might be all that user really needs. This consistent -ENOSPC behavior, regardless of rotating or fixed log behavior, allows to prevent backwards compatibility breakage. The only user-visible change is which portion of verifier log user ends up seeing *if buffer is too small*. Given contents of verifier log itself is not an ABI, there is no breakage due to this behavior change. Specialized tools that rely on specific contents of verifier log in -ENOSPC scenario are expected to be easily adapted to accommodate old and new behaviors. Importantly, though, to preserve good user experience and not require every user-space application to adopt to this new behavior, before exiting to user-space verifier will rotate log (in place) to make it start at the very beginning of user buffer as a continuous zero-terminated string. The contents will be a chopped off N-1 last bytes of full verifier log, of course. Given beginning of log is sometimes important as well, we add BPF_LOG_FIXED (which equals 8) flag to force old behavior, which allows tools like veristat to request first part of verifier log, if necessary. BPF_LOG_FIXED flag is also a simple and straightforward way to check if BPF verifier supports rotating behavior. On the implementation side, conceptually, it's all simple. We maintain 64-bit logical start and end positions. If we need to truncate the log, start position will be adjusted accordingly to lag end position by N bytes. We then use those logical positions to calculate their matching actual positions in user buffer and handle wrap around the end of the buffer properly. Finally, right before returning from bpf_check(), we rotate user log buffer contents in-place as necessary, to make log contents contiguous. See comments in relevant functions for details. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230406234205.323208-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2023-07-11 08:04:53 +00:00
void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u64 new_pos);
int bpf_vlog_finalize(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 *log_size_actual);
__printf(3, 4) void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
u32 insn_off,
const char *prefix_fmt, ...);
static inline struct bpf_func_state *cur_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
bpf: introduce function calls (verification) Allow arbitrary function calls from bpf function to another bpf function. To recognize such set of bpf functions the verifier does: 1. runs control flow analysis to detect function boundaries 2. proceeds with verification of all functions starting from main(root) function It recognizes that the stack of the caller can be accessed by the callee (if the caller passed a pointer to its stack to the callee) and the callee can store map_value and other pointers into the stack of the caller. 3. keeps track of the stack_depth of each function to make sure that total stack depth is still less than 512 bytes 4. disallows pointers to the callee stack to be stored into the caller stack, since they will be invalid as soon as the callee returns 5. to reuse all of the existing state_pruning logic each function call is considered to be independent call from the verifier point of view. The verifier pretends to inline all function calls it sees are being called. It stores the callsite instruction index as part of the state to make sure that two calls to the same callee from two different places in the caller will be different from state pruning point of view 6. more safety checks are added to liveness analysis Implementation details: . struct bpf_verifier_state is now consists of all stack frames that led to this function . struct bpf_func_state represent one stack frame. It consists of registers in the given frame and its stack . propagate_liveness() logic had a premature optimization where mark_reg_read() and mark_stack_slot_read() were manually inlined with loop iterating over parents for each register or stack slot. Undo this optimization to reuse more complex mark_*_read() logic . skip_callee() logic is not necessary from safety point of view, but without it mark_*_read() markings become too conservative, since after returning from the funciton call a read of r6-r9 will incorrectly propagate the read marks into callee causing inefficient pruning later . mark_*_read() logic is now aware of control flow which makes it more complex. In the future the plan is to rewrite liveness to be hierarchical. So that liveness can be done within basic block only and control flow will be responsible for propagation of liveness information along cfg and between calls. . tail_calls and ld_abs insns are not allowed in the programs with bpf-to-bpf calls . returning stack pointers to the caller or storing them into stack frame of the caller is not allowed Testing: . no difference in cilium processed_insn numbers . large number of tests follows in next patches Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-12-15 01:55:06 +00:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
return cur->frame[cur->curframe];
}
static inline struct bpf_reg_state *cur_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
return cur_func(env)->regs;
}
int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_prog *prog);
int bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
int bpf_prog_offload_finalize(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
void
bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
struct bpf_insn *insn);
void
bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt);
/* this lives here instead of in bpf.h because it needs to dereference tgt_prog */
static inline u64 bpf_trampoline_compute_key(const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
{
if (tgt_prog)
return ((u64)tgt_prog->aux->id << 32) | btf_id;
else
return ((u64)btf_obj_id(btf) << 32) | 0x80000000 | btf_id;
}
/* unpack the IDs from the key as constructed above */
static inline void bpf_trampoline_unpack_key(u64 key, u32 *obj_id, u32 *btf_id)
{
if (obj_id)
*obj_id = key >> 32;
if (btf_id)
*btf_id = key & 0x7FFFFFFF;
}
int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const struct bpf_prog *prog,
const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
u32 btf_id,
struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info);
bpf: Introduce BPF support for kernel module function calls Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.redhat.com/2069045 Conflicts: already applied 3990ed4c4266 ("bpf: Stop caching subprog index in the bpf_pseudo_func insn") commit 2357672c54c3f748f675446f8eba8b0432b1e7e2 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Sat Oct 2 06:47:49 2021 +0530 bpf: Introduce BPF support for kernel module function calls This change adds support on the kernel side to allow for BPF programs to call kernel module functions. Userspace will prepare an array of module BTF fds that is passed in during BPF_PROG_LOAD using fd_array parameter. In the kernel, the module BTFs are placed in the auxilliary struct for bpf_prog, and loaded as needed. The verifier then uses insn->off to index into the fd_array. insn->off 0 is reserved for vmlinux BTF (for backwards compat), so userspace must use an fd_array index > 0 for module kfunc support. kfunc_btf_tab is sorted based on offset in an array, and each offset corresponds to one descriptor, with a max limit up to 256 such module BTFs. We also change existing kfunc_tab to distinguish each element based on imm, off pair as each such call will now be distinct. Another change is to check_kfunc_call callback, which now include a struct module * pointer, this is to be used in later patch such that the kfunc_id and module pointer are matched for dynamically registered BTF sets from loadable modules, so that same kfunc_id in two modules doesn't lead to check_kfunc_call succeeding. For the duration of the check_kfunc_call, the reference to struct module exists, as it returns the pointer stored in kfunc_btf_tab. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211002011757.311265-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <ykaliuta@redhat.com>
2022-04-22 08:50:54 +00:00
void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab);
int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno);
bpf: Introduce composable reg, ret and arg types. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2069046 Upstream Status: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git commit d639b9d13a39cf15639cbe6e8b2c43eb60148a73 Author: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Date: Thu Dec 16 16:31:44 2021 -0800 bpf: Introduce composable reg, ret and arg types. There are some common properties shared between bpf reg, ret and arg values. For instance, a value may be a NULL pointer, or a pointer to a read-only memory. Previously, to express these properties, enumeration was used. For example, in order to test whether a reg value can be NULL, reg_type_may_be_null() simply enumerates all types that are possibly NULL. The problem of this approach is that it's not scalable and causes a lot of duplication. These properties can be combined, for example, a type could be either MAYBE_NULL or RDONLY, or both. This patch series rewrites the layout of reg_type, arg_type and ret_type, so that common properties can be extracted and represented as composable flag. For example, one can write ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_MAYBE_NULL which is equivalent to the previous ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL The type ARG_PTR_TO_MEM are called "base type" in this patch. Base types can be extended with flags. A flag occupies the higher bits while base types sits in the lower bits. This patch in particular sets up a set of macro for this purpose. The following patches will rewrite arg_types, ret_types and reg_types respectively. Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211217003152.48334-2-haoluo@google.com Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
2022-06-10 13:12:51 +00:00
#define BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(BPF_BASE_TYPE_BITS - 1, 0)
/* extract base type from bpf_{arg, return, reg}_type. */
static inline u32 base_type(u32 type)
{
return type & BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK;
}
/* extract flags from an extended type. See bpf_type_flag in bpf.h. */
static inline u32 type_flag(u32 type)
{
return type & ~BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK;
}
bpf: Resolve to prog->aux->dst_prog->type only for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120966 commit 4a9c7bbe2ed4d2b240674b1fb606c41d3940c412 Author: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Date: Tue Mar 29 18:14:56 2022 -0700 bpf: Resolve to prog->aux->dst_prog->type only for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT The commit 7e40781cc8b7 ("bpf: verifier: Use target program's type for access verifications") fixes the verifier checking for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT (extension) prog such that the verifier looks for things based on the target prog type that it is extending instead of the BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT itself. The current resolve_prog_type() returns the target prog type. It checks for nullness on prog->aux->dst_prog. However, when loading a BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING prog and it is tracing another bpf prog instead of a kernel function, prog->aux->dst_prog is not NULL also. In this case, the verifier should still verify as the BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING type instead of the traced prog type in prog->aux->dst_prog->type. An oops has been reported when tracing a struct_ops prog. A NULL dereference happened in check_return_code() when accessing the prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type and prog->aux->attach_func_proto is NULL here because the traced struct_ops prog has the "unreliable" set. This patch is to change the resolve_prog_type() to only return the target prog type if the prog being verified is BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT. Fixes: 7e40781cc8b7 ("bpf: verifier: Use target program's type for access verifications") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220330011456.2984509-1-kafai@fb.com Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2022-09-09 13:20:59 +00:00
/* only use after check_attach_btf_id() */
bpf: Remove prog->active check for bpf_lsm and bpf_iter Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 commit 271de525e1d7f564e88a9d212c50998b49a54476 Author: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Date: Tue Oct 25 11:45:16 2022 -0700 bpf: Remove prog->active check for bpf_lsm and bpf_iter The commit 64696c40d03c ("bpf: Add __bpf_prog_{enter,exit}_struct_ops for struct_ops trampoline") removed prog->active check for struct_ops prog. The bpf_lsm and bpf_iter is also using trampoline. Like struct_ops, the bpf_lsm and bpf_iter have fixed hooks for the prog to attach. The kernel does not call the same hook in a recursive way. This patch also removes the prog->active check for bpf_lsm and bpf_iter. A later patch has a test to reproduce the recursion issue for a sleepable bpf_lsm program. This patch appends the '_recur' naming to the existing enter and exit functions that track the prog->active counter. New __bpf_prog_{enter,exit}[_sleepable] function are added to skip the prog->active tracking. The '_struct_ops' version is also removed. It also moves the decision on picking the enter and exit function to the new bpf_trampoline_{enter,exit}(). It returns the '_recur' ones for all tracing progs to use. For bpf_lsm, bpf_iter, struct_ops (no prog->active tracking after 64696c40d03c), and bpf_lsm_cgroup (no prog->active tracking after 69fd337a975c7), it will return the functions that don't track the prog->active. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221025184524.3526117-2-martin.lau@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-14 11:01:48 +00:00
static inline enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
bpf: Add reference tracking support to kfunc Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120966 Conflicts: Simple context change due to already applied commit 45ce4b4f9009 ("bpf: Fix crash due to out of bounds access into reg2btf_ids.") commit 5c073f26f9dc78a6c8194b23eac7537c9692c7d7 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 14 22:09:48 2022 +0530 bpf: Add reference tracking support to kfunc This patch adds verifier support for PTR_TO_BTF_ID return type of kfunc to be a reference, by reusing acquire_reference_state/release_reference support for existing in-kernel bpf helpers. We make use of the three kfunc types: - BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_ACQUIRE Return true if kfunc_btf_id is an acquire kfunc. This will acquire_reference_state for the returned PTR_TO_BTF_ID (this is the only allow return value). Note that acquire kfunc must always return a PTR_TO_BTF_ID{_OR_NULL}, otherwise the program is rejected. - BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_RELEASE Return true if kfunc_btf_id is a release kfunc. This will release the reference to the passed in PTR_TO_BTF_ID which has a reference state (from earlier acquire kfunc). The btf_check_func_arg_match returns the regno (of argument register, hence > 0) if the kfunc is a release kfunc, and a proper referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is being passed to it. This is similar to how helper call check uses bpf_call_arg_meta to store the ref_obj_id that is later used to release the reference. Similar to in-kernel helper, we only allow passing one referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID as an argument. It can also be passed in to normal kfunc, but in case of release kfunc there must always be one PTR_TO_BTF_ID argument that is referenced. - BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_RET_NULL For kfunc returning PTR_TO_BTF_ID, tells if it can be NULL, hence force caller to mark the pointer not null (using check) before accessing it. Note that taking into account the case fixed by commit 93c230e3f5bd ("bpf: Enforce id generation for all may-be-null register type") we assign a non-zero id for mark_ptr_or_null_reg logic. Later, if more return types are supported by kfunc, which have a _OR_NULL variant, it might be better to move this id generation under a common reg_type_may_be_null check, similar to the case in the commit. Referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is currently only limited to kfunc, but can be extended in the future to other BPF helpers as well. For now, we can rely on the btf_struct_ids_match check to ensure we get the pointer to the expected struct type. In the future, care needs to be taken to avoid ambiguity for reference PTR_TO_BTF_ID passed to release function, in case multiple candidates can release same BTF ID. e.g. there might be two release kfuncs (or kfunc and helper): foo(struct abc *p); bar(struct abc *p); ... such that both release a PTR_TO_BTF_ID with btf_id of struct abc. In this case we would need to track the acquire function corresponding to the release function to avoid type confusion, and store this information in the register state so that an incorrect program can be rejected. This is not a problem right now, hence it is left as an exercise for the future patch introducing such a case in the kernel. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220114163953.1455836-6-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2022-09-05 11:41:49 +00:00
{
bpf: Fix updating attached freplace prog in prog_array map JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-30774 commit fdad456cbcca739bae1849549c7a999857c56f88 Author: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev> Date: Sun Jul 28 19:46:11 2024 +0800 bpf: Fix updating attached freplace prog in prog_array map The commit f7866c358733 ("bpf: Fix null pointer dereference in resolve_prog_type() for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT") fixed a NULL pointer dereference panic, but didn't fix the issue that fails to update attached freplace prog to prog_array map. Since commit 1c123c567fb1 ("bpf: Resolve fext program type when checking map compatibility"), freplace prog and its target prog are able to tail call each other. And the commit 3aac1ead5eb6 ("bpf: Move prog->aux->linked_prog and trampoline into bpf_link on attach") sets prog->aux->dst_prog as NULL after attaching freplace prog to its target prog. After loading freplace the prog_array's owner type is BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS. Then, after attaching freplace its prog->aux->dst_prog is NULL. Then, while updating freplace in prog_array the bpf_prog_map_compatible() incorrectly returns false because resolve_prog_type() returns BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT instead of BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS. After this patch the resolve_prog_type() returns BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and update to prog_array can succeed. Fixes: f7866c358733 ("bpf: Fix null pointer dereference in resolve_prog_type() for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT") Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240728114612.48486-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
2024-11-26 11:23:00 +00:00
return (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT && prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type) ?
prog->aux->saved_dst_prog_type : prog->type;
bpf: Add reference tracking support to kfunc Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2120966 Conflicts: Simple context change due to already applied commit 45ce4b4f9009 ("bpf: Fix crash due to out of bounds access into reg2btf_ids.") commit 5c073f26f9dc78a6c8194b23eac7537c9692c7d7 Author: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 14 22:09:48 2022 +0530 bpf: Add reference tracking support to kfunc This patch adds verifier support for PTR_TO_BTF_ID return type of kfunc to be a reference, by reusing acquire_reference_state/release_reference support for existing in-kernel bpf helpers. We make use of the three kfunc types: - BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_ACQUIRE Return true if kfunc_btf_id is an acquire kfunc. This will acquire_reference_state for the returned PTR_TO_BTF_ID (this is the only allow return value). Note that acquire kfunc must always return a PTR_TO_BTF_ID{_OR_NULL}, otherwise the program is rejected. - BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_RELEASE Return true if kfunc_btf_id is a release kfunc. This will release the reference to the passed in PTR_TO_BTF_ID which has a reference state (from earlier acquire kfunc). The btf_check_func_arg_match returns the regno (of argument register, hence > 0) if the kfunc is a release kfunc, and a proper referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is being passed to it. This is similar to how helper call check uses bpf_call_arg_meta to store the ref_obj_id that is later used to release the reference. Similar to in-kernel helper, we only allow passing one referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID as an argument. It can also be passed in to normal kfunc, but in case of release kfunc there must always be one PTR_TO_BTF_ID argument that is referenced. - BTF_KFUNC_TYPE_RET_NULL For kfunc returning PTR_TO_BTF_ID, tells if it can be NULL, hence force caller to mark the pointer not null (using check) before accessing it. Note that taking into account the case fixed by commit 93c230e3f5bd ("bpf: Enforce id generation for all may-be-null register type") we assign a non-zero id for mark_ptr_or_null_reg logic. Later, if more return types are supported by kfunc, which have a _OR_NULL variant, it might be better to move this id generation under a common reg_type_may_be_null check, similar to the case in the commit. Referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is currently only limited to kfunc, but can be extended in the future to other BPF helpers as well. For now, we can rely on the btf_struct_ids_match check to ensure we get the pointer to the expected struct type. In the future, care needs to be taken to avoid ambiguity for reference PTR_TO_BTF_ID passed to release function, in case multiple candidates can release same BTF ID. e.g. there might be two release kfuncs (or kfunc and helper): foo(struct abc *p); bar(struct abc *p); ... such that both release a PTR_TO_BTF_ID with btf_id of struct abc. In this case we would need to track the acquire function corresponding to the release function to avoid type confusion, and store this information in the register state so that an incorrect program can be rejected. This is not a problem right now, hence it is left as an exercise for the future patch introducing such a case in the kernel. Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220114163953.1455836-6-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2022-09-05 11:41:49 +00:00
}
bpf: Remove prog->active check for bpf_lsm and bpf_iter Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 commit 271de525e1d7f564e88a9d212c50998b49a54476 Author: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Date: Tue Oct 25 11:45:16 2022 -0700 bpf: Remove prog->active check for bpf_lsm and bpf_iter The commit 64696c40d03c ("bpf: Add __bpf_prog_{enter,exit}_struct_ops for struct_ops trampoline") removed prog->active check for struct_ops prog. The bpf_lsm and bpf_iter is also using trampoline. Like struct_ops, the bpf_lsm and bpf_iter have fixed hooks for the prog to attach. The kernel does not call the same hook in a recursive way. This patch also removes the prog->active check for bpf_lsm and bpf_iter. A later patch has a test to reproduce the recursion issue for a sleepable bpf_lsm program. This patch appends the '_recur' naming to the existing enter and exit functions that track the prog->active counter. New __bpf_prog_{enter,exit}[_sleepable] function are added to skip the prog->active tracking. The '_struct_ops' version is also removed. It also moves the decision on picking the enter and exit function to the new bpf_trampoline_{enter,exit}(). It returns the '_recur' ones for all tracing progs to use. For bpf_lsm, bpf_iter, struct_ops (no prog->active tracking after 64696c40d03c), and bpf_lsm_cgroup (no prog->active tracking after 69fd337a975c7), it will return the functions that don't track the prog->active. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221025184524.3526117-2-martin.lau@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-14 11:01:48 +00:00
static inline bool bpf_prog_check_recur(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
switch (resolve_prog_type(prog)) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
return prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_ITER;
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
bpf: Consider non-owning refs trusted JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-10691 commit 2a6d50b50d6d589d43a90d6ca990b8b811e67701 Author: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Date: Mon Aug 21 12:33:06 2023 -0700 bpf: Consider non-owning refs trusted Recent discussions around default kptr "trustedness" led to changes such as commit 6fcd486b3a0a ("bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier."). One of the conclusions of those discussions, as expressed in code and comments in that patch, is that we'd like to move away from 'raw' PTR_TO_BTF_ID without some type flag or other register state indicating trustedness. Although PTR_TRUSTED and PTR_UNTRUSTED flags mark this state explicitly, the verifier currently considers trustedness implied by other register state. For example, owning refs to graph collection nodes must have a nonzero ref_obj_id, so they pass the is_trusted_reg check despite having no explicit PTR_{UN}TRUSTED flag. This patch makes trustedness of non-owning refs to graph collection nodes explicit as well. By definition, non-owning refs are currently trusted. Although the ref has no control over pointee lifetime, due to non-owning ref clobbering rules (see invalidate_non_owning_refs) dereferencing a non-owning ref is safe in the critical section controlled by bpf_spin_lock associated with its owning collection. Note that the previous statement does not hold true for nodes with shared ownership due to the use-after-free issue that this series is addressing. True shared ownership was disabled by commit 7deca5eae833 ("bpf: Disable bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc calls until race conditions are fixed"), though, so the statement holds for now. Further patches in the series will change the trustedness state of non-owning refs before re-enabling bpf_refcount_acquire. Let's add NON_OWN_REF type flag to BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS such that a non-owning ref reg state would pass is_trusted_reg check. Somewhat surprisingly, this doesn't result in any change to user-visible functionality elsewhere in the verifier: graph collection nodes are all marked MEM_ALLOC, which tends to be handled in separate codepaths from "raw" PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Regardless, let's be explicit here and document the current state of things before changing it elsewhere in the series. Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821193311.3290257-3-davemarchevsky@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-11-27 17:53:31 +00:00
#define BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS (MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED | NON_OWN_REF)
bpf: Allow trusted pointers to be passed to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/2177177 commit 3f00c52393445ed49aadc1a567aa502c6333b1a1 Author: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Date: Sat Nov 19 23:10:02 2022 -0600 bpf: Allow trusted pointers to be passed to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs Kfuncs currently support specifying the KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag to signal to the verifier that it should enforce that a BPF program passes it a "safe", trusted pointer. Currently, "safe" means that the pointer is either PTR_TO_CTX, or is refcounted. There may be cases, however, where the kernel passes a BPF program a safe / trusted pointer to an object that the BPF program wishes to use as a kptr, but because the object does not yet have a ref_obj_id from the perspective of the verifier, the program would be unable to pass it to a KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc. The solution is to expand the set of pointers that are considered trusted according to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, so that programs can invoke kfuncs with these pointers without getting rejected by the verifier. There is already a PTR_UNTRUSTED flag that is set in some scenarios, such as when a BPF program reads a kptr directly from a map without performing a bpf_kptr_xchg() call. These pointers of course can and should be rejected by the verifier. Unfortunately, however, PTR_UNTRUSTED does not cover all the cases for safety that need to be addressed to adequately protect kfuncs. Specifically, pointers obtained by a BPF program "walking" a struct are _not_ considered PTR_UNTRUSTED according to BPF. For example, say that we were to add a kfunc called bpf_task_acquire(), with KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS, to acquire a struct task_struct *. If we only used PTR_UNTRUSTED to signal that a task was unsafe to pass to a kfunc, the verifier would mistakenly allow the following unsafe BPF program to be loaded: SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") int BPF_PROG(unsafe_acquire_task, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) { struct task_struct *acquired, *nested; nested = task->last_wakee; /* Would not be rejected by the verifier. */ acquired = bpf_task_acquire(nested); if (!acquired) return 0; bpf_task_release(acquired); return 0; } To address this, this patch defines a new type flag called PTR_TRUSTED which tracks whether a PTR_TO_BTF_ID pointer is safe to pass to a KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfunc or a BPF helper function. PTR_TRUSTED pointers are passed directly from the kernel as a tracepoint or struct_ops callback argument. Any nested pointer that is obtained from walking a PTR_TRUSTED pointer is no longer PTR_TRUSTED. From the example above, the struct task_struct *task argument is PTR_TRUSTED, but the 'nested' pointer obtained from 'task->last_wakee' is not PTR_TRUSTED. A subsequent patch will add kfuncs for storing a task kfunc as a kptr, and then another patch will add selftests to validate. Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221120051004.3605026-3-void@manifault.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2023-03-20 16:41:39 +00:00
static inline bool bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(u32 type)
{
return type_flag(type) & ~BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS;
}
static inline bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type)
{
return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC;
}
static inline bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type)
{
return type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) && type_flag(type) & NON_OWN_REF;
}
static inline bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
type = base_type(type);
return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
}
static inline bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
}
static inline bool type_may_be_null(u32 type)
{
return type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
}
static inline void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
{
env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno;
}
static inline void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi)
{
env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi;
}
static inline bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
{
return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1;
}
static inline bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno)
{
return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1;
}
static inline bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots;
}
static inline void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
env->scratched_regs = 0U;
env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL;
}
/* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */
static inline void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
env->scratched_regs = ~0U;
env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL;
}
bpf: Preserve boundaries and track scalars on narrowing fill JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23649 commit c1e6148cb4f83cec841db1f066e8db4a86c1f118 Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com> Date: Sat Jan 27 19:52:34 2024 +0200 bpf: Preserve boundaries and track scalars on narrowing fill When the width of a fill is smaller than the width of the preceding spill, the information about scalar boundaries can still be preserved, as long as it's coerced to the right width (done by coerce_reg_to_size). Even further, if the actual value fits into the fill width, the ID can be preserved as well for further tracking of equal scalars. Implement the above improvements, which makes narrowing fills behave the same as narrowing spills and MOVs between registers. Two tests are adjusted to accommodate for endianness differences and to take into account that it's now allowed to do a narrowing fill from the least significant bits. reg_bounds_sync is added to coerce_reg_to_size to correctly adjust umin/umax boundaries after the var_off truncation, for example, a 64-bit value 0xXXXXXXXX00000000, when read as a 32-bit, gets umin = 0, umax = 0xFFFFFFFF, var_off = (0x0; 0xffffffff00000000), which needs to be synced down to umax = 0, otherwise reg_bounds_sanity_check doesn't pass. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127175237.526726-4-maxtram95@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
2024-06-24 14:22:55 +00:00
static inline bool bpf_stack_narrow_access_ok(int off, int fill_size, int spill_size)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
off -= spill_size - fill_size;
#endif
return !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE);
}
const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type);
const char *dynptr_type_str(enum bpf_dynptr_type type);
const char *iter_type_str(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id);
const char *iter_state_str(enum bpf_iter_state state);
void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_func_state *state, bool print_all);
void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_func_state *state);
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */